Iran - Israel/US War: Israel-US declare war on Iran, Iran responds

[AZ_HighCountry]

after electing the biggest psychopath since Adolf Hitler - you cannot claim your country isn’t capable of pure evil.

your system of government has no circuit breaker for stopping a psychopath president.

Your founding idiots were white suprematists who created a moronic system of government.

So utterly shit that no one else has copied it!

Outstanding display of ignorance.

Congratulations.

 

[Immortals]

 

[BananaRepublic]

Yanks are such classless uncouth buggers!

 

[Persian Gulf]

 

[BHAN85]

Trump gonna attack soon at Bibi’s request?

uk seems to want some involvement in that, only explanation for recent nonsenses declarations from prime minister about foiled attack to military base.

so something must be brewing right now.

 

[Professor Jiang]

Now that the Iranian delegation's trip to New York has ended with this scene in which the U.S. government has effectively asked the Iranian delegation to leave New York sooner, perhaps it's time for Tehran to answer a fundamental question: Have we truly understood Donald Trump and the logic of his policy toward Iran?

This question matters because the Iranian delegation went to New York to find, amid the war, a way to reduce tensions and perhaps exit the crisis. Tehran's message was also more or less clear: Iran is ready for dialogue, ready to negotiate a path to end the war, and even willing to bargain over some of its most important levers. But the end of this trip, regardless of its diplomatic details, yields a symbolic image of a larger problem. Tehran may still believe that demonstrating rationality, restraint, and readiness for compromise will, in itself, generate goodwill from the other side. The Trump experience, however, forces us to doubt this assumption.

Many foreign policy mistakes stem not from a lack of information, but from errors of perception. Governments interpret the other side's behavior through their own logic and assume that what signals rationality, goodwill, or accountability to them carries the same meaning for the other side. In confronting Donald Trump, this very assumption must be reevaluated.

The Iranian policymaker must first understand—and more importantly, believe—that Trump and his administration do not necessarily award points for "being rational," "acting responsibly," or "being a good player." The notion that if Tehran speaks the language of diplomacy, emphasizes its commitment to international law, shows restraint, and proves it does not want to escalate the war, this behavior will ultimately earn it political credit, is not necessarily compatible with Trump's logic.

In his logic, what matters more than good behavior is the balance of power and leverage. Restraint may be read not as political maturity, but as a result of pressure. If the other side concludes that you've backed down due to rising costs, their next question isn't how to reciprocate this goodwill; it's why they should stop the pressure.

This is where the second issue begins: the immediacy of concessions.

In classical diplomacy, a confidence-building measure might pave the way for reciprocal action. But this is only possible when both sides have a relatively similar understanding of what that action means. If what Tehran calls "goodwill" is interpreted in Washington as a "sign of need" or "effect of pressure," the outcome could be the exact opposite of Iran's expectation.

When, amid the war, this message comes from Tehran in Foreign Affairs magazine that let's stop the war, open the Strait, or reduce tensions, one shouldn't assume this message is necessarily logged as accountability. The other side's takeaway might be that the pressure has worked. Trump does not necessarily record a concession given upfront and without receiving anything in return in the column of America's debts. What has been given quickly becomes the new status quo, and the next negotiation will start from that fresh point.

In simple terms: What you gave, you gave; now let's see what we can get for the rest.

That's why the sequencing of concessions in any potential negotiation holds fundamental importance. Who does what first isn't a technical matter; it's part of the bargaining power itself. Leverage set aside without receiving anything in exchange is no longer leverage.

But the issue runs even deeper. In Tehran, there's still this notion that perhaps the entire crisis with America could be managed by resolving the nuclear file. The logic here is clear: The nuclear file is Washington's most explicitly stated issue; so if Iran can offer a major concession in this area, Trump can present it as a victory and find a way out of the crisis.

The danger in this view lies in overly narrowing the problem.

The Iranian policymaker must take seriously the possibility that the nuclear issue isn't the entirety of the Iran problem for the Trump administration. It might even be a pretext, a tool, or just one component of a larger project. In that case, a nuclear concession won't necessarily end the crisis; it might just remove one item from the list of demands, with another taking its place.

 

[Ali_Baba]

Now that the Iranian delegation's trip to New York has ended with this scene in which the U.S. government has effectively asked the Iranian delegation to leave New York sooner, perhaps it's time for Tehran to answer a fundamental question: Have we truly understood Donald Trump and the logic of his policy toward Iran?

This question matters because the Iranian delegation went to New York to find, amid the war, a way to reduce tensions and perhaps exit the crisis. Tehran's message was also more or less clear: Iran is ready for dialogue, ready to negotiate a path to end the war, and even willing to bargain over some of its most important levers. But the end of this trip, regardless of its diplomatic details, yields a symbolic image of a larger problem. Tehran may still believe that demonstrating rationality, restraint, and readiness for compromise will, in itself, generate goodwill from the other side. The Trump experience, however, forces us to doubt this assumption.

Many foreign policy mistakes stem not from a lack of information, but from errors of perception. Governments interpret the other side's behavior through their own logic and assume that what signals rationality, goodwill, or accountability to them carries the same meaning for the other side. In confronting Donald Trump, this very assumption must be reevaluated.

The Iranian policymaker must first understand—and more importantly, believe—that Trump and his administration do not necessarily award points for "being rational," "acting responsibly," or "being a good player." The notion that if Tehran speaks the language of diplomacy, emphasizes its commitment to international law, shows restraint, and proves it does not want to escalate the war, this behavior will ultimately earn it political credit, is not necessarily compatible with Trump's logic.

In his logic, what matters more than good behavior is the balance of power and leverage. Restraint may be read not as political maturity, but as a result of pressure. If the other side concludes that you've backed down due to rising costs, their next question isn't how to reciprocate this goodwill; it's why they should stop the pressure.

