@Oscar
To understand this entire sordid saga and how the hell a 4 trillion dollar economy can not
buy a modern diesel electric submarine and is going to have a logistic nightmare of operating possibly 4 different kind of diesel subs, read this...
Or I will save you the trouble...
1. In 1999
war was happening Indian navy wanted subs.
2. So.... bright minds in new delhi come up with a plan to buy and build western and eastern (russian) submarines locally and then proceed to build Indian indigenous sub by combining best aspects of both designs.
Yup, there were always going to be two different sub designs. It was by design. These two projects were supposted to run in parallel in two different docks. Thus were born P75 and P75(I). Sounds fun right?
3. To cut a long story short, democracy in India fucked up P75(I) in 2004. Then everyone forgot about it. Then indian navy got shit scared because P75 did not have an AIP. Why? DRDO and their "We are too cool for Sterling Engine/MESMA/German Fuel cells".
4. Once those admirals were shitting their pants, they necromacied P75(I) and pushed Modi to get it going.
5. Nothing happened till 2016, Admirals were now shitless and did not want any **** ups in AIP. who can blame them? DRDO wanted their sailors to play with phosphoric acid without actual tests. So they added a condition : "We want a proven AIP". And everyone and especially Russia ran away. Because all of them run nuclear subs so they do not need that stupid AIP.
6. To add more to this comedy, DRDO was testing its dangerous phosphoric acid fuel cell on land only. LOL! And only now they realized that they need to test this in a real sub. Navy has said it will spare a Kilo sub but given it is India (Remember the "Beaurocrat Dragged their Feet"?), it will be next century before anything will materialize.
Oh India... never change! You are a cute clumsy voluptuous brown-faced klutz!
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Way forward for Project 75(I) and MDL
Project 75 was the first part which was started in Oct 2005 and is nearing completion, with the sixth Kalvari class boat of Scorpene design to be delivered to the Navy by the end of this year.
By Cmde Arun Kumar,
Project 75(I) is the second part of Phase I of the 30-year submarine building plan, approved by the CCS in Jul 1999, which was to be executed in the period 2000-15. Under this, six submarines of an appropriate design, preferably of a derivative of 877EKM like the Amur 1650 (Russia), were to be built in the period as stated above. Project 75 was the first part which was started in Oct 2005 and is nearing completion, with the sixth Kalvari class boat of Scorpene design to be delivered to the Navy by the end of this year.
Early Negotiations
As per the 30-year plan, discussions to identify the platform for P-75I were initiated with the Russian side in November 1999, which continued through December 2001. By then, it was understood that broad agreements on design specifications and transfer of design and build
technology for Amur 1650 had been reached. Representatives of MDL and L&T also participated in this.
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Consequently, follow-on actions to progress the project were taken up with the competent authority. It was towards the end of 2003. However, due to the announcement of early General elections in May 2004, the case was kept in abeyance until a new Government at the Centre was formed after the elections. The UPA formed the new Government at the Centre, and a review of all ongoing cases was undertaken, and as a result, P75(I) receded into the background. The contract for the Scorpene design with M/S DCN of France was concluded for P75 in Oct 2005, and construction activities with a delay started in MDL in real earnest only in 2010. Despite the initial hiccups, this programme has progressed well and will be complete by the end of this year.
Reformation of NSQRs for P75 (I)
As per the original approval of the 30-year plan, the two projects in Phase I viz; P75 and P75(I) were to have designs from Western Sources (Scorpene selected) and of Eastern (Russia) Origin for P75(I). In Phase II (2016-30), 12 submarines were to be made of a totally indigenous design incorporating the best of both the above-mentioned designs. However, since Project 75(I) as envisaged could not be progressed in parallel, as mandated by the 30-year plan, and due to a considerable time-lapse, the NSQRs for P 75(I) were reformed to include Air Independent Propulsion System (AIPS). The primary role for the boats under P75 (I) was the capability to attack targets ashore and deep inland; as such, a Land attack missile was integral to the QRs. The inclusion of AIPS created a dilemma in that the Russians did not have an AIPS, and the other contenders from the West did not have a sub-launched land attack missile. Thus the project stalled and could not be actively pursued.
Two lines of production
At the time of the initial discussions, since boats of two designs were to be built simultaneously, two production lines were under consideration. These were the established MDL and L&T that had gained experience building hull sections for a special project. The choice of two lines then was imperative since MDL would be fully loaded with P 75 and could not undertake series construction of 12 boats. Even to execute the P 75, an infrastructure upgrade in MDL was needed, and as understood, sums in hundreds of crores were budgeted. In addition, skill sets that had been lost due to the abandonment of the 5th & 6th SSKs of Shishumar class boats in the mid-80s needed to be created afresh. Just as a side effect, we lost trained manpower to South Korea, which was starting the production of conventional submarines.
