Foinikas
Elite Member
Don't they need all the MRAPs they can make right now?
Forged by fire: Iran’s military preparedness at an all-time high after 12-day war
- Thread starter Mr Iran Eye
- Start date
Mr Iran Eye
Registered Member
- Thread starter
- #62
Generally, a thermobaric missile is 5 to 10 times more powerful than a conventional missile of the same size. Imagine the damage it can cause; there's no need for nuclear weapons to inflict serious harm on the enemy.
Kyussis
Trusted Member
There is no need to fly a few MRAPs in when you can ship many more for far less cost. There is no need for such a move on the ground, only on X and in the heads of the Shahi idiots who think there is a "revolution" taking place in Iran.
Nuffle
Registered Member
I'll only believe it when I see it.
Mr Iran Eye
Registered Member
- Thread starter
- #65
The Starlink shutdown reveals hidden agendas on Iran's part. Let's hope the game holds more surprises, and I'm convinced it does. This should provoke a reaction from the Zionists, piss them off.
Kyussis
Trusted Member
So says the Salafist Zionist!
Mr Iran Eye
Registered Member
- Thread starter
- #67
Unconfirmed reports indicate that approximately 16 military cargo planes from China have arrived in Iran over the past 56 hours. This marks the largest amount of military aid China has ever sent to Iran in such a short timeframe.
Press TV
Press TV
Pakistan Space Agency
Elite Member
Wow. That's brilliant news if true.
Ali_Baba
VIP Member
If True, then yes it is and it should bring to the Iranian Government the value of building China as a miliary supplier to the armed forces. They have industrial manufacturing bandwidth that Russia cannot compete with, and also superior weapons/EW technology(imho) than Russia can ever make now.
Last edited:
Mr Iran Eye
Registered Member
- Thread starter
- #70
Starlink jamming in Iran: the revolution of Iranian counter-space?
Robert Maillard, Paris
Former British diplomat Alastair Crooke recently made a bombshell statement in an interview with The Cradle, claiming that Iranian authorities had successfully neutralized SpaceX's Starlink satellite network during a recent wave of riots marked by terrorist attacks.
According to Crooke, this success was based on "the exploitation of sophisticated jamming technology supplied by China." This claim, though not independently verified by Western sources, opens a crucial debate on the reliability of critical Western space infrastructure, through which the United States and its allies interfere, according to their geopolitical interests, in the internal affairs of sovereign states.
Crooke's revelation: a geopolitical victory?
In his interview, Crooke emphasized the use of "Chinese technology" to counter Starlink. The Starlink network, essential for communications in areas where terrestrial infrastructure is compromised, represents a major strategic component for armed elements tasked by US intelligence services with infiltrating peaceful protesters, a way to incite these demonstrations toward bloody clashes or terrorist attacks.
If a state actor manages to neutralize it for an extended period across an entire territory, this constitutes an unprecedented challenge to US connectivity capabilities. The fact that Iran could potentially block this network indicates an advanced level of mastery of electronic warfare targeting LEO (Low Earth Orbit) frequencies.
Jamming Starlink is particularly complex due to the nature of the constellation. Indeed, the satellite constellation is characterized first and foremost by its mobility and redundancy. Thousands of satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) are constantly changing position, requiring dynamic targeting capabilities and broad terrestrial coverage for complete jamming.
Another distinctive feature of Starlink is the wide range of frequencies it uses. Starlink primarily uses the Ka and Ku bands, which require powerful and precise jamming systems to saturate the uplink to the satellites or the downlink to user terminals.
If Iran succeeded in effectively neutralizing Starlink, even temporarily, it suggests that the terrestrial jamming systems employed were either extremely powerful or very well integrated into a sophisticated targeting architecture, potentially aided by geolocation data (SDK) provided by partners. And in either case, this gives the Americans plenty to think about.
The Iranian Space-Based Jamming Hypothesis: The Most Advanced Lead
While China is initially blamed, a thorough analysis of Iranian capabilities suggests an alternative or complementary approach: the use of its own space systems. In recent months, Iran has demonstrated an increased capacity to place small satellites into low Earth orbit (LEO), often with logistical support and Russian launch vehicles. The recent simultaneous launch of three small Iranian satellites into LEO corroborates this growing capability.
