Our Heroes - Pakistan Army

[ghazi52]

Shabir was captain when he was committed for marriage in a noble family of Lahore. His father Major Sharif decided to marry his son but it was not a good time. He was retired now and only living on his pension. Although his elder daughter was married already but there was still another to be married. Now Shabir was also committed for marriage; so he wrote a letter to his son.

Shabir was a spendthrift. His fuel expense was too much, he also smoked an expensive brand of cigarette , cork tipped Craven A.

Moreover, he spent on his friends what ever was left. So sparing any money looked impossible.
Those days he was also doing a course in the School of Military Intelligence. He wrote a letter to his father on July 17, 1968

“My dear Daddy,
I don’t know whether I can tell you or not what I do, how much I save and where I spend, but believe me I am aware of your problems. It doesn’t mean that I am not your thankful son. Its only a matter of a few months, everything will be alright. You know that I smoke, I’ll quit if necessary. I promise you that as and when the course ends, I shall start sending you a good amount every month.”

(In the picture Major Shabir can be seen smoking a cigarette with Major Mujahid Ali Shaheed (26 FF). Major Mujahid is also a martyr of 1971 war)

 

[ghazi52]

General Abu Bakr Osman Mitha was not only one of the finest officers of Pakistan Army during his time but also can be considered one of the best men ever seen in the military history. Although his whole career was an example of excellence and hard work, but the brightest feather in his cap was the formation of SSG. The most elite unit of Pakistan Army. Here is our humble effort to depict that how hard he tried to raise the best unit. Based on his memoirs, we have written an article. Although Mitha was the person who never praised himself and preferred to remain in dark, but we have penned down the article in the first-person narration just to show how committed he was towards his cause.

Seeing the length of article, we have divided it into two parts.

I received the orders from GHQ that 17 Baluch is going to be converted into the SSG and I’ll be its first CO. This whole unit was to be made only out of volunteers. So, I kept only one company of 17 Baluch along with Major Sharif and Captain Riaz, with me to handle administrative duties and told Baluch Regimental Center to post out others to different units. Later I took Lieutenant Saleem Zia as well (He later commanded SSG too).

Lacking the expertise and relevant details for the operations, I had to visit America on 17 March 1956. Where I studied different kinds of curriculum to be inducted in the SSG. Initially I landed in New York, where I was taught the activities for “Stay Behind” in the enemy territory. Later I was taken to Fort Bragg (Fort Liberty now), where I studied the techniques of modern para warfare. After that I was taken to Jericho Vermont, where the Mountain Warfare School is located. Lastly, I attended Frogman School in Los Angeles. After couple of months on my return, I was able to draw up a course out line for the SSG.

After my return, I met with Ayub Khan and briefed him on what I had learned. On my return to Cherat, I received the first batch of the volunteers of the SSG, including officers and ORs. I personally selected the candidates for initial two companies, to indicate that what kind of men I want for the SSG. I never compromised over my criteria for the SSG. It was the reason that I always had shortage of men up to 15% of the requirement. I could accept the shortage but not any incompetent person. Under training recruits from the units, Frontier Corps, and other arms of the military as well, I asked for the men who were willing to go through intense hardship of training.

The first batch was selected, and the initial two months of rigorous training were started for the soldiers. They were asked to do what they couldn’t have ever imagined in their actual months. For example, an exercise was held to walk up to 40 miles in the mountainous terrain. After pushing beyond their limits when they made 40 miles, carrying their heavy burden; they were asked to go for another 10 miles and later 5 more. Only a few were able to do this initial phase. Those who were unable were sent to their parent units back immediately. It was just a tiny example of what they were told to do.

I encouraged them to improvise and act on their plans situation to situation, creating a real war like situation during the training. Although I preferred the lightest and most maneuverable weapons, but they had to carry it in a maximum quantity as much as they could. Only the backpack weighed up to 40 pounds. They were not given enough food supplies, instead they were ordered to take food from the environment. Such as, collecting dew drops for water, wring the moss, eating leaves and branches or even roots of different plants.

Instead of any decoration or garnishing of the unit lines and barracks, I had told on the very first day that I only need barracks and equipment to be cleaned and updated. I also strictly forbade the fatigue parties and labor work by the soldiers. I want them to be focused strictly on their work. I also forbade any soldier to take part in any sports out of the unit. However, sports inside the units must be participated. I also took part with my jawans. Unit mess was to remain open throughout the year. The timings and duration of the training was to remain the same, even in Ramzan. Instead of being called by the bugle, I told them to study the notice board where the daily schedule was pasted for everyone. I wanted them to treat them like adults, not like some school kids. Everyone was to reach the relevant point on time, otherwise he was to face the consequences. One more thing I added was that if anyone was not seen marching smartly while going in the unit premises, he will regret it.

If someone wanted to go on leave, all he should do is to enter the Kote-Guard and leave. However, he should be sure that he doesn’t have any duty assigned to him. If someone doesn’t come on the devised time after spending the weekend, he would be considered AWOL (Absent without Leave). I can proudly say that during my six years of command, there wasn’t any single case of AWOL. Instead, everyone thought it sacred to keep this in order. Captain Anwar (Later Major General) was returning to Cherat from Peshawar. But he missed the van and no cab driver agreed to travel here in such a dark. So he treadled from Peshawar to Cherat with his ordinary civillian shoes. He reached the parade 5 minutes earlier. But what condition was his feet suffering cant be described in words. A jawan named Noor Muhammd was returning to Cherat from his village. As the train reached Attock station, it passed without stopping as it was a nonstop train. Without caring for his life, he jumped from the train. He fell near the tracks and his head was chopped off under the train wheels. A common man must think it as an act of lunacy, but it was the discipline as I think it.

