We only have narratives but no proof of Balakot’s success: Former Indian HC to Pakistan

[Joe Shearer]

Cope harder, dude. Cope harder!

Try reading.
All the facts are on record.

 

[Joe Shearer]

If those records were available and from a reputable source you wouldn’t struggle so abjectly to produce them.

Cope harder.

I'm not struggling. I am simply refusing to do your homework for you. The longer you persist in your shallow, headline driven, Internet fuelled gossip mongering, the more you show up to be those things - shallow, driven by headlines, fuelled by Internet gossip. If you are so desperate to know, it takes just one minute of search to reveal the facts. How come you are shrinking from it?

Why not name a Moderator whom you trust, whom I shall show the evidence, so that you can do what you should be doing even now, doing your homework?

 

[Joe Shearer]

You have wasted enough of my time today. Enjoy the rest of your day. I’ve zero interest in indulging in your childish roundabout.

Do as you please, but don't publish false data.

 

[Lionheart]

There was never any evidence from the Indians and all available verifiable evidence goes against them. The IAF couldn’t breach meaningfully into Pakistani airspace and was forced to use standoff weapons in a hurry, making them miss their mark.

Pakistan was able to breach their airspace, jam the heck out of their Air Force & air defense system, Abiy guy walked into a trap and was shot down, poor chap literally didn’t know what hit him. His buddies in Mirage-2000s and SU-30s run away from the battle space.

In the rush to salvage some pride, the Indian air defense decided to join the party but were themselves jammed. The Indian air defense systems were so jammed, they ended up shooting down their own helicopters killing multiple Indian personnel.

Not a single pakistani casualty, both material and men.

The New York Times covered the air skirmishes with a brutal headline

After India Loses Dogfight to Pakistan, Questions Arise About Its ‘Vintage’ Military​

After India Loses Dogfight to Pakistan, Questions Arise About Its ‘Vintage’ Military (Published 2019)

As America strengthens its alliance with India to help counter China, critics say its military faces serious challenges, from the age of its hardware to the size of its budget.

www.nytimes.com

The American Foreign Affairs magazine Foreign Policy Magazine was equally brutal

India’s Dogfight Loss Could Be a Win for U.S. Weapons-Makers​

India’s Dogfight Loss Could Be a Win for U.S. Weapons-Makers

Boeing and Lockheed Martin are vying for India’s long-delayed fighter replacement program.

foreignpolicy.com

To date, not a single reputable source has backed or endorsed any of the claims made by the Indians.

Good to see Indians themselves now climbing down from their ridiculous claims. The Indian Air Force was simply outclassed and humiliated by the PAF once again.

Lets assume that you are absolutely correct in all your claims.

All wars are fought to achieve some objectives. And they are fought on multiple fronts and domains. Would you please show me what all benefits did Pakistan gained from this PAF outclassing IAF episode?

It would have been much better for PAF if they didn't expose the deficiencies (e.g. lack of software defined radios) of IAF and waited for a possible large scale confrontation on future to use it more effectively. Maybe they still have more aces up their sleeves. Who knows? Still 3 aces are much better than 2.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Lets assume that you are absolutely correct in all your claims.

All wars are fought to achieve some objectives. And they are fought on multiple fronts and domains. Would you please show me what all benefits did Pakistan gained from this PAF outclassing IAF episode?

It would have been much better for PAF if they didn't expose the deficiencies (e.g. lack of software defined radios) of IAF and waited for a possible large scale confrontation on future to use it more effectively. Maybe they still have more aces up their sleeves. Who knows? Still 3 aces are much better than 2.

He is specifically wrong about the shooting down of the IAF helicopter, and since he is content to get his information from social media, he is ignorant of the reasons, and will remain ignorant.
Please check your direct mail.

 

[Lionheart]

He is specifically wrong about the shooting down of the IAF helicopter, and since he is content to get his information from social media, he is ignorant of the reasons, and will remain ignorant.
Please check your direct mail.

Thanks. I had already read the article with all the incredulity that I could have mustered at that time at the whole episode.

Anyway, I was not conceding anything to him. I was more interested in the tangible gains that Pakistani citizens achieved from this episode.

