We have seen the prelude to the main engagements in 1965, almost the equivalent of a classical music quartet or a quintet to the entire symphonic orchestra of battles heard of elsewhere, even battles fought by the British Indian Army in Burma. Only 13 infantry battalions on the two sides combined, about 4 conventional divisions, 2 and a half armoured regiments, a Corps worth of artillery, sporadic interventions by the IAF. Nothing more than would constitute a skirmish in any campaign of the preceding WWII, or even the Korean War, with its massed infantry attacks combined skilfully with infiltration tactics to take apart far superior weaponry and a technology an order of magnitude higher.
But this was to change very shortly, as a second, and then a third Army Corps on the Indian side took on several divisions on the Pakistan side, and both sides fought like tigers to break the other side.
By the end of August, the Corps Commander Indian XV Corps evidently had had much to say to his Army Commander, the GOC-in-C Western Command, General Harbaksh Singh, and to his COAS, General Chaudhuri. Operation Grand Slam was the last straw; when 191 Brigade, weakened and demoralised by the preliminary engagements that deprived them of their CO, was shredded by General Malik's two Infantry Divisions, and two Armoured Regiments, and his artillery, even the reinforcing two brigades provided to support the nascent Indian 10th Division could not hold out against the onrushing enemy. Given a day's respite on the 2nd, they held out as long as they could on the 3rd and the 4th, until finally flesh and blood could take it no longer, and 41 Mountain Brigade regrouped behind their reserve brigade, 28 Brigade, and took position at Akhnur.
This was effectively the end of both Operation Gibraltar and Grand Slam, and left Indian XV Corps holding the Haji Pir Pass, but not the heights surrounding that feature, thus denying the Indian Army the use of the strategic Uri-Poonch Road; Indian 10 Division was left to hold out against the Pakistan Army 10 Brigade, 104 Brigade and
4 Azad Kashmir Brigade, and two Patton-equipped armoured regiments, and artillery. Attacks on 10 Division continued on the 6th, and it was clear that this pressure would continue, even increase.
The situation needed a sharp reaction.
Sir please, let's think positive.
Despite all the false bravado by fanboys on this forum, my biggest fear is a conflict breaking out between India and Pakistan. Both sides are armed to the teeth, possess some of the most deadliest weapons and have mastery of the arms they possess. That's a lot of bodies sir.
Believe me, there is nothing that I would like to see less than our jawans in danger in war.
Sir please, let's think positive.
Despite all the false bravado by fanboys on this forum, my biggest fear is a conflict breaking out between India and Pakistan. Both sides are armed to the teeth, possess some of the most deadliest weapons and have mastery of the arms they possess. That's a lot of bodies sir.
I'm so glad you're following this thread. It has been a re-education for me; I had no idea I had got so many things wrong.
What do we already know about the background to the 'sharp reaction'?
We know from inputs by Shuja Nawaz, and also from PanzerKiel, about the background to I Corps actions, but immediately, at this moment, it might help focus to look at XI Corps exclusively.
About XI Corps, we are reminded that I Armoured Div was very much part of XI Corps reserves, and Dhillon gave up command of I Armoured to I Corps with great reluctance. So we have General Dhillon executing his part of the operation short of the thunderbolt that he should have been able to hurl, and having to traverse clear country, with no defences to shield his troops, and these troops being almost exclusively PBI: 15 Infantry Div, 7th Infantry Div, and 4 Mtn Div. A quick flash forward: 15 Div zipped over its given line of attack, and not only reached the Ichhogil Canal, the given objective, but was recalled and then asked to advance a second time, in the teeth of a warned and aroused opposition. This, in spite of the visible war-weariness of the divisional commander, and his contribution to the legacy of the Pakistan Army - he donated his jeep to its war museum.
7 Div pushed forward rapidly to Hudiara, its objective; however, while its two brigades, 48 and 65, were to have leapfrogged each other, 48 to capture Hudiara and Nurpur, two points across each other on the Lahore road, and 65 to approach the position held by 48 and move on past it to the Ichhogil Canal, in reality, while 48 Brigade achieved its objectives, 65 faced the aroused Pakistan Army and made heavy weather of its advance. Their story effectively ended when 48 Brigade was diverted to support 4 Mtn Div. which was in trouble to the south of 7 Div's axis.
4 Mtn Div proved all over again that mountain troops really have no business fighting in the plains; why these troops were repeatedly deployed during this phase and immediately earlier is a mystery (we just saw 41 Brigade come up to support the badly battered 191 Brigade at Chhamb, and their rough handling by the two Pakistani armoured regiments supporting Grand Slam). On top of everything else, this division and its components had to travel very long distances, hundreds of kilometres, to reach its assembly point. It is best to deal with the actions of 4 Mtn Div. separately, as it saw the most action, even keeping in mind the magnificent performance of individual battalions within the 15 Infantry Division.
