India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

[Panzerkiel]

Some points of note in this battle are -

There was intelligence failure in not having been able to locate the crack 1 AD . That failure led to the initial debacle while trying to attack.

It also showed that yet again infantry if not properly supported cannot itself prevail against determined defence well covered by artillery and with armour reserves backing it up. 4 mtn was ill equipped to conduct offensive operations, with inadequate artillery, less than normal allocation of AT resource (4 rcl against normal 6). Moreover they trained to operate the lighter 57mm rcl not the heavy 106 and it ought to have caused avoidable confusion on the eve of attack.

4 mtn trained to operate in mountainous Himalayan terrain suitable for infantry operations but not conducive to large scale armoured operations being conducted on this theatre. To use such a unit who was untrained for the terrain also under strength (2 Bde vs normal 3) reflects poorly on Indian offensive preparations. That it was incapable of effective offensive was reflected in it’s subsequent bungling of attacks on Khem Karan. It should however must be pointed out that it did performed admirably well in defensive operations around Asal Uttar, which may have been the way it was trained to operate all along.

Lastly 4 mtn did break from the initial combined arms assaults it faced. S. Singh states that it was the 1st time IA infantrymen were facing major armoured push( Grand Slam was only 2 Patton Regt) and the initial shock may have contributed to the rout. Fortunately however the situation was rectified and the reprieve it got on 7th gave the formation ample time to overcome the initial panic and also receive some morale boost in form of 2 IAB, which if provided earlier may not have resulted in such a fiasco in the first place.

@Joe Shearer ,@Panzerkiel

 

[Panzerkiel]

 

[Panzerkiel]

There was intelligence failure in not having been able to locate the crack 1 AD . That failure led to the initial debacle while trying to attack.

What worries me as an Indian is that there still seems to be an asymmetry in intelligence gathering quantity and quality. It is not at all clear that Indian Military Intelligence knows what it needs to know about the Pakistani order of battle. There have been lots of purchases of surplus and redundant armour from other nations; what are these destined for? Are new units being formed, for instance, on the Pakistan-Afghanistan borders? Are old units being strengthened? Are old units being revived by replacement of what is felt to be less effective?

Certainly professional intelligence gathering will not be reported in the media, but information tends to seep out, and the usual suspects who make a living out of speculative reporting on neighboring military developments would have had tons to say about anything significant that is discovered. Their silence seems to mean that little has been discovered. Or, at the very least, that such discoveries will not make headline or TRP-worthy news.

Possibly the worst defeat in pakistani military history with huge local superiority in armour and artillery,4-5 patton regiments plus chaffees were defeated by a single centurion regiment plus some obsolete shermans and jeeps.AMX were spectators.

Quite right.

What we should worry about is that this was an unexpected defeat, that this went 'against the run of play', so to speak. There was every rational reason to believe that the superior technology would prevail.

Therefore, what is important is to analyse how it happened, not merely what happened.

It is equally important to find out why mountain troops were committed to a battle where their defeat was assured; we cannot afford to forget that the preliminary to this battle was the routing of Indian attacks on the Pakistani positions, on the Ruhi Nulla, and on the Ichhogil Canal.

For that matter, we cannot afford to forget, either, that the aftermath to this 'worst defeat in pakistani military history' was followed by another dismal performance in attacking Pakistani positions in and around Khem Karan and trying to recover these from the same defeated forces that were actually reduced to bolster Pakistani defences in the Sialkot area.

Another cause for concern is the very long passages, 200 kms. at a time, that Indian troops had to traverse to get to battle, that they entered straight out of the trains, without rest, a pause for equipment, or time for briefing or orientation. An armoured team travelled from Ambala to Valtoha, another infantry formation moved from the Himachal hills to the same theatre; these are the weak points that we need to address, as these (the distance between cantonment and battle-field) remain, both on our western flank and on the northern.

@kongn

I hope Indians examining these events will agree that what took place was due to an intention to prevent failures, as much as to produce successes - a policy, in game theory terms, of Minimax, not of Maximin. It sounds faint-hearted, but as @jbgt90 has never tired of pointing out in his rare posts, this was the first of the three major renovations that the Indian military (distinct from the Air Force and from the Navy) underwent.

On a frivolous note, it was, and is, Pakistani policy that followed Maximin. As a pacifist formerly engaged in defence services, my hope is that that will remain so.

