JF-17 PFX program

[mythbuster]

IMO we must reframe our thinking:

Aerospace Industry =/= Crewed Fighter.

Yes, the end of the JF-17 program would be a hard pill to swallow, but to those who are aware, sustaining a crewed fighter program in lieu of an actual industry base was never going to be a thing.

If by the end of the JF-17 program we could not initiate gas turbine, composite, advanced steel, electronics, and other key industries, then it would be impossible to create a successor unless we repeat the JF-17 (by importing all of the critical inputs from abroad, outsourcing design work to a foreign OEM, etc).

By that point, we wouldn't progress at all, just repeat the same thing over and over.

Rather, we should ask, "What does it take for us to build critical industries?"

The answer is to start at a more modest level whereby the critical inputs are much, much more attainable for our local industry.

Help our industry generate growth by doing what they can do today and, in turn, drive them to invest in more advanced areas by gradually elevating the technical expectations.

So, for example, instead of continuing with some crewed fighter program (e.g., PFX), our aviation industry should pivot to UCAV technology.

We don't need to start at some large and highly complex UCAV. Rather, we can start with a small loyal wingman UCAV -- e.g., 3-4 ton MTOW max.

It's OK for this UCAV to be flawed...e.g., so what if it doesn't have cutting-edge stealth materials, it's small and meant to be disposable. So what if it can't maneuver well, it's meant to carry out just a few tasks. So what if it's slow due to a less powerful engine... and so on.

I guarantee you that it'd be much easier for our nascent in-house design teams to produce a viable UCAV design than a crewed NGFA or even a PFX. NESCOM, for example, has an awareness of the tech (flight controls, for example) and has a grasp of the fundamentals via ALCMs.

Likewise, it'd be easier for the domestic industry to provide work (and lower the costs) as inputs like composites, steel, etc., shouldn't be as high-tech or cutting-edge as those for a NGFA.

Yes, for a superficial mind, the UCAVs won't look or sound as impressive as PFX or AZM. However, we want to escape superficial thinking...

...The war planners in India will understand that Pakistan gaining the ability to mass-produce a UCAV by deeply leveraging its public and private sector industry is a huge threat.

Moreover, as the private sector grows on the back of UCAV V1 orders, NASTP and/or NESCOM can start designing a more complex V2, and then a V3, and so on. Over a period of 15-20 years, you'll see that the industries we lacked for an NGFA (like aviation grade steel, composites, and possibly even gas turbines) will start appearing.

It's at THAT point we start designing a crewed fighter (6th or 7th-gen).

You are talking long term systematic approach ...... Pakistan doesn't have the luxury of time .....both , China and Pakistan are wary of each other ....China is getting arrogant and Pakistan is not willing to accept the American type attitude from China .... diversification and self reliance in shortest possible time is the goal .....private sector is woefully lacking in capacity to make any credible contribution .....PAF is on it's own

 

[HRK]

IMO we must reframe our thinking:

Aerospace Industry =/= Crewed Fighter.

Yes, the end of the JF-17 program would be a hard pill to swallow, but to those who are aware, sustaining a crewed fighter program in lieu of an actual industry base was never going to be a thing.

If by the end of the JF-17 program we could not initiate gas turbine, composite, advanced steel, electronics, and other key industries, then it would be impossible to create a successor unless we repeat the JF-17 (by importing all of the critical inputs from abroad, outsourcing design work to a foreign OEM, etc).

By that point, we wouldn't progress at all, just repeat the same thing over and over.

Rather, we should ask, "What does it take for us to build critical industries?"

The answer is to start at a more modest level whereby the critical inputs are much, much more attainable for our local industry.

Help our industry generate growth by doing what they can do today and, in turn, drive them to invest in more advanced areas by gradually elevating the technical expectations.

So, for example, instead of continuing with some crewed fighter program (e.g., PFX), our aviation industry should pivot to UCAV technology.

We don't need to start at some large and highly complex UCAV. Rather, we can start with a small loyal wingman UCAV -- e.g., 3-4 ton MTOW max.

It's OK for this UCAV to be flawed...e.g., so what if it doesn't have cutting-edge stealth materials, it's small and meant to be disposable. So what if it can't maneuver well, it's meant to carry out just a few tasks. So what if it's slow due to a less powerful engine... and so on.

I guarantee you that it'd be much easier for our nascent in-house design teams to produce a viable UCAV design than a crewed NGFA or even a PFX. NESCOM, for example, has an awareness of the tech (flight controls, for example) and has a grasp of the fundamentals via ALCMs.