XI Corps, under Lt. General J. S. Dhillon, was asked to strike straight for the Pakistani defensive line at the Ichhogil Canal. The topography between Amritsar and Lahore is flat and unrelieved by any kind of cover; that leads to advantages and disadvantages both. The advantage was that armour could move quickly, stopped only by canals and waterways, including rivers; the disadvantages were that artillery and air attack both could stop an attacking team in its tracks. For that matter, it could also expose a defending team to a pounding.
XI Corps also had the element of surprise. Pakistan had not done anything particularly effective to defend Lahore. Even its 10 Division had been positioned in front of the city only the day before; actually, only hours before the Indian attack.
XI Corps then had, north to south, 15 Infantry Div., aiming for Dograi; 7 Infantry Div., aiming for Hudiara, and 4 Mtn. Brigade was launched at Kasur.
The initial objective was to advance along the GT Road to the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal, just next to the village of Dograi, which lay east of the Canal. To do this, General Dhillon had assigned 15 Infantry Division, that had two Brigades under command: 38 Brigade, tasked to take the road bridge at Bhaini Dhilwan, leading to the Pakistani enclave; and 54 Brigade, launched straight down the GT Road (the northernmost bridge near Dera Baba Nanak was assigned to 29 Brigade).
Let us see what happened at each of these bridges.
BRIDGE OVER RAVI NEAR DERA BABA NANAK
First, northernmost bridge near Dera Baba Nanak, and 29 Infantry Brigade; Brig. Pritam Singh, had captured this bridge and its enclave early on 6th September. Dera Baba Nanak was 80 kms southerly of Jammu, where all the excitement had been on the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 6th of September.
If I have read the maps correctly, this is the same bridge that connects Dera Baba Nanak to Kartarpur, over the Ravi, and allowing Pakistan access to its land enclave east of the Ravi; a bridge that has been much in the news recently.
However, the Pakistan Army, realising the situation in all its gravity with the three divisions attacking and gaining quick objectives on the 6th itself, reacted very strongly, and recovered much of the losses; this bridge was one of the first to be recovered. Around 15:00 HRS on the 6th, the Army Commander and the Corps Commander heard from Pritam Singh that the situation was dire, and that 29 Brigade should be allowed to fall back on the Batala Road, further behind his current position off the objective, of which he had been dispossessed.
There was logic behind this, although Pritam Singh had gone into a flap earlier than necessary. The thinking behind the bid to capture this bridge had been to pre-empt a Pakistani crossing in strength and a drive towards Gurdaspur and then towards Pathankot; Pathankot, it needs to be remembered, was 108 kms from Dera Baba Nanak, Gurdaspur only 70. They lay in the easterly direction from DBN; therefore withdrawing to the Batala Road, somewhat south-east of DBN, would allow Pritam to threaten the right flank of such an attack if it developed, and cut the lines of communication by attacking the connecting bridge.
However, Pritam Singh had not checked the situation on the ground, and was reacting to the tales of woe received from his forward battalions. While capturing the bridge in the early hours of the 6th, in darkness, the Indian troops had not noticed that a watchtower remained intact, and that the Pakistan Army were using it as an Artillery Observation Post, and calling down heavy fire from first light itself on the troops occupying the bridge. After softening them up for eight hours, the Pakistan Army advanced with tanks and overran two companies of the forward Indian battalion; the rest of the battalion managed to hang on. The shelling continued, and most of 29 Brigade got a fair share of attention.
This was the position at 14:00 HRS and this is what was partially reported to General Harbaksh Singh and General Dhillon at 15:00. On realising what had happened (or not happened, in this case), Dhillon ordered the 29 Brigade to stand firm, and put his GSO1 on site, to sit on Pritam Singh's head and generally encourage and edify him. For whatever reason, perhaps due to a refreshing and encouraging conversation with his Corps Commander, 29 Brigade first held out against a renewed Pakistani attack in the darkness of the 6th night, around 21:00 HRS, and then counter-attacked with armour at around 02:45 HRS on the 7th morning, winning back the bridge, and winkling out the mischief-making observation post. The PA, however, demolished one span of the bridge; in other words, the Indian defensive objective was achieved, the feared offensive move of the PA was still-born.
BRIDGE OVER ICHHOGIL CANAL AT BHAINI DHILWAN
The reader will have to bear with the narrative, as formation replaced formation in quick succession during the course of pursuing this objective.
