When India claimed Chitral, and 75,000 Chitralis mobilized to liberate occupied Kashmir

arjunk

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Some optimistic people think that India's absurd claims on neighboring country's lands are a product of recent low IQ Hindutva historical revisionism. But such imperialist fantasies are a chronic problem of India.

For example, in 1956, Nehru claimed that Chitral was a part of India.

In response, 75,000 Chitralis wrote a letter to the Government of Pakistan requesting that they be allowed to liberate what was left of Occupied Kashmir.
1710659730977.png
It is pertinent to note that the nine years ago, India surrendered to Chitral at Skardu, thereby liberating Baltistan from occupation.

Needless to say, India gave up its claim to Chitral.
 
Source:
Pakistan Affairs - June 18 1956
Some optimistic people think that India's absurd claims on neighboring country's lands are a product of recent low IQ Hindutva historical revisionism. But such imperialist fantasies are a chronic problem of India.

For example, in 1956, Nehru claimed that Chitral was a part of India.

In response, 75,000 Chitralis wrote a letter to the Government of Pakistan requesting that they be allowed to liberate what was left of Occupied Kashmir.
View attachment 26859
It is pertinent to note that the nine years ago, India surrendered to Chitral at Skardu, thereby liberating Baltistan from occupation.

Needless to say, India gave up its claim to Chitral.
Interesting, Is the source link working? I'm unable to access anything upon clicking on it.

Additionally, can you expand more about India surrendering to Chitral at skardu nine years ago ( so around 2015?)
I'd like to read up on it for my edification, any sources or publications would be most appreciated
 
Interesting, Is the source link working? I'm unable to access anything upon clicking on it.

Additionally, can you expand more about India surrendering to Chitral at skardu nine years ago ( so around 2015?)
I'd like to read up on it for my edification, any sources or publications would be most appreciated
Nine years before Nehru's statement, obviously.


 
Interesting, Is the source link working? I'm unable to access anything upon clicking on it.

Additionally, can you expand more about India surrendering to Chitral at skardu nine years ago ( so around 2015?)
I'd like to read up on it for my edification, any sources or publications would be most appreciated
It was one of the side-shows of the Kashmir war of 1947-48.

Those of us who have been forced to delve into the details know that the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was stitched together entirely by a single dynasty, the Jamwals of Jammu, ethnic Dogras, who parlayed their entire clan's defeat by the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh into domination of the Lahore Court after Ranjit Singh died.

What follows is from memory, and within a short interval that I can spend sitting up, so, no dates, sorry. The sequence of events was like this:

Jammu: Once the Sikhs had defeated the existing Raja of Jammu, some of his kinsmen took up service at the Lahore Court. After years of loyal service, often in menial positions, they were gifted the jagir of Jammu, as jagirdars under the Lahore Durbar, with the title (once again, on the lines of their predecessor) of Raja. Before taking their position as jagirdar, the head of the family approached the former sovereign, their kinsman, and got his acceptance of their being his natural heirs, and acknowledgement of their rights to the throne (now, a jagir under Lahore).

This was always the seat of their power into the distant future.

Poonch: This was another independent sovereign subdued and brought into the position of a jagir under the Sikhs. The old rulers, again Dogras and kinsmen of the Jammu Raja, continued to rule, but was backward in keeping up his contacts in court, and found, gradually, his prized assets, including revenue-earning salt mines, being handed over to the Raja of Jammu.

Eventually, without anyone quite able to grasp the details of the transition, by the end of the Sikh Empire, Poonch found itself a jagir of Jammu.

These two were the bases of Dogra Jamwal power in Jammu and Kashmir. Both were highly diversified statelets, with a substantial Muslim minority within an overall Hindu majority.

Kishtwar, others: The fall of these kingdoms and their conversion to jagirs under the Sikh empire had an unsettling effect on the very small states in the foothills rimming the Kashmir Valley. Kishtwar, for instance, came under Jammu rule directly, not through the mediation of the Sikh Empire, due to the conflict between its wazir and its raja, and due to the wazir appealing for help to Jammu, help that was promptly extended, on terms. The raja was ousted, and Kishtwar became part of the Jammu state.