SSG personnel were ordered to reach any part of the country on immediate notice, carrying their relevant gears. They were tasked to meet the task without any flaw. All they had were weapons and sometimes, not even that. They had to reach the target without any transport or aid, meet the objective and return without being spotted. If anyone was caught carrying any food supplies while going, money or even a pen knife while leaving for the target, he was immediately kicked out of the SSG and sent to his parent unit with a warning letter.

I had only kept a single company of 17 Baluch, naming them as “Training Company”. They were tasked to supervise the under-training men. I personally conducted “raids” on the hideouts of the commandos. In such a situation, they were ordered to leave the positions immediately, not only carrying their belongings, but also to remove any signs of their presence in the area. All I wanted was to keep them active all the time as being caught by me or any of the “training Company” personal meant was the return to the parent unit. For the initial two months, I also accompanied my men carrying full operational gears, carrying a forty pounds backpack, and performing the same duties with my men.

While going through all this, I was called by General Naseer (The Chief of Staff), who objected to my methods and accused me of spoiling army conducts. He also told me to finish all my practices or I shall face the consequence. I had no other choice but to talk to General Ayub Khan. I don’t know what he said to General Naseer, but I never faced any situation like that. Not only the trainees, but the company commander and the commanding officer (me) also had to attend the PT. It was not common sit ups and pushups but a hard core physical exercise, which everyone had to attend. For the whole day workout, it was just an appetizer. I also gave the demo to climb the 13 feet high wall without any support and descend without any support. Those (especially younger than me) who couldn’t do so, were given “special treatment” by the PT NCOs.

One day when I was descending a rope using only my hands, I heard some officers saying, “Sir may you slip from the rope”. For the next two days, I went to the boxing classes especially and had a match with those specific officers. I gave them a proper “reward” for their prayers. They asked me a time for couple of days to get trained in the boxing, which I gladly did. However, when I met them after a week, I beat them even worse than before. The poor chaps never hooted at me again.

I made the rotation practice of my men. I rotated them in such a manner that a person doing his duties in desert will be performing his tasks in snowcapped areas just after a couple of weeks and later in the coastal belts. The first company I sent to Baluchistan consisted of only ten soldiers. One day I received a call from the Commanding Officer of a scout platoon from Chaman.

When I reached there, I was told that only eight to ten of men are roaming in the area where even two hundred of scouts don’t dare to come without proper armament, as it was the stronghold of most fierce robbers and terrorists of the region. The nearest platoon what the CO was talking about was of Captain Syed. I called him on wireless and asked him to meet us (me and the CO). When Syed reached, I asked him the exact situation of the area. I told the CO not to worry about my men and ordered Syed to continue his operations.

Ironically, after a few weeks, Syed brought the most notorious robber of the area with robber’s hands tied on his back. Not only him but also three of his associates, known for robbery, killing and smuggling. I signaled to the CO that does he require the SSG escort for him if he wants to stay safe? I never received a reply from him.

It is also pertinent to mention about Naik Miran, who was operational in this area. He was roaming the area in civilian attire. Scouts saw him suspiciously and arrested him. They arrested him and started interrogating, including third degree as well. He kept silent until forty-eight hours. After forty-eight hours he told that he belongs to SSG. When we were asked, we confirmed that he is one of us. On inquiring by the scouts, he told that it is the training of SSG that ID remains undisclosed until it passes forty eight hours. Naik Miran was taken by us. He was given an option to get one rank demotion or to be kicked out of the SSG. He didn’t want to get our of SSG so he accepted demotion. He was demoted because of the reason why he was caught.
However, it would be futile to say that never happened any problem. Once I saw an officer marching. His backpack looked overstuffed, even heavier than 40 pounds, but its condition looked as if it had not been opened for days. I called him and asked him to open it. He opened it and I was furious to see that it was only filled with cardboard pieces. Before lunch, he had to leave Cherat.
Every year in the month of February, an exercise was conducted in Mansehra. Its purpose was to test the “Stay Behind” capabilities of SSG. An infantry battalion played the role of the enemy and SSG had to penetrate their lines. It longed for four weeks. In the month of February, it was the season of intense rain and cold. They were not issued any ration, tent or supplies, or even the medical aid. Every soldier had to carry his burden and arrange food supplies for him. Even if someone was injured or sick, he had to approach exercise headquarters on his own, without anyone’s help. I feel proud to say that my men never let me down. I always kept my head high because of them.
As long as I had been the commander of SSG, I always objected to have any specific shoulder sign, Barret or insignia for the SSG. Instead of being symbolic, I wanted them to act practically. My friend Colonel (Later Major General Janjua) once asked me to stay in Cherat for a couple of days. He wanted to verify whether the SSG are special indeed or its just a propaganda among the lines. On a fateful day I received him in Cherat and dropped him in the mess, as he wanted to see himself in a casual mood what SSG really is. I arranged his stay for a week in Cherat. But surprisingly the next day, he asked me to leave Cherat. I asked him why so soon? Wont he verify my claim about SSG? But he replied that he has seen my men here. The way they talk and reply any question and scan a person while saluting, it’s enough to tell that they are not a common breed now.
My doors were open to anyone. Any moment of grief, joy, trouble or advise; was common between me and my men. I proudly say that in my absence, any of my officers or jawans never hesitated to knock my door and asked my wife anything in their household matters. As per the routine in army unites, I had also issued orders that only ten percent of the men can go on leave for Eid celebrations. However, my home was opened for every jawan or officer at that moment. A feast was arranged for them at my home. Considering me more than their elder brother, they helped my wife in kitchen, arranging the feast or even cleaning the utensils after lunch. But this was hell of a job to do. Just imagine what a group of strong and sturdy men will do to the lunch, when they have some score to settle with their CO?
On receiving the first batch of officers, I arranged an ice cream party for them. I was the only person having a refrigerator at home so I could keep the ice cream. But after that day on every week end, my home was the picnic point for those who wanted to enjoy ice cream. Even after the refrigerator was arranged in the mess, ice cream party still continued to grace my home.
I had heard much about Americans regarding their skills. But they surprised me even more. I was shocked to see how much they under estimated us. I had told them already about our basic course outlines, but it was of no use. On the very first day when I visited the class, I saw them teaching the officers about the basics of small arms and ballistics. I attended that class for four hours myself, just to see what they were teaching. I called the chief instructor to my office and stopped this futile activity because our “Small Arms Course” has told us much about it already. The same happened when the class of demolition course started. I told them we know about it already.

