Indian Army News & Discussions

Col. Ponung Doming, SM, a pioneering officer from Arunachal Pradesh, is leading the world’s highest engineering task force at 15,300 feet in Ladakh.

In this exclusive interview, she shares her challenges, triumphs, and the unyielding spirit of the Indian Army’s engineering corps in one of the world’s most extreme terrains.From sub-zero temperatures and avalanches to logistical hurdles and reduced manpower efficiency, Col. Doming’s command is a testament to grit, innovation, and leadership.

She discusses the strategic importance of border infrastructure, how her team ensures all-weather connectivity in the region, and the cutting-edge technologies revolutionising military engineering projects.Beyond the technical challenges, Col. Doming reflects on her personal leadership journey—from being raised in Arunachal Pradesh to becoming a role model for women across the country.

She speaks about the power of self-reliance, the importance of teamwork, and the responsibilities that come with commanding an elite engineering force at the frontlines.With India rapidly enhancing its border infrastructure post the Galwan incursion in 2020, this conversation sheds light on the country’s evolving strategic posture and the unsung heroes working tirelessly behind the scenes.

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One of the subjects which have been close to be heart for the last 25 years.... Kargil Conflict..... Further interesting points brought out by Brigadier Surinder Singh

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One of the subjects which have been close to be heart for the last 25 years.... Kargil Conflict..... Further interesting points brought out by Brigadier Surinder Singh

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Point taken, but it was not Malik alone, playing golf in Europe while the conflict developed. It was also, most damning of all, Lt. General Khanna of Northern Command (who fortunately for his career was also, like Ved Malik, absent at that time), Lt. General Kishan Pal, a Kargil denier consistently, perhaps the most lethal, and the Div. Commanders, Mohinder Puri, and Budhwar.

Finally, the jawans bled and fought, while these rotten eggs got away scotfree.
 
One of the subjects which have been close to be heart for the last 25 years.... Kargil Conflict..... Further interesting points brought out by Brigadier Surinder Singh

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One of the worst features, and the reason why I hate the BJP approach to security, was the very dangerous transfer of emphasis from border security to counter-insurgency actions. Bipin Rawat should never have made it to CDS, but this skewed emphasis, and the family involvement with the RSS, brought him to the top.
 
One of the subjects which have been close to be heart for the last 25 years.... Kargil Conflict..... Further interesting points brought out by Brigadier Surinder Singh

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You haven't told us your reactions to this interview. Not good, bad and astounding, but your professional response.
 
You haven't told us your reactions to this interview. Not good, bad and astounding, but your professional response.
Years of my research have gone in on this particular subject.....have read multiple books including Gen Malik's as well....even went to the extent of marking each and every post from both sides on my google earth to get the feel of the terrain itself....

Part of the title of Gen Malik's books...FROM SURPRISE......says it all.....in my opinion indian GHQ shouldnt have been surprised in the first place....a small infiltration is one thing....but here we have a logistical buildup which had been going on for months, hundreds of men are infiltrating in several sectors, occupying several key peaks which should have otherwise been occupied.....indian intelligence agencies, including RAW and army's own are responsible for that.

Bajrang Post is an interesting event itself....it was vacated by indian army, our troops then occupied it.....i personally met the officer who was at that post...he showed me pictures of the post he took while he was there, indian rations which were dump, the route which Captain Saurav Kalia's party took, our troops had MGs well sited on adjoining heights, Kalia's party was allowed to walk-in before being challenged. Couple of men froze there, knowing that the game was up, however remaining including Kalia turned around and made a run for it, thats when he was hit from behind his head, with the bullet exiting from his face front, hence a large exit wound which was later portrayed as though Pak troops had first captured him and then shot him at point blank.

Over all indian tactics at the beginning were surprising....units already in Kashmir were short of all sorts of weapons, equipment and ammunition. With little to no artillery support, troops were made to charge barren mountain slopes and peaks which, though lightly held in manpower, had abundance of automatic weapons which raked the slopes.....many casualties could have been avoided had the tactics been right...

Later on, large number of artillery guns were inducted to give the indian army the minimum amount of firepower required to take the peaks....surprising thing was that even artillery from Western and South Western Commands was moved to Kashmir sector.....resultantly the strike corps in these command were diluted of their inherent firepower.....who knows how would they have fared in case a conventional war migh have broken out in these sectors.

I dont want to go into the state of indian army deployed in kashmir...then and now both.....their levels of training are very low.....avoidance of conflict and contact with the enemy wont fetch them anything. With such massive superiority in numbers and equipment in Kashmir, against three divisions of Pak (FCNA, 12 and 23), things should have turned out differently in Kargil.

And of course how can we forget Pak Army Chief daring to cross the line and spending a night in enemy territory, the artillery guns which were heli lifted by Pak before the fighting started.....and then fighting under adverse circumstances with no air support, minimum of rations and fire support......



Just some random thoughts.
 
Years of my research have gone in on this particular subject.....have read multiple books including Gen Malik's as well....even went to the extent of marking each and every post from both sides on my google earth to get the feel of the terrain itself....

Part of the title of Gen Malik's books...FROM SURPRISE......says it all.....in my opinion indian GHQ shouldnt have been surprised in the first place....a small infiltration is one thing....but here we have a logistical buildup which had been going on for months, hundreds of men are infiltrating in several sectors, occupying several key peaks which should have otherwise been occupied.....indian intelligence agencies, including RAW and army's own are responsible for that.

Bajrang Post is an interesting event itself....it was vacated by indian army, our troops then occupied it.....i personally met the officer who was at that post...he showed me pictures of the post he took while he was there, indian rations which were dump, the route which Captain Saurav Kalia's party took, our troops had MGs well sited on adjoining heights, Kalia's party was allowed to walk-in before being challenged. Couple of men froze there, knowing that the game was up, however remaining including Kalia turned around and made a run for it, thats when he was hit from behind his head, with the bullet exiting from his face front, hence a large exit wound which was later portrayed as though Pak troops had first captured him and then shot him at point blank.

Over all indian tactics at the beginning were surprising....units already in Kashmir were short of all sorts of weapons, equipment and ammunition. With little to no artillery support, troops were made to charge barren mountain slopes and peaks which, though lightly held in manpower, had abundance of automatic weapons which raked the slopes.....many casualties could have been avoided had the tactics been right...

Later on, large number of artillery guns were inducted to give the indian army the minimum amount of firepower required to take the peaks....surprising thing was that even artillery from Western and South Western Commands was moved to Kashmir sector.....resultantly the strike corps in these command were diluted of their inherent firepower.....who knows how would they have fared in case a conventional war migh have broken out in these sectors.

I dont want to go into the state of indian army deployed in kashmir...then and now both.....their levels of training are very low.....avoidance of conflict and contact with the enemy wont fetch them anything. With such massive superiority in numbers and equipment in Kashmir, against three divisions of Pak (FCNA, 12 and 23), things should have turned out differently in Kargil.

And of course how can we forget Pak Army Chief daring to cross the line and spending a night in enemy territory, the artillery guns which were heli lifted by Pak before the fighting started.....and then fighting under adverse circumstances with no air support, minimum of rations and fire support......



Just some random thoughts.
Difficult to add a word to the first five paragraphs.
Thank you, Sir.
 
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