 

[Afif]

This is what I read sometimes ago. (in an unexpected site) Back then, I did some crosschecking. Overall it seemed mostly accurate enough to me given the OSINT we have in our hand. I added some corrections & modification. Posting here the original post only to keep it brief. (Don't have time to go find all those sources & post them here right now)

---

When Op Swift Retort went live, the IAF had four aircraft undertaking DCA activities in Kashmir. Two Mirage-2000s in the North near Bandipora (the Ironman flight) and Two Su-30MKI in the South near Nowshera (the Avenger flight). MiG-21s were on ORP at multiple bases, and possibly MiG-29s as well. An AWACS was rotating out, as were four Su-30s.

The PAF was monitoring Indian movements, and exploited this momentarily thin presence perfectly to launch its raid.

The PAF's raid consisted of four distinct packages. One flight of four JF-17s was intended to pin down the Ironman flight. Another flight of four F-16s was to pin down the Avenger flight. They would keep the skies safe for two strike packages. Of these, the main package consisted of four Mirage-IIIs, and four JF-17s, with four F-16s providing escort. This was directed at the Brigade HQ in Bhimber and Krishnaghati Top. Another package of four more Mirage-IIIs was to hit the ammunition dump at Narian/or miss it intentionally and land the the bombs nearby. The entire raid was managed by a Saab ERIEYE AWACS. A Falcon 20 provided jamming support.

In all, the PAF threw 24 fighters, supported by AWACS and stand-off jamming, against just four IAF fighters.

Now let's look at how it all panned out.

These two PAF OCA flights (4 x JF-17 and 4 x F-16) appear to have had two objectives: One, to tie down Indian CAPs so that they didn't interfere with the main strike package; and two, to score kills on IAF fighters. The first was a success, the second, not so much. The Mirages managed to hold their own against the JF-17s in a BVR grind, preventing any offensive moves. The F-16s attacking the Su-30 flight also appear to have been spooked by Avenger 1's aggression (he approached within 25-30 km of the F-16s and forced them to go cold prematurely).

When the intent of the raid became clear, the MiG-21s on ORP in Srinagar took off. They remained hidden from the PAF AWACS because the radar shadow cast by the Pir Panjals, and weren't illuminated until they nearly bounced the main strike package. That package had to release its munitions in haste and turn tail, anticipating more IAF interceptors on its way. In that melee, Abhinandan (who was flying deaf because of the jamming) crossed the LoC. I think he got what pilots call "target fixation". And he got shot down.

All this happened within minutes. The IAF managed to quickly scramble more Mirages and MiG-29s, in addition to a Phalcon that was arriving on the scene, but by then, it was too late. The raid was done.

The obvious question here is: why weren't the IAF's most capable fighters (Su-30s and Mirage-2000s) present in greater numbers? This is where the IAF's risk assessment comes in. Fearing a massive strike that had the potential to destroy large parts of a forward-deployed fleet on the ground, it moved its most capable assets to bases further back. Those assets had to fly in from great distances to maintain a presence, which meant reduced time on station. This, in turn, opened a gap for the PAF to exploit.

Overall, there were success and failure on both side. The IAF failed to anticipate the nature of the Pak response, and couldn't muster the volume of aircraft to mount round-the-clock DCA missions. However, the IACCS worked relatively well. It was able to effectively build a picture of the battlespace and also control the air battle from a node in Punjab (for which Sqn. Ldr. Minty got an award).

The most glaring tactical error was the Mi-17 shootdown by air defences in Srinagar. The pilots had their IFF transponder turned off (the reason cited was interference with civilian frequencies). So the helicopter showed up on the base AD consoles as an unidentified object. The officer in charge failed to cross-check with the IACCS, and took the decision to shoot. In his defence, this was the first time that there was actualaction, and the fog of war, added to the pressure to make a quick decision, didn't help. But only a systemic failure and lackadaisical attitude towards safety rules could have precipitated this incident.

The skirmish also represented a strategic failure of sorts. The fact that the IAF didn't hit back was the most jarring. Between the IAF's lack of prep for an all-out air war and the approaching elections, there was no appetite to initiate a larger conflict, and India let Pakistan get away with Swift Retort.

On the other side, the PAF managed to disguise a large-ish raid as an exercise (?), cloak the main thrust, and keep the IAF guessing as to its intent until the very last moment. It mounted a fairly effective raid, and bagged an enemy fighter. The primary objective—to demonstrate the PAF's resolve and capacity to hit back, and hit back immediately—succeeded.

Ultimately, the whole skirmish went like you would expect it to: some plans went awry, others worked, and last minute improvisations were able to deliver partial results, albeit at a cost. In the final analysis, the PAF was seen to win the engagement, because its victories were publicly visible. It had the audacity to target Indian military infrastructure, it shot down a MiG-21, and then paraded the captured pilot all over the social media. That was the big one. Conversely, the IAF's failures were public, and the partial successes too abstract to convince a lay audience. Doubling down on a very questionable claim about an F-16 kill made it appear as if an embarrassed IAF was cooking up stories to cover up its failures.