Ladakh: Ladakh was then a fringe state to the Tibetan state, just like the other fringe state of western Tibet, the erstwhile state of Guge (Franke's book The History of Western Tibet is most informative). In about 1834, the general of the Dogra rajas, acting under the overall suzerainty of the Lahore Durbar, leaving Baltistan, culturally and commercially an adjunct of Ladakh, out of the conquest. That was only temporary; Zorawar Singh took a few months to settle the Ladakh region, and by 1839, was ready to move again.

Break - Headache time
 
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Baltistan: Baltistan was captured next, without much trouble. It had been a subordinate principality to the Gyalpo of Ladakh, the King of Ladakh, and had sought to draw away while Zorawar Singh was consolidating his hold on Ladakh proper, where there were several attempts at regaining independence.

The difference between Ladakh and its tributary principality, Baltistan, was that ethnically, both were the same, Tibetans, but while Ladakh was still wholly Buddhist, Baltistan was wholly Muslim.

With these battles and campaigns, Zorawar Singh had almost completed the cycle of conquests that created the principality of Jammu and Kashmir, excepting the Vale, Gilgit and Chitral. Whatever he might have done is never to be known, because his next campaign was a fatal one.

Before proceeding further, it is important to know and remember the major reason for these conquests. It was a commercial drive.

In the nineteenth century, the absolute craze in all of Europe, but peaking in Paris, were Pashmina shawls of the finest weave, with the mango motifs that we call Paisley today. Most of this raw material, mistakenly called wool, was the fleece of a mountain goat variety, that was caught on the thorns of bushes where the goats pastured, all in Western Tibet, in today's Ngyari area, then the ancient but absorbed into mainland area of Tibet. Ladakh and Kashmir (where the weaving took place) were centres of the trade, but the raw material was in western Tibet.

Therefore, the next campaign that the indefatigable Zorawar Singh set out upon was an attack on western Tibet, and this campaign was, finally, over-reach.

<cont.>
 
If I may be permitted to add..( from my notes )

Zorawar Singh’s conquest of Ladakh and Baltistan brought the Dogra principality of Jammu to the neighbourhood of Central Asia and Tibet. It also uncovered new political fields for the Sikh state of Lahore.

The Sikh state was surrounded by the British on all sides, except on the north and north-east. It was, therefore, isolated and left without friends and was constantly in danger of British invasion. The only direction left for Lahore kingdom for expansion was on the north and east of Ladakh. It was also in this direction that they could hope to make allies, particularly with Nepal. Nepal was the only surviving independent Hindu kingdom which could be expected to help Lahore in the hour of need. Both were already in correspondence and contact with each other through their representatives. But Nepal could be reached only by the conquest of the intervening territory of western Tibet, over which the Dogras could assert claim as being part of the once extensive Ladakhi kingdom.

The more important cause for the Dogra invasion of Tibet was perhaps the Dogra diplomacy of strengthening their own position in their own territories. This was necessary for the achievement of independence whenever opportunity for this presented itself. After the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839, the influence of Gulab Singh and his brothers, Dhian Singh and Suchet Singh, at the Lahore Darbar was on the wane.

Apart from the diplomatic and commercial interests, the territories of western Tibet offered to the Dogras another incentive for conquest, which also served as immediate cause of the invasion. Up to the reign of Singge Namgyal in Ladakh (1600-645) the region of western Tibet formed a part of the Ladakhi kingdom. As a result of the Ladakhi-Tibetan war of 1684, Singge had to cede these territories, from the borders of present Ladakh up to the Maryum pass, to Lhasa. Zorawar Singh could therefore assert Ladakhi claims on these Tibetan territories which lie to the east and south-east of Ladakh, and are known as Rudok, Chang-Thang (Shan-than) and Naris.

Gulab Singh’s objective was to get control of this lucrative wool trade. Previously this wool used to be sent to Ladakh but the Dogra conquest of Ladakh diverted the trade to the factories of Bashahr. Now it became necessary to conquer the lands producing this wool in order to monopolise its trade. So “with Ladakh in his hands all he needed to achieve a monopoly of the coveted wool trade was to annex those areas of Tibet from which wool came.”