Likewise, it'd be easier for the domestic industry to provide work (and lower the costs) as inputs like composites, steel, etc., shouldn't be as high-tech or cutting-edge as those for a NGFA.

Yes, for a superficial mind, the UCAVs won't look or sound as impressive as PFX or AZM. However, we want to escape superficial thinking...

...The war planners in India will understand that Pakistan gaining the ability to mass-produce a UCAV by deeply leveraging its public and private sector industry is a huge threat.

Moreover, as the private sector grows on the back of UCAV V1 orders, NASTP and/or NESCOM can start designing a more complex V2, and then a V3, and so on. Over a period of 15-20 years, you'll see that the industries we lacked for an NGFA (like aviation grade steel, composites, and possibly even gas turbines) will start appearing.

It's at THAT point we start designing a crewed fighter (6th or 7th-gen).

To an extent I agree with your argument to give importance to UCAV and related technologies for Pakistani aviation Industry infact I too advocate to have at least a research program for Loyal wingmen.

BUT (Please allow me to disagree here) issue is our aviation industry has not grown vertically upward but top down in it's orientation.

It's has not made any successful aviation product other then Mushshak trainer aircraft.

Before JF-17, we were stuck in overhauling of Mirage Jets and F-7 jets but JF-17 program has initiated many sub program like aviation grade metal sheet working, Avionics production and integration program, air weapon testing range etc.

Now our capabilities which we have acquired after the JF-17 could also be used for UAV & UCAV program but

- UCAV or UAV could not fullfil our requirement of affordable fighter jet which we could field in desired number without breaking the bank.

- Which could be used as a part of team with 5 Gen jet (again in numbers) as 5th gen jet would not be field in large numbers by PAF.

- F-16 would be retired in next 15 years

- Using J-10 in that role mean import of J-10 in large number along with imported 5 Gen jet which mean our offensive punch would be solely dependent on imported system from a single supplier. This will also a very expensive option for PAF

- At least for next 15 to years main need for PAF arise from manned fighter jet segment not from UAV or UCAV segment, therefore ignoring indigenous solution for main needs is not a wise decision.

- Also if we recall the South African aviation industry never recovered after the end of indigenous Atlas Carver jet program they had more experience and technological know how in aviation field so much so that they even had a program related to the indigenous jet engine production, but where are they now after abandoning the car er jet program.

 

[PakShaheen_79]

I think optimal route can be to focus on UCAVs for now and start a project for developing a high class gas turbine/ turbo fan engine. Unargubly the most complex part of any fighter program. We must learn lesson from Indian LCA program. They have complete fighter but engines are missing. Even a giant like GE is unable to fulfill their requirements in time putting the entire program in limbo. We need to develop our own engine, doesn't matter if its first iteration is not efficient enough. We need that critical learning in producing single crystal blade turbines and related technologies. We can focus on other areas like avioinics for a manned program meanwhile. But jumping into a NGFA like program without an engine will not solve our problem. For funding, this program must have political ownership like our missile and nuclear program. If we can succeed there, I am optimist we will succeed here as well with time, patience and of course with trail and error.

 

[Quwa]

To an extent I agree with your argument to give importance to UCAV and related technologies for Pakistani aviation Industry infact I too advocate to have at least a research program for Loyal wingmen.

BUT (Please allow me to disagree here) issue is our aviation industry has not grown vertically upward but top down in it's orientation.

It's has not made any successful aviation product other then Mushshak trainer aircraft.

Before JF-17, we were stuck in overhauling of Mirage Jets and F-7 jets but JF-17 program has initiated many sub program like aviation grade metal sheet working, Avionics production and integration program, air weapon testing range etc.

Now our capabilities which we have acquired after the JF-17 could also be used for UAV & UCAV program but

- UCAV or UAV could not fullfil our requirement of affordable fighter jet which we could field in desired number without breaking the bank.

- Which could be used as a part of team with 5 Gen jet (again in numbers) as 5th gen jet would not be field in large numbers by PAF.

- F-16 would be retired in next 15 years

- Using J-10 in that role mean import of J-10 in large number along with imported 5 Gen jet which mean our offensive punch would be solely dependent on imported system from a single supplier. This will also a very expensive option for PAF

- At least for next 15 to years main need for PAF arise from manned fighter jet segment not from UAV or UCAV segment, therefore ignoring indigenous solution for main needs is not a wise decision.

- Also if we recall the South African aviation industry never recovered after the end of indigenous Atlas Carver jet program they had more experience and technological know how in aviation field so much so that they even had a program related to the indigenous jet engine production, but where are they now after abandoning the car er jet program.