 

[Panzerkiel]

 

[Panzerkiel]

 

[Panzerkiel]

By end of day on the 8th, the PA had successfully advanced from the line of the Ruhi Nulla into the former positions of the 4 Mountain Infantry Division, just before the village of Asal Uttar, and had been probing the prepared defensive positions of the Indians, frequently overrunning the Indian defences, but did not make a break-through; the Chaffees were thwarted by Deccan Horse with its Shermans, the Pattons were halted by 3 Cavalry, fighting Centurions.

There was another advance on this day towards Voltoha simultaneously with 24 cavs advance towards Chima conducted by 6 Lancers with one company of 1 FF . This advance was more successful, and they reached Valtoha railway station around 1600 hrs without suffering much losses.But they too were ordered back to lagger at Khem Karan.

The Pakistani attack started at 02:00 HRS. 2 Independent Armoured Brigade had moved its other components into place beside 3 Cavalry into two sickle-shaped formations between Chima Kalan and Lakhna, even befo

This was a 2 Bde attack, much stronger than yesterday’s 2 Regt attack.

Then the armour advanced, attacking 18 Rajrif from three directions in their outlying positions. A fierce battle broke out, and the tanks sought to come into redoubts of 18 Rajrif.

It is claimed that there wasn’t adequate infantry to support the armoured spearhead, and this may well be so as 5 Bde had a single battalion supporting 2 Regts. Also the ground was soggy so that stalled the armour advance and the CO of 6 Lancers was killed in action. This caused confusion among the attackers.

Only a deep penetration on the left, that is, on the Indian right flank, remained.

This attack was spearheaded by 4Cav under 4AB. They ran into the prepared defences of 2IAB and suffered heavy casualties.
There were plans to launch a second attack on Asal Uttar after the 24 cav attack failed. But perhaps the death of Artillery Commander and wounding of the GOC stopped it.

The attack was not a success.

None of the battalions pressed home the attack with anything like determination; on the contrary, Pakistani counter-attacks were desperate affairs, mounted with fierce determination, and making no difference that losses were suffered

H. Singh severely criticised the conduct of operation by 41 Bde. The attacking battalions 1/8 GR and 15 Kumaon did not press home the attack and were subsequently repulsed. 2 Mahar did achieve it’s objectives but was driven away by intense artillery fire.

 

[Panzerkiel]

 

[Panzerkiel]

 

[Panzerkiel]

There was another advance on this day towards Voltoha simultaneously with 24 cavs advance towards Chima conducted by 6 Lancers with one company of 1 FF . This advance was more successful, and they reached Valtoha railway station around 1600 hrs without suffering much losses.But they too were ordered back to lagger at Khem Karan.

This was a 2 Bde attack, much stronger than yesterday’s 2 Regt attack.

It is claimed that there wasn’t adequate infantry to support the armoured spearhead, and this may well be so as 5 Bde had a single battalion supporting 2 Regts. Also the ground was soggy so that stalled the armour advance and the CO of 6 Lancers was killed in action. This caused confusion among the attackers.

This attack was spearheaded by 4Cav under 4AB. They ran into the prepared defences of 2IAB and suffered heavy casualties.
There were plans to launch a second attack on Asal Uttar after the 24 cav attack failed. But perhaps the death of Artillery Commander and wounding of the GOC stopped it.

Just some points from my side regarding PA 1 Armored / 11 Div ops.

PA failed to exploit the unprepared defences of 4 MD after their rout. This gave them time to put up a hasty defence first which then transformed into a deliberate one.

5 AB's initial push managed to find the gap south of the rail line leading towards Khem Karan (6 Lancer's action) which was not exploited and the regiment was called back. IA then managed to plug this gap. Overall, 5 AB's failure was their bad recce of the front which deprived them of any knowledge of IA defences and their gaps.

4 AB then again attacked in a void. First, they themselves were not a potent enough force to force a defensive reaction on 4 MD. Their outflanking move failed in the sense that they bumped again into 4 MD. Again, bad recce....its nothing out of the world, just procedural mistakes...and in this case, as it turned out, bad map reading skills on the part of 4 AB commander who was twice corrected by the CO of under commander MIB but even then did not pay any heed to it.

Moreover, 4 and 5 ABs always started their attacks late in the day, which left precious little day time to operate. Moreover, both brigades made it their business to give up their daily gains after last light and retire to their respective leaguers. They fought for the same area each day.

I am always full of admiration for GOC WC, Gen Harbaksh, for the role he played in 65 War. As commander of almost all the IA troops who took part in 65 war, he proved his mettle. He was always found wherever IA was about to break. He made his personality felt and did not feel shy in visiting the critical sectors of his front whenever there was a need. This thing was found lacking on PA's side. In case of Khem Karan as well, for me, GOC WC played the role of no less than a Strike Corps which strengthened 4 MD.

