While I understand the armed assault role, dedicated attack role has taken a hit after the Russo Ukraine war. Too risky(expensive )to deploy a $16 million dollars alligator against one or two tanks (since there are no mass tank assaults). Russians have been using Orlon ($100k) + Lancet ($30k) combination to deal with this problem.
The heli gunships are either used as artillery (unguided rocket salvos) or to defend when there is a major offensive, like in 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive where armour density on the battlefield was higher and it was then Worth the risk.
Americans recently cancelled their Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program due to this war. I wonder how hot is Pakistan for ATAK and Z-10s now.
While I agree that the high cost (not just upfront cost, but also the cost of upkeep and service) of dedicated attack helicopters, and their significant losses in the Russo-Ukraine war have exposed some concerns regarding the cost-effectiveness of dedicated attack helicopter gunships, I don't think this is the primary reason why the US cancelled the FARA program, nor should it be taken as a suggestion for all powers of different circumstances to abandon their plan for future gunship procurement/development.
The often touted myth that MALE drones + loitering munition can replace attack gunships is innately flawed. Despite the losses of attack helicopters, they are still heavily used especially by the Russian armed forces, with production still going strong. The same cannot be said for MALE drones like the TB-2, which have enjoyed great success during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, have gone all but extinct. MALE drones are specifically designed to exploit the relatively limited range of MANPAD and outdated SHORAD systems and have proven themselves just as helpless, if not more, against a proper military with comprehensive accompanying AA coverage.
The only way that a weapon could replace helicopter gunships is by occupying the same niche with greater effectiveness, and so far that weapon has yet to emerge. Gunships still enjoy the greatest flexibility as they can more easily exploit terrain and treelines, are great platforms for stand-off weaponry as they can easily maintain stand-off range with a much larger window of opportunity than fixed-wing, and deliver the greatest amount of firepower with the smallest opportunity cost, able to engage and impede much larger forces per encounter compared to loitering munition.
It's worth noting that Russian helicopters are severely lagging behind in situational awareness and engagement options due to inferior radar/optics (Ka-52's export statistics are not pretty...), a complete lack of long-ranged standoff options prior to the introduction of Izdeliye 305 ATGM, left alone NLOS ordnance, and it wouldn't be far-fetched to attribute their high loss rates to these reasons. On the flip side, situational awareness, advanced sensors, and stand-off capability are precisely the emphasis of Z-10ME in recent displays either on Zhuhai airshows or Singapore defence expos, which in my book makes them much more future-proof than say, Mi-28NM or Ka-52.
The US cancelled their FARA program primarily because they are re-gearing themselves for conflict in the South China Sea, where their primary struggle is the lack of infrastructure (bases, airfields) and thus resistance to suppression within PLA's A2/AD sphere, and a lack of long-ranged platforms to conduct efficient stand-off strikes facing the increasing comprehensive ISR capability of the PLA in the west pacific - challenges that attack gunships would not help against.