Once a survival instructor was sent to us, considering that he can teach us something. After a week, we received a gigantic and sturdy American officer. He kept teaching my men for two weeks. After that he came to my office and told me that he is just wasting his time. I asked why he is saying that. Then he told me that my men already know what he is here to teach, even they know better than him in several matters. For example, he said that my men already know that how to make loaf out of wild berry seeds or the medical characteristics of many herbs. He even came to know about some other practices as well which were not in his knowledge already.

When general Musa became the C-in-C, he planned a visit to Cherat. During his visit, he reached a hideout where the survival course was under practice. There was a strange odor in the air when Musa arrived at hide out. He saw that a couple of men were cooking frogs in a tin to eat. In a surprised manner Musa asked the NCO,”Do you really intend to eat it or just trying to impress me?”
“Sir will you try some if I eat one?”, NCO asked.
“For sure”, Musa answered.

The next moment Musa saw NCO chewing the two frogs and very next moment, Musa picked up two frogs and swallowed it without chewing. “How was the taste sir?” I couldn’t resist asking.

For a few days, Musa stayed in Peshawar and off and on, he visited Cherat, seeing the most unique military exercises to the extent of my knowledge he saw. About a week prior to Musa’s visit, my company commanders came to me and asked whether they should prepare for guard of honor and demos for the exercises. I replied to them, why do they need a week for practice, what’s the purpose of such rigorous training? Do they have enough spare time? All I allowed them was to have only one day to practice before the visit. I not even asked them that are they even practicing it or not, I knew my men. On the day of the visit, the demo and guard of honor given by the SSG not only spell bounded me, but what to say of Musa. I could read it on his face that he is not dealing here with ordinary men.

The time of six years just passed in a few moments. The day I remember when I was going to complete my three years in the SSG, on the instructions of General Ayub Khan I was given an extension of three more years because I was not satisfied with the standards of SSG. From the company of Unit 17 Baluch, I had now raised a full-fledged unit of Special Services Group. They could now operate on land, air, sea and under sea. I could not see anything further to be added in the curriculum. Till 1962, I had put my best for the SSG. Now I was feeling bored and monotonous. Although GHQ looks in a mood to extend my tenure for a further three years, it was enough. So, on a fateful day, I left the SSG with a heavy heart and lots of love.

 

[ghazi52]

 

[ghazi52]

Shaheeds of 1965 War - Corps of Signals

S/No	Rank	Name	Unit	Date of Death
1.	Sig	Lall Hussain	14 Sig Bn	03 Jun 1965
2.	Lhav	Muhammad Asghar	6 Sig Bn	11 Jun 1965
3.	Sig	Muhammad Khan	20 Sig Bn	12 Jul 1965
4.	Lnk	Muhammad Yousaf	5 Sig bn	03 Sep 1965
5.	Hav	Fida Hussain	14 Sig Bn	06 Sep 1965
6.	Hav	Muhammad Riaz	HQ SSG	07 Sep 1965
7.	Lnk	Qamar Ud Din Ahmed	HQ SSG	07 Sep 1965
8.	Sig	Muhammad Aziz	16 Sig Bn	08 Sep 1965
9.	Sig	Muhammad Sidiq	25 Sig Bn	09 Sep 1965
10.	Lnk	Muhammad Bakhsh	14 Sig Bn	10 Sep 1965
11.	Sig	Bashir Ahmed	20 Sig Bn	11 Sep 1965
12.	Lnk	Muhammad Ishaq	20 Sig Bn	14 Sep 1965
13.	Sig	Ghulam Hussain	17 Sig Bn	14 Sep 1965
14.	Sig	Ghulam Hussain	20 Sig Bn	14 Sep 1965
15.	Sig	Muhammad Bashir	20 Sig Bn	16 Sep 1965
16.	Sig	Muhammad Ghani	16 Sig Bn	20 Sep 1965
17.	Sig	Syed Ibrar Hussain Shah	14 Sig Bn	03 Oct 1965
18.	Nk	Mahmood Ahmed	54 Bde Sig Coy	25 Oct 1965

 

[ghazi52]

On 4th April 24, a land slide occured near Lalpari, Gonar Farm, Chilas on main Karakorum Highway causing two way blockage of KKH for all types of traffic.

A team headed by Naib/Subedar Khalid and 02 soldiers were tasked to clear the slide and open the road.

During the clearance, a fresh slide triggered along with falling rocks from cliff and hit the FE Loader, resulting into injury of all three soldiers.

The soldiers were rushed to DHQ Chilas, for medical treatment and were further shifted to CMH Gilgit.

Naib/Subedar Khalid, has head injuries and his lever was badly damaged and Embraced Shahadat. Waseem, the operator of the Front End loader got his leg amputated due to severe injuries.






