Where did I say our industrial base was strong?
As for Turkiye's membership in the WA; yes, it's a member of the WA, but its actual policymakers and industrialists who have to work in the field to develop solutions tell a more nuanced story. Work with the West just long enough and you can't take their treaties and institutions at face-value -- there are many other rules stacked atop of the foundations. E.g., certain R&D inputs are directly controlled by US regulators such that the US retains the final right to release them, even to WA members. And, in more and more cases, those permits to Turkiye are drying up. That was my point.
Second, China not being part of the WA never stopped Airbus from working with AVIC on helicopters, it didn't stop Apple from working with your various suppliers on precision-manufacturing, it didn't stop many, many upstream suppliers from transferring knowledge to your alloy, steel, composites, and countless other suppliers.
We're not obsessed with Western narratives. It's just that don't drink up the CPC kool-aid and actually read third-party literature, not Commie party handbooks.
Here's what's documented.
"Concurrently, the share of U.S. advanced technology exports to China also increased. In 2020, ATP constituted roughly 19 percent ($30.8 billion) of U.S. exports to China, 59 nearly three times the figure from 2008.60 In 2021, high-tech exports constituted around 33 percent ($49.6 billion) of total exports to China. Of these, about 13 percent ($18.8 billion) were considered sensitive ATP exports. China is not solely or even primarily reliant on the U.S. for ATP imports, however. The U.S. currently ranks fifth in advanced and new technology exports into China, following the EU (constituting more than half of imports), Taiwan (approximately one third), South Korea (one fourth), and Japan (one fifth)."
During the past decade, the U.S. Commerce Department approved more than $15 billion worth of strategically sensitive U.S. exports to the People’s Republic of China. The exports included equipment that can be used to design nuclear weapons, process nuclear material, machine nuclear weapon components, improve missile designs, build missile components and transmit data from missile tests.
The equipment, by definition, is of great strategic value. Only the highest performing machine tools, instruments, computers and other such items require a Commerce Department export license. This equipment has been placed on the U.S. export control list by U.S. experts who have judged that special care — and government review — is needed before releasing it to foreign countries.
Nevertheless, some of this “dual-use” equipment went directly to leading nuclear, missile and military sites — the main vertebrae of China’s strategic backbone. And several of these Chinese buyers later supplied nuclear, missile and military equipment to Iran and Pakistan.
A Report by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control Table of Contents Executive Summary Section I, Part A Dual-use American Equipment Licensed for Export to China, 1988 - 1998 1.1-1.11 Section I, Part B U.S. Equipment Approved for Chinese Nuclear, Missile or Military
www.wisconsinproject.org
I swear to God (a supreme Deity, not a CPC handler), if you respond to me again, I'll drop more and more of this literature to dismantle you, piece by piece. Some of us here have actual real world jobs in the industries and fields you're purpoting expertise in. I suggest you do what your forebearers did in the 1980s and 1990s -- i.e., sit down, shut up, and listen.
