Not exactly
The F-2 is derived from Agile Falcon designed in the 80s - for a F-16 with a larger wing and more powerful engines.
They had been manufacturing the F-15J but MHI took the design parameters and focused to create an aircraft around it but because they were trying to push all sorts of untried methods such as new composite techniques and structural approaches which caused a lot of growing pains that still haunt that aircraft. Ironically, the Japanese did not use an uprated engine.
Most of that aircraft was about Japanese avionics and it did validate their industry.
MHi was WELL experienced in aircraft manufacturing which allowed them to absorb the technical debt they created with new technologies. They created the manufacturing jigs, processes and so on which took on design concepts from LM.
They even reverse taught LM some manufacturing techniques to help offset manufacturing timelines using LM facilities.
PAC is not in that model - PAC has taken a Chinese provided manufacturing line and absorbed into creating the aircraft. It did manufacture aircraft in the scale nor does it have engine manufacturing experience like MHI - it was a big leap for it to learn how to manufacture JF-17. So it can modify the JF-17 within what it learns and what it can import as processes - but has little ability to actually create processes without external assistance.
Lastly - it lacks anywhere in terms of the skilled labor along internal knowledge available to Japanese along with very few embodying the work ethic.
IMO... We should approach aerospace in terms of scalability with the aim of driving a high output and rapidly recouping R&D overhead.
For the PAF, the requirement for crewed aircraft will always be limited. The total PAF requirement of the JF-17 topped off at 250, but was averaged to around 150 (which it achieved). Minus exports or follow-on PAF orders, the PAC production line is an overhead that is underused.
Likewise, developing a new crewed aircraft is very expensive, especially when we lack the industrial capacity to create local inputs (in contrast to Japan or South Korea, which can develop their own inputs).
So, like AZM, the PAF will likely hit a wall with the PFX. In fact, the realistic scenario would be a continuation of the JF-17 as-is but with improved radars, avionics, and munitions. However, this doesn't solve the issue of underused production capacity at PAC.
IMO, to solve that problem, the PAF (via NASTP and PAC) should pivot to developing UCAVs. Start with a 1~2-ton attritable UCAV designed for 2-4 AAMs or SDBs. Use this relatively simpler program to properly learn about aerodynamic design, flight control systems, composite materials, etc.
The advantage of an attritable UCAV design is its scalability. A system of this nature would be needed by the hundreds both within the PAF as well as foreign buyers and, possibly, other tri-services arms.
Basically, you'd start with a relatively low R&D overhead cost (vs. crewed jets) and can distribute that across a massive domestic order. This helps you keep the overall unit cost of each one competitively low, which helps drive foreign interest and exports. When the demand is too much for PAC to handle alone, you can start delegating work to the private sector, thus encouraging real private investment in aerospace.
It's when these private companies start building capacity for production and, in turn, generate revenue, they'll delve into more original work. You'd get organic, bottom-up R&D from the industry and a growth in capacity for more complex programs.
So, after the attritable UCAV, you'd move onto a more complex UCAV (like 5~6-ton), and repeat the process. Then, eventually, you'll have the capacity to do a 16~20-ton design, at which point you can explore some crewed fighter design.