Some analysis of Khem Karan battle...
It was good tankable terrain, though the tall grass obstructed observation at times.

There was a clear lack of judgement and anticipation on the part of PA commanders.

Southern approach, which was empty and founded by 6 Lancers, was not exploited.

Infantry-tank cooperation was a serious issue.

Poor wireless discipline as well, one PA armored unit continued to transmit everything in clear, without code.

The PA bridgehead was one big mismanaged operation in which almost everything went wrong.

No articulating HQ in the form of a Corps HQ to control and coordinated the ops of 1 AD and 11 ID.

No artillery was used for the attacks against 4 MD defences even though two divisional artillery and one Corps artillery brigades were available.

PAF was not utilized against 4 MD defences.

PA operation in total ignorance of IA strength and defences. It was due to procedures related to recce not being followed.



Now coming to the 4 MD attempts to retake Khem Karan once 1 AD moved out and 11 ID settled for defence.

This time, IA made the same mistake which PA did. Hurling tanks against fixed defences.

PA missed another golden opportunity when 2 IAB was suddenly called to support IA 15 Div. 2 IAB remained away and returned after 48 hours, a fact not seen by PA.

Khem Karan was finally defended by PA's one infantry brigade and an armored brigade.

For IA, it was now a matter of prestige to re-capture Khem Karan. However, there were no reserves with 11 Corps or WC for this task. Therefore, 4 Sikh, which was sorely tired after its capture of Barki, was pulled out and launched in an infiltration op. 2 Mahar was also launched.
CO 4 Sikh was even reminded of 12 Sep, the date of Battle of Saraghari, by GOC WCso that he would make a supreme effort.

CO 4 Sikh initially objected to his unit's op due to...
-ordered to infiltrate the same night on which he arrived, without any rest.
-He had not fully assembled is unit yet.
-Unfamiliar AOO.
- He was given just one night to go through PA infantry brigade supported by an armored brigade.

4 Sikh was subsequently decimated since PA opened fire at close range. 4 Sikh managed to hit a cauldron which was ringed by PA dug-in tanks, SP guns and infantry. Many became POWs. Almost 200 all ranks of 4 Sikh participated in this attack.

IA tried one last, major and desperate attack on 21/22 Sep before the ceasefire.

However, IA had again faulty int regarding PA defences. PA also had dug-in all tanks which proved difficult to eliminate. IA armor, again, was again in support role of infantry instead of leading the infantry. This time, PAF intervened and took our IA artillery gun positions first. IA lack of training in night operations was also evident since they continuously used star shells and flares which provided PA gunners with good indications of IA troops.
....and also, as usual, there was no sign of IAF, which should have intervened massively.

 

[Panzerkiel]

 

[Panzerkiel]

On the Pakistan’s side, that is the Sialkot Sector

Pakistan’s great advantage in this area is that Sialkot is a single sector with excellent internal lines of communications. This is why Pakistan can keep just two infantry divisions, an armored brigade and an (I) infantry brigade in this area. In a short war, these troops are adequate to prevent India from making any major gains.

With a force of 5 Divisions (plus) in Sialkot and Shakergarh sectors, not adding reinforcements located nearby, Pakistan is well- protected in the face of the several Indian divisions in Jammu and Pathankot sectors.

Because of its interior lines of communication, Pakistan can attack Jammu, Samba, Kathua, Pathankot and Gurdaspur with equal facility, or switch forces with ease. Pakistan does not have everything its own way in Shakergarh salient, which is thrusting into India, is vulnerable to being pinched out by India, as IA had started to do in 1971. The problem for India is that by advancing, it pushes Pakistani troops back into a more compact, more easily defended area, and a long war becomes inevitable for decisive results.

To buttress its defense and to utilize the minimum number of troops, Pakistan has fortified the entire area. There are a number of rivers, canals, and tributaries. For example, the Ravi protects the entire south eastern side of the Sialkot sector. The same does not apply to India, because in order to attack Dera Baba Nanak, the gateway to Gurdaspur, Pakistan has only to concentrate on its own side of the Ravi.

To strengthen these water obstacles, Pakistan has also created a series of single and double DCBs. Even a relatively narrow water obstacle can hold up an army for long periods: we have only to remember what happened to the US 36 Infantry Division at the crossings of the Rapido River in Italy in World War II.