In summary, IAF's defensive actions narrowly avoided defeat at the operational level. But it was a strategic failure, a mixed bag at the tactical level. The proximate cause of the operational and tactical outcomes was the posture that the IAF chose to adopt, which in turn was dictated by its assessment of the risks. The IAF and civilian government appear to have lacked the stomach for expanding the scope of the conflict, which resulted in a strategic failure. Lack of adequate preparation may have been a factor too, but it is hard to say so definitively.

On the other hand, PAF was caught by partial surprise (?) the previous night, but it was able to organize large scale combined arms maneuvers (consisting of AWACS, stand off jammers, strike package & interceptors) on short notice and disguise its intentions as well as time it to catch India off guard.

---

Note- If you are here to troll or bait, please spare yourself the effort. 'caues I don't have the patience or resolve of @Joe Shearer . So, if I sense ingenuity, I will not respond.

 

[Musings]

Stick to the topic guys or i will take action.

 

[Falcon26]

Lets assume that you are absolutely correct in all your claims.

All wars are fought to achieve some objectives. And they are fought on multiple fronts and domains. Would you please show me what all benefits did Pakistan gained from this PAF outclassing IAF episode?

It would have been much better for PAF if they didn't expose the deficiencies (e.g. lack of software defined radios) of IAF and waited for a possible large scale confrontation on future to use it more effectively. Maybe they still have more aces up their sleeves. Who knows? Still 3 aces are much better than 2.

What objective are you even talking about at this point? IAF attempted to breach Pakistani air space and after, Pakistan’s objective was to restore the equilibrium. India initiated a conflict, and got badly bruised as a result. The only objective was to react which PAF did.

 

[m52k85]

The F-16s attacking the Su-30 flight also appear to have been spooked by Avenger 1's aggression (he approached within 25-30 km of the F-16s and forced them to go cold prematurely).

Find this part hard to believe, both the Su-30mki with R-77s and F-16 Amraam c-5s have the ability to target their each other at more than double the distance, no chance they came so close with BVRs still on their pylons.

Plus, I have a patch somewhere showing the HUD condition of F-16 that 'took a shot at a Su-30', it was at 40 nm or 72 km. Mind you the PAF and IAF are agreed on that part: 'took a shot at a Su-30'. We claim a kill, while Indians celebrate with 'Amraam Dodger' patches.

 

[Joe Shearer]

This is what I read sometimes ago. (in an unexpected site) Back then, I did some crosschecking. Overall it seemed mostly accurate enough to me given the OSINT we have in our hand. I added some corrections & modification. Posting here the original post only to keep it brief. (Don't have time to go find all those sources & post them here right now)

---

When Op Swift Retort went live, the IAF had four aircraft undertaking DCA activities in Kashmir. Two Mirage-2000s in the North near Bandipora (the Ironman flight) and Two Su-30MKI in the South near Nowshera (the Avenger flight). MiG-21s were on ORP at multiple bases, and possibly MiG-29s as well. An AWACS was rotating out, as were four Su-30s.

The PAF was monitoring Indian movements, and exploited this momentarily thin presence perfectly to launch its raid.

The PAF's raid consisted of four distinct packages. One flight of four JF-17s was intended to pin down the Ironman flight. Another flight of four F-16s was to pin down the Avenger flight. They would keep the skies safe for two strike packages. Of these, the main package consisted of four Mirage-IIIs, and four JF-17s, with four F-16s providing escort. This was directed at the Brigade HQ in Bhimber and Krishnaghati Top. Another package of four more Mirage-IIIs was to hit the ammunition dump at Narian/or miss it intentionally and land the the bombs nearby. The entire raid was managed by a Saab ERIEYE AWACS. A Falcon 20 provided jamming support.

In all, the PAF threw 24 fighters, supported by AWACS and stand-off jamming, against just four IAF fighters.

Now let's look at how it all panned out.

These two PAF OCA flights (4 x JF-17 and 4 x F-16) appear to have had two objectives: One, to tie down Indian CAPs so that they didn't interfere with the main strike package; and two, to score kills on IAF fighters. The first was a success, the second, not so much. The Mirages managed to hold their own against the JF-17s in a BVR grind, preventing any offensive moves. The F-16s attacking the Su-30 flight also appear to have been spooked by Avenger 1's aggression (he approached within 25-30 km of the F-16s and forced them to go cold prematurely).

