Nuffle
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- Dec 25, 2023
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We even have pro-Israel articles stating that Hezbollah should have acted after October 7:It's 100% stupidity. Israel had been saying since October 7th that after they're done with Gaza, they'll turn their guns to Hezbullah.
Hezbullah and especially Iran should have expected this, but instead they expected Israel's known lying allies to keep their word.
Their naivety and stupidity cause this to happen.
The fact that Halezbullah still isn't shooting st the armored formations on the border is evidence that they STILL think Israel is bluffing.
Buffoonery
Hassan Nasrallah’s Critical Mistakes since October 7, 2023
Nasrallah miscalculated Israel’s human and military assets - Hassan Nasrallah’s Critical Mistakes since October 7, 2023
jcpa.org
Furthermore, if they were really interested in actually opening the northern front, the rocket attacks could have been better exploited to overwhelm Iron Dome, because Israel was facing thousands of Hamas rockets in the first days, if Hezbollah had effectively entered, it would have completely overwhelmed Iron Dome, ruling out here the hypothesis of an eventual American intervention, but certainly Israel would have been in its worst position.Failure to Act on October 7
Nasrallah’s first major error occurred on the war’s first day, October 7, 2023. He failed to order the “Radwan” forces, stationed on the Israeli border, to invade northern Israel and seize the Galilee region. This could have occurred simultaneously with Hamas’s attack on settlements near the Gaza border. These forces had been training for years for such an operation and were combat-ready, but the order never came.
This missed opportunity could have allowed Hizbullah to score a significant victory over Israel. At the time, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) presence on the Lebanon border was thin, and Hizbullah could have relatively easily occupied parts of the Galilee and captured Israeli settlements and military bases.
Sources suggest that Nasrallah was not informed by Yahya Sinwar of the exact timing of Hamas’s “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation. While he was aware of Hamas’ broader intentions, the lack of precise information left him unprepared.
By the time he recovered from the surprise, the IDF had reinforced its positions on the northern border, and Hizbullah lost the element of surprise.