It should be noted that when war gainers assign values for the defence against a heavy attack, it is customary to allow defenders behind seriously prepared obstacles almost 3.5 times greater chance of destroying the attacker than in open, hastily prepared defenses. And since the area in question is relatively small, with the entire line fortified, outflanking the line of fortifications is impossible.
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As far as format is concerned, I'll prefer to follow from Indian point of view, we'll discuss both, but my main focus would be that why india has not prevailed in the conventional wars..... From this argument, the capabilities and limitations of both sides will come up.
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The United States had embargoed military supplies to both countries on the outbreak of war. As Pakistan was at least 70% equipped with American arms, this was a very severe blow. As India had perhaps 5% American arms, this was of absolutely no consequence. So no fresh supplies were reaching Pakistan with the possible exception of some minor, clandestine shipments from Iran.

It was the Americans’ practice to give its ally the capability of resisting an enemy attack for about two weeks. After that, should it be deemed necessary the US would arrive with its own forces. It’s allies were, in effect, to maintain just trip- wire forces.

With the Pakistanis running out of ammunition, but with India just getting into its stride, this was the time to press the attack and go for broke. The first of the mountain divisions from the northeast had come up. 23 Mountain Division and its lead brigade had just entered action on the outskirts of Lahore. Whereas Pakistan’s strength was declining, Indian strength was increasing.

Instead of stepping up the offensive, India again accepted a cease- fire, this time pressurized by the Soviets. And brave little Shastri, the man who surprised the Pakistanis by crossing the international frontier in retaliation for attack of Pakistan 12/7 Infantry Divisions at Chhamb- Akhnur, went to negotiate with Ayub Khan at Tashkent.

At that time, Pakistan had its 12 Division in Kashmir, 7 Division in Chhamb, hastily raised 6 Armored Division and 9 Division as reserves located in the Sialkot sector, 15 Division at Sialkot, 10 Division at Lahore, 11 Division at Kasur along with crack 1 Armored Division nearby, 8 Division in Sind, and 14 Division in East Pakistan. The 11 Division, like the 6 Armored, had been hastily raised. The two armored divisions on strength belied the reality that Pakistan had actually converted its 106 Independent Armored Brigade into a division by breaking out reserve tanks without US permission, by diluting tank crews in other regiments and by incorporating its self-propelled tank destroyers into new armored regiments. This hodge podge arrangement meant that Pakistan’s armor was much less effective than a seasoned armored division and an independent armored brigade.

Pakistan’s 7 Division had to be pulled back to the Sialkot-Lahore sector when Indian Xl corps crossed the international border. Its 6 Armored Division and 15 Infantry Division were opposing the advance of Indian 1 Corps from Kathua- Samba. Its 10 Division was opposing the advance of Indian 15 Division out of Amritsar. Its 8 Division was opposing Indian 11 Division in the desert, plus an independent brigade. That left its reconstituted 7 and previously uncommitted 9 Divisions as reserves, and the 1 Armored and an Infantry Division opposed by Indian 4 Division and 2 Independent Armored Brigade.

Because Pakistan had almost reached Akhnur and because it had made a shallow penetration at Khem -Karan, it could declare itself it was winning. Particularly since its Navy had just smacked the nose of the much more powerful Indian Navy by shelling Dwarka, and its compact, efficient air force had inflicted disproportionate casualties on the larger, more diffuse, and still under raising Indian Air Force.

But now lets look at the line-up from the Indian side.

In the north India had 3 Infantry Division out of Leh, which could spare two brigade to attack the Pakistan northern areas. In Kashmir India had bigger 19 and 25 Divisions compared to just one large 12 division for Pakistan.

In the stretch between Akhnur and Pathankot India had no less than five divisions, equal to half of Pakistan’ s entire army. These divisions were 10 Division (Akhnur), 26 Division (Jammu) and I Corps with 1 Armored, 6 Mountain and 14 Divisions. Plus Jammu held the 3 Independent Armored Brigade. In the Punjab India had three divisions and an independent armored brigade under Xl Corps. But another division, 23 Mountain, had moved up and was entering action. And Pakistan’s 1 Armored Division had been rendered almost ineffective at Khem Karan. India had nine divisions including one armored and two independent armored brigades between Akhnur and Ferozepur while Pakistan was left with almost six divisions including one armored.

India also had the equivalent of another division in loose brigades, one under formation, and seven mountain divisions in the east. Of these seven, at least one could have been spared without weakening the Northeast defenses.

This would have given India an effective one armored and ten infantry divisions, plus one armored brigade (leaving aside 2 (I) Armored Brigade which we deduct on account of casualties, as we have deducted Pakistan 1 Armored Division). On Pakistan’s side there were 1 armored and 5 infantry divisions.