In 1841, the time seemed favourable for Gulab singh to send Zorawar Singh on conquest of these territories. At .that time the Sikh kingdom of Lahore had been shaken to its foundations by internal dissensions. The British were busy in saving their face in Afghanistan & Burma. The Chinese were resisting British attempts to sell Opium to China, Nepal was divided by factional struggles. In Tibet itself there was considerable turmoil arising from a power struggle between the Regent of The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Ministers.
Taking advantage of these events; Zorawar Singh made ’ ready to move his forces into Naris, the region of Tibet to the West of the Mayum pass. To provide him with pretext for mobilisation he revived claims to these territories in the capacity of the master of Ladakh, which once ruled , over Naris.

He wrote to the Garphoh (governor) of these districts not to; supply pashmina wool to any other area except Ladakh & also demanded tribute from him. But the Garphon sent only five horses'and five mules. The Dogra General was offended at this & ordered his forces to move into Naris to occupy it for Gulab Singh.

By the middle of June 1841 Zorawar Singh was reported to have moved his troops to the outposts of western Tibet. Zorawar Singh also secured his rear before leaving on the conquest of Tibet. He also made it sure that the Baltis and Ladakhis remained peaceful and loyal. For this purpose, and perhaps with a view to testing the loyalty of his new subjects and their chiefs. Zorawar not only sent their leaders at the head of various columns but also mobilised and armed Baltis and Ladakhis and made them to accompany the Dogra army as auxiliary force.

The invasion was planned out during April 1841 and the movement of the troops towards of Naris started by May. His thrust into Naris was three pronged. In addition to his own force, two smaller columns of 300 to 500 men each, marched through Rupshu, one under Ghulam Khan (the former ruler of Skardu) and the other under Nono Sodnam, the Ladakhi chief. Both these columns moved and entered the Tibetan territory before Zorawar advanced with his main force.

Zorawar Singh himself led the main force of about 3000, Dogra soldiers and advanced in May along the road-south of the Pankong lake. From Chushul he entered the Tibetan district of Rudok and conquered the place on June 5th and took the Garphon (governor) prisoner.

The Chinese account of the Dogra-Tibetan war of 1841 which was written by the Chinese Resident at Lhasa, reveals the promptitude with which the Chinese and. Tibetan authorities reacted to the Dogra invasion, They offered stubborn resistance and sent against the Dogras large armies at the first information of their entry into their land.

The most important and the decisive battle of this campaign was fought at Kardung, where the General Pi-hsi was waiting for the arrival of the Dogra armies. He had organized stiff resistance to the invaders with the help of the Gonpo (Governor) of Gartok who had fled to Taklakot after his defeat. The Tibetan defences were, however, broken down and the defenders routed.
The first thing Zorawar Singh did after the conquest of Misra was to take a holy bath in the lake Manasarovar and offer a golden idol at the Kailash temple.

He had achieved the height of fame. His downfall was imminent. The Chinese dragon had been provoked, the line of communications precariously extended, and the freezing hostile winter was about to lash out with all its fury of snow and storms.

In a short span of three or four months Zorawor Singh had introduced in his newly-conquered territory all the measures of administration and defence which he had tried successfully in Ladakh. By these measures he pleased the population and thus prepared ground for the permanent occupation of the western Tibet. In spite of all the British objections, Zorawar Singh was determined to annex the conquered territories to the Dogra principality, and to the kingdom of Lahore through Gulab Singh.

Meanwhile, an eminent Chinese official, Kahlon Sarkhung, and other Tibetan officials, arrived on the east side of the Mayum pass. As soon as Zorawar received intimation of their arrival, he opened peace negotiations “promising to withdraw on condition of a money payment (tribute) from Tibet.” He also desired the Tibetans to recognise him as the ruler of western Tibet, and to pay the cost of the various actions fought by him in Tibet. He also demanded that the Tibetans should send all shawl-wool to Ladakh as had been done in the past, otherwise he threatened to invade Lhasa. Zorawar had wanted to withdraw to Ladakh in view of the severe winter.