4:57 AM · Apr 6, 2024

 

[Fatman17]

EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DJ

Bravehearts of Indo-Pakistan War of 1965​

ByAzam Qadri
December 5, 2023
0
37

Pakistan Army

The Kashmir Sector
During the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, the Pakistan Army was involved in several military operations in the Kashmir region. The war began on April 1, 1965, and lasted until September 23, 1965. The conflict primarily centered around the disputed region of Kashmir and its surrounding areas. I will mention few examples of valour in the Kashmir Sector.
1. Operation Gibraltar
Operation Gibraltar was a military maneuver conceived and executed by the Pakistan Army during August 1965 in the contested expanse of Jammu and Kashmir. This covert operation was formulated with the intent of clandestinely breaching the Line of Control (LoC) and provoking an insurrection within the predominantly Muslim populace of Kashmir against the Indian governmental authority.
Pakistani military strategists believed that such a local uprising, triggered by Operation Gibraltar, would substantiate Pakistan’s justifications against India on the global platform. Deliberately chosen as a historical allusion, the name “Gibraltar” aimed to draw parallels to the historical Muslim conquests of Portugal and Spain, originating from the strategic port of Gibraltar.
Brig Hazur Hasnain SJ & Bar,
during this operation, stood out as one the greatest soldier the Pakistan Army has known. Shorter than average in height, he was a giant among men. Born on 27 November 1936 in UP, he migrated to Pakistan and was educated in Hyderabad. Joined PMA in 1957 he went on to bag all three awards, The Sword of honour, Norman Gold medal and silver spurs. Commissioned in 15 Baloch, he joined the SSG. Before the Indo-Pakistan War 1965, broke out, he was dropped behind enemy lines. Having carried out attacks as per his mission, he was surrounded but fought his way back and for his heroism was awarded Sitara e Jurat. He was decorated for valour again during the Indo-Pakistan War 71, in erstwhile East Pakistan.
2. Operation Grand Slam
Also known as Operation Grand Slam, this was a Pakistani offensive launched in the Chamb sector of Jammu and Kashmir in August 1965. The objective was to eventually link up with the guerillas that were launched inside Indian held Kashmir and also to cut off the Indian town of Akhnoor from the rest of India and potentially threaten the city of Jammu. This operation was carried out successfully and Pakistan Army was knocking at the Akhnur Bridge by 5 September 1965, when the Indians attacked Lahore and Sialkot on 6 September 1965, starting the all-out war.
• Lt (later Maj) Shabir Sharif Shaheed
During the Battle of Chamb-Jaurian, the Brigade Commander ordered 6 FF to send out a Reconnaissance Patrol, to take a look at the deployment of Indians on and around that ‘Throti’ feature. Shabir who was originally tasked to carryout reconnaissance, saw an opportunity where an arty battery was in a state of rest and not fully alert. Seeing an opportunity, he changed his mind and instead of going back, he attacked the gun positions and got them into a panic, thus forcing them to either withdraw or fall for him. He captured four Indian POWs and having destroyed two guns he brought along a field gun towed to a gun-tower (Shaktiman). He put in his own wounded soldiers and Indian POWs in the same vehicle on his arrival back, with full information about the Indian deployment. This action of Lt (later Major) Shabir Sharif, enabled operations of 10 Infantry Brigade to be resumed with 6 FF again leading on the main axis with 13 Lancers in support on a manoeuvre to get around Throti Feature and face towards Jaurian. These ops were a great success and the Indians panicked and ran. The Brigade took a large number of vehicles, ammunition dumps and POWs. It was perhaps the largest ever haul of men and materials in all our wars with India. During the Indo-Pakistan War 1971, Maj Shabir Sharif earned Shahadat and well deserved Nishan-e-Haider.
• Major Raza Shah Shaheed, SJ:
Before the war started he was the Group Commander of Gunnery at the School of Armour. As soon as he learnt of war being imminent, he took off for the battle front and joined his great Regiment, the PAVO’s 11 Cavalry. As the operation started on 31 August, he was a leading squadron commander and despite the terrain being unfriendly tank country, he braved Indian defenses and carried out his task, supporting the accompanying infantry in the process embraced Shahadat on 1 August 1965, thus becoming one of the first casualties of the War.
The Sialkot Sector
During the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, the Sialkot Sector was one of the main theatres of conflict between the Indian and Pakistani forces. The war was fought over various issues, including the Kashmir dispute and territorial claims, and the Sialkot Sector witnessed significant military operations.
The Pakistan Army launched a major offensive in the Sialkot Sector with the objective of capturing key areas and putting pressure on the Indian defenses. The sector was strategically important due to its proximity to the city of Sialkot, which was a crucial transportation and communication hub.
• The Battle of Chawinda:
One of the most prominent battles in the Sialkot Sector was the Battle of Chawinda. Pakistani forces launched an offensive to capture the town of Chawinda, located near the border with India. The battle lasted several days and saw intense fighting between the two sides. The Indian Army, under the leadership of Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, managed to repel the Pakistani offensive and inflict heavy casualties on the Pakistani forces.
• The Battle of Phillora:
Another significant engagement in the Sialkot Sector was the Battle of Phillora. Pakistani forces attempted to capture the town of Phillora, but the Indian Army successfully defended its positions. The battle involved tank warfare and artillery exchanges, and the Indian forces managed to hold their ground.
• Ceasefire and End of Operations:
As the war continued, international pressure mounted for a ceasefire. Both India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire on September 23, 1965, effectively ending the hostilities. The ceasefire resulted in no major territorial changes, and the situation returned to the status quo.
The operations in the Sialkot Sector were marked by intense fighting and heavy casualties on both sides. While the Pakistani Army made initial advances, the Indian Army’s strong defensive positions and effective use of tanks and artillery played a crucial role in halting the Pakistani offensive.
The 1965 war had a lasting impact on the region, influencing the political and military dynamics between India and Pakistan. The events of the war continue to be studied by historians and military analysts to understand the strategies, tactics, and outcomes of the conflict. The following stood out by their valour and fighting beyond the call of duty:
1. Operations of 25 Cavalry Regiment
• Lt Col (Later Brig) Nisar Ahmed. Was the commanding officer of 25 Cavalry, during its operations in Sialkot Sector, particularly in the battle of Chawinda. His leading from the front and in the process of bringing the Indian 1 Armoured Division Deserves a special mention and should be remembered for all times. He was deservingly decorated with the Sitar-e-Jurat.
• Maj (later Brig) Mohammad Ahmed
On raising of 25 Cavalry Regiment (9 June 1962) at Kharian, Maj Ahmed was amongst the pioneering officers to join “Men of Steel”. While in the Regiment, he was selected to attend the Tank Technology Course from UK from 1964 to 1965. On his return to Pakistan, he joined his Regiment, 25 Cavalry and fought in the famous “Battle of Chawinda”, a battle that stands in the annuls of Pakistan Army’s history as one of the fiercest battles of all times. Where the Regiment performed outstandingly, with its Commanding Officer Lt Col Nisar Ahmed (Kaka Nisar), getting SJ and several others as well. It was Major Mohammad Ahmed, while commanding B Squadron, who fought like a true cavalier, wherein the tanks he was fighting in were hit successfully and he had to change his tank thrice. During the battle he sustained another direct hit, due to which his hands and face were badly burnt and evacuated in a semi-unconscious state. He was awarded with a well-deserved SJ.
2. Maj Ziauddin Abbasi (Guides Cavalry) – “My squadron will advance”
The Indian military strategically deployed its potent armoured division, comprising tanks, armored vehicles, and infantry, with a resolute objective: a swift advance towards Wazirabad. This pivotal moment necessitated exceptional leadership and audacious strategy. Amid this turmoil, Major Abbasi emerged as an inspirational figure, instilling valor and unwavering determination in his squadron. His authoritative command resonated: “Today, my squadron will advance with unprecedented swiftness and impact, transcending historical warfare precedents.”
