You haven't told us your reactions to this interview. Not good, bad and astounding, but your professional response.
Years of my research have gone in on this particular subject.....have read multiple books including Gen Malik's as well....even went to the extent of marking each and every post from both sides on my google earth to get the feel of the terrain itself....
Part of the title of Gen Malik's books...FROM SURPRISE......says it all.....in my opinion indian GHQ shouldnt have been surprised in the first place....a small infiltration is one thing....but here we have a logistical buildup which had been going on for months, hundreds of men are infiltrating in several sectors, occupying several key peaks which should have otherwise been occupied.....indian intelligence agencies, including RAW and army's own are responsible for that.
Bajrang Post is an interesting event itself....it was vacated by indian army, our troops then occupied it.....i personally met the officer who was at that post...he showed me pictures of the post he took while he was there, indian rations which were dump, the route which Captain Saurav Kalia's party took, our troops had MGs well sited on adjoining heights, Kalia's party was allowed to walk-in before being challenged. Couple of men froze there, knowing that the game was up, however remaining including Kalia turned around and made a run for it, thats when he was hit from behind his head, with the bullet exiting from his face front, hence a large exit wound which was later portrayed as though Pak troops had first captured him and then shot him at point blank.
Over all indian tactics at the beginning were surprising....units already in Kashmir were short of all sorts of weapons, equipment and ammunition. With little to no artillery support, troops were made to charge barren mountain slopes and peaks which, though lightly held in manpower, had abundance of automatic weapons which raked the slopes.....many casualties could have been avoided had the tactics been right...
Later on, large number of artillery guns were inducted to give the indian army the minimum amount of firepower required to take the peaks....surprising thing was that even artillery from Western and South Western Commands was moved to Kashmir sector.....resultantly the strike corps in these command were diluted of their inherent firepower.....who knows how would they have fared in case a conventional war migh have broken out in these sectors.
I dont want to go into the state of indian army deployed in kashmir...then and now both.....their levels of training are very low.....avoidance of conflict and contact with the enemy wont fetch them anything. With such massive superiority in numbers and equipment in Kashmir, against three divisions of Pak (FCNA, 12 and 23), things should have turned out differently in Kargil.
And of course how can we forget Pak Army Chief daring to cross the line and spending a night in enemy territory, the artillery guns which were heli lifted by Pak before the fighting started.....and then fighting under adverse circumstances with no air support, minimum of rations and fire support......
Just some random thoughts.