India’s loss in Bangladesh not necessarily China’s gain

[Beijingwalker]

Do Taiwanese love Chinese?

Taiwanese are Chinese, don't they love themselves?

 

[Detdjo550]

In Brief

The fall of Sheikh Hasina's government in Bangladesh has been described as a strategic loss for India and a potential gain for China. But various obstacles may hinder China from gaining greater influence in the region. Political instability, economic challenges, and India's enduring importance to Bangladesh will limit the extent of China's influential inroads.

Ivan Lidarev

View attachment 61135

The fall of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, an atypically pro-Indian Bangladeshi leader, has been a serious strategic loss for India. For many observers, India’s loss is certain to be China’s great strategic gain. But while Beijing may improve its position in Bangladesh, that conclusion is exaggerated and premature.

The Bangladesh crisis has given China an advantage over India and an opportunity to expand its influence. But Beijing is facing serious obstacles that will blunt its advantage, slow the expansion of its influence and make seizing this opportunity difficult.

The collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s government following weeks of protests is a major blow to New Delhi. Not only had India effectively staked its relationship with Dhaka on Hasina’s regime, but the protest movement, which includes students, supporters of the opposition Bangladesh National Party and Islamists, has an anti-Indian bent.

Hasina’s government was a valuable strategic asset for India. It stabilised the previously troubled India–Bangladesh relationship and opened a ‘golden chapter’ in the relationship, according to both sides in a 2021 joint statement. During her 15-year tenure, Hasina addressed New Delhi’s long-standing concerns about cross-border militancy, protection of Bangladesh’s Hindu minority and Pakistani activities in Bangladesh.

For India, the partnership with Bangladesh was also crucial for promoting regional connectivity and economic integration in South Asia under Indian leadership. In a major win for India, Dhaka and New Delhi established a railway connection through Bangladeshi territory to supply India’s poor, restive and China-pressured Northeast, with plans for developing further rail links. The fall of the Awami League government threatens these Indian gains.

Hasina’s government sought to strike a balance between Beijing and New Delhi, but with a tilt toward India. This tilt became obvious, despite many successful Chinese projects in Bangladesh, when Dhaka cancelled the China-supported and strategically crucial Sonadia deep-sea port, likely under Indian pressure.

The increasingly beleaguered Hasina government had decided to lean strongly on New Delhi in 2024. It chose India over China for financing the reservoir of the crucial Teesta water project, which Beijing had long sought to finance despite Indian opposition prompted by security concerns. Beijing signalled its displeasure during Hasina’s July 2024 visit to China by treating the Bangladeshi prime minister coldly and providing just 1 billion renminbi (US$137 million) in financial assistance, as opposed to the requested US$5 billion. An angered Hasina cut short her visit.

The coup in Bangladesh gives China an advantage over India and an opportunity to expand its influence. China, with its ample financial resources, enjoys an advantage over New Delhi in a Bangladesh that is mired in economic crisis and unfriendly towards India,.

The installation of a new Bangladeshi government offers China an opportunity to expand its influence. That would not only allow Beijing to increase its influence on India’s eastern front, as it has done on India’s western front through its relationship with Pakistan. It would also boost its presence in the Bay of Bengal and the North Indian Ocean. Crucially, together with recent Chinese inroads in the Maldives, it would help keep New Delhi boxed in South Asia and less able to challenge Beijing in the broader Indo-Pacific theatre.

But it will be difficult for China to make use of its advantage and seize the opportunity. Political instability in Bangladesh, fuelled by the revolution, the lack of a clear political alternative, purges of Awami League officials and student takeovers of parts of the state, are major obstacles against the expansion of Chinese influence.

To do business with Bangladesh, Beijing needs a stable government in Dhaka that can keep its commitments, particularly as China has centred its relationship with Bangladesh on the Awami League government. The presence of a powerful Islamist movement, which might play a key role in a future government and which has occasionally been critical of China, is also an uncertainty for Beijing.

Bangladesh’s difficult economic situation is another obstacle for Beijing. It means that China might have to offer large loans to Bangladesh — an expensive and high-risk bet on Dhaka’s future with limited immediate benefits. Moreover, the combination of economic crisis and political uncertainty complicates large Chinese investment projects in Bangladesh and is likely to put off Chinese businesses.