If we assign an infantry division a value of 1, an armored division a value of 3, and the independent armored brigade a value of 2 (as being more than half as strong as an armored division) we get a total of 15 for India and 8 for Pakistan. Using Lanchester’s equation, we square each side’s combat power and get 225 for India and 64 for Pakistan, or a 3. 5 to 1 superiority.

Assume further that after another two weeks of fighting India loses the equivalent of three infantry divisions and an independent armored brigade, whereas Pakistan loses two infantry divisions and half its remaining armored division. (India’s losses would be greater because it was attacking.) Then India’s combat power reduces to 100 and Pakistan’s to 20; or a 5:1 superiority. In the next two weeks this could have meant defeat for Pakistan.

Yes, none of this was going to happen overnight. The two countries had been at war for a little over two weeks, and probably another two weeks would have been required for the state of attrition described above to come about on land and in the air. So give another two weeks after that, say six weeks in all, Lahore and Sialkot would surely have fallen.

But of course, when India barely managed to psychologically hold out in a two-week war, with an extra few days added for the initial defence of Chhamb-Akhnur, then there was no question of a six-week war.

 

[Panzerkiel]

After reading several accounts, including the source I have been using so far, Major K. C. Praval’s Indian Army After Independence, it seemed that @meghdut ‘s summary of Cloughley is the most economical. So it is presented here to take our narrative forward. @meghdut has done a marvellous job condensing Cloughley, and I have only made minor grammatical or orthographic corrections in several places.

THE SIALKOT SECTOR

The Indian attack in the Sialkot sector began on the night of 7th September on two axes; the Jammu Sialkot road and a parallel route some 12 miles to the south east. I Corps consisted of following unit

(i) 26 Inf Division, advanced on the axis of Jammu Sialkot road via the border village of Suchtgarh. G Ahmed claims it consisted of 4 Inf. Bdes and 2 Armd. Regts.

(ii) 6 Mtn. Div on the southern axis , crossed border near the village of Charwa.

(iii) 1 Armd. Joined the advance on the first light of 8th September, crossing the border near Charwa moving SE towards Chawinda; consisting of 2 Armrd Bdes with two ARs each and a lorried Ind. Bde with 2 batts. But having exchanged one/two of it’s Centurion equipped Regts. With Sherman Regts. of 2 IAB was understrength.


In the opening stages of the battle Pak 1st Cops covered the Sialkot sector with 15 Inf.Div. consisting of 7 battalions in 4 Bdes. (24,101,104,115) with 25 Cav as Armd Regt and a good allocation of artillery. But there were problems, not the least of which was that 115 Bde was fighting in the Jassar area, where it was required to remain for the rest of the war. 101, Bde (19 Punjab, 13FF) was the only formation directly defending Sialkot, and was located astride the main road to Jammu where it faced the onslaught of the Indian 26 Div. 24 bde(2 punjab, 3 FF and 25 Cav) was between the border and Chawinda, which lies due east of an almost right-angled bend in the Sialkot-Lahore railway. 104 Bde, which consisted of a single battalion 9 Baluch, was in reserve in the area of Uggoke/Raipur, about four miles west of Sialkot. It seemed that in the Jammr/Sialkot sector the Indian army might be able to bring sufficient force to bear to carry the day and even win the war. India’s 1 Corps advanced with two Inf Divisions and an Armd. Division against a Pakistani Armd. Bde and a single Inf. Division that had fragmented and understrength fighting units, no cohesive defensive plan, and some leaders of dubious quality who were always under considerable pressure. India’s 1 Armd. Div was ready to exploit the advantage won by the infantry that preceded it. The way to west seemed open.


6 Armd division , consisting of the Guides Cav, 22nd Cav. 1st SP Regt. Of 25 pdr on tracked chassis, and 4 FF (in total a Bde of 80 tanks 12 guns and 700 infantry) was in leaguer around Kot daska, 15 miles SW of Sialkot and 30 miles west of border . Chawinda, where it was to win it’s spurs , was 20 miles away. The units moved quickly when it became apparent that the Indian invasion was taking place.

