India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

Compared to 1971, Pakistan today has good MR capabilities, which makes it very difficult for any IN task force to approach undetected. There are a minimum of 70 PAF aircraft which are within easy reach of our coast. Some are also equipped with multiple types of AShMs. Then for close-in defence, we have land based shore AShM batteries, patrol/missile boats and helis. For mid-line defense we have destroyers and frigates while subs are there for extended defence and sea-denial missions.
 
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Panzerkiel said:
Compared to 1971, Pakistan today has good MR capabilities, which makes it very difficult for any IN task force to approach undetected. There are a minimum of 70 PAF aircraft which are within easy reach of our coast. Some are also equipped with multiple of AShMs. Then for close-in defence, we have land based shore AShM batteries, patrol/missile boats and helis. For mid-line defense we have destroyers and frigates while subs are there for extended defence and sea-denial missions.
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also drones make it pretty much impossible to blockade without loosing ships , more worried about IN just siting far way and spamming brahmos at karachi and navy/af infra .
peacemaker99 said:
For blessed are the peacemaker ballistic missiles...
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lets assume india uses drones to get deep in to water with fire power of indian army with extensive use of drones on karachi anduse iaf for air to ground while indian navy destroyers frigate to fire brahnose from 800 km range with fiece fire power. can it succeed?
 
samsite84 said:
Animosity with India will only result in Pakistan going down...
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Pakistan have seen new heights when it recently kicked Indians ass..
Actually fking INDIA up brings the best out of Pakistan...
You are NEWBIE here... On this forum... We have Heard since 2008 on this forum of mighty Su30 to Rafales to surgical strike to operation Sindoor... So you need to smell coffee rather than some Indian stinking curry...
I have seen those members disappear like they cease to exist.. 😂 😂 😂..
@Sharma Ji
 
For IN, main problem would always remain obtaining the requisite air cover in any attack against Pakistan. Just an example, to keep just two aircraft above the fleet may require a whole squadron of 16 aircraft to be deployed. Ground based IAF aircraft may be able to escort the IN fleet no further than 200 miles considering available assets, serviceability rate and ongoing OCAOs and DCAOs.

IN carriers normally have 16-20 fixed wing aircraft... which are hardly adequate to protect approaching IN fleet from what aircraft PAF has....and the nearer IN fleet approaches Pak coast, it will reduce the range of PAF aircraft to mount effective strikes. And we are not talking about the LOMADs and HIMADs regiments of Pak Army...

Another duty which the IN carriers may have to perform is escorting indian inbound and outbound sea convoys...because indian SLOCs run due south of Pak coast...hence a major IN effort is likely to be deployed for protection of their SLOCs.
 
Panzerkiel said:
For IN, main problem would always remain obtaining the requisite air cover in any attack against Pakistan. Just an example, to keep just two aircraft above the fleet may require a whole squadron of 16 aircraft to be deployed. Ground based IAF aircraft may be able to escort the IN fleet no further than 200 miles considering available assets, serviceability rate and ongoing OCAOs and DCAOs.

IN carriers normally have 16-20 fixed wing aircraft... which are hardly adequate to protect approaching IN fleet from what aircraft PAF has....and the nearer IN fleet approaches Pak coast, it will reduce the range of PAF aircraft to mount effective strikes. And we are not talking about the LOMADs and HIMADs regiments of Pak Army...

Another duty which the IN carriers may have to perform is escorting indian inbound and outbound sea convoys...because indian SLOCs run due south of Pak coast...hence a major IN effort is likely to be deployed for protection of their SLOCs.
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sir i ask ai about your post and i can post its response .Now how to counter it

1. Long-Range Strike Before Approaching the Coast​


India would not necessarily need to move carrier groups very close to Pakistan's coastline.


  • Land-based fighters can conduct long-range strikes with aerial refueling.
  • Cruise missiles and stand-off weapons allow attacks from considerable distances.
  • Naval vessels can launch missiles without entering heavily defended airspace.

This reduces exposure to PAF aircraft and coastal air defenses.


2. Suppression of Air Defenses​


Before major naval operations, an attacker generally attempts to degrade:


  • Radar networks.
  • Surface-to-air missile sites.
  • Air bases.
  • Command-and-control infrastructure.

Reducing the effectiveness of air defenses can increase the survivability of naval forces operating farther offshore.


3. Distributed Naval Operations​


Rather than concentrating a fleet in one vulnerable area:


  • Multiple task groups can operate across a wider area.
  • Submarines can operate independently.
  • Surface ships can remain dispersed.

This complicates targeting and reduces the effectiveness of concentrated air attacks.


4. Submarine Operations​


Submarines are often considered among the most important assets in regional naval conflicts.


They can:


  • Threaten enemy naval units.
  • Monitor sea lanes.
  • Force the opponent to dedicate resources to anti-submarine warfare.

5. Air Force Support​


The passage assumes limited Indian Air Force support beyond roughly 200 miles, but modern operations can involve:


  • Aerial refueling.
  • Forward air bases.
  • Long-range fighter patrols.
  • Airborne early warning aircraft.

