Nuffle
Registered Member
In my opinion, it is not yet. The strikes demonstrated that Israel has ABMs to counter the first strike, although we do not know about the subsequent waves. With the October strike, Israel must clearly have realized that it may have no choice but to accumulate a large stockpile of Arrow ABMs to counter subsequent strikes. Of course, the same conclusion may have reached the Iranian high command, which clearly must have further increased missile production and accumulated even larger stockpiles in case of a possible mass attack against its enemies. But the point remains that in a high-intensity war, the rate of missile burn-up is almost always underestimated, especially in the initial phase.30%+ is pretty good for first small waves, in my opinion.
we have to consider massive asymmetry in inventories: Israel is estimated to have c. 300-400 Arrow interceptors + c. 90 THAAD interceptors = 400-500 total ABM interceptors (50% operational at any one time, the rest in reserve for reloads)
from 180 missiles fired in TP2, if 1/3 failed, 1/3 impacted, and 1/3 intercepted = c. 60 interceptors depleted
120 missiles fired in TP1: 30% failed, 10% impacted, 60% intercepted = 72 interceptors depleted
so already c. 25-30% of their entire inventory is gone (on a very conservative basis assuming 1 interceptor per target missile, which is not true in practice). they have to preserve interceptors for cities and will increasingly not attempt to defend other targets (as we saw in Nevatim in TP2). so naturally with time the penetration rate will increase (as we see in Russia).
IRI officials talk about increasing capacity for much larger attacks than TP2, meaning launch of 1000+ missiles at once.
in that scenario the penetration rate will be insignificant, only the accuracy and lethality of the warheads will matter.
The case of Nevatim that you mention is interesting, an open, unprotected but quite large area. Israel can save ABMs here by simply dispersing its aircraft, relying on luck and the inaccuracy of Iranian MRBMs to maintain the operational base. Other cases deserve some more detailed analysis. Iran could change its approach, focusing on a single target at a time, and attacking one target at a time in a massive manner, which would increase the penetration rate. Accumulating the initial strike by targeting Israeli and American ABM targets and radars, would increase the penetration rate of subsequent strike waves, but could exhaust the ABM missiles and destroy the ABM/SAM sites.





