When we think about ultimate strategic deterrence, the first thing that comes to the mind is thermonuclear weapons. For countries like Bangladesh that wants avoid all political and economic repercussions of developing nukes yet need to posses deterrence, secret biological weapons of mass destruction could give a new deterrence perspective.
It is realistically possible to develop it in a lab with a handful of mid tier scientists. Something that is practically concealable from today's intelligence, unlike a nuclear WMD program. Which requires billions of dollars and over a thousand people to develop the whole eco-sytem. (Multiple enrichment plants, development of several types of delivery systems, production of sufficient numbers of warheads, force design, command and control, second strike capability) All of this is not practically concealable in 21th century. Or even wasn’t in 20th century.
However, the cost of a biological weapon is estimated to be about 0.05 percent the cost of a conventional weapon in order to produce similar numbers of mass casualties per kilometer square. Moreover, their production is significantly easier, as common technology can be utilized to produce biological warfare agents, like that used in production of vaccines, foods, spray devices, beverages and antibiotics.
en.wikipedia.org
While, it should be noted that biological WMD doesn't have tactical and operational battlefield utility of selected 'precision' nuclear strikes against military or limited civilian targets, (with arbitrary escalation control) it can definitely serve as strategic second strike enabled deterrence. (Even though USA can shoot down limited numbers of ICBMs carrying thermonuclear payload, it simply cannot shoot down virus.)
In today's highly globalised And interconnected world (Unprecedented in human history) any decent intelligence agency has the ability to convertly introduce multiple deadly viruses into adversary's territory that could conceivably result in large numbers of civilian casualties and cause severe disruption to economic and societal infrastructure, before the adversary catches up to one of the viruses with development, sufficient production and distribution of vaccine in time, let alone all of them.
And unlike nuclear weapon, state don’t even have to openly declare to world that it posses biological WMD and have sufficient delivery system in place and invite all the reprocussions (which is far more easier and less complicated than conventional nuclear delivery systems like ICBM and SSBN) for deterrence effect to take place.
All it has to do when faced with existential threat of first strike is to let the nuclear armed adversary know that it has biological WMD and the sufficient means in place to deliver it. Again, adversary don’t have to fully believe the threat. The very ambiguity will provide a level of deterrence that you wouldn’t otherwise have. To any sane adversary, taking such huge risk would be deemed unacceptable.
That is because, when faced with existential threat of first strike, if a state suddenly deocare out of blue, we have nukes, it won't be credible. as for deterrence to work adversary has believe/at least half believe your threat. Which is not gonna happen in this case, becuase it practically impossible develop nukes amd delivery systems today in complete secrecy. Hence, adversary will simply call off the bluff.
On the other hand, biological WMD program (both the development of the agents themselves and the delivery system) can be practically kept concealed as stated above. Hence, adversary simply cannot be sure if this is an empty bluff or an actual threat.
In conclusion- biological weapon of mass destruction doesn't have practical battlefield utility. Hence it won't stop conventional military agression. In fact any attempt to do so would likely invite nuclear retaliation. However, it could serve an excellent strategic all-in second strike capability against a nuclear armed adversary if and when faced with existential threat of first strike.
This paper explore the topic in more detail.
And there is more.
www.siumed.edu
www.jstor.org
@Michael Corleone @AbuShalehRumi @LeonBlack08 @Alter_Ego @Joe Shearer @Oscar
It is realistically possible to develop it in a lab with a handful of mid tier scientists. Something that is practically concealable from today's intelligence, unlike a nuclear WMD program. Which requires billions of dollars and over a thousand people to develop the whole eco-sytem. (Multiple enrichment plants, development of several types of delivery systems, production of sufficient numbers of warheads, force design, command and control, second strike capability) All of this is not practically concealable in 21th century. Or even wasn’t in 20th century.
However, the cost of a biological weapon is estimated to be about 0.05 percent the cost of a conventional weapon in order to produce similar numbers of mass casualties per kilometer square. Moreover, their production is significantly easier, as common technology can be utilized to produce biological warfare agents, like that used in production of vaccines, foods, spray devices, beverages and antibiotics.
Biological warfare - Wikipedia
While, it should be noted that biological WMD doesn't have tactical and operational battlefield utility of selected 'precision' nuclear strikes against military or limited civilian targets, (with arbitrary escalation control) it can definitely serve as strategic second strike enabled deterrence. (Even though USA can shoot down limited numbers of ICBMs carrying thermonuclear payload, it simply cannot shoot down virus.)
In today's highly globalised And interconnected world (Unprecedented in human history) any decent intelligence agency has the ability to convertly introduce multiple deadly viruses into adversary's territory that could conceivably result in large numbers of civilian casualties and cause severe disruption to economic and societal infrastructure, before the adversary catches up to one of the viruses with development, sufficient production and distribution of vaccine in time, let alone all of them.
And unlike nuclear weapon, state don’t even have to openly declare to world that it posses biological WMD and have sufficient delivery system in place and invite all the reprocussions (which is far more easier and less complicated than conventional nuclear delivery systems like ICBM and SSBN) for deterrence effect to take place.
All it has to do when faced with existential threat of first strike is to let the nuclear armed adversary know that it has biological WMD and the sufficient means in place to deliver it. Again, adversary don’t have to fully believe the threat. The very ambiguity will provide a level of deterrence that you wouldn’t otherwise have. To any sane adversary, taking such huge risk would be deemed unacceptable.
That is because, when faced with existential threat of first strike, if a state suddenly deocare out of blue, we have nukes, it won't be credible. as for deterrence to work adversary has believe/at least half believe your threat. Which is not gonna happen in this case, becuase it practically impossible develop nukes amd delivery systems today in complete secrecy. Hence, adversary will simply call off the bluff.
On the other hand, biological WMD program (both the development of the agents themselves and the delivery system) can be practically kept concealed as stated above. Hence, adversary simply cannot be sure if this is an empty bluff or an actual threat.
In conclusion- biological weapon of mass destruction doesn't have practical battlefield utility. Hence it won't stop conventional military agression. In fact any attempt to do so would likely invite nuclear retaliation. However, it could serve an excellent strategic all-in second strike capability against a nuclear armed adversary if and when faced with existential threat of first strike.
This paper explore the topic in more detail.
And there is more.
Overview of Potential Agents of Biological Terrorism | SIU School of Medicine
During the Great Depression, Hans Zinsser, a bacteriologist and historian wrote that "Infectious Disease is one of the few genuine adventures left in the world." "Infectious Disease is one of the great tragedies of living things - the struggle for existence between different forms of life . ...
Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare on JSTOR
Gregory Koblentz, Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare, International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter, 2003/2004), pp. 84-122
www.jstor.org
@Michael Corleone @AbuShalehRumi @LeonBlack08 @Alter_Ego @Joe Shearer @Oscar
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