A space-based jammer would be inherently more effective against an LEO constellation like Starlink than a ground-based system, as it can target signals with significantly greater effective range and power, unconstrained by topography or ground range limitations. The effectiveness of a space-based jammer against Starlink would actually depend on several factors:
Orbital proximity: an enemy satellite, such as those allegedly used by Iran against Starlink, positioned in a favorable geometric configuration (low elevation angle relative to the targeted Starlink satellite), could emit a jamming signal with a spectral density far exceeding that of a ground station, even a powerful one.
Targeting: space-based jamming systems could potentially disrupt the link between the Starlink satellite and the ground segment or, more difficult, directly target the satellite-user terminal link if the jamming satellite is within line of sight.
This space-based capability, if confirmed, would place Iran in a select group of nations possessing active countermeasures in the space domain, potentially joining Russia, China, and the United States. Developing such a system would require significant expertise in orbital mechanics, space emission power, and thermal/energy management. These are fields hermetically sealed off from a state that, moreover, is subject to a draconian sanctions regime and whose rise in space science dates back barely more than a decade.
The Triangulation of Technological Alliances
The resounding success that Crooke attributes to Iran likely rests on a strategic convergence between three actors, forming a counter-space technology value chain. The three Eastern powers—Iran, China, and Russia—may have shared the task in this spectacular space battle: China could be the potential supplier of the software architecture or high-performance jamming hardware components (e.g., power amplifiers or synchronization software), having a strategic interest in countering Starlink as a tool of American influence, while Russia would present itself as the essential logistical partner, facilitating the deployment of Iranian space systems into orbit through the use of its launch vehicles or facilities (such as those used for recent Iranian satellite launches). Russia possesses a proven doctrine in electronic warfare and could share knowledge on how to manage LEO interference.
And what would be Iran’s role? It is the operational actor, adapting acquired technology for immediate tactical integration within its territory, whether through powerful ground-based transmitters or, more dramatically, through the deployment of a dedicated space-based system.
This interstate collaboration within the Eastern axis represents an attempt to circumvent the technological restrictions imposed by the West by pooling critical skills to develop so-called "anti-access/area denial" (A2/AD) capabilities in the space domain.
In short, Alastair Crooke's statement, whatever its exact origin, signals a major escalation in electronic warfare against the West, which claims to have invented it. If Iran is, as Crooke acknowledges, capable of deploying effective space-based jamming against Starlink, this redefines the rules of the game in orbit. It confirms that American and NATO satellite systems, previously considered "invulnerable to sustained and localized interference," are now active targets, transforming the skies into a new theater of geopolitical operations pitting East against West. This is all the more significant given the growing reliance on LEO networks for strategic and civilian communications, making the ability to neutralize them a decisive advantage.
In any case, the jamming of Iran's satellite internet network is forcing the United States, the space superpower, to come down to earth and reassess the reliability of its critical networks, even as the current space order is being radically challenged by a coalition of actors united around Iran, the world's most anti-imperialist state.
But the claim that Iran has neutralized Starlink using space-based jamming technology, if confirmed, would have implications far beyond simply controlling internal communications. Such a success would demonstrate the ability of a significant non-Western state actor—namely Iran—to counter an offensive US space infrastructure, operated by a private entity (SpaceX) but strategically vital. For intelligence agencies like the CIA, whose operations in hostile countries often rely on secure and resilient communication networks (including, potentially, systems like Starlink), this would signal a major systemic vulnerability.
If Iran or Russia can develop and deploy systems capable of effectively jamming or targeting low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites in ways not anticipated by US electronic defenses, it would force the CIA to reassess all its operational procedures. Plans to interfere with or support armed dissident militias (Agitators in Black) in antagonistic countries would then immediately become riskier, as the critical access and control point—the satellite link—could be intercepted, neutralized, or compromised by hostile space-based means. In this scenario, Iran would not only be shutting down a network, but would also be issuing a strategic warning about the militarization of space-based electronic warfare, giving the anti-US camp a significant head start.
Robert Maillard is a writer and military analyst based in Paris.