The United States, which opposed the increasingly undemocratic Hasina government to India’s displeasure, is another constraint on Chinese influence. Washington, which was supportive of the protest movement, is close to interim leader Mohammad Yunus and is likely to increase its influence as Bangladesh emerges from the crisis. Dhaka will also need US support to secure desperately needed IMF and World Bank lending.

India remains critically important for Bangladesh, a fact that inherently limits how far Dhaka can align itself with Beijing. An unstable and economically distressed Bangladesh can ill afford a long quarrel with a country that is its largest export destination in Asia, a key energy import and connectivity partner and a neighbour along almost all of its land borders. If New Delhi acts fast to begin rebuilding ties with Dhaka, Beijing’s advantage in Bangladesh will be further reduced.

The political and economic situation in Bangladesh, US influence and India’s inherent leverage over Dhaka limit the extent to which Bangladesh can move closer to China. The revolution in Bangladesh will likely improve Beijing’s relative position vis-a-vis India but will not be the Chinese triumph that some predict.

how not

 

[Fallstuff]

There is loss or gain here. Each party should mind their own business.

 

[Cryptonian]

Well China is a big alternative to USA. I hope the Bangladeshi people can see that.

Thats such a rubbish, BD is dependent of dollars earned through exports, What can BD export to China. ?

 

[Michael]

In Brief

The fall of Sheikh Hasina's government in Bangladesh has been described as a strategic loss for India and a potential gain for China. But various obstacles may hinder China from gaining greater influence in the region. Political instability, economic challenges, and India's enduring importance to Bangladesh will limit the extent of China's influential inroads.

Ivan Lidarev

View attachment 61135

The fall of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, an atypically pro-Indian Bangladeshi leader, has been a serious strategic loss for India. For many observers, India’s loss is certain to be China’s great strategic gain. But while Beijing may improve its position in Bangladesh, that conclusion is exaggerated and premature.

The Bangladesh crisis has given China an advantage over India and an opportunity to expand its influence. But Beijing is facing serious obstacles that will blunt its advantage, slow the expansion of its influence and make seizing this opportunity difficult.

The collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s government following weeks of protests is a major blow to New Delhi. Not only had India effectively staked its relationship with Dhaka on Hasina’s regime, but the protest movement, which includes students, supporters of the opposition Bangladesh National Party and Islamists, has an anti-Indian bent.

Hasina’s government was a valuable strategic asset for India. It stabilised the previously troubled India–Bangladesh relationship and opened a ‘golden chapter’ in the relationship, according to both sides in a 2021 joint statement. During her 15-year tenure, Hasina addressed New Delhi’s long-standing concerns about cross-border militancy, protection of Bangladesh’s Hindu minority and Pakistani activities in Bangladesh.

For India, the partnership with Bangladesh was also crucial for promoting regional connectivity and economic integration in South Asia under Indian leadership. In a major win for India, Dhaka and New Delhi established a railway connection through Bangladeshi territory to supply India’s poor, restive and China-pressured Northeast, with plans for developing further rail links. The fall of the Awami League government threatens these Indian gains.

Hasina’s government sought to strike a balance between Beijing and New Delhi, but with a tilt toward India. This tilt became obvious, despite many successful Chinese projects in Bangladesh, when Dhaka cancelled the China-supported and strategically crucial Sonadia deep-sea port, likely under Indian pressure.

The increasingly beleaguered Hasina government had decided to lean strongly on New Delhi in 2024. It chose India over China for financing the reservoir of the crucial Teesta water project, which Beijing had long sought to finance despite Indian opposition prompted by security concerns. Beijing signalled its displeasure during Hasina’s July 2024 visit to China by treating the Bangladeshi prime minister coldly and providing just 1 billion renminbi (US$137 million) in financial assistance, as opposed to the requested US$5 billion. An angered Hasina cut short her visit.

The coup in Bangladesh gives China an advantage over India and an opportunity to expand its influence. China, with its ample financial resources, enjoys an advantage over New Delhi in a Bangladesh that is mired in economic crisis and unfriendly towards India,.

The installation of a new Bangladeshi government offers China an opportunity to expand its influence. That would not only allow Beijing to increase its influence on India’s eastern front, as it has done on India’s western front through its relationship with Pakistan. It would also boost its presence in the Bay of Bengal and the North Indian Ocean. Crucially, together with recent Chinese inroads in the Maldives, it would help keep New Delhi boxed in South Asia and less able to challenge Beijing in the broader Indo-Pacific theatre.