This is where the second issue begins: the immediacy of concessions.

In classical diplomacy, a confidence-building measure might pave the way for reciprocal action. But this is only possible when both sides have a relatively similar understanding of what that action means. If what Tehran calls "goodwill" is interpreted in Washington as a "sign of need" or "effect of pressure," the outcome could be the exact opposite of Iran's expectation.

When, amid the war, this message comes from Tehran in Foreign Affairs magazine that let's stop the war, open the Strait, or reduce tensions, one shouldn't assume this message is necessarily logged as accountability. The other side's takeaway might be that the pressure has worked. Trump does not necessarily record a concession given upfront and without receiving anything in return in the column of America's debts. What has been given quickly becomes the new status quo, and the next negotiation will start from that fresh point.

In simple terms: What you gave, you gave; now let's see what we can get for the rest.

That's why the sequencing of concessions in any potential negotiation holds fundamental importance. Who does what first isn't a technical matter; it's part of the bargaining power itself. Leverage set aside without receiving anything in exchange is no longer leverage.

But the issue runs even deeper. In Tehran, there's still this notion that perhaps the entire crisis with America could be managed by resolving the nuclear file. The logic here is clear: The nuclear file is Washington's most explicitly stated issue; so if Iran can offer a major concession in this area, Trump can present it as a victory and find a way out of the crisis.

The danger in this view lies in overly narrowing the problem.

The Iranian policymaker must take seriously the possibility that the nuclear issue isn't the entirety of the Iran problem for the Trump administration. It might even be a pretext, a tool, or just one component of a larger project. In that case, a nuclear concession won't necessarily end the crisis; it might just remove one item from the list of demands, with another taking its place.

Very well written article and reflects reality more than most other commentary out there. Iran has wasted its military opportunities to demonstrate to the USA that it cannot achieve its objectives, and the internal "reformist" battle that has been externalised, has created fissures in Iran that has not helped Iran much either.

Iran needs to impose a bigger military cost on Trump and his calculus before the USA starts to talk rationally, so far, everything has done in its restrained calculated reciprocal manner, encouraged Trump, not dissuaded him. Iran needs a significant miliary victory like an aircraft carrier, or some number of large warships actually hit, etc. Something that Trump cannot disguise.

 

[Master Chief]

Russia needs the USA or Israel to use it first. It wants a precedent..

Not sure tbh.

I think USA could plausibly use a nuke on pickaxe - that I agree with (though it is unlikely imho).

The second part of your inference, that Russia (or even China) acquires a free pass to do the same as a consequence, is something I am not convinced of.

Look at what Israel did to Gaza. Does Russia dare do the same to Ukraine? Would China conceivably do that to anyone?

I think USA under Israeli influence and Israel itself have turned into a hegemonic entity, without anyone else even coming close.

 

[Master Chief]

Your founding idiots were white suprematists who created a moronic system of government.

This is patently false. In fact, the USA's founding fathers and those who initially guided it, arguably up to and including Woodrow Wilson's early years of presidency, advocated for non-interventionism. There really was a significant hope that USA might provide a counterbalance to European colonialism.

Of course, that was all before certain groups acquired disproportionate influence.

 

[Khorasan Black Flags]

 

[BHAN85]

Not sure tbh.

I think USA could plausibly use a nuke on pickaxe - that I agree with (though it is unlikely imho).

The second part of your inference, that Russia (or even China) acquires a free pass to do the same as a consequence, is something I am not convinced of.

Look at what Israel did to Gaza. Does Russia dare do the same to Ukraine? Would China conceivably do that to anyone?

I think USA under Israeli influence and Israel itself have turned into a hegemonic entity, without anyone else even coming close.

yeah, israel assassinated a lot of high ranking enemies, including iran supreme leader, russia doesnt even dare to touch zelensky who is a national clown and not so important to ukraine like khamenei was to iran.

that speech of russia waiting for use nukes i think it comes from usa and it's projection, it's usa who is waiting and wishing for a big event to nuke enemies.

maybe iran never will have nukes, but iran wants to sink usn warships, and maybe usa ruling elite makes easier for them.

then icbm launch from usa land silos will be justified and they will overfly russia in his path to iran, some of them could detonate over russian soil due to some electronic error.

 

[Khorasan Black Flags]

 

[Flotilla]

Not sure tbh.

I think USA could plausibly use a nuke on pickaxe - that I agree with (though it is unlikely imho).

The second part of your inference, that Russia (or even China) acquires a free pass to do the same as a consequence, is something I am not convinced of.

Look at what Israel did to Gaza. Does Russia dare do the same to Ukraine? Would China conceivably do that to anyone?

I think USA under Israeli influence and Israel itself have turned into a hegemonic entity, without anyone else even coming close.

Well, even if you're right and Israel became a hegemonic entity because their leverage over US at long term Israel is done.

Returning to the subject of the excellent article, I do not believe the reformists are merely clumsy fools causing Iran to lose its influence.

I believe the reformists' role is to attempt a diplomatic solution—however far-fetched that might seem at this stage—for the following reasons:

1. Defense strategy. It is established doctrine that Iran only responds to attacks and does not initiate conflicts.

2. Time. Everyone knows (including the reformists) that negotiating peace with Israel and the United States is impossible; Iran vitally needs time to rebuild its defense industry, replenish stockpiles, and complete its nuclear program—including the bomb.

The IRGC announces daily that the defense system based on merely responding to attacks is a thing of the past, and it seems clear that the nuclear program never stopped, even when Natanz and Fordow were bombed.

 

[shapurzolaktaf]

Wahabi Abrahamic love