Robert Maillard, Paris
Former British diplomat Alastair Crooke recently made a bombshell statement in an interview with The Cradle, claiming that Iranian authorities had successfully neutralized SpaceX's Starlink satellite network during a recent wave of riots marked by terrorist attacks.
According to Crooke, this success was based on "the exploitation of sophisticated jamming technology supplied by China." This claim, though not independently verified by Western sources, opens a crucial debate on the reliability of critical Western space infrastructure, through which the United States and its allies interfere, according to their geopolitical interests, in the internal affairs of sovereign states.
Crooke's revelation: a geopolitical victory?
In his interview, Crooke emphasized the use of "Chinese technology" to counter Starlink. The Starlink network, essential for communications in areas where terrestrial infrastructure is compromised, represents a major strategic component for armed elements tasked by US intelligence services with infiltrating peaceful protesters, a way to incite these demonstrations toward bloody clashes or terrorist attacks.
If a state actor manages to neutralize it for an extended period across an entire territory, this constitutes an unprecedented challenge to US connectivity capabilities. The fact that Iran could potentially block this network indicates an advanced level of mastery of electronic warfare targeting LEO (Low Earth Orbit) frequencies.
Jamming Starlink is particularly complex due to the nature of the constellation. Indeed, the satellite constellation is characterized first and foremost by its mobility and redundancy. Thousands of satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) are constantly changing position, requiring dynamic targeting capabilities and broad terrestrial coverage for complete jamming.
Another distinctive feature of Starlink is the wide range of frequencies it uses. Starlink primarily uses the Ka and Ku bands, which require powerful and precise jamming systems to saturate the uplink to the satellites or the downlink to user terminals.
If Iran succeeded in effectively neutralizing Starlink, even temporarily, it suggests that the terrestrial jamming systems employed were either extremely powerful or very well integrated into a sophisticated targeting architecture, potentially aided by geolocation data (SDK) provided by partners. And in either case, this gives the Americans plenty to think about.
The Iranian Space-Based Jamming Hypothesis: The Most Advanced Lead
While China is initially blamed, a thorough analysis of Iranian capabilities suggests an alternative or complementary approach: the use of its own space systems. In recent months, Iran has demonstrated an increased capacity to place small satellites into low Earth orbit (LEO), often with logistical support and Russian launch vehicles. The recent simultaneous launch of three small Iranian satellites into LEO corroborates this growing capability.
A space-based jammer would be inherently more effective against an LEO constellation like Starlink than a ground-based system, as it can target signals with significantly greater effective range and power, unconstrained by topography or ground range limitations. The effectiveness of a space-based jammer against Starlink would actually depend on several factors:
Orbital proximity: an enemy satellite, such as those allegedly used by Iran against Starlink, positioned in a favorable geometric configuration (low elevation angle relative to the targeted Starlink satellite), could emit a jamming signal with a spectral density far exceeding that of a ground station, even a powerful one.
Targeting: space-based jamming systems could potentially disrupt the link between the Starlink satellite and the ground segment or, more difficult, directly target the satellite-user terminal link if the jamming satellite is within line of sight.
This space-based capability, if confirmed, would place Iran in a select group of nations possessing active countermeasures in the space domain, potentially joining Russia, China, and the United States. Developing such a system would require significant expertise in orbital mechanics, space emission power, and thermal/energy management. These are fields hermetically sealed off from a state that, moreover, is subject to a draconian sanctions regime and whose rise in space science dates back barely more than a decade.
The Triangulation of Technological Alliances
The resounding success that Crooke attributes to Iran likely rests on a strategic convergence between three actors, forming a counter-space technology value chain. The three Eastern powers—Iran, China, and Russia—may have shared the task in this spectacular space battle: China could be the potential supplier of the software architecture or high-performance jamming hardware components (e.g., power amplifiers or synchronization software), having a strategic interest in countering Starlink as a tool of American influence, while Russia would present itself as the essential logistical partner, facilitating the deployment of Iranian space systems into orbit through the use of its launch vehicles or facilities (such as those used for recent Iranian satellite launches). Russia possesses a proven doctrine in electronic warfare and could share knowledge on how to manage LEO interference.
