Some of you may disagree with me, and that's completely fine. But let's ask an honest question... even if every Afghan were removed from Pakistan tomorrow, would that suddenly solve all of our problems? Would inflation disappear? Would political instability end? Would governance improve? Would corruption vanish? We all know the answer.
Many of the crises Pakistan faces today are not imported problems. They are largely self-inflicted wounds that have accumulated over decades. Most of this chaos is man-made, and much of it could have been avoided if difficult conversations had been held years ago instead of being repeatedly swept under the rug.
In my view, this time the establishment has bitten off more than it can chew. The old methods of managing political, economic, and security challenges are no longer producing the same results. The cracks that were once hidden are now visible to everyone.
One of our biggest problems is that we often confuse showcase projects with genuine development. If our entire gauge of progress revolves around slogans like, "Lahore is Pakistan's Paris," then we are already in trouble. A country does not become developed because one city has nice roads, metro buses, flyovers, or attractive commercial districts. Real development means functioning institutions, quality education, access to healthcare, reliable local governments, economic opportunities, and equal treatment of citizens regardless of which province they live in.
A nation succeeds when development reaches Quetta, Peshawar, Sukkur, Gwadar, Interior Sindh, South Punjab, and the remote districts that rarely make headlines. If all the investment, attention, and narrative are concentrated in a few urban centers while the rest of the country feels neglected, resentment naturally grows.
Ten years ago, if I had this conversation, I would have focused on provincial grievances, feelings of exclusion, unequal treatment, and the lack of ownership many citizens feel toward the state. These were issues that people whispered about privately. Today, they are discussed openly in interviews, podcasts, newspaper columns, and public forums.
For decades, many people in Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan have felt that they were treated as territories to be managed rather than equal stakeholders in the federation. Whether one agrees with that perception or not, the feeling exists and cannot simply be dismissed.
Sindh was effectively left to PPP and MQM. Many critics argue that MQM repeatedly traded long-term structural reforms, such as a stronger local government system, fair census representation, and greater administrative autonomy for Karachi, for short-term political arrangements and ministerial positions. Consequently, Karachi continues to face many of the same governance problems despite its importance to Pakistan's economy.
In Balochistan, people have long complained that despite the province's strategic location and natural resources, local communities have not seen proportional benefits. The province became associated with smuggling routes, informal trade networks, and chronic underdevelopment, while trust between the center and local populations continued to deteriorate.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa spent decades bearing the consequences of regional conflicts, militancy, refugee flows, and security operations. Yet whenever law and order deteriorates, the blame is often placed entirely on the provincial government. What is frequently overlooked is that border management and national security are fundamentally federal responsibilities. The federal government, military, and security agencies all have central roles in securing and managing the country's borders.
The irony is that Pakistan's leadership has often searched for external explanations for internal failures. It's easier to blame refugees, foreign conspiracies, neighboring countries, or political opponents than it is to confront decades of policy mistakes, weak governance, institutional dysfunction, and uneven development.
Pakistan's problems are far too deep to be solved by finding a scapegoat. Expelling Afghans will not automatically fix corruption, economic mismanagement, weak institutions, poor governance, or provincial grievances. Those problems existed before the refugee issue became politically convenient, and they will remain afterward unless they are addressed honestly.
At some point, Pakistan must stop measuring success through optics and start measuring it through results. The real question is not whether Lahore looks like Paris. The real question is whether every Pakistani, regardless of province or ethnicity, feels that Pakistan belongs to them and that they have a fair stake in its future. Only then will meaningful and lasting stability be possible.
What really bewilders me is that some people talk about these issues without understanding the regional history, geopolitics, or the long-term consequences of state actions. Imposing Governor's Rule or an emergency in KPK might satisfy certain political interests in the short term, but it would come at a significant cost. It could fuel resentment against the federal government and the establishment, strengthen feelings of political disenfranchisement, and create unnecessary hostility among the people. History shows that coercive political solutions often generate more problems than they solve, especially in regions where trust between citizens and the state is already fragile.
After read some of the comments, I was going to write some pretty nasty words, but I didn't because it's becoming clearer that these people are living in their own bubble unaware of the ground realities. I always give an example of "The Matrix".
My 34 EZ model will fix majority of the problems including development in all 34 Economic Zones, not just "Lahore".