THE INDIAN THRUST ALONG THE MAIN SIALKOT ROAD

In the north 2 batts of India’s 26 ID crossed the border astride the Jammu-sialkot road at midnight on 7th September. They quickly overcame the outposts of the Sutlwj Rangers but were brought to a halt by 101 Bde and weight of PA artillery. According to Mankekar and Johri, the approaches to Sialkot ‘bristled with pill-boxes, bunkers and gun-emplacements’, the latter including ‘ three field and one medium artillery regts. one heavy battery and one heavy mortar regts’. A concentration of this number of guns and mortars would cover an area of 500/150 meters in which the weight of shells and mortar bombs from one round of fire from each equipment would be approximately two tons. It does indicate that PA artillery fire was substantial and effective.

26 div. managed to reach the village of Kalarawanda, about 3 miles west of the border, by the time of the cease fire . There was a massive effort on the part of the IA on the northern axis of the Sialkot front, but an advance of only 3 miles cannot be called satisfactory when one considers the numerical superiority of 26 div. the defence of Sialkot by 19 Punjab and 13 FF and their supporting gunners were effective.

CHAWINDA BATTLES

Also at about midnight of 7th , two bdes of India’s 6 mountain division crossed the border south of the 26 div. axis and occupied the villages of Maharajke and Charwa just inside Pakistan. The battalions in the assault were 4 Raj Rif, and 2/5 Gurkha rifles. They secured the firm base for the advance of 1 AD at first light. In fact although the armour came through as planned, the immediate border area was not secure for several days because PA stay behind parties wreaked havoc by sniping and ambushing. The division’s 1 AB reached the village of Phillora and the line of the Sialkot-Lahore railway by 0900, but it’s right flank was exposed by the failure of 43 inf bde to move quickly enough to keep up. Explanations vary regarding the reasons for this, Johri claims there was a downpour which bogged down the vehicles, Verghese states the armour simply outran the wheeled vehicles, but whatever happened, the Armd Bde had no flank protection. Then a hastily assembled ad-hoc force under direct command of HQ 1 Corps Gujranwala , moved east quickly and stuck on 8 September. It forced the IA back to border where it remained for two days before advancing again.

The PA had three Armd. Regts. and three Inf.battalions, a mixture of units from 1st Armd.(6th?) and 24 Inf. Bde. India had two Armd. bde with two Regts. and an Inf. Battalion. Forces about equal strength had met in battle and one had been made to retreat. Unfortunately for PA, it had insufficient armour immediately available to strike a quick blow that would have destroyed the Indian armour which was, naturally , in some disarray,. Even Verghese claims that “1st Armoured division was hit….hard in the rib, because it dashed forward somewhat rashly”.

Both sides used the lull to regroup. The Indians rapidly regained balance and probed forward, while the Pakistanis brought up as many reinforcements as they could to match the preponderance of Indian armour, which was also being augumented. It was a desperate time for PA. they well knew IA still had reserves while almost every unit of PA ORBAT was already committed to the fight. 11 Cav arrived from Chhamb along with 4 Inf. Bde(14 Punjab and 6FF) not a minute too early to join ain defending the area against the Indian assault which began at first light of 11 September.

The Indians advanced on two axes, Charwa-Chawind and Kaloi-Pagowal. The battalion group advancing on the latter route was repulsed and forced to fall back to the Kaloi area. On the Chawinda axis, the Indians reached Phillora after a series of head-on tank and infantry battles in which the two sides slugged it out until dusk when 5 Jat(100 killed), 5/9 GR, elements of the Poona Horse, and 4 Horse took and held the village. Battles raged over the area until cease-fire. The Indians knew it was essential for them to take Chawinda; the Pakistanis knew that if they did, the ground between Lahore and Sialkot would open up for their further advance as there were no forces available for defence further west. On 12 Spetember the PA tried without success to retake Phillora and next day Indians tried to outflank Chawinda from the east but, in an impressive display of flexibility, PA moved 19 and 20 Lancers and 1 FF (of 1 Ad) to tis defence and the Indian advance was halted after fierce fighting. Gulzar Ahmed acknowledged that “It must be said to the credit of the Indian AArmy that they fought with commendable courage and determination on this day”. An attack against Chawind was planned on 14th but, in classic employment of good intelligence and efficient artillery, the PA located the FUP of the Garhwali battalion that was to lead the assault and brought fire down on it. The battalion was forced to withdraw and the attack did not take place.

