In theory, what happened was not supposed to happen.
I published a sample of an air campaign against Iran in april 2025 (one month before Israel's attacks on Iran), an account on the X platform used data modeling and AI to produce this data, considering everything Israel did, I believe that a good part of what was reported in this analysis of the air campaign in april 2025 was true and actually happened.
Structure and Capabilities
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| Name (type) | Altitude | Missile | Detect range (km) | Tracking range (km) | Min. range (km) | Max range (km) | Max altitude (km) | Notes |
|---|
| Misaq-3 (MANPADS) | Low | - | - | - | 3 | 5 | 3.5 km | Licensed by China (QW-1) |
| - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Ya Zahra-3 | Medium | Shahab-e Thaqeb | - | - | 1 km | 16 km | 11 km | Used by IRGCASF. |
| Herz-eh Nobom | Medium | Shahab-e Thaqeb | - | - | 1 km | 16 km | 11 km | Mobile system fully coupled to Ya Zahra. |
| Tabas | Low-medium | Taer-2A/2B, 3M9/9M9 Kub (24 km) | 250 km | - | 75 km | 30 km | 27 km | It can be coupled with the Bashir search radar. |
| Raad-1 | Medium | Taer-1 (50 km), 3M9/9M9 Kub (24 km) | - | - | 3 km | 50 km | 23 km | Used by IRGCASF. |
| Mersad-1/2, Qader | Low-medium | Shahin, Shalamcheh, Sayyad-2 | 150 km | 80 km | 45 km | 75 km | 18 km | Used by IRIADF. Can be paired with Najm-804 and Hafaz mobile search systems (detection at 350 km, tracking at 110-150 km). |
| Talash-1 | Medium-high | Sayyad-1 | 150 km | - | 35 km | 75 km | - | Used to protect targets against a variety of airborne threats. |
| 3rd of Khordad / Khordad-3 | Medium-high | Taer-2/2B, Sayyad-2/3 | 400 km | 150 km | 50 km | 105 km | 30 km | Used by IRGCASF. Includes new launchers. |
| Talash-2 | Medium-high | Sayyad-2, Sayyad-3 | 150 km | - | 75 km | 120 km | 27 km | Updated version of the S-200 system. |
| Sayyad | Medium-high | Sayyad-2, Sayyad-4 | 150 km | 150 km | 50 km | 150 km | 27 km | Active radar with a range of 1500/1000 km. |
| Bavar-373 | High | Sayyad-2, Sayyad-4 | 320 km | 260 km | 75 km | 200/300 km | 27 | High-altitude air defense system with advanced capabilities. |
This is not up-to-date data and I did not have time to check each Iranian air defense system due to lack of time.
Iran’s Air Defense Force is comprised of a combination of SAM systems, state-of-the-art radars, and early warning systems. The force is responsible for detecting, intercepting, and destroying any airborne threat, including aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.
Air Defense Systems: Iran has a diverse array of anti-aircraft missile systems, both short-range and long-range. The most advanced of these is the Bavar-373, which became operational in 2019 and is capable of intercepting targets at altitudes of up to 27 km and ranges of up to 200 km. Other systems include the Soviet-made S-200, the Talash, and the Mersad, a modernized version of the Hawk system.
Radars and Early Warning Systems: The IRIADF also operates an extensive network of radars and surveillance systems that cover the entire Iranian territory. These systems are crucial to providing a complete aerial picture and anticipating potential air attacks. Key radars include the Sepehr, which has a range of 3,000 km, and the Ghadir, which is also capable of detecting stealth aircraft and ballistic missiles.
Integration with Other Armed Forces: The IRIADF works closely with the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force and Navy to coordinate air defense operations and ensure a rapid response to any threats. The integration of communication and command systems allows Iran to respond in a coordinated manner to any violation of its airspace.
An important feature of Iran’s air defense is its emphasis on self-sufficiency. Due to international sanctions, Iran has had to develop its own weapons systems and radar technologies. Iran’s defense industry has grown substantially in recent decades, and the IRIADF has been a major beneficiary of these advances. In addition to the Bavar-373, Iran has produced several indigenous systems, such as the Khordad 3, which gained notoriety in 2019 after shooting down a US surveillance drone, the Global Hawk, over the Strait of Hormuz.
The development of these capabilities is part of Iran’s strategy to minimize its dependence on foreign suppliers and to ensure continued defense against attacks from adversary states, such as the United States and Israel. The IRIADF also conducts regular air defense exercises, such as Velayat Sky Shield, to test and enhance its readiness.
The Problem with Iran’s Strategy
The effectiveness of its air defenses could be tested in modern conflicts, where threats such as cruise missiles and stealth aircraft are increasingly sophisticated. Iran also faces continued pressure from international sanctions, which limit its access to cutting-edge technologies and components crucial to maintaining its systems.
It is abundantly clear that the force has played a key role in deterring potential air strikes and protecting the country's critical infrastructure, such as nuclear and military facilities, but none of that mattered when the actual attack took place.
Iran should have adopted a strategy similar to the Ukrainian one at the beginning of the war, staying hidden and disconnected, waiting for the attack on the targets and, immediately after the attack, the batteries turn on the radars and try to shoot down any evading planes.
Almost like an aerial “guerrilla” strategy.
The reality is that the Iranian defense tried to adopt a conventional strategy against the IAF, but it was not the main threat they initially faced. All of Iran’s air defense was compromised by cyber attacks, commando actions attacking with drones and ATGMs.