Against the unrelenting Indian assault, Maj Abbasi’s squadron stood unwavering, a bulwark against waves of attacks. His leadership, an unwavering beacon, embodied unshakeable resolve. At the forefront, his tank boldly engaged, advancing fearlessly with turret exposed. This display held strategic and symbolic weight, encapsulating his commitment to precision amid battle chaos. Amid shelling, Maj Abbasi remained resolute, the epitome of courage.
His daring decision to lead with an open turret showcased dedication to mission and men. With each inch gained, his presence galvanized soldiers, mirroring battle intensity. Recognizing the enemy’s fierce artillery rendered head-on assault futile, Maj Abbasi’s brilliance shone.
He daringly flanked with a small contingent, resolute amidst enemy fire, standing tall in an exposed turret. His actions testified to leadership and unwavering commitment. Tragedy struck during this campaign. A shell hit, and Maj Abbasi embraced martyrdom with comrades. His tank, once a symbol of advance, became a sacrifice monument. Yet, his legacy persisted. His strategy and courage inflicted heavy enemy casualties, casting doubt on their ambitions.
Maj Abbasi’s fearless charge and leadership left an indelible mark, halting enemy advances, his heroism etched in memory. His name became synonymous with the Battle of Chawinda – a testament to duty. Posthumously awarded the Sitara-e-Jurat, Maj Ziauddin Ahmad Abbasi epitomized front-line leadership, inspiring comrades in the pursuit of honor and country.
The Lahore Sector
During the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, the Lahore Sector witnessed intense military operations between the Indian and Pakistani forces. The war was primarily fought over the Kashmir issue, and the Lahore Sector was one of the main theatres of conflict along the western border between the two countries.
The Pakistani Army launched a major offensive in the Lahore Sector as part of its strategy to divert Indian forces and relieve pressure on its forces in other sectors. The main objective was to capture key areas in the Indian state of Punjab, including the city of Amritsar. The Pakistani forces aimed to exploit the perceived vulnerabilities in the Indian defense and achieve a breakthrough.
One of the significant engagements in the Lahore Sector was the Battle of Burki. In this battle, Pakistani forces launched an attack on the Indian positions near the village of Burki, located southeast of Lahore.
The battle was fierce, with both sides suffering casualties. While the Pakistani forces made initial gains, the Indian Army managed to repel the attack and maintain control of the area.
The Lahore Sector saw significant fighting, and while the Pakistani Army made initial gains, the Indian forces were ultimately able to repel the attacks and defend their positions. The war ended with no major territorial changes, and both sides claimed victory. The conflict left a lasting impact on the region and contributed to the strained relations between India and Pakistan. The following stood out by their valour and fighting beyond the call of duty:
• Maj Gen Sarfraz Khan.
He was the GOC of the 10 Infantry Division that was defending Lahore and fought the battle of Lahore most brilliantly. He was decorated with a Hilal-e-Jurat, whereas he had already earned a Military Cross (MC), during WW II.
• Brig Ahsan Rashid Shami,
who was well ahead in the theatre of battle monitoring and coordinating the artillery support. Being precariously close to the Indian Forces, he fell victim to ground fire and embraced Shahadat. He was awarded the Hilal-e-Jurat, posthumously, thus becoming the highest-ranking officer during the War in 1965.
• Brig Qayum Sher,
who fought the defensive battle for Lahore, during which he carried out counter attacks to dislodge the Indians. He was decorated with a Hilal-e-Jurat.
• Maj Raja Aziz Bhatti, who was defending the onslaught of the Indian offensive, right on the frontlines and also conducting the artillery fire, fell to a direct hit from ground fire, setting a personal example of leadership and embraced Shahadat and decorated with a Nishan-e-Haider.
The events of the 1965 war continue to be a subject of historical analysis and debate, as they shaped the political and military dynamics between the two countries in the decades that followed.
The Sulaimanki Sector
During the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, the Sulaimanki Sector was a significant theater of military operations between the Pakistani and Indian forces. The sector is located in the southern part of Punjab, near the international border between the two countries. The war was fought over various issues, including territorial disputes and the broader Kashmir conflict.
The Pakistan Army conducted several operations in the Sulaimanki Sector as part of its broader strategy to engage Indian forces and achieve tactical objectives. One of the key objectives for Pakistan was to capture territory and put pressure on Indian defenses in this sector.
• The Battle of Dograi and Bedian:
One of the notable operations in the Sulaimanki Sector was the Battle of Dograi and Bedian. Pakistani forces launched an offensive to capture the Indian-held town of Dograi and the nearby village of Bedian. These areas were strategically important due to their proximity to the Sutlej River and their potential impact on the Indian defense lines. The Battle of Dograi was particularly fierce, with intense fighting between the two sides. The Pakistani Army made initial gains and managed to enter the outskirts of Dograi. However, determined Indian counterattacks pushed the Pakistani forces back, and the town remained under Indian control.
• The operations in the Sulaimanki Sector
were marked by heavy fighting and casualties on both sides. The terrain and defensive positions played a crucial role in determining the outcomes of various battles. While the Pakistani Army made some initial gains, the Indian Army’s resilient defense and counterattacks prevented any major breakthroughs.
Khem Karan Sector
The Khem Karan Sector was a strategically significant theater of operations during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965. The sector is located in the northwestern part of India, near the international border with Pakistan. The war was marked by intense battles and military engagements as both countries sought to achieve their respective objectives. The Pakistan Army conducted several operations in the Khem Karan Sector as part of its larger military strategy. The sector held importance due to its proximity to the town of Khem Karan and its strategic location in the defense of Punjab.
• Battle of Asal Uttar:
One of the most notable battles in the Khem Karan Sector was the Battle of Asal Uttar. Pakistani forces launched an offensive with the aim of capturing the Indian town of Khem Karan and making advances deeper into Indian territory. However, Indian forces under the leadership of Brigadier Harbaksh Singh successfully repelled the Pakistani advance. The Battle of Asal Uttar is often referred to as the “Defence of the Deserts” because the Indian Army effectively used the natural obstacles and defensive positions of the region to halt the Pakistani advance. The Indian forces had prepared well-concealed anti-tank defenses, including minefields, trenches, and well-emplaced artillery. Pakistani forces faced significant casualties as they encountered strong resistance from the Indian defenders. The Indian Army’s successful defense prevented the Pakistani forces from achieving their objectives in the sector.
• Ceasefire and End of Operations:
The war between India and Pakistan ended with a ceasefire on September 23, 1965. The ceasefire agreement halted all military operations and hostilities along the border, including in the Khem Karan Sector.
The operations in the Khem Karan Sector were marked by heavy fighting and casualties on both sides. The Battle of Asal Uttar stood out as a significant victory for the Indian Army, showcasing their ability to defend against determined enemy offensives using well-planned defensive strategies. The 1965 war had a lasting impact on the region and the relationship between India and Pakistan. The events in the Khem Karan Sector and other sectors along the border during the war continue to be studied by historians and military analysts to understand the tactics, strategies, and outcomes of the conflict. The following stood out by their valour and fighting beyond the call of duty:

Lt Col Sahibzad Gul, Commanding Officer 6 Lancers
He took over the command of 6th Lancers in Jul 1964. On declaration of emergency, in first half of 1965, he moved the Regiment to the field service area. He was the commanding officer 6th Lancers during Indo – Pak war 1965. The regiment fought in the Khem Karan sector. It was 6 Lancers that stepped first into Indian territory and under its brave Commanding Officer, Lt Col Sahibzad Gul, captured Khem Karan, amongst the first Indian towns to be captured by Pakistan.
On 8 September 1965, 6 Lancers, outflanked Khem Karan, advanced along the railway line and reached Voltoha Railway Station and contacted the Indian defences, only one platoon of 1 FF was with them. At about mid-day on 9 September, commander 5 Armoured Brigade ordered 6 Lancers with two companies 1 FF to capture Voltoha ,1 FF quickly established the firm base and contacted the Indians at Asal Uttar, 6 Lancers advanced and attacked the Indians at Voltoha. Their objective was milestone 32, Indian called it “Battle of Asar Uttar. Lieutenant Colonel Sahibzad Gul, while leading from the front was standing on turret of his tank and observing the Indian position, when he was mortally wounded and his tank blew off the ground due to anti-tank fire from enemy.
Due to his brave and bold command, he was awarded Sitara e Jurat posthumously. Two officers, eleven Non-Commissioned Officers and 7 Sowars of the 6 Lancers embraced Shahadat. Account of his brave action is given in his citation.
The Desert Sector
The Desert Sector, also known as the Rajasthan Sector, was a crucial theater of operations during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965. This sector encompassed the vast desert regions in the western part of India, near the international border with Pakistan. The war in this sector witnessed significant military engagements and strategic maneuvering.
Pakistan Army conducted several operations in the Desert Sector as part of its military strategy during the conflict:
The operations in the Desert Sector were marked by fierce fighting and significant casualties on both sides. The battles in this sector were characterized by tank warfare, as both India and Pakistan deployed armored units in the desert terrain. The events in the Desert Sector during the 1965 war have continued to be studied by military historians and analysts to understand the tactics, strategies, and outcomes of the conflict. The war had a lasting impact on the region and the relationship between India and Pakistan, shaping their military doctrines and approaches in subsequent years.
Ceasefire and End of Operations:
The war between India and Pakistan ended with a ceasefire on September 23, 1965. The ceasefire agreement halted all military operations and hostilities along the border, including in the Desert Sector. The war ended with a ceasefire brokered by international mediation, and both sides agreed to the Tashkent Agreement in January 1966.
The agreement facilitated a return to the pre-war boundaries and established the ceasefire line, which later became known as the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir.

