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What India can learn from China’s approach to warship production
By prioritising manufacturing efficiency and continuity over radical design changes, China has built warships at breathtaking speed
By Ajai Shukla
2nd November 2026
On 16th Oct 2026, Indian Naval Ship (INS) Samarthak became the newest addition to the navy’s fleet. Designed and constructed by L&T Shipyard, in Katupalli, Tamil Nadu, the versatile new “multi-purpose vessel” (MPV) carries out maritime surveillance, offshore patrolling, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and is a platform for testing new sensors and weapons.
However, just four MPVs are on order, and therein lies a serious problem: In most years, the Indian Navy retires more ships than it commissions. Since its 220-odd surface vessels and submarines sail for an average of 30-35 years each, an average of 7 vessels retire every year.
Of prime importance is the replacement of capital warships – the heavily armed aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes and submarines that constitute a navy’s strike power. India has about 100 capital warships; of which 3-4 are decommissioned each year. To replace them, just 17 new capital warships have been commissioned over the preceding decade.
Too few warships come through the acquisition pipeline each year because a cautious Ministry of Defence (MoD) orders only small batches of 3-4 warships each. Only in Project 17A has the MoD gone out on a limb and placed orders for building 7 stealth frigates.
This tentative ordering stems from the apprehension that a design flaw detected in a new warship would be easier to fix in a line of 3-4 ships than across a significantly larger fleet. Consequently, the small numbers of warships entering service each year dwarf the larger numbers that retire.
PLA(N) build strategy
No such lack of technological or manufacturing confidence deters the US Navy (USN), or China’s People’s Liberation Army (Navy), or PLA(N), from ordering warships in far bigger batches. There are valuable lessons here for India.
The workhorse of the PLA(N)’s surface fleet – some 40-50, Type 052D destroyers of the Luyang III-class – were built in just four evolutionary batches. Batches 1 and 2 comprised of orders for 12 Standard Type 052D destroyers. This first batch order aimed at stabilising the warship’s design, mastering assembly line processes at China’s Jiangnan and Dalian shipyards and training the crew-members needed to build, man and maintain all these ships.
As manufacture of Batches I and II stabilised, the PLA(N) lost no time in ordering another dozen ships in Batch III – the Type 052DL, or the "stretched variant.” This required the destroyer’s flight deck to be extended by 4 meters to accommodate the new Z-20F anti-submarine helicopters and to upgrade the anti-stealth radar systems.
Finally, in Batch 4, the PLA(N) rolled out the Type 052DM variant. This is the final design, with dual-face, rotating AESA radars, state-of-the-art electronic warfare suites, and tighter command-and-control networks.
By prioritizing manufacturing efficiency and continuity over radical design changes, China’s shipyards build warships at breathtaking speed, at one point launching 8 to 10 destroyers in a single calendar year. These were built in two mega yards – Jiangnan and Dalian – which specialise in building multiple hulls, side-by-side, in dry docks, with components, tools and labour moving fluidly between ships.
Also driving down costs was China’s dual-use production model. Since Jiangnan and Dalian also build commercial container ships and tankers, heavy vessel production is constantly under way, allowing resources to be optimised between naval and commercial block construction.
Building the Type 055 "Super Destroyers"
China’s most formidable surface combatant is the 12,000-tonne, Type 055, Renhai-class cruiser, also called the “super destroyer”. This too was introduced to the fleet with a strict, high-volume block contract strategy.
Batch I, consisting of the first 8 cruisers, was split between Dalian and Jiangnan shipyards. Construction began in 2014, and all 8 ships were built, launched, and operational by 2023.
After validating their performance during deep-sea carrier escort operations, the PLA(N) began constructing the second batch of 8 Type 055 cruisers. The lead ships of this second batch, such as the Dongguan, entered operational service in 2026. No time-consuming changes were made to the ship’s hull form; changes were restricted to internal hardware revamps, next-generation sonar/sensor suites, and integrated propulsion infrastructure.
US Navy's build strategy: Distributed production
The US Navy is unique in that it is structured around 11 aircraft carriers, each designed and built individually. Like the PLA(N), the USN fields a large fleet of 51 Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyers. Building these faced production challenges at two warship yards – Bath Iron Works, owned by General Dynamics; and Lockheed Martin’s Huntington Ingalls Shipbuilding.
Huntington Ingalls perfected the so-called “distributed labour model”. Instead of welding every component in a single shipyard, sub-assembly modules are constructed at six partner shipyards across Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida. These pre-fabricated blocks are then transported to the primary shipyard for final assembly.
With component blocks manufactured across different states, precise digital data dictates the automated steel cutting and pipe bending to ensure perfect alignment when the blocks finally meet.
India’s build strategy
The Indian Navy’s typical “small batch order” for 3-4 warships, does guard against technological obsolescence. Warship technologies, especially those of weapons and sensors, evolve faster than a ship's hull or propulsion; so mid-sized navies like India’s, prefer to order small batches, and to introduce upgraded versions – Flight I, Flight II etc – as technology evolves.
There is also a political and budgetary logic to small orders. Since military allocations change with governments, it is easier to commit funding for 3–4 vessels than for much larger orders.
Furthermore, mid-sized navies require only small numbers of highly specialized ships for tasks like intelligence gathering, ice-breaking, amphibious command, or submarine rescue. Larger numbers are simply not needed without reliable export markets.
However, economies of scale remain essential for items such as armoured steel, engines, electronics, weapons and sensors. Significantly lower rates can be contracted for 20-30 warships rather than for just 3-4.
Bulk production also reduces long-term operating costs of logistics and training. In a standardised navy, personnel can transfer from one ship to another without extensive training since there are common systems and controls across the fleet.
Cost remains a major issue, in which China remains a leader. The PLA(N)’s 7,500-tonne, Type 052D destroyers cost $500-$600 million each. That is barely half the cost of India’s billion-dollar, 7,400-tonne, Vishakhapatnam-class destroyers. The US Navy's 9,850-tonne, Arleigh-Burke-class (Flight III) Aegis destroyers each cost $2.4 billion, 5-6 times the cost of the PLA(N)’s workhorse Luyang III. Finally, the PLA(N)’s Type 055, Renhai-class cruisers, each of which displaces 12,000-tonnes, cost $900 million each – cheaper than Indian destroyers.