And what would be Iran’s role? It is the operational actor, adapting acquired technology for immediate tactical integration within its territory, whether through powerful ground-based transmitters or, more dramatically, through the deployment of a dedicated space-based system.
This interstate collaboration within the Eastern axis represents an attempt to circumvent the technological restrictions imposed by the West by pooling critical skills to develop so-called "anti-access/area denial" (A2/AD) capabilities in the space domain.
In short, Alastair Crooke's statement, whatever its exact origin, signals a major escalation in electronic warfare against the West, which claims to have invented it. If Iran is, as Crooke acknowledges, capable of deploying effective space-based jamming against Starlink, this redefines the rules of the game in orbit. It confirms that American and NATO satellite systems, previously considered "invulnerable to sustained and localized interference," are now active targets, transforming the skies into a new theater of geopolitical operations pitting East against West. This is all the more significant given the growing reliance on LEO networks for strategic and civilian communications, making the ability to neutralize them a decisive advantage.
In any case, the jamming of Iran's satellite internet network is forcing the United States, the space superpower, to come down to earth and reassess the reliability of its critical networks, even as the current space order is being radically challenged by a coalition of actors united around Iran, the world's most anti-imperialist state.
But the claim that Iran has neutralized Starlink using space-based jamming technology, if confirmed, would have implications far beyond simply controlling internal communications. Such a success would demonstrate the ability of a significant non-Western state actor—namely Iran—to counter an offensive US space infrastructure, operated by a private entity (SpaceX) but strategically vital. For intelligence agencies like the CIA, whose operations in hostile countries often rely on secure and resilient communication networks (including, potentially, systems like Starlink), this would signal a major systemic vulnerability.
If Iran or Russia can develop and deploy systems capable of effectively jamming or targeting low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites in ways not anticipated by US electronic defenses, it would force the CIA to reassess all its operational procedures. Plans to interfere with or support armed dissident militias (Agitators in Black) in antagonistic countries would then immediately become riskier, as the critical access and control point—the satellite link—could be intercepted, neutralized, or compromised by hostile space-based means. In this scenario, Iran would not only be shutting down a network, but would also be issuing a strategic warning about the militarization of space-based electronic warfare, giving the anti-US camp a significant head start.
Robert Maillard is a writer and military analyst based in Paris.
Mr Iran Eye
Registered Member
- Thread starter
- #71
Humiliés en juin dernier lorsqu'ils ont été contraints de supplier Téhéran de cesser de frapper Tel Aviv et Haïfa, et surtout d'étendre sa riposte par missiles balistiques aux frappes contre Fordow et Natanz au-delà de la plus grande base militaire américaine en Asie occidentale, al-Udeid, les États-Unis ont finalement retiré de leur arsenal, six mois plus tard, un autre scénario de guerre hybride contre l'Iran.
Fin décembre et début janvier, l'Iran a été confronté à une vaste opération de déstabilisation, présentée comme le prélude à une « attaque militaire étrangère ». Ce scénario de guerre hybride combinait pressions économiques, actions clandestines, guerre de l'information et infiltration de groupes terroristes armés. Selon des sources sécuritaires proches des services de renseignement iraniens, les États-Unis, avec le soutien d'« Israël et des services de renseignement d'une dizaine de pays », ont orchestré cette stratégie, en s'appuyant sur des réseaux déjà établis dans la région.
La forte dépréciation du rial iranien ces dernières semaines, provoquée par un durcissement drastique des sanctions, constitue un levier central de la stratégie hybride des États-Unis à l'encontre de l'Iran. La hausse rapide du taux de change et la baisse du pouvoir d'achat visent à créer un climat de mécontentement social, susceptible de dégénérer en troubles internes. De toute évidence, cette dynamique n'aurait pas été possible sans l'implication directe d'acteurs extérieurs, notamment par le biais de mécanismes financiers et monétaires liés au dollar.
Parallèlement à ces pressions économiques, les autorités iraniennes ont détecté « l’infiltration progressive de terroristes armés » dans le pays, venant de plusieurs directions, notamment du Pakistan, du Kurdistan irakien, de l’Azerbaïdjan et des Émirats arabes unis, où le triangle CIA-Mossad-MI6 est très actif.