When the intent of the raid became clear, the MiG-21s on ORP in Srinagar took off. They remained hidden from the PAF AWACS because the radar shadow cast by the Pir Panjals, and weren't illuminated until they nearly bounced the main strike package. That package had to release its munitions in haste and turn tail, anticipating more IAF interceptors on its way. In that melee, Abhinandan (who was flying deaf because of the jamming) crossed the LoC. I think he got what pilots call "target fixation". And he got shot down.

All this happened within minutes. The IAF managed to quickly scramble more Mirages and MiG-29s, in addition to a Phalcon that was arriving on the scene, but by then, it was too late. The raid was done.

The obvious question here is: why weren't the IAF's most capable fighters (Su-30s and Mirage-2000s) present in greater numbers? This is where the IAF's risk assessment comes in. Fearing a massive strike that had the potential to destroy large parts of a forward-deployed fleet on the ground, it moved its most capable assets to bases further back. Those assets had to fly in from great distances to maintain a presence, which meant reduced time on station. This, in turn, opened a gap for the PAF to exploit.

Overall, there were serious failures & some partial success. The IAF failed to anticipate the nature of the Pak response, and couldn't muster the volume of aircraft to mount round-the-clock DCA missions. However, the IACCS worked relatively well. It was able to effectively build a picture of the battlespace and also control the air battle from a node in Punjab (for which Sqn. Ldr. Minty got an award).

The most glaring tactical error was the Mi-17 shootdown by air defences in Srinagar. The pilots had their IFF transponder turned off (the reason cited was interference with civilian frequencies). So the helicopter showed up on the base AD consoles as an unidentified object. The officer in charge failed to cross-check with the IACCS, and took the decision to shoot. In his defence, this was the first time that there was actualaction, and the fog of war, added to the pressure to make a quick decision, didn't help. But only a systemic failure and lackadaisical attitude towards safety rules could have precipitated this incident.

The skirmish also represented a strategic failure of sorts. The fact that the IAF didn't hit back was the most jarring. Between the IAF's lack of prep for an all-out air war and the approaching elections, there was no appetite to initiate a larger conflict, and India let Pakistan get away with Swift Retort.

On the other side, the PAF managed to disguise a large-ish raid as an exercise (?), cloak the main thrust, and keep the IAF guessing as to its intent until the very last moment. It mounted a fairly effective raid, and bagged an enemy fighter. The primary objective—to demonstrate the PAF's resolve and capacity to hit back, and hit back immediately—succeeded.

Ultimately, the whole skirmish went like you would expect it to: some plans went awry, others worked, and last minute improvisations were able to deliver partial results, albeit at a cost. In the final analysis, the PAF was seen to win the engagement, because its victories were publicly visible. It had the audacity to target Indian military infrastructure, it shot down a MiG-21, and then paraded the captured pilot all over the social media. That was the big one. Conversely, the IAF's failures were public, and the partial successes too abstract to convince a lay audience. Doubling down on a very questionable claim about an F-16 kill made it appear as if an embarrassed IAF was cooking up stories to cover up its failures.

In summary, IAF's defensive actions narrowly avoided defeat at the operational level. But it was a strategic failure, a mixed bag at the tactical level. The proximate cause of the operational and tactical outcomes was the posture that the IAF chose to adopt, which in turn was dictated by its assessment of the risks. The IAF and civilian government appear to have lacked the stomach for expanding the scope of the conflict, which resulted in a strategic failure. Lack of adequate preparation may have been a factor too, but it is hard to say so definitively.

On the other hand, PAF was caught by partial surprise (?) the previous night, but it was able to organize large scale combined arms maneuvers (consisting of AWACS, stand off jammers, strike package & interceptors) on short notice and disguise its intentions as well as time it to catch India off guard.

---

Note- If you are here to troll or bait, please spare yourself the effort. 'caues I don't have the patience or resolve of @Joe Shearer . So, if I sense ingenuity, I will not respond.

In terms of command responsibility, quite clearly there was unified command on the PAF side, and every element at every moment, including moments of surprise, like Avenger 1's berserk attack, or the MiG flight's sudden appearance, was dealt with, after perhaps initial hesitation. I include the shortening of the exercise in that planned reaction; not to proceed further was a decision, good, bad or ugly is another matter.