From the beginning of. the Tibetan episode, the British officials,were afraid of its harmful influences to their diplomacy. One fear was the possibility of a Dogra-Sikh-Gurkha axis against them. The other fear was the provocation of the Chinese. In their opinion, China would not view with indifference the capture of Garo and other Tibetan territories by the Dogras. It was feared that in case of the Chinese counteroffensive a dangerous situation was likely to develop on the northern border of India which could he harmful to their interests in China and Nepal. Such a situation could lead to the impairment of their relations with China with whom they were negotiating peace settlement after the recent Opium war. So when General Zorawar Singh had occupied the post and town of Gartok in the middle of August, the Government of India became particularly concerned and advised their Agent, Mr. G. R. Clerk, to call on the Maharaja of Lahore for an explanation of these aggression. He was also advised to convey to the Maharaja the view of the British that he will be held responsible for all injurious proceedings on the part of their vassal Dogra Rajas, and that he should let the Maharaja understand that the Governor-General may possibly insist on the return of Jammu troops from the scene of their aggression. The British authorities thought it dangerous for them to allow the Sikhs and Gulab Singh to establish their authority in that region.

The Sino-Tibetan authorities had become unnerved at the steady advance of General Zorawar Singh towards Lhasa. His progress could not be stopped by the strong military outposts established at the five military headquarters of the provincial divisions. They made frantic preparations to stop the further advance of the Dogras and to hurl them back. A number of troops had already been sent.

As a result of these skirmishes and ill effects of extreme cold, some soldiers of Zorawar’s army seem to have started deserting their camp and taking shelter in the British territories. The British authorities, therefore, advised the Commissioner of Kumaon that he should provide for their actual
needs and send them to the Punjab.

The Dogra General now realised his critical position. The enemy numbered over 10,000, or almost three times the strength of his own troops. No help could be expected from the Dogra Rajas, who were deeply busy in their own affairs, quite oblivious of the position of their brave General.

As the Gulabnama records, “the cloud and snow had disabled most of the warriors. Snow and chill, freezing wind and frost plundered the army of its courage and strength and reduced Zorawar’s soldiers to desolation and desperation.”

In spite of this disability Zorawar Singh did not surrender, and he and his soldiers decided to face the situation heroically. They dug up trenches, around which there was a three- day combat. The Dogras wanted to advance towards Toyo. The Tibetans had laid an ambush. The Dogras, however, boldly rushed on the enemy and made their way towards their destination.
 
Brilliant.
There are nuances with which one might differ, but many of these bid smoothed over by the end.
Waiting for the continuation.
Particularly the treaty of Chushul.
 
If I may be permitted to add..( from my notes )

Zorawar Singh’s conquest of Ladakh and Baltistan brought the Dogra principality of Jammu to the neighbourhood of Central Asia and Tibet. It also uncovered new political fields for the Sikh state of Lahore.

The Sikh state was surrounded by the British on all sides, except on the north and north-east. It was, therefore, isolated and left without friends and was constantly in danger of British invasion. The only direction left for Lahore kingdom for expansion was on the north and east of Ladakh. It was also in this direction that they could hope to make allies, particularly with Nepal. Nepal was the only surviving independent Hindu kingdom which could be expected to help Lahore in the hour of need. Both were already in correspondence and contact with each other through their representatives. But Nepal could be reached only by the conquest of the intervening territory of western Tibet, over which the Dogras could assert claim as being part of the once extensive Ladakhi kingdom.

The more important cause for the Dogra invasion of Tibet was perhaps the Dogra diplomacy of strengthening their own position in their own territories. This was necessary for the achievement of independence whenever opportunity for this presented itself. After the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839, the influence of Gulab Singh and his brothers, Dhian Singh and Suchet Singh, at the Lahore Darbar was on the wane.

Apart from the diplomatic and commercial interests, the territories of western Tibet offered to the Dogras another incentive for conquest, which also served as immediate cause of the invasion. Up to the reign of Singge Namgyal in Ladakh (1600-645) the region of western Tibet formed a part of the Ladakhi kingdom. As a result of the Ladakhi-Tibetan war of 1684, Singge had to cede these territories, from the borders of present Ladakh up to the Maryum pass, to Lhasa. Zorawar Singh could therefore assert Ladakhi claims on these Tibetan territories which lie to the east and south-east of Ladakh, and are known as Rudok, Chang-Thang (Shan-than) and Naris.

Gulab Singh’s objective was to get control of this lucrative wool trade. Previously this wool used to be sent to Ladakh but the Dogra conquest of Ladakh diverted the trade to the factories of Bashahr. Now it became necessary to conquer the lands producing this wool in order to monopolise its trade. So “with Ladakh in his hands all he needed to achieve a monopoly of the coveted wool trade was to annex those areas of Tibet from which wool came.”