I think the key is to reframe how we approach fighter requirements.

The air warfare environment has changed, and as such, the needs that we once took for granted 10 years ago no longer apply for the next 10 years.

For example, how much of the PAF's air defence and attack requirements require a multi-role fighter? In other words, can the PAF supplement some of its fighter needs with medium-to-long-range SAMs and UCAVs?

Now, once we factor in the existence of large-scale SAM and UCAV programs, how many multirole fighters does the PAF realistically need?

Let's say there's a two-tier requirement: 90 'heavy' long-range types for offensive ops, and 150-180 'medium' multi-role types.

...Do we have the fiscal and industrial capacity to absorb a new fighter program for around 150-180 multirole units? I don't think we do, hence to frantic push to finding export customers for the JF-17 as it is right now.

Moreover, what will this new PFX add to the equation that the J-10CE does not already offer? Okay, we can argue there's more domestic tie-ins, sure, but there's also added cost to achieving those tie-ins (overhead) sitting on top of the production cost.

So, the question is, can we leverage those same resources more efficiently and, in turn, achieve better outcomes? I think so...if we pivot to focusing on domestic UCAVs as well as domestic SAMs, ALCMs, decoys, loitering munitions, SSMs, etc.

However, we can take steps to accelerate our industrial capacities. For example, we can approach Turkiye to join the KAAN for the 'heavy' requirement, and tie our purchase into valuable offset, co-production, and joint R&D initiatives.

Sadly, we dropped our chance to get the most concessions back in 2016-2017 (when the Turks invited us into the TFX) and, instead, did AZM (and look at the results).

Overall, I stand by my much earlier stand...the optimal approach for the PAF was to join the KAAN for the "heavy" requirement and acquire J-10CEs for the "medium" need. With the KAAN, they should've sought workshare, joint-R&D, and local capacity building, and then steer that towards a UCAV program to pair with the KAAN.

 

[Armchair]

Everyone who is mocking PAF over Project Azm and PFX... must consider following points very seriously.

1. How long it took for US and China to put their 5G fighter in air despite having world class R&D and manufactureing?

2. How long it took France to make Rafale what it's today in F4R config?

3. Was it logical for India to stick with LCA despite knowning fully that they can't produce everything within India?

Obviously No!! They ended up in a situation where engines have stalled their production of MK1s ... let alone MK1A and MK2.

4. How PAF was suppose to produce all the technologies in house within a decade? Remember, Project Azm was announced in 2017 and not in 1917, lolz
5. Don't you think that may be PFX is realization of our own limitation by PAF and a decision to make progress step by step in creating niche technologies instead of going for full aircraft which obviously is not possible right now. Remember, it is an experimental fighter what we know so far.

6. What if PFX is never meant for serial production but to serve as a stepping stone in long journey of Project Azm?

I disagree with this post. The difference between west Germany and east Germany was the operating system, it wasn't an issue of more time. Same with north or south Korea.

The reason Pak military industrial complex keeps failing is the same - the operating system. As with the case of Germany and Korea, the bad system as the non-merit based system.

For the right system you would want a scientific research organisation to be run by scientists, not military officials. For a merit based system you would give marks to someone who knows engineering, not a rote learner.

That is the crux of the problem.

 

[Armchair]

I think the key is to reframe how we approach fighter requirements.

The air warfare environment has changed, and as such, the needs that we once took for granted 10 years ago no longer apply for the next 10 years.

For example, how much of the PAF's air defence and attack requirements require a multi-role fighter? In other words, can the PAF supplement some of its fighter needs with medium-to-long-range SAMs and UCAVs?

Now, once we factor in the existence of large-scale SAM and UCAV programs, how many multirole fighters does the PAF realistically need?

Let's say there's a two-tier requirement: 90 'heavy' long-range types for offensive ops, and 150-180 'medium' multi-role types.

...Do we have the fiscal and industrial capacity to absorb a new fighter program for around 150-180 multirole units? I don't think we do, hence to frantic push to finding export customers for the JF-17 as it is right now.

Moreover, what will this new PFX add to the equation that the J-10CE does not already offer? Okay, we can argue there's more domestic tie-ins, sure, but there's also added cost to achieving those tie-ins (overhead) sitting on top of the production cost.

So, the question is, can we leverage those same resources more efficiently and, in turn, achieve better outcomes? I think so...if we pivot to focusing on domestic UCAVs as well as domestic SAMs, ALCMs, decoys, loitering munitions, SSMs, etc.

