Operation Ghazab Lil Haq (Pakistan - Afghanistan War)

[RescueRanger]

I hear a lot of noise - but we must accept that the situation in Afghanistan cannot be viewed in isolation without considering outside threat factors, hostile actors and their impact on Pakistan's NATSEC doctrine.


Overall whilst recent terrorism and cross border incidents have been "spectacular" as most terrorism incidents are - gaining attention of the national and international media - the trend of incidents and casualties has seen a downward trajectory compared to 2025.


Regardless of noise, this alone is proof that our policy is working - however more action is needed on this front, I empathize with the security forces because a lot of the work being done is being done covertly without much visibility - the powers that be, need to make sure to keep up public awareness on these IBOs and their overall impact beyond power point presentations - to maintain public confidence and increase trust factor among all stakeholders.

 

[Distant_Observer]

I hear a lot of noise - but we must accept that the situation in Afghanistan cannot be viewed in isolation without considering outside threat factors, hostile actors and their impact on Pakistan's NATSEC doctrine.
View attachment 204250

Overall whilst recent terrorism and cross border incidents have been "spectacular" as most terrorism incidents are - gaining attention of the national and international media - the trend of incidents and casualties has seen a downward trajectory compared to 2025.
View attachment 204245
View attachment 204246
Regardless of noise, this alone is proof that our policy is working - however more action is needed on this front, I empathize with the security forces because a lot of the work being done is being done covertly without much visibility - the powers that be, need to make sure to keep up public awareness on these IBOs and their overall impact beyond power point presentations - to maintain public confidence and increase trust factor among all stakeholders.

Understood, however is there a reason why top level TTP and BLA leadership have not been targeted?

Are they leaving space for negotiations?

 

[RescueRanger]

Understood, however is there a reason why top level TTP and BLA leadership have not been targeted?

Are they leaving space for negotiations?

Correct, Pakistan has always maintained a policy of keeping doors open. There is method to what may seem like madness given the circumstances.

 

[ghazi52]

Security and stability of Pakistan are at risk with this latest lethal missile and rocket technology ....

 

[ghazi52]

To view this content we will need your consent to set third party cookies.
For more detailed information, see our cookies page.

Accept third party cookies

 

[RescueRanger]

@Distant_Observer I have complied a brief timeline of "Peace deals" with militants for you to better understand the dynamics at play when it comes to Pakistan's strategy. There has been a consistent trend line about negotiating with the terrorists as a viable conflict resolution mechanism.

Conventionally, COIN regimes are said to be 80% political and 20% military in nature. However, the first thing which becomes obvious is that the Terrorists do not seem serious about the political aspect of COIN.

This is arguably a vindication of the proponents of the ‘hard line’ stance towards militants such as the Taliban; they do not seem too amenable to the political aspect of COIN utilizing negotiations.

In fact, they have apparently used the negotiation table as a tactic to gain time, interrupting trend lines of operations which were underway at the time. The state always tried to reason with the militants as a logical enemy but have not gained any useful advantage from it.

Considering the Pakistani case in question, the Pakistani COIN has been for long focused on pushing the militants out of their territorial sanctuaries and holding these areas. This is the result of a long-drawn out process consisting of lots of talking and little fighting till 2009, when the Pakistani army decided to engage in full blown offensives that re took Swat, and cleared large swathes of territory which the state has held successfully.

The militants in Pakistan do not seem amenable to negotiation, or the political side of COIN, and have in fact used the negotiating table as a tactic to interrupt trend lines of operations underway at the time. The state initially tried to reason with the militants as a logical enemy but did not gain any useful advantage from it.

In all operations before ‘‘Rah-e-Haq’’ and ‘‘Rah-e-Nijat’’ the Pakistani government’s counterinsurgency policy was consistently skewed toward negotiating with one warlord or the other.



Breakdown of timeline and significant events:

 

[reader2026]

He is not wrong. Every afghan regime was anti pakistan starting from 1947, its only the black sheep in Pakistan that has divided opinion about Afghanistan

Keep it 100. It's some Pashtuns that have divided loyalty.