Squadron Leader Rafiqui supporting the Pakistan Army in Chamb Sector
PAF
Some exceptional actions and decisive moments:
The PAF pilots were like air gladiators, whose heroics are endless and to write down about each of them is beyond the scope of this discourse. Several individual moments during the war showcased the PAF’s excellence. I will mention these briefly here.
Battle of Chamb
Squadron Leader Sarfraz Rafiqui
September 1, 1965, marked a pivotal juncture in the Pakistan-India conflict, as the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) initiated a daring strike under the leadership of Sarfraz Rafiqui. As dusk settled that evening, the swift advancement of the Pakistan Army’s 12 Division in the Akhnoor sector of Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) prompted the Indian Air Force (IAF) to respond, with its No 45 Squadron promptly dispatched from Poona to Pathankot, deploying Vampire aircraft for close support amidst the challenging Kashmiri terrain. The escalating ground situation spurred the Vampires into immediate action. In a series of three successive strikes, each comprising four Vampires, the IAF aimed to defend their positions.
Despite the IAF’s claims of success, Major General G S Sandhu’s account in ‘History of Indian Cavalry’ offers a contrasting narrative. The first Vampire assault effortlessly obliterated three AMX-13 tanks of India’s 20 Lancers, alongside vital support vehicles. Subsequently, the second sortie targeted Indian infantry and artillery, culminating in impactful explosions among ammunition-laden vehicles.
However, a transformative moment materialized when Squadron Leader Rafiqui and Flight Lieutenant Imtiaz Bhatti of the PAF entered the fray. Patrolling near Chhamb at an altitude of 20,000 feet, they locked onto two Vampires guided by radar. With a swift descent, Rafiqui engaged the adversaries, dispatching the first Vampire with a lethal volley from the 0.5″ Browning six-shooter, just as two additional Vampires closed in. This pivotal encounter marked a definitive turning point in the conflict, underscoring the PAF’s adeptness and strategic acumen. Sarfraz Rafiqui’s calculated actions illuminated the efficacy of the PAF’s approach, emphasizing that strategic maneuvers could indeed reshape the course of history even when confronted with daunting odds.

Wreckage of an IAF Vampire shot down by the PAF over Chamb
Attack on Halwara Airfield
On 6 Sep 1965, Squadron Leader Sarfraz Ahmed Rafiqui led a formation of three F-86 aircraft on a strike against Halwara airfield. Soon after crossing the Indian border, Rafiqui had been warned about a large number of enemy interceptors being in the air by the leader of a returning F-86 formation. He, however, continued his mission single-mindedly.
On the way back, the formation was intercepted by about ten Hunter aircraft out of which Rafiqui accounted for one in the first few seconds. After Rafiqui shot down one Hunter aircraft, his guns jammed due to a defect and stopped firing upon which he refused to leave the battle area, as he would have been perfectly justified to do; he instead ordered his No. 2 to take over as leader and continue the engagement with the enemy.
He himself now took up a defensive position in the formation in an attempt to give it as much protection as was possible by continuing fighting manoeuvres in unarmed aircraft whilst the remainder proceeded to give battle to the enemy.
This called for a quality of courage and dedication on the part of Rafiqui equal to the best in the history of air fighting. The end for him was never in doubt. He chose to disregard it and, in the process, his aircraft was shot down and he was killed but not without his action enabling his formation to shoot down three more Hunter aircraft.
Rafiqui thus provided exemplary leadership in battle and displayed outstanding courage in the face of exceptionally strong opposition. His inspiring leadership and selfless example significantly affected the subsequent course of the air war in which PAF never failed to dictate terms to an overwhelmingly larger and better-equipped enemy.
Rafiqui’s conduct was clearly beyond the call of duty and conformed to the highest tradition of leadership and bravery in battle against overwhelming odds. For this and his earlier exploits, he is posthumously awarded HJ.
The First Air Strike on Pathankot
Air Commodore Sajad Haider:
The strike mission which he led on 6th Sep 1965, against Pathankot airfield, where his formation destroyed 13 enemy aircraft including nine MIG-21’s, was conducted in the best traditions of the PAF. The formation carried out repeated attacks in the face of heavy Ack Ack. For the determination, courage and exceptional flying skill with which he flew and led his Sqn during operations against the enemy. Squadron Leader Sayed Sajad Haider is awarded SJ”.
Saving Lahore
On the morning of Sep 6 when news came of the enemy attack on Lahore sector, a PAF squadron, which was on a mission elsewhere was diverted to stop the advancing Indians. This Squadron gave the Indians the fore taste of things to come.
At around 0900 hrs the Squadron was ordered to strike the Indian army advancing on Lahore along with Amritsar-Wagha road.

Smoke rises from India’s Pathankot airbase during airstrikes by PAF’s No 19 Squadron
Squadron Leader Sajad Haider along with Flight Lieutenants Mohammad Akbar, Arshad Sami, Khalid Latif, Dilawar and Ghani Akbar flew this historical mission which saved Lahore and in turn saved Pakistan that day.
The formation armed with rockets, in addition to the guns, took off in Sep haze and levelled off at the planned height before heading towards the target.
Shortly afterwards they were over the target area where to their amazement they spotted enemy vehicles of all sorts moving along the road crossing Wagah covered by Indian armour. For the while enemy did not see them but when they did, it was a sight to see the drivers jumping out to take cover leaving their vehicles to their fate.
In all they made six attacks each and the formation stayed for 16-17 minutes over the target, making sure that the enemy attack on the motherland was completely blunted. By the time they decided to exit, there were columns of fire all around, melting steel with enemy within. Sajad Haider called-off the mission after nearly all their ammo was depleted and fuel perilously low.
Squadron Leader M M Alam- the extraordinary feat and the Making of an Ace
The air duals overhead Sargodha, to defend this important base stay in the annuls of air history as one of valour and resilience of PAF pilots. It is here that Squadron Leader M M Alam made those historic kills.
On the morning of September 7th, the skies above Sargodha became a battleground as the Indian Air Force (IAF) launched a retaliatory strike. Anticipating this move, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was prepared, with the Sargodha Base standing at full alert.
Among the PAF ranks, an exceptional pilot named Alam, accompanied by his wingman Flight Lieutenant Masood Akhtar, was patrolling the skies on a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) mission.