These can extend operational reach.


6. Attacking Logistics and Infrastructure​


Instead of directly confronting coastal defenses, a force might focus on:


  • Ports.
  • Fuel facilities.
  • Logistics nodes.
  • Maritime infrastructure.

This can impose economic and operational costs without requiring close coastal operations.


What the Original Argument Gets Right​


The quoted assessment does identify genuine challenges:


  • Carrier air wings are limited in size.
  • Land-based aircraft usually have numerical advantages near their own territory.
  • Coastal air defenses can make operations near shore dangerous.
  • Protecting sea lines of communication requires substantial resources.

These are considerations for virtually every navy operating close to an opponent's coastline.


What It Potentially Understates​


  • Long-range precision weapons.
  • Aerial refueling capabilities.
  • Submarine operations.
  • Electronic warfare.
  • Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.
  • Joint operations between air force and navy.

Modern maritime campaigns rarely depend solely on carriers approaching an enemy coast.
 
maxpane said:
sir i ask ai about your post and i can post its response .Now how to counter it

1. Long-Range Strike Before Approaching the Coast​


India would not necessarily need to move carrier groups very close to Pakistan's coastline.


  • Land-based fighters can conduct long-range strikes with aerial refueling.
  • Cruise missiles and stand-off weapons allow attacks from considerable distances.
  • Naval vessels can launch missiles without entering heavily defended airspace.

This reduces exposure to PAF aircraft and coastal air defenses.


2. Suppression of Air Defenses​


Before major naval operations, an attacker generally attempts to degrade:


  • Radar networks.
  • Surface-to-air missile sites.
  • Air bases.
  • Command-and-control infrastructure.

Reducing the effectiveness of air defenses can increase the survivability of naval forces operating farther offshore.


3. Distributed Naval Operations​


Rather than concentrating a fleet in one vulnerable area:


  • Multiple task groups can operate across a wider area.
  • Submarines can operate independently.
  • Surface ships can remain dispersed.

This complicates targeting and reduces the effectiveness of concentrated air attacks.


4. Submarine Operations​


Submarines are often considered among the most important assets in regional naval conflicts.


They can:


  • Threaten enemy naval units.
  • Monitor sea lanes.
  • Force the opponent to dedicate resources to anti-submarine warfare.

5. Air Force Support​


The passage assumes limited Indian Air Force support beyond roughly 200 miles, but modern operations can involve:


  • Aerial refueling.
  • Forward air bases.
  • Long-range fighter patrols.
  • Airborne early warning aircraft.

These can extend operational reach.


6. Attacking Logistics and Infrastructure​


Instead of directly confronting coastal defenses, a force might focus on:


  • Ports.
  • Fuel facilities.
  • Logistics nodes.
  • Maritime infrastructure.

This can impose economic and operational costs without requiring close coastal operations.


What the Original Argument Gets Right​


The quoted assessment does identify genuine challenges:


  • Carrier air wings are limited in size.
  • Land-based aircraft usually have numerical advantages near their own territory.
  • Coastal air defenses can make operations near shore dangerous.
  • Protecting sea lines of communication requires substantial resources.

These are considerations for virtually every navy operating close to an opponent's coastline.


What It Potentially Understates​


  • Long-range precision weapons.
  • Aerial refueling capabilities.
  • Submarine operations.
  • Electronic warfare.
  • Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.
  • Joint operations between air force and navy.

Modern maritime campaigns rarely depend solely on carriers approaching an enemy coast.
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I will try to reply you point wise....do please match it with your lines....

  • Land-based fighters can conduct long-range strikes with aerial refueling. (Yes, that will be in full swing, wherein even airfields and western Balochistan will be hit as well...but we are discussion about air cover for IN sea blockade and a possible amphibious landing along Pak's western sea flank)

  • Cruise missiles and stand-off weapons allow attacks from considerable distances.(Yes, but then their launch platforms, ground, aerial and sea, but surface and sub surface, can be hit or spoiled...its not just as simple as math that if they have something then they will be able to launch it as well...the platforms can be hit, the projectiles themselves can be dealt with as well)

  • Naval vessels can launch missiles without entering heavily defended airspace.( important role for our subs....even in 1971, we managed to send one sub to indian eastern coast which is a long distance...nowadays, with many subs which have much improved capabilities, subs will be employed in blue or deep waters just for interdiction of these IN assets)

  • Suppression of Air Defenses (a very costly and attrition heavy operation since IAF will have to develop the stomach to absorb losses...with their numerical superiority, they will be ultimately able to suppress bulk of PAF bases, but then they should be ready for losses as well....moreover, suppressing a base as a one time measure is one thing....keeping multiple bases continuously suppressed is a whole different game altogether...in previous wars IAF hasnt been able to manage this thing)​

  • ​

  • Distributed Naval Operations, Submarine Operations, Air Force Support (Yes, we need to discuss this here separately...its important to understand how IN will likely operate)​


Just try to keep the ongoing Iran US war in mind as well.....important lessons for everyone...!
 
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