In 1841, the time seemed favourable for Gulab singh to send Zorawar Singh on conquest of these territories. At .that time the Sikh kingdom of Lahore had been shaken to its foundations by internal dissensions. The British were busy in saving their face in Afghanistan & Burma. The Chinese were resisting British attempts to sell Opium to China, Nepal was divided by factional struggles. In Tibet itself there was considerable turmoil arising from a power struggle between the Regent of The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Ministers.
Taking advantage of these events; Zorawar Singh made ’ ready to move his forces into Naris, the region of Tibet to the West of the Mayum pass. To provide him with pretext for mobilisation he revived claims to these territories in the capacity of the master of Ladakh, which once ruled , over Naris.

He wrote to the Garphoh (governor) of these districts not to; supply pashmina wool to any other area except Ladakh & also demanded tribute from him. But the Garphon sent only five horses'and five mules. The Dogra General was offended at this & ordered his forces to move into Naris to occupy it for Gulab Singh.

By the middle of June 1841 Zorawar Singh was reported to have moved his troops to the outposts of western Tibet. Zorawar Singh also secured his rear before leaving on the conquest of Tibet. He also made it sure that the Baltis and Ladakhis remained peaceful and loyal. For this purpose, and perhaps with a view to testing the loyalty of his new subjects and their chiefs. Zorawar not only sent their leaders at the head of various columns but also mobilised and armed Baltis and Ladakhis and made them to accompany the Dogra army as auxiliary force.

The invasion was planned out during April 1841 and the movement of the troops towards of Naris started by May. His thrust into Naris was three pronged. In addition to his own force, two smaller columns of 300 to 500 men each, marched through Rupshu, one under Ghulam Khan (the former ruler of Skardu) and the other under Nono Sodnam, the Ladakhi chief. Both these columns moved and entered the Tibetan territory before Zorawar advanced with his main force.

Zorawar Singh himself led the main force of about 3000, Dogra soldiers and advanced in May along the road-south of the Pankong lake. From Chushul he entered the Tibetan district of Rudok and conquered the place on June 5th and took the Garphon (governor) prisoner.

The Chinese account of the Dogra-Tibetan war of 1841 which was written by the Chinese Resident at Lhasa, reveals the promptitude with which the Chinese and. Tibetan authorities reacted to the Dogra invasion, They offered stubborn resistance and sent against the Dogras large armies at the first information of their entry into their land.

The most important and the decisive battle of this campaign was fought at Kardung, where the General Pi-hsi was waiting for the arrival of the Dogra armies. He had organized stiff resistance to the invaders with the help of the Gonpo (Governor) of Gartok who had fled to Taklakot after his defeat. The Tibetan defences were, however, broken down and the defenders routed.
The first thing Zorawar Singh did after the conquest of Misra was to take a holy bath in the lake Manasarovar and offer a golden idol at the Kailash temple.

He had achieved the height of fame. His downfall was imminent. The Chinese dragon had been provoked, the line of communications precariously extended, and the freezing hostile winter was about to lash out with all its fury of snow and storms.

In a short span of three or four months Zorawor Singh had introduced in his newly-conquered territory all the measures of administration and defence which he had tried successfully in Ladakh. By these measures he pleased the population and thus prepared ground for the permanent occupation of the western Tibet. In spite of all the British objections, Zorawar Singh was determined to annex the conquered territories to the Dogra principality, and to the kingdom of Lahore through Gulab Singh.

Meanwhile, an eminent Chinese official, Kahlon Sarkhung, and other Tibetan officials, arrived on the east side of the Mayum pass. As soon as Zorawar received intimation of their arrival, he opened peace negotiations “promising to withdraw on condition of a money payment (tribute) from Tibet.” He also desired the Tibetans to recognise him as the ruler of western Tibet, and to pay the cost of the various actions fought by him in Tibet. He also demanded that the Tibetans should send all shawl-wool to Ladakh as had been done in the past, otherwise he threatened to invade Lhasa. Zorawar had wanted to withdraw to Ladakh in view of the severe winter.

