The JF-17 sale has been very successful to other nations. Some nations that showed interest are still in the process of decision making to buy a platform.
By the way, Indonesia is more tilted towards India.
It’s not really about their tilt toward India, anyway. The more interesting question is whether Indonesia is building a coherent long-term fighter force or simply accumulating platforms from different suppliers. Indonesians are reportedly moving toward the J-10CE for induction, but they already operate a remarkably diverse mix of aircraft, with different origins, logistics chains, weapons ecosystems, training pipelines, and support requirements.
I’m not entirely sure how suitable the J-10CE—or even the JF-17—would be for Indonesia in that context. Both platforms come with their own data-link architectures, mission systems, weapons integration requirements, maintenance ecosystems, and broader infrastructure implications. Introducing another fighter type therefore isn’t simply a matter of acquiring airframes; it potentially adds another layer of complexity to an already fragmented force structure.
Indonesia’s priority should arguably be to think through its strategic fighter mix for the next few decades before making further acquisitions. What roles need to be covered, how many fighter families can they realistically sustain, how should those platforms be networked, and which weapons and support ecosystems do they want to standardize around? Buying aircraft from everyone and everywhere may provide short-term capability, but it isn’t necessarily a good force-multiplication strategy. At some point, interoperability, commonality, sustainment, and network integration become just as important as the individual performance of the aircraft.