However, we can take steps to accelerate our industrial capacities. For example, we can approach Turkiye to join the KAAN for the 'heavy' requirement, and tie our purchase into valuable offset, co-production, and joint R&D initiatives.

Sadly, we dropped our chance to get the most concessions back in 2016-2017 (when the Turks invited us into the TFX) and, instead, did AZM (and look at the results).

Overall, I stand by my much earlier stand...the optimal approach for the PAF was to join the KAAN for the "heavy" requirement and acquire J-10CEs for the "medium" need. With the KAAN, they should've sought workshare, joint-R&D, and local capacity building, and then steer that towards a UCAV program to pair with the KAAN.

An issue is missed here - do the requirements factor in the reality of engineering and mass production?

For instance, the requirement by military planners for a tank was met differently by the Nazis from the Soviets. The latter took into account that a tank with 80% of the capability but 20% of the engineering effort would be more beneficial.

The reality of the Ukraine war again brings back the same issue. A wunder tank does not fair much better than a simpler one. An expensive UAV isn't much more effective than a much cheaper drone.

Who would have thought that a turtle tank - something that could easily be built enmass at minimal cost - would be preferred over a bells and whistles MBT?

Understanding industrial engineering requirements is critical. If you ask me, Pakistan does not need multiple types of fighter aircraft. It needs one. It needs credible SAM systems that it can build for itself. Such systems could go into ships. In a future conflict, the ability to manufacture a medium-long range sam system would be far more useful than the latest wunder weapon.

Imagine what it would mean - the ability to build meaningful corvettes in Pakistan without massive expenditure on foreign SAM systems. The ability to keep fighting despite all airbases being missiled to oblivion. The ability to build something rather than import aircraft that needs massive Forex, and becomes dependent for spares, which continue to cost giant Forex reserves for as long as they remain operational.

 

[Quwa]

An issue is missed here - do the requirements factor in the reality of engineering and mass production?

For instance, the requirement by military planners for a tank was met differently by the Nazis from the Soviets. The latter took into account that a tank with 80% of the capability but 20% of the engineering effort would be more beneficial.

The reality of the Ukraine war again brings back the same issue. A wunder tank does not fair much better than a simpler one. An expensive UAV isn't much more effective than a much cheaper drone.

Who would have thought that a turtle tank - something that could easily be built enmass at minimal cost - would be preferred over a bells and whistles MBT?

Understanding industrial engineering requirements is critical. If you ask me, Pakistan does not need multiple types of fighter aircraft. It needs one. It needs credible SAM systems that it can build for itself. Such systems could go into ships. In a future conflict, the ability to manufacture a medium-long range sam system would be far more useful than the latest wunder weapon.

Imagine what it would mean - the ability to build meaningful corvettes in Pakistan without massive expenditure on foreign SAM systems. The ability to keep fighting despite all airbases being missiled to oblivion. The ability to build something rather than import aircraft that needs massive Forex, and becomes dependent for spares, which continue to cost giant Forex reserves for as long as they remain operational.

Pretty much.

To be clear, when I say "UCAV" in Pakistan's context, I'm referring to a 2-3-ton (at most 4-ton) design that straddles between an ALCM and a 'Loyal Wingman.'

A system that's fundamentally expendable, but when used at scale, can be a good offensive strike asset (see the Spirit Mosquito below as a reference).



Think of something the PAF can send into high-risk environments knowing that it will lose some (or many), but with the benefit of depleting Indian SAMs, developing real-time awareness of Indian deployments (with UCAVs acting as recon drones as they approach their targets), and striking some targets successfully.

I'd rather orient Pakistan's state-owned and private sector aviation industries towards building such UCAVs at scale. In fact, imagine building a level of redundancy where a loss can be replaced within a week.

And to be clear, this should be the upper end of our industry in wartime; the bulk should focus on guided munitions, like medium-to-long-range SAMs, cheap loitering munitions, guided surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, low-cost cruise missiles, etc.

The "premier" or "marquee" assets - such as fighter aircraft and submarines - should be treated as permanent attrition. Meaning, as you wouldn't be able to replace them during a war (due to the reliance on foreign inputs, lack of industrial capacity, etc), you aim to replace them after the war.

These premier assets have a role, for sure, but IMO they shouldn't be the workhorse or drive the bulk of wartime operations. Rather, they should be strategic assets meant for very specific missions.

 

[FuturePAF]

I think the key is to reframe how we approach fighter requirements.

The air warfare environment has changed, and as such, the needs that we once took for granted 10 years ago no longer apply for the next 10 years.