From the beginning of. the Tibetan episode, the British officials,were afraid of its harmful influences to their diplomacy. One fear was the possibility of a Dogra-Sikh-Gurkha axis against them. The other fear was the provocation of the Chinese. In their opinion, China would not view with indifference the capture of Garo and other Tibetan territories by the Dogras. It was feared that in case of the Chinese counteroffensive a dangerous situation was likely to develop on the northern border of India which could he harmful to their interests in China and Nepal. Such a situation could lead to the impairment of their relations with China with whom they were negotiating peace settlement after the recent Opium war. So when General Zorawar Singh had occupied the post and town of Gartok in the middle of August, the Government of India became particularly concerned and advised their Agent, Mr. G. R. Clerk, to call on the Maharaja of Lahore for an explanation of these aggression. He was also advised to convey to the Maharaja the view of the British that he will be held responsible for all injurious proceedings on the part of their vassal Dogra Rajas, and that he should let the Maharaja understand that the Governor-General may possibly insist on the return of Jammu troops from the scene of their aggression. The British authorities thought it dangerous for them to allow the Sikhs and Gulab Singh to establish their authority in that region.

The Sino-Tibetan authorities had become unnerved at the steady advance of General Zorawar Singh towards Lhasa. His progress could not be stopped by the strong military outposts established at the five military headquarters of the provincial divisions. They made frantic preparations to stop the further advance of the Dogras and to hurl them back. A number of troops had already been sent.

As a result of these skirmishes and ill effects of extreme cold, some soldiers of Zorawar’s army seem to have started deserting their camp and taking shelter in the British territories. The British authorities, therefore, advised the Commissioner of Kumaon that he should provide for their actual
needs and send them to the Punjab.

The Dogra General now realised his critical position. The enemy numbered over 10,000, or almost three times the strength of his own troops. No help could be expected from the Dogra Rajas, who were deeply busy in their own affairs, quite oblivious of the position of their brave General.

As the Gulabnama records, “the cloud and snow had disabled most of the warriors. Snow and chill, freezing wind and frost plundered the army of its courage and strength and reduced Zorawar’s soldiers to desolation and desperation.”

In spite of this disability Zorawar Singh did not surrender, and he and his soldiers decided to face the situation heroically. They dug up trenches, around which there was a three- day combat. The Dogras wanted to advance towards Toyo. The Tibetans had laid an ambush. The Dogras, however, boldly rushed on the enemy and made their way towards their destination.
I am not well, and unable to sit up for more than half-an-hour, sometimes an hour at a time.

Could we hope for another note like this, on the piecemeal takeover of Gilgit, Hunza and Nagar, and the formation of the Gilgit Agency when the British were panicked by the appearance of a Russian military officer with a detachment of Cossacks in these parts?

The ultimate portion being, of course, the history of the Malakand Field Force and the stirring events around Chitral, and their acceptance of J&K suzerainty, but it is up to you, how much you wish to share of these events with us.
 
I am not well, and unable to sit up for more than half-an-hour, sometimes an hour at a time.

Could we hope for another note like this, on the piecemeal takeover of Gilgit, Hunza and Nagar, and the formation of the Gilgit Agency when the British were panicked by the appearance of a Russian military officer with a detachment of Cossacks in these parts?

The ultimate portion being, of course, the history of the Malakand Field Force and the stirring events around Chitral, and their acceptance of J&K suzerainty, but it is up to you, how much you wish to share of these events with us.
I shall be happy to follow up. It’s just that I am on holiday and neck deep with family and grandchildren here in Canada these days which is why I posted from my notes, we are returning in a few weeks and would endeavour to take this further

Meanwhile, I could add to the exploits of Zorawar Singh

Get well soon
 
I shall be happy to follow up. It’s just that I am on holiday and neck deep with family and grandchildren here in Canada these days which is why I posted from my notes, we are returning in a few weeks and would endeavour to take this further

Meanwhile, I could add to the exploits of Zorawar Singh

Get well soon
Then I will have to inch my way through Gilgit and Chitral, to bring us the full backdrop to answer the proposition put by @arjunk (in essence, correct, but embellished).

Drat.
 
Any update on Zorawar Singh?

I would like to start from after the Treaty of Chushul, the only formal treaty between an Indian state and the Qing Dynasty empire of China, and one that should be useful today in our interminable discussions with the Chinese.
 

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