But it will be difficult for China to make use of its advantage and seize the opportunity. Political instability in Bangladesh, fuelled by the revolution, the lack of a clear political alternative, purges of Awami League officials and student takeovers of parts of the state, are major obstacles against the expansion of Chinese influence.

To do business with Bangladesh, Beijing needs a stable government in Dhaka that can keep its commitments, particularly as China has centred its relationship with Bangladesh on the Awami League government. The presence of a powerful Islamist movement, which might play a key role in a future government and which has occasionally been critical of China, is also an uncertainty for Beijing.

Bangladesh’s difficult economic situation is another obstacle for Beijing. It means that China might have to offer large loans to Bangladesh — an expensive and high-risk bet on Dhaka’s future with limited immediate benefits. Moreover, the combination of economic crisis and political uncertainty complicates large Chinese investment projects in Bangladesh and is likely to put off Chinese businesses.

The United States, which opposed the increasingly undemocratic Hasina government to India’s displeasure, is another constraint on Chinese influence. Washington, which was supportive of the protest movement, is close to interim leader Mohammad Yunus and is likely to increase its influence as Bangladesh emerges from the crisis. Dhaka will also need US support to secure desperately needed IMF and World Bank lending.

India remains critically important for Bangladesh, a fact that inherently limits how far Dhaka can align itself with Beijing. An unstable and economically distressed Bangladesh can ill afford a long quarrel with a country that is its largest export destination in Asia, a key energy import and connectivity partner and a neighbour along almost all of its land borders. If New Delhi acts fast to begin rebuilding ties with Dhaka, Beijing’s advantage in Bangladesh will be further reduced.

The political and economic situation in Bangladesh, US influence and India’s inherent leverage over Dhaka limit the extent to which Bangladesh can move closer to China. The revolution in Bangladesh will likely improve Beijing’s relative position vis-a-vis India but will not be the Chinese triumph that some predict.

The analysis of the whole article is too one-sided and far-fetched. I don't know what nationality the author is from, but he doesn't know much about China and the Chinese government. If you want to analyze and predict the movements of China and the Chinese government, you need to understand some basic Chinese culture. These Chinese cultures have always influenced everything about the Chinese.

At present, China's strategic focus is still on dealing with United States. The Chinese government does not have much interest in South Asian affairs, let alone rise to a strategic level.

For South Asian countries, China does have some economic activity. But these are only natural spillovers after China's rapid economic growth, and they are not national strategic actions. Perhaps for South Asian countries, these economic activities are very important. But for China, it's all very, very small economic activity, dispensable. Whether it's free, profitable, or loss-free, it doesn't matter to the banks or businesses that invest in them.

Many businesses in China will decide whether to conduct business in a particular region based on their own analytical judgment. In fact, these actions have little to do with government actions, and even if some companies are state-owned, they have a very large degree of autonomy.

If South Asian countries want to bring in Chinese capital, it is often more effective to liaise directly with these business institutions. Liaison with the government can make these projects more difficult.

Chinese businesses place more emphasis on a stable and safe social environment. According to Chinese law, if a Chinese employee is killed in these places, he must pay huge compensation. At the same time, it will seriously affect the willingness of other Chinese employees to work locally.

As for the problem of power shortages, for them, it is easy to solve. They can buy a lot of very cheap solar power systems or diesel generator sets from China. If the project is big enough, they can even easily build a power plant on their own.In China, many companies have their own power plants. They don't use the national grid. Of course, the power lines are connected, and when they need to maintain their own power generation equipment, they use the national grid; They will also sell their surplus electricity to the national grid. This is very common in China.

Of course, there are also some criminals from China who are engaged in some criminal activities in Southeast Asia and South Asia. Local governments need to be cautious about these things.

========================================================

Judging from the Chinese government's dispatch of Wang Wenbin as China's ambassador to Cambodia, the Chinese government will take some strategic actions in Southeast Asia in the future. But this does not include South Asia, let alone Bangladesh.

If one day, the Chinese government sends a heavyweight to a certain country in South Asia to serve as an ambassador, it means that the Chinese government is going to act in South Asia.

 

[Hakikat ve Hikmet]

Prof Yunus has been awarded almost all the top US civilian awards a foreigner can receive for a reason. The USA has got an interest in the formation and continuation of the Yunus administration.....

