Any source for this information?
Hard to believe. Please provide reference(s) if any on above.
There is no publicly available source on this "GHQ/Government's Insistence" information.
The source people quote (even I quoted earlier for the sake of argument) are "secondary" - these secondary sources quote the primary source "Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission Main Report" - which to this day hasn't been declassified. Some excerpts from the Supplementary Report (1974) were declassified, however, that public document doesn't contain any detail on PNS Ghazi.
The main report, in summary, is critical of almost all the war-time operations. Owing to the outcome of 1971, and for the sake of argument, it can be said that blunders were committed but then again the details are shrouded in the dark except for the few testimonial accounts, that again aren't entirely reliable.
Anyhow, the blame gets pinned on the army generals of the time, and rightly so (again due to the outcome of the war) - but the issue is hindsight is always 20/20.
The problem is that a number of people would not include the nuances that led to the failure e.g. the most significant one being the gross discrepancy of military assets shared b/w East and West Pakistan, and then the gross strategic and operational disasters owing to ad hoc measures to deal with such a discrepancy in the middle of an all out war.
Surely all blame, whether supported by evidence or not, can be pinned on a few corrupt and negligent generals in power at the time but to use that history as an argument against the CDF restructure is incorrect, because as I already mentioned in one of my previous responses that the same disastrous outcome can occur whether you have a CDF or not, and whether armed forces are put under civilian oversight or not simply because at the end of the day there is going to one person who has the final authority and is no less likely to commit the same mistake that we are discussing currently.
Trivia: The same Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission Report concluded that another reason for 1971 failure was the lack of inter-services operational planning and coordination