Of the two brigades assigned to 15 Infantry Division, 38 Brigade was set to capture the Bhaini Dhilwan Bridge, and it fell to 1 Jat to achieve that. They did that, but could hold on, due to heavy artillery and tank fire. Later, on their falling back around noon on the 6th, the Corps commander personally ordered 6 Kumaon of the reserve 96 Brigade to take up the task and re-capture the bridge. They were unsuccessful in their attack on the 7th September evening, but consolidated nearby, holding on until the 8th September evening.
On the 11th, however, opposing tanks and infantry that had followed 6 Kumaon and 1 Jat when they left their firm defensive positions near Ranian, began to pose a major threat. To support them, 2 Independent Armoured Brigade, held by the Corps, that had just fought a brilliant battle in the Kasur sector, was shifted from 4 Mtn. Division to 15 Infantry Division, and reinforced 96 Brigade, whose unit 6 Kumaon was. Relieved of pressure from the opposing armour, 96 Brigade now took back the bridge in three days' time, by the 14th September.
96 Brigade had been the corps reserve for XI Corps. As it had been committed, 50 Independent (Para) Brigade that had arrived on the field, was attached to XI Corps, but was relieved in two days time by our old friends, 41 Mtn. Brigade, last seen fighting for its life in front of 28 Brigade in Akhnoor, and forced to pass through that brigade to re-group and consolidate. That regrouped and consolidated formation now was transferred from XV Corps to XI Corps, and took up position as Corps reserve; 50 Independent (Para) Brigade moved to a point north of Atari.
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These, then, were the two smaller engagements that 15 Infantry Division had, involving 29 Brigade in the north, 38 Brigade, later 96 Brigade.
The larger one was the battle for the Bridge over the Ichhogil near Dograi, fought by 54 Brigade, 3 Jat in particular, and the recoil and renewed attack on Dograi after the recall of the victorious troops by the Brigade Commander of 54 Brigade. This story might be named Victory into Defeat.
This will be narrated as
THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI.
Besides this, 7 Infantry Division struck out for its own objectives, and was not really successful.
To be reported as
THE BRIDGE AT BARKI.
The really significant fighting under XI Corps, however, was the fighting under 4 Mtn. Div. in the extreme southern edge of the Corps boundary. That might echo Field Marshal Bill Slim's book, and be described as Defeat into Victory.
Just to remind all readers of an earlier post in the thread by
@Panzerkiel, here it is:
Coming to Operations Riddle and Nepal....
XI Corps attack plan was named RIDDLE.....
involved attack towards Lahore along three axis (15, 7 and 4 Mountain Divisions), they were to capture area uptill BRBLC, with a be-prepared mission to go across it in case of unexpected success...moreover, Jassar enclave was to be eliminated and its bridge capture to negate a Pakistani offensive option towards DBN.
1 Corps attack plan was named Nepal..
for which a bridgehead was planned in Bhagowal-Phillaurah area to provide a firm base for 1 Armored Division to break out towards MRLC and Daska....
Problems faced by IA...
first, owing to vast distances (international border to peacetime locations), WC was forced to stagger all these attacks...therefore all these formations had to attack right from their line of march without any rest or necessary coordination...
WC also did not have upto date maps of their area of operations....
Moreover, there was also indicators of indian reluctance to cross the international border....some reasons being...
PA's edge in armor (quantity and quality)
Superior PA artillery
F-104 (even though it was available in a limited quantity to have any major impact on the tactical battle)
GOC XV Corps, since he was hard pressed due to Gibralter and Grandslam, pressed COAS to open the international border so that PA pressure against him can be reduced. Therefore IA D Day was advanced to 6 Sep in order to relieve pressure against Akhnur..
PRELIMINARIES TO THE BATTLE FOR THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI
If we look at how the conflict unfolded, there is a steady development of the theme visible up to a point. So we had irregulars in action in Operation Gibraltar, messing up the peace of mind of the Indian XV Corps, and getting Katoch to imitate Stephen Leacock's hero: "Lord Ronald said nothing; he flung himself from the room, flung himself upon his horse and rode madly off in all directions." Katoch managed to keep the upper hand, and even capture an important strategic feature, but not without suffering injuries; not crippling injuries, but in the context of things, given that 47-48 was 17 years before, most alarming. He successfully communicated his troubled state of mind to his Army commander, and to his Chief, during his conference with them at Srinagar, and it was actually while they were with him that news of Grand Slam broke upon them like a, well, thunderclap. General Chaudhuri immediately air dashed to Delhi (I've always wanted to use that phrase!), got permission for taking action with a free hand and issued orders for the Indian riposte; Operations Riddle and Nepal (for some reason, these names are never mentioned in Indian circles in Indian annals).