Revival of P75 (I)
Once the P75 was truly underway, attention was once again turned to P 75(I) with the amended QRs. However, with the introduction of the new DPP of 2016, the concept of Strategic Partner Initiative (SPI) involving the Private Sector was introduced, and P75 (I) was earmarked as the first project to be undertaken with an SP. After many deliberations and fits and starts, two SPs were shortlisted viz; MDL and L&T. (One wonders why so many years were needed to decide this as way back in 2003 itself, it was clear that only these two had capabilities for submarine construction). It was also decided to go the competitive route to select the design collaborator. Accordingly, five potential collaborators viz; Rosoboronexport (Russia), Navantia (Spain), Daewoo (South Korea), DCN Naval Group (France) and Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (FRG) have been shortlisted. The two SPs were asked to negotiate a tie-up with any one of the five collaborators and make a joint bid to the MOD for final selection. In my view, this is a harebrained scheme wherein a yard is to negotiate the technology transfer with each of the five collaborators and then decide on a bid with the selected partner. The induction of technology is a ‘user’ function and not that of the yard. The user should have done this activity at NHQ. Be that as it may, except for DSME (South Korea), all others showed hesitancy to participate due to the RFP’s conditions.
Further, it was not clear how a private yard would ensure the secrecy and integrity of the information without a sovereign guarantee. As of present, as understood, the matter rests here. The urgency to progress the project needs no emphasis as already the project is 20 years in arrears. The matters should be progressed with alacrity even if the RFP has to be tweaked to accommodate the concerns of the collaborators.
In the case of P75, the user first selected the Collaborator and the Yard MDL (Only one). During the negotiations with the Collaborator, the MDL team sat on the side of the MOD. Once that was complete, the yard had a clear idea of design transfer and collaboration costs and was in a firm position to bid for the total cost as the Principal Contractor. Accordingly, the next stage of negotiations was between the user (MOD) and the MDL for the total cost of the Project/boat. The success of this model was the fruition of the contract in the production and delivery of six boats of Scorpene design. This, in my view, is the only viable working model to follow.
Future Exploitation of Assets in MDL
The upgraded infrastructure created in MDL for P 75 has already gone idle, with the 6th submarine Vaghsheer in the final stages of construction. It would be a great folly to let this strategic asset go to waste without further orders. As stated earlier herein, in the initial stages of the implementation of Phase I of the 30-year plan, there was a necessity for a second line, but in the present circumstances, the same no longer holds. Further, the MDL has created the capacity to undertake a series of construction of 11 boats with the conversion of the Alcock yard to submarine building and the East Yard. This is a strategic defence asset of the Government of
India and cannot be allowed to idle. The multiplicity of yards in such a vital sector is a luxury even the United States cannot afford. They have only two yards, viz; Newport and the Electric boat division at General Dynamics, which make strategic and tactical boats. In our case, we already have the Ship Building Centre dedicated to the Strategic Programme.
Continuation of Series Production
The 30 Year plan had envisaged a strategic vision of creating indigenous capability in the design and construction of conventional submarines in concert with the private sector. That aim remains valid even today. With the construction of 18-24 boats under the plan does not mean its end but a continuation of series construction to enable replacements as the older boats become due for retirement (Decommissioning). The capabilities thus created must remain alive and viable at all times. The intervals of outputs may be staggered to balance the yard loading and meet the force level requirements at any given time. What cannot be allowed, at any cost, is the non-utilisation of a strategic asset created at great costs not only in monetary terms but also in terms of skill sets and expertise either due to redundancy or demand. Our investments must be thus tuned to ensure capacity utilisation as an assembly line.
Way Forward
The goals and aim of the 30-year submarine building plan were well-considered and strategic in thought and nature. They must be implemented for our Navy to be self-sufficient (Atma Nirbhar) in meeting its own requirements of submarine force levels. In due course, it could also mean the ability to export submarines. Strategic assets like in MDL for the construction of submarines must be kept loaded and in activity mode at all times. This will not only ensure the survival and viability of these assets but also nurture innovation in the long run. Accordingly, since MDL is already selected as the SP, it must be nominated as the lead yard (Principal Contractor) for P75 (I) with a work-sharing relationship with L&T (The other SP). This will allow the rules of DPP to be also met. Redundancy built for just the sake of it may not be prudent in the present case. Work-sharing will also help reduce the delivery periods and, in some measure, mitigate the inordinate delay the 30 Year plan has suffered. The Contract for the Transfer of Design and Build technology must be between the user and the Collaborator (Principal Collaborator). We must not forget that Phase II is looming ahead.
(
The author is a recipient of AVSM, NM and is a veteran submariner. He is the author of the book on the Indian Navy’s first nuclear submarine S71 INS Chakra – The Pioneer and her men. Views expressed are personal and do not reflect the official position or policy of FinancialExpress.com. Reproducing this content without permission is prohibited).
