PAF SAM based Air Defense System - News, Discussion & Updates

[Toxic]

Shorad(s)

Bas aik baat bata do, penaflix ke ilawa kuch local hai?

 

[rafale]

Typically, the flight trajectory of a ballistic missile is divided into three phases: the boost phase (initial ascent), the mid-course phase, and the terminal phase.

During the boost phase of a ballistic missile, interception is virtually impossible—unless, of course, an adversary were to permit you to deploy an interception system directly around their launch base (which is, of course, a laughable notion).

Consequently, anti-ballistic missile systems are generally categorized into two types: mid-course interceptors and terminal interceptors. Many observers draw an analogy between the HQ-19 system and the U.S. THAAD system; however, this is actually an inaccurate comparison. The THAAD system is designed for terminal-phase interception, whereas the HQ-19 system focuses primarily on mid-course interception, with terminal interception serving as a secondary capability. In terms of operational methodology, the appropriate analogues for the HQ-19 are actually the U.S. SM-3 and GMD systems.

From a technical perspective, a complete anti-ballistic missile system can be broken down into four subsystems:
1. Sensing Layer: Detection + Tracking.
Examples: Space-based infrared early warning satellite constellations, ground-based ultra-long-range strategic early warning radars, and mobile radar systems (land, sea, and air).
2. Information Processing Layer: Trajectory calculation, target discrimination (identifying whether an object is a decoy or a warhead), and data fusion.
3. Command and Control Layer: Deciding whether to intercept, allocating resources, and coordinating operations across multiple layers.
4. Interception Execution Layer: Interceptor missiles.

Typically, our focus centers on the interception layer, making it easy to overlook the preceding three—hidden yet critically important—layers. Nations also keep the capabilities of these first three layers highly classified, rarely disclosing significant details to the public.

Terminal interception systems—such as the HQ-9, S-300/400, THAAD, and PAC-2/3—can compress these four layers of capability into a compact, closed-loop system, thereby establishing an independent operational capability. Naturally, when integrated into a national ballistic missile defense system (a "large closed loop"), their capabilities are further enhanced.

Mid-course interception systems—such as the HQ-19/26, SM-3, and GMD—must, however, rely on the support of a national missile defense network (the "large closed loop") to fully realize their potential. Absent the support of this large-scale, closed-loop architecture, they would be effectively downgraded to the status of terminal-phase interception systems, resulting in a severe reduction in their actual combat effectiveness.

=========================================================

Pakistan does not currently possess a comprehensive national missile defense system. Were it to acquire the HQ-19 system, the following scenarios would likely arise:

1. Reliance on China's National Missile Defense System: This approach mirrors the manner in which the United States deploys related systems in other nations—nominally belonging to the host country, yet in reality remaining under complete U.S. control. Evidently, the current national policies of both China and Pakistan would preclude such an arrangement.

2. Degraded Operation: Theoretically, the HQ-19 system is fully capable of operating autonomously to execute terminal defense missions. However, this system is extraordinarily expensive. When utilized strictly as a terminal defense system, its cost-effectiveness is significantly lower than that of specialized terminal defense systems, such as the HQ-9.

Furthermore, the 610A long-range early warning radar—a component integral to the HQ-19 system—boasts an high-altitude detection range on the order of 4,000 kilometers. If such a capability were to appear within Pakistan, do you realize the implications?

Thanks for your post.

However, I believe ABM system is the need of the hour for Pakistan, so what options does it have from China? More HQ9BEs? Or some other HQ system if not HQ19?

 

[Starlord]

Shorad(s)

do we know which one? or its still a secret ?

 

[Michael]

...... I believe ABM system is the need of the hour for Pakistan......

You need to precisely define the scope of what is "needed" before we can discuss this further.

Pakistan's military strategic decision-making is not primarily defensive in nature. — From the perspective of the economics of warfare, defense is invariably more costly than offense.

so what options does it have from China? More HQ9BEs? Or some other HQ system if not HQ19?

Serious and rational advice often tends to attract the most criticism.

At this stage—and for the foreseeable future—mid-course ballistic missile defense does not fall within the scope of Pakistan's strategic considerations.

Regarding terminal-phase defense, my recommendation is that Pakistan should acquire additional HQ-22 (FK-3/FK-3B) systems.
The HQ-22 system is significantly more affordable than the HQ-9 system, enabling Pakistan to procure it in large quantities. Furthermore, Pakistan could seek a Transfer of Technology (ToT) for the system's interceptor missiles to further reduce operational costs.
The HQ-22 system can be integrated into a network with the HQ-9 system to establish a more robust air defense grid. The HQ-9 system's situational awareness and command-and-control systems can be shared with the HQ-22, thereby enhancing the latter's combat effectiveness.

Defense against suicide drones is an issue of a different nature and is unrelated to the aforementioned systems. You may wish to look into China's civilian-grade AESA radar systems and laser defense systems. These products are highly affordable and are not subject to export restrictions. While military-grade products offer superior performance, their cost is substantially higher.

 

[Toxic]

SPADA 2000 test footage

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[Toxic]

@Ak01 what happened to the SAM test?

 

[Aziqbal]

Shorad(s)

Exactly


and we kind of have same issue as Iran

we need the interception for this lower flying missiles like Tomahawks , JASSMS and Brahmos

 

[Toxic]

@Ak01 @Quwa

would the FK-3000 be a good CAUS solution? It has 96 micro missiles and a 30mm gun with programmable ammo

The missiles have a 40mm diameter and are much smaller then even Manpad missiles with range 12KMs, so we are looking at a missile cost of roughly $50k

 

[Corax]

@Ak01 @Quwa

would the FK-3000 be a good CAUS solution? It has 96 micro missiles and a 30mm gun with programmable ammo

The missiles have a 40mm diameter and are much smaller then even Manpad missiles with range 12KMs, so we are looking at a missile cost of roughly $50k


View attachment 196181

We could actually build something like this ourselves based on our Anza series manpads, we could ramp up production, rather than buying in a whole new product.

 

[kimjongun]

Some new things on AD

 

[Toxic]

Some new things on AD
View attachment 196191View attachment 196192View attachment 196194View attachment 196193

What is that lance IR SAM

 

[kimjongun]

What is that lance IR SAM

looks like a shorad , Anza MK3?(it was said to be ir based )
And it looks like it has a stand with it with place for two launchers ( i could be wrong) similar to the RBS70 or Mistral

 

[Toxic]

looks like a shorad , Anza MK3?(it was said to be ir based )
And it looks like it has a stand with it with place for two launchers ( i could be wrong) similar to the RBS70 or Mistral

I guess so

 

[Lone Ranger]

 

[Broghil]

What is that lance IR SAM

looks like a shorad , Anza MK3?(it was said to be ir based )
And it looks like it has a stand with it with place for two launchers ( i could be wrong) similar to the RBS70 or Mistral

I think Anza was the name of the Lance of the Holy Prophet PBUH.