On the IAF side, there is a perceptible memory of 1965 and the sweeps that the PAF made and caught an unaware IAF on the ground. All the argument about Asghar Khan and Arjun Singh's tacit agreement during the Kutch incident and Nur Khan's dismissal of an agreement to which he was not a party and that covered an entirely different set of circumstances do not matter. The success of getting such a large number of IAF a'c on the ground was what mattered, and after that, it was a question of playing catch-up.

So the IAF went into the post 26th period determined not to lose, not determined to win. There was then no question of winning, once you have written it off as an outlier. Really strange that all the investment in Air Defence was worth nothing when push came to shove, and the PAF simply barreled in without a challenge initially.

Add to that the change in command at GOC-in-C Air Force Command level, and the operation of a thinned down air presence, and the ingredients were ready for baking. Lock of command, lack of resource and absence of a will to win.

What happened to the IAF helicopter was horrible. Someone panicked, on seeing live action. All too often, brilliant performers in peacetime fall to pieces once the first bullet is fired. That seems to have happened, in a negative way, to the Group Captain who lost his job, in a positive way to Abhinandan, and his target fixation. It is not for nothing that in western air forces, there is almost an obsession with situational awareness. That is what Abhinandan lacked, more seriously, what he failed to detect in time that he lacked.

All in all, @Afif's summation can hardly be bettered:

In summary, IAF's defensive actions narrowly avoided defeat at the operational level. But it was a strategic failure, a mixed bag at the tactical level. The proximate cause of the operational and tactical outcomes was the posture that the IAF chose to adopt, which in turn was dictated by its assessment of the risks. The IAF and civilian government appear to have lacked the stomach for expanding the scope of the conflict, which resulted in a strategic failure. Lack of adequate preparation may have been a factor too, but it is hard to say so definitively.

On the other hand, PAF was caught by partial surprise the previous night, but it was able to organize large scale combined arms maneuvers (consisting of AWACS, stand off jammers, strike package & interceptors) on short notice and disguise its intentions as well as time it to catch India off guard.

 

[Afif]

Find this part hard to believe, both the Su-30mki with R-77s and F-16 Amraam c-5s have the ability to target their each other at more than double the distance,

Of course.

no chance they came so close with BVRs still on their pylons.

Unlikely, but nevertheless possible still.

 

[Afif]

Really strange that all the investment in Air Defence was worth nothing when push came to shove, and the PAF simply barreled in without a challenge initially.

I beg to differ. At that time both SPYDER MR and AkASH lacked enough AD coverage. Today, with S-400 & MRSAM it is substantially different.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I beg to differ. At that time both SPYDER MR and AkASH lacked enough AD coverage. Today, with S-400 & MRSAM it is substantially different.

I'll go along with that.
You haven't been wrong so far.

 

[Lionheart]

What objective are you even talking about at this point? IAF attempted to breach Pakistani air space and after, Pakistan’s objective was to restore the equilibrium. India initiated a conflict, and got badly bruised as a result. The only objective was to react which PAF did.

I was kinda hoping you'll not ask that. Typing on mobile is so cumbersome.

I'm a lay person with no specific knowledge or experience in the grand strategy thing.

Following are my assumptions regarding the objectives of both nations. Keep a bucket of salt with you while going through the same and take generous amount when you find them difficult to digest.

Objectives of Indian policymakers:
1. Make Pakistan aware of the resolve of Indian policymakers regarding the cross-border transactions.
2. To test Pakistan's response to limited skirmishes.
3. To make the world powers realise that India's threshold for these transections have gone down. That'll build pressure on Pakistan to bring them down a few notches.
4. To continue building the narrative of long term sufferings from these cross border transections.
5. Browny points (though proved unnecessary) for ruling party for domestic consumption.

Objectives of Pakistani policy makers:
1. To prevent the loss of faith of the citizens of Pakistan on their armed forces. (Turned out there were apparently two holes and the trust went down through the other one. Kinda like an own goal)
2. To avoid highlighting the cross-border transactions issue at global level and to minimise the collective pressure on self. (Must have failed. Because borders became silent, no major attacks in India)
3. To build up the conventional deterence to prevent further such aggressions in future. (subsequent attacks from the both sides are against it. Even if it is proved to be a success- at what cost?)

IMHO, at a cost of loosing an already-on-the-verge-of-being-retired aircraft, India did manage to get a lot of traction from the incidence.

Loss of the MI17 from blue on blue action was absolutely tragic and must be avoided in future. I hope IAF brass have their eyes opened by this.

Please feel free to add your comments.