I do not agree with the last part of your post, because saying ISI has “long ceased to be an effective intelligence agency” is too broad and frankly reflects a shallow reading of how intelligence systems actually function. It is fair to argue that India has improved over the last decade, especially by investing more seriously in HUMINT while strengthening its technical capabilities, and it is also fair to say Pakistan’s system has become increasingly reactive and distracted by domestic political priorities. But that is very different from claiming the entire institution now survives on reputation alone.
ISI’s shortcomings are better understood as a result of distorted state priorities from the top, followed by weak coordination and degraded follow-through across the rest of the system. ISI does not own troops, does not run the FIA, does not command provincial police, and does not directly govern formations, FC structures, or the chronically weak administrative framework in places like former FATA and parts of Balochistan. It can support, coordinate, and sometimes temporarily prop up parts of that ecosystem, but it cannot substitute for absent governance, inconsistent policy, or a fragmented state response. Expecting one rotating institution, with changing leadership, limited mandates, and finite resources, to compensate for structural failures across the state is not serious analysis; it is a misunderstanding of what intelligence agencies are actually built to do.