So we saw a progression; from an entire Army Corps facing a large number of irregulars (estimates differ), albeit with considerable 'sympathetic' support from heavy artillery across the line of control, fire that had its own effect in battering the Indian troops defending Chhamb-Akhnoor, we next had, in Operation Grand Slam, 7 battalions and 2 Armoured Regiments, and the artillery from a Corps, on the Pakistan side of the equation, facing 5 battalions, a light tank regiment and fairly innocuous artillery. The inevitable consequences followed; the Indian position of the newly-institutied 10 Division was opened up as if by a tin-cutter, with one segment doing a backward left wheel from a north-south orientation to a west-east orientation along the foothills, and another segment falling back before a traumatic armoured attack faced by a mountain brigade, 41 Mtn Brigade, to re-group behind the Corps reserve, 28 Brigade.
The Div. commander lost his job; very unfairly, considering that he only got a division that took up its war-time location on the very day that his enemy attacked, and considering that he was left with ad hoc formations deputed to him at the eleventh hour, including a Mountain Division that didn't have the tools to resist an armoured attack, and an armoured contingent that was frankly not fit to oppose main battle tanks in battle. But there it is; he and the CO, 15 Infantry Division, were the two divisional commanders to be removed.
Both were negligent in reporting, and tried to mislead their respective commanders, Chopra the Corps commander XV Corps General Katoch, and Niranjan Prasad, who had already two strikes against him (NEFA 4 Division, Kashmir 25 Division) the Corps commander XI Corps Joginder Dhillon.
That was the critical difference.
One last point: it was baffling to see XI Corps attacking on such a broad front. From Dera Baba Nanak to Kasur is 125 kms; we have XI Corps deploying 3 Divisions, 15 Infantry, 7 Infantry and 4 Mountain, with two brigades, 38 and 54, under the first, two brigades, 48 and 65, under the second, and 7 Mountain and 62 Mountain, under the third. In addition, 96 Brigade was pressed into service vice 29 Brigade, in the tussle over the bridge near Dera Baba Nanak.
General Harbaksh Singh has an explanation, and we will go into that later. It was not a terribly convincing explanation, having to do with this being originally a plan that would have deployed 1 Armoured Division along one of the captured bridges, and looking a bit pointless after the COAS had diverted 1 Armoured Division to his pet new 1 Armoured Corps, and made a joke of the entire plan. That does not explain why, having found that this was going through, the XI Corps plan had not been changed to strengthen one of the four access points to Pakistani territory.
@Cuirassier
I don't know. I only have this brutally direct piece of narration by Harbaksh Singh:
In the meanwhile, a message came from 39 Medium Battery of Artillery (this was part of a Sikh Battalion converted into a Medium Artillery Regiment and the message was meant for me as Colonel of the Sikh Regiment) that the personnel of the 161 Artillery Regiment, deployed next to them, had deserted enmass, leaving their guns, with stacked ammunition, and wagon-line (vehicles) behind.They wanted them collected, lest they fall into enemy hands. Despite the desertion, they averred that the Medium Battery, in position, would continue to support the forward Brigade. Upon receipt of this message, I ordered the Divisional Commander, Major General Chopra, in the presence of his Corps Commander, to muster as much manpower and as many electrical mechanical engineers from his Division, as he could, and arrange to collect the guns, the ammunition and the vehicles. Having done so, he could then order 41 Mountain Brigade to withdraw that night. The orders for withdrawal were to get to the Brigade by 2 o’clock that afternoon, so that the Brigade Commander could plan his withdrawal properly. Thereafter, General Kashmir Katoch arid I left Akhnoor, by the same helicopter in which we had come, and flew back to our respective Headquarters.
The next morning, the 5th of September, my Chief of Staff was rung up by General Officer Commanding 10 Division to say that the Brigade had come back safely, with all its equipment and ammunition. But before congratulating the General Officer Commanding for this successful operation, I asked my Chief of Staff to check up from the General Officer Commanding if the guns had also been brought back. His reply that they could not be brought back made me furious. I ordered his Corps Commander to hold a Court of Inquiry for this lapse. As a result of this inquiry, General Chopra was sacked from his appointment.
After finishing the narration of the battle for the bridge at Dograi, and for the bridge at Barki (by 7 Div in the second case), when we come to the actions of 4 Mtn Div. I plan to share some relevant extracts from several different accounts. I do not have the book written by Major General Joginder Singh*, who seems to have been a thorough-going pain in the, erm, elbow, which is a pity.
Please bear with me till then.
* There were two general officers named Joginder Singh.
One was Major General Joginder Singh, Chief of Staff to Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh; the other was Lieutenant General Joginder Singh Dhillon, GOC-in-C XI Corps.
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