On the night of 15/16 September the Indians again tried to outflank the main PA force, this time by pressing west to Jassoran, three miles due west of Chawinda, across the railway line, then south to cut off Chawinda from the rear. Once the village was isolated, the Indians considered it would fall. At first the advance went well, with Jassoran being occupied at about 1100 on the 16 by 8 Garhwali rifles, supported by 1 Sqdn of 2 Poona Horse. The infantry than turned south and managed to take the village of Buttar Dograndi, but their armour was engaged so heavily by PA AT weapons that it could not advance further. The battalion held out until 17th then was forced to withdraw to Jassoran. It had been impossible to reinforce the unit in order to continue the advance, but neither could the Pakistanis bring in enough force to mount a counter attack. Furthermore the PA artillery was running short of ammunition. By mid September the daily allocation of 155mm ammo was five rounds per gun! The embargo on Pakistan was taking effect.

In spite of ammo shortage and tank casualities, the PA regrouped and managed to clear the area west of Chawinda around the railway line on 18/19 September; but did not manage to fully retake the station at Alhar, the north side of which remained in Indian hands until the cease-fire. The PA planned Operation Wind Up for 19/20 September with the aim of outflanking the Indians and penetrating west to cut them off. But it was cancelled for various reasons.

 

[Panzerkiel]

After reading his War Despatches, I began to understand your assessment more fully. It is as you said; where he was not present, the area of action of I Corps, for instance, things did not go well.

Its both positive and negative.

Positive in the sense that GOC WC, despite the long frontage of his Command, did not shy away from visiting his frontline commanders. A commander, irrespective of his level (platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division, Corps and Army), can only influence a battle with his Command Reserves. You may have noted that there were NO COMMAND RESERVES at the disposal of GOC WC. This left little choice with him except to set personal example and be visible whenever the situation turned critical somewhere. And its amply clear that his personal example and presence worked wonders and saved Indian Army many a times.

Negative in the sense that.....what if GOC WC were of the same caliber as of Commander 1 Corps, XI Corps, 1 Armd Div or even 15 Div. You can well imagine what would have happened. Gen Chaudhri, COAS, was also hardly seen anywhere, especially during the war itself.

@Joe Shearer like one of your associates told you, and you quoted here as well....Indian Army, being bigger than PA, has also greater number of duds. Its all relative. Smaller country, smaller share...bigger country, bigger share.

 

[Panzerkiel]

You may have noted that there were NO COMMAND RESERVES at the disposal of GOC WC. This left little choice with him except to set personal example and be visible whenever the situation turned critical somewhere. And its amply clear that his personal example and presence worked wonders and saved Indian Army many a times.

On reading the accounts from different points of view by different authors, this was the most incredible fact that emerged. I can hardly believe that the Indian Army attacked with such paper thin resources, and spread out in such a way that there was no local superiority anywhere, EXCEPT for two or three days right at the outset of I Corps' abortive attack.

Thank Heavens for Harbaksh Singh.

I have been promised by a rather more well-endowed member that he will get me Major General Jogindar Singh's Behind the Scene; I am looking forward to reading it as the excerpts I have read so far show it to be the same as Jake's book on his military life and his war experiences; a Chief of Staff who despised his Commander. I could only think despairingly of von Gneisenau and of Ludendorff. When will we learn to work in teams with loyalty towards each other? Is it impossible?

Negative in the sense that.....what if GOC WC were of the same caliber as of Commander 1 Corps, XI Corps, 1 Armd Div or even 15 Div. You can well imagine what would have happened. Gen Chaudhri, COAS, was also hardly seen anywhere, especially during the war itself.

I worked with the General's son, and he was one of only three managers with whom I worked successfully in 35 years; like others in my family, I was found to be an excellent superior, a prickly equal and an impossible subordinate. So I was terribly sorry, very, very disappointed to read about his performance in this test.

It was only on reading excerpts from Jogindar Singh's book that I realised that Muchu had been GOC XV Corps in his time. What was he doing, allowing his troops to be strung out like so many picquets along the tortuous border? Why did he create I Corps and recall Dunn from leave preparatory to retirement? What was he doing attacking from what clearly, in retrospect, was the wrong spot and in the wrong line of advance? Why did such a key person keep having mood swings, that Chavan reports in his diary? (I have my major reservations about Chavan, but that is another story, based on my complete antagonism towards Gopal Bewoor). How could he panic and ask that Indian troops retire behind the Beas? Why was he so ill-informed about Indian reserves and materiel status? I get a headache thinking of these; they go to bear out my theory, that I have repeatedly advanced, that the divine power was with India, not with Pakistan; nothing else can explain our survival.

You talked of 15 Div.; we had discussed this before, when you pointed out that Biji Kaul had commented that Niranjan Prasad had proved cool under fire. My objection to that remains; where did Biji hear or see enemy fire? He never saw it in his entire career, most of which was in the ASC; where did he see Niranjan Prasad braving it? Considering the rapid steps that the good Major General took when danger threatened?