 

[KAAFIR]

But why most Bangladeshis hate you Indians?

Ideology, religion, brainwashing! Many factors. They even hate each other. They even hate you. The day you will stop money to them , that day they will show you the real face.
Bangladeshis are the most thankless people on the earth.

 

[Al-Zakir]

What does China has to do with the fall of the previous Bangladesh gov ? China is more than willing to work with the new gov in BD.

Nothing, absolutely nothing. It was totally done by Bangladeshi people.

Writer is a pimp and he is undermining people heroic victory against a tyrant physopath regime.

 

[Guru Dutt]

there was a reason why USA& NATO left all those 80+ Billion dfollars worth weapons, small arms , MANPAD SAMs & ATGMs and all kinds of supprt vehicels and hellicopters in Afghanistan and now Pakistan and even to some extend Iran is unterstanding the real "GREAT GAME" thats played on them ..... and and and

There was a reason why US and European Think Tanks and ecosystem almost a decade and half ago started celebrating people living in USA like Prof Yunis the current PM of Bangladesh and Abhijeet Benrjee or Amrtya Sen

then they sent there files in cold storage ... prof yunis went back to US and bso did Abhijeet benerjee and Amrtya sen but the two indian bengai noble laureattes started working for congress and its aflliated english ecosystem

fast forward to 2024 where both NAMO & Shiekh Hasina won elections despite all games played by the US/European deep state .... but they were able to de ost Bangladeshi PM but not Indian

China or No china its a bigger game and as "Rocky Handsome" said now Bangladeshi will understand the very very hard way like "teree sazzaa tujhe batayegee ki tujh se kitnee baree galti hui hai"...... but khair sannu ki

 

[MNZGamerX]

The analysis of the whole article is too one-sided and far-fetched. I don't know what nationality the author is from, but he doesn't know much about China and the Chinese government. If you want to analyze and predict the movements of China and the Chinese government, you need to understand some basic Chinese culture. These Chinese cultures have always influenced everything about the Chinese.

At present, China's strategic focus is still on dealing with United States. The Chinese government does not have much interest in South Asian affairs, let alone rise to a strategic level.

For South Asian countries, China does have some economic activity. But these are only natural spillovers after China's rapid economic growth, and they are not national strategic actions. Perhaps for South Asian countries, these economic activities are very important. But for China, it's all very, very small economic activity, dispensable. Whether it's free, profitable, or loss-free, it doesn't matter to the banks or businesses that invest in them.

Many businesses in China will decide whether to conduct business in a particular region based on their own analytical judgment. In fact, these actions have little to do with government actions, and even if some companies are state-owned, they have a very large degree of autonomy.

If South Asian countries want to bring in Chinese capital, it is often more effective to liaise directly with these business institutions. Liaison with the government can make these projects more difficult.

Chinese businesses place more emphasis on a stable and safe social environment. According to Chinese law, if a Chinese employee is killed in these places, he must pay huge compensation. At the same time, it will seriously affect the willingness of other Chinese employees to work locally.

As for the problem of power shortages, for them, it is easy to solve. They can buy a lot of very cheap solar power systems or diesel generator sets from China. If the project is big enough, they can even easily build a power plant on their own.In China, many companies have their own power plants. They don't use the national grid. Of course, the power lines are connected, and when they need to maintain their own power generation equipment, they use the national grid; They will also sell their surplus electricity to the national grid. This is very common in China.

Of course, there are also some criminals from China who are engaged in some criminal activities in Southeast Asia and South Asia. Local governments need to be cautious about these things.

========================================================

Judging from the Chinese government's dispatch of Wang Wenbin as China's ambassador to Cambodia, the Chinese government will take some strategic actions in Southeast Asia in the future. But this does not include South Asia, let alone Bangladesh.

If one day, the Chinese government sends a heavyweight to a certain country in South Asia to serve as an ambassador, it means that the Chinese government is going to act in South Asia.

If we are to assume for arguments sake that it was the Americans that were behind the fall of Hasina and an installation of a pro-American government in Dhaka then this does raise certain strategic risks and threats to China as the objective according to two American naval security experts would be to use Bangladesh as a staging post for a conflict between the US and China especially as a means to blocking the Malacca Straits. It is very likely this is well understood in Beijing ...