Parmi les groupes terroristes mentionnés figurent le PJAK, Komala, le Parti démocratique du Kurdistan iranien et d'autres organisations terroristes de l'est de l'Iran. Ces réseaux avaient pour mission de transformer des manifestations pacifiques organisées contre le coût élevé de la vie en attentats terroristes d'une violence sans précédent, ciblant notamment les forces de sécurité, les manifestants, les passants, les infrastructures publiques, les lieux de culte et les commissariats de police. La coordination opérationnelle était assurée depuis des quartiers généraux situés à proximité de l'Iran.
Fin décembre et début janvier, l'Iran a été confronté à une vaste opération de déstabilisation, présentée comme le prélude à une « attaque militaire étrangère ». Ce scénario de guerre hybride combinait pressions économiques, actions clandestines, guerre de l'information et infiltration de groupes terroristes armés. Selon des sources sécuritaires proches des services de renseignement iraniens, les États-Unis, avec le soutien d'« Israël et des services de renseignement d'une dizaine de pays », ont orchestré cette stratégie, en s'appuyant sur des réseaux déjà établis dans la région.
La forte dépréciation du rial iranien ces dernières semaines, provoquée par un durcissement drastique des sanctions, constitue un levier central de la stratégie hybride des États-Unis à l'encontre de l'Iran. La hausse rapide du taux de change et la baisse du pouvoir d'achat visent à créer un climat de mécontentement social, susceptible de dégénérer en troubles internes. De toute évidence, cette dynamique n'aurait pas été possible sans l'implication directe d'acteurs extérieurs, notamment par le biais de mécanismes financiers et monétaires liés au dollar.
Parallèlement à ces pressions économiques, les autorités iraniennes ont détecté « l’infiltration progressive de terroristes armés » dans le pays, venant de plusieurs directions, notamment du Pakistan, du Kurdistan irakien, de l’Azerbaïdjan et des Émirats arabes unis, où le triangle CIA-Mossad-MI6 est très actif.
Parmi les groupes terroristes mentionnés figurent le PJAK, Komala, le Parti démocratique du Kurdistan iranien et d'autres organisations terroristes de l'est de l'Iran. Ces réseaux avaient pour mission de transformer des manifestations pacifiques organisées contre le coût élevé de la vie en attentats terroristes d'une violence sans précédent, ciblant notamment les forces de sécurité, les manifestants, les passants, les infrastructures publiques, les lieux de culte et les commissariats de police. La coordination opérationnelle était assurée depuis des quartiers généraux situés à proximité de l'Iran.
Mr Iran Eye
Registered Member
- Thread starter
- #72
Two Chinese cargo planes and a Russian transport aircraft landed at Imam Khomeini Airport in the Iranian capital, Tehran.
to be checked
to be checked
lamdacore
Registered Member
The US and Israel know Iran cant respond as effectively. They are coming in for the kill. Once the military and government structures are destroyed and the masses take over and form a new government...Israel will come in and destroy literally every piece of military hardware just as did in Syria and leave Iran completely toothless.
Iran new government would have no choice but to be absolutely subservient to the US and Israel and in this way they can stop arms flow to Russia and oil to China.
Iran new government would have no choice but to be absolutely subservient to the US and Israel and in this way they can stop arms flow to Russia and oil to China.
StrategicBear
Registered Member
It's not that easy. Before this war ends a US aircraft carrier would be sunk by Iranian missiles and mass casualties will happen all over the region with the Straits of Hormuz closed to shipping permanently and Arab oil facilities all blown up due to hosting US Bases.
This war will result in many US ships sunk and destroyed.
maverick
Trusted Member
Current US regime does not care, they will do whatever they have to, to make sure that Epstein pictures are not released, implicating everyone in the administration. Mass casualty of US troops will help Trump and Israel rally general American population in nationalistic fervor devour of the ground reality.
Users who are viewing this thread
Pakistan Defence Latest
-
-
-
-
-
Can Pakistan Win Bangladesh’s Trust Without Apologizing for the Genocide of 1971? (4 Viewers)- Latest: Al-Zakir
Country Watch Latest
-
-
-
-
-
Taliban Wants To Build Afghanistan’s Air Defenses With Russia’s Help (2 Viewers)- Latest: Hopefully Pessimistic