I Armoured Division did not do well; however, on reading Harbaksh Singh, and on reading excerpts from Jogindar's poisoned book, I realised that my own pet hate was here, too, doing his bit. Brigadier K. K. Singh messed up in these movements, and he not only survived his ham-handed handling of his Armoured Brigade, but was leading a Division in 71, and retired as a Lieutenant General replete with honours and a Wikipedia page to himself. Theograj, to the best of my knowledge, retired in the same rank in which he fought Asal Uttar, Brigadier.

I personally think XI Corps could have done little, given an old woman like Niranjan Prasad leading one Division, and given the unbelievable decision to put a Mountain division to attack the world's best tanks with nothing much to stave them off with. However, perhaps you would say that it isn't enough to dig out excuses, it needs the digging out of victory from the situation. I believe Gurbaksh Singh was the least harmful of the top generals.

As for Dunn, the poor man should have not been recalled from Leave preparatory to retirement.

It was difficult reading these books and reading your comments. Painful.

 

[Panzerkiel]

Some points from my side regarding the battle of Chawinda / Sialkot

Indian 1 Corps was raised in April - May 1965 as a spare HQ, with its Commander P O Dunn junior to Sparrow who was commanding 1 Armored Division under him. Initially there were no troops under command HQ 1 Corps.

The mandate given by GOC WC to GOC 1 Corps was..
Advance along axis Pathankot-Samba, EITHER towards Jammu or Daska to relieve Jammu...
OR establish bridgehead on Ravi in Dera Baba Nanak area, and then advance till MRLC.

Later 1 Armored, 6 Mountain, 14 and 26 Infantry Divisions were placed under command 1 Corps.

Overall final plan was for 6 Mountain and 14 Infantry Divisions to secure a lodgement from which 1 Armored Division will breakout. 26 and 14 Infantry Divisions were to protect the flanks of 1 Armored Division by pushing towards Sialkot and Zafarwal respectively.

PA 6 Armored division had its own problems due to its hasty raising. They included...
- Absence of Brigade HQs between Div HQ and units
- Absence of Div artillery HQ
-absence of Col Staff
-each armored regiment had one squadron of obsolete M36B2 tank busters.
-Armored Infantry units had no APCs, only trucks.
-15 RRs per unit instead of 27 RRs.
-Ineffective signal comm eqpt
-6 Armored Division was actually to undergo a test exercise in Oct 1965 to gel some cohesion due to the hasty raising, but the war came first.

Strangely, once IA 1 Armored Division was identified, PA 6 Armored Division was given a defensive task to hold ground, a task suited for infantry formations, not armor.

As usual , IAF again failed to play any role in furthering the operations of IA 1 Corps.

IA 14 Division also missed a golden opportunity to capture Zafarwal keeping in view of paucity of troops on PA side initially.

Overall, Op Nepal ended as a stalemate.
Root cause which was identified was lack of schwerpunkt....there was no real strength of IA forces on any given axis.

Op Nepal forces advanced on a wide front which resulted into dilution of forces. Hence, again, there were NO RESERVES with Corps / Div commanders.
14 Division was supposed to be the Corps reserve formation, but it was initially cannibalized, and subsequently scattered.

Moreover, there was strategic direction of IA 1 Corps...a specific direction in which the Corps could have focused all its efforts.

1 Armored Brigade of IA 1 Armored Division operated with only two armor regiments, there was lack of a third regiment which could have been used for exploitation.

GOC 1 Armored Division, instead of showing boldness and going deep or for outflanking maneuvers, settled for shallow jabs only.

IA feint at Jassar and diversionary effort could have better exploited if these actions could have been included in the overall planning.

1 Corps overall showed undue caution which was clear by its policy of detaching major forces for flank protection instead of in attack.

Weak command and control of GOC 1 Corps was also clearly evident.

It can also be said that overall, this battle was a competition between the ineptness of Indian commanders in applying operational strategy principles and inability of PA commanders to handle large formations in the field.

PA suffered due to incorrect assessment of IA strength and its intentions. PA in Sialkot had no reason to be surprised by IA 1 Corps offensive since it opened two days after 6 September.

Later, in a hurried fashion, PA pulled out 1 AD from Khem Karan and deployed it in Sialkot sector with no plans for its employment. This shows that there no peacetime contingency plans for employment of PA 1 AD in Sialkot sector.

Later, it was also found that IA was operating with outdated maps, with no new features or names. This shows their peacetime preparation and planning for an offensive in Sialkot sector.