For example, how much of the PAF's air defence and attack requirements require a multi-role fighter? In other words, can the PAF supplement some of its fighter needs with medium-to-long-range SAMs and UCAVs?

Now, once we factor in the existence of large-scale SAM and UCAV programs, how many multirole fighters does the PAF realistically need?

Let's say there's a two-tier requirement: 90 'heavy' long-range types for offensive ops, and 150-180 'medium' multi-role types.

...Do we have the fiscal and industrial capacity to absorb a new fighter program for around 150-180 multirole units? I don't think we do, hence to frantic push to finding export customers for the JF-17 as it is right now.

Moreover, what will this new PFX add to the equation that the J-10CE does not already offer? Okay, we can argue there's more domestic tie-ins, sure, but there's also added cost to achieving those tie-ins (overhead) sitting on top of the production cost.

So, the question is, can we leverage those same resources more efficiently and, in turn, achieve better outcomes? I think so...if we pivot to focusing on domestic UCAVs as well as domestic SAMs, ALCMs, decoys, loitering munitions, SSMs, etc.

However, we can take steps to accelerate our industrial capacities. For example, we can approach Turkiye to join the KAAN for the 'heavy' requirement, and tie our purchase into valuable offset, co-production, and joint R&D initiatives.

Sadly, we dropped our chance to get the most concessions back in 2016-2017 (when the Turks invited us into the TFX) and, instead, did AZM (and look at the results).

Overall, I stand by my much earlier stand...the optimal approach for the PAF was to join the KAAN for the "heavy" requirement and acquire J-10CEs for the "medium" need. With the KAAN, they should've sought workshare, joint-R&D, and local capacity building, and then steer that towards a UCAV program to pair with the KAAN.

Perhaps we can make the PFX in such a way, that the design is for a manned fighter, that is just the right size as that required by the PLAAF for their UCAV requirements. In that way, we can become a supplier of parts (or whole air frames) to the Chinese UCAV market, for a relatively attributable platform. Something akin to the Boeing-Australian MQ-28 Ghost Bat, but supersonic; with super cruise using the WS-19 engine (with approx. 115 kn when it’s fully developed), don’t can operate out into alot of the first island chain.

With these economies of scale, cost should be kept under control and both nations can have a very robust platform; with the space to house enough internal munitions, and house the needed electronics, all while being agile enough to put up a decent fight against manned and unmanned adversaries.

Sharing a platform with China means we can supply each other during a contingency, from each other’s existing stocks at first, and then from the other’s factory directly.

 

[PakShaheen_79]

I think the key is to reframe how we approach fighter requirements.

The air warfare environment has changed, and as such, the needs that we once took for granted 10 years ago no longer apply for the next 10 years.

For example, how much of the PAF's air defence and attack requirements require a multi-role fighter? In other words, can the PAF supplement some of its fighter needs with medium-to-long-range SAMs and UCAVs?

Now, once we factor in the existence of large-scale SAM and UCAV programs, how many multirole fighters does the PAF realistically need?

Let's say there's a two-tier requirement: 90 'heavy' long-range types for offensive ops, and 150-180 'medium' multi-role types.

...Do we have the fiscal and industrial capacity to absorb a new fighter program for around 150-180 multirole units? I don't think we do, hence to frantic push to finding export customers for the JF-17 as it is right now.

Moreover, what will this new PFX add to the equation that the J-10CE does not already offer? Okay, we can argue there's more domestic tie-ins, sure, but there's also added cost to achieving those tie-ins (overhead) sitting on top of the production cost.

So, the question is, can we leverage those same resources more efficiently and, in turn, achieve better outcomes? I think so...if we pivot to focusing on domestic UCAVs as well as domestic SAMs, ALCMs, decoys, loitering munitions, SSMs, etc.

However, we can take steps to accelerate our industrial capacities. For example, we can approach Turkiye to join the KAAN for the 'heavy' requirement, and tie our purchase into valuable offset, co-production, and joint R&D initiatives.

Sadly, we dropped our chance to get the most concessions back in 2016-2017 (when the Turks invited us into the TFX) and, instead, did AZM (and look at the results).

Overall, I stand by my much earlier stand...the optimal approach for the PAF was to join the KAAN for the "heavy" requirement and acquire J-10CEs for the "medium" need. With the KAAN, they should've sought workshare, joint-R&D, and local capacity building, and then steer that towards a UCAV program to pair with the KAAN.

But PAF is part of KAAN project. And I don't think much resources were wasted on Azm as PAF very soon realized the lack of niche technologies required to undertake that sort of project all by itself.