 

[Fatman17]

No 19 Squadron saving Lahore- 6 Sep 1965
As the haunting silhouettes of IAF Hunters appeared over Sargodha, Alam received radar vectors guiding him towards the incoming threat. In a synchronized response, another section of PAF Sabres, led by Flight Lieutenant Bhatti, endeavored to engage the approaching Hunters.
Yet, it was Alam who surged forward, positioning himself as the first line of defense. High above in an F-104, Flight Lieutenant Arif Iqbal keenly observed the unfolding events with profound fascination. Alam’s radar screen painted the locations of the enemy planes, and as he was vectored back towards Sargodha, his wingman Akhtar reported a contact with four Hunters.
With a swift decision, Alam plunged towards the adversaries, shedding his external stores to enhance maneuverability.
However, in the midst of the chaos, two more Hunters emerged behind Alam. Reacting with split-second instincts, he disregarded the four in front and climbed to confront the duo behind.
The Hunter squadron changed course, abandoning their intended strike on Sargodha, and veered towards Alam. Capitalizing on his F-104’s speed advantage, Alam executed a daring maneuver, pulling up and then reversing his course to close the distance. Fixating on the rearmost Hunter, Alam initiated his attack.
His first Sidewinder missile launched, but missed its mark, exploding harmlessly on the ground. The skirmish played out amidst a web of high-tension wires, adding an element of peril to the dogfight.

MM Alam over Sargodha
As the Hunters navigated to avoid the wires, Alam seized the opportunity and fired a second Sidewinder. The missile raced toward its target, colliding with the tail of the Hunter. Alam had achieved his first kill, downing the enemy aircraft. The Hunter’s pilot, Sqn Ldr Onkar Nath Kakar, ejected and was later captured as a prisoner of war.
Amidst the flurry of action, Alam momentarily lost sight of the remaining five Hunters. His wingman’s voice cut through the chaos, revealing their positions. Alam swiftly located the five-enemy aircraft, flying in impeccable formation at low altitudes and high speeds.
The Hunters, unaware of the impending danger, initiated a sharp left turn. In a matter of heartbeats, Alam seized his moment. He unleashed a torrent of firepower from his aircraft’s powerful weaponry, executing precise shots with deadly accuracy. The Hunters, unable to counter the onslaught, fell one after another, their demise etched against the backdrop of the Sargodha skies. Alam’s masterful skill, unwavering courage, and impeccable timing led to a breathtaking display of aerial combat prowess. His swift maneuvers and deadly accuracy resulted in a decisive victory, with the once-imposing Hunter squadron reduced to fragments in the skies over Sargodha.
This engagement, a testament to the pinnacle of piloting prowess, remains an indelible chapter in the annals of aerial warfare.
The Fear of F-104s and The Surrender of the IAF Gnat
An IAF Squadron comprising of Gnats intruded in the Sialkot Sector, in response to which the PAF scrambled F-104s to intercept them under Flight Lieutenant (later Air Chief Marshal) Hakim Ullah. On his arrival the IAF Squadron scrambled and one of the Gnats, was overheard warning others of the incoming Starfighter. This Gnat was flown by Squadron Leader Brij Pal Singh Sikand, who not only lowered his landing gear but landed at an abandoned airstrip in Pasrur. Air Chief Marshal Hakim Ullah is credited with forcing the Gnat down.
Squadron Leader Mervyn Middlecoat
He was commanding the elite No 9 Sqn equipped with F-104’s, when the war broke out in first week of Sep 1965. The Sqn was assigned with the precious and vital task of photoreconnaissance deep inside enemy territory, along with Air Defence of Pakistan.
Another important task for the Star fighters was the interception of intruding IAF Canberra bomber aircraft. The only potent weapon available to PAF was the F-104, as it could fly the night interception missions and could pose threat to IAF bombers. After 1 Sep, the F-104s were extremely active in Air Defence and Air Superiority Operations.

Folland Gnat at PAF Museum Karachi
Out of 246 missions flown by F-104s during hostilities, 42 were at night against the IAF Canberras. Middlecoat was highly enthusiastic about these night interception sorties and flew many such missions. The first positive encounter between a Canberra and PAF night fighter took place on the night of 13/14 Sep when a Star Fighter flown by Middlecoat from Sargodha intercepted a Peshawar intruder during its high-level exit.
The Sakesar radar carried out the interception. As Middlecoat arrived at the position directed by the radar, nothing was visible in the pitch-dark night. Middlecoat carried out a completely blind interception and was vectored about half a mile behind the intruder by the Sakesar radar.

Air Marshal Nur Khan in discussion with Wing Commander Middlecoat during 1965 War
On arriving at the directed position, he fired his lethal sidewinder. Missile tone indicated acquisition of the target, and seconds later an explosion was seen at a range of about 4000 feet. It was an indication that the impact or proximity fuse of the sidewinder had fired, and the Canberra was assumed to have been destroyed, although confirmation was not possible since the encounter took place over the Indian Territory.
Middlecoat also flew daring photo recce missions deep inside enemy territory. He flew with great courage and produced some extra ordinary results. The intelligence gathered by him while flying these missions proved to be of great importance to PAF and Pak Army in assessing the battlefield.
Azam Qadri
The writer is a military historian and biographer. Email: booksaremypassion49@gmail.com

 

[ghazi52]

CAPT. Salman sarwar shaheed

captainmojiz
@captainmojiz

After passing out from 115 l/c, Capt. Salman joined 42 lancers of the armoured corp, he was later temporarily transferred to FC KPK, more specifically, the Special Operation Group (SOG). There, he took part of operation al meezan and led many successful operations his comrades always praised and appreciated his bravery.

On 14th may, 2013, he encountered a group of terrorist in khyber agency, he was hit by three bullets, one went through his heart, despite this, he picked up his gun and suppressed enemy fire, he also helped his injured and Martyred comrades, he remained alive for 90 minutes after being injured and repeatedly told others not to worry about him. Before he left for his final abode, he gave a beautiful smile and a thumbs up. He will always remain a inspiration to others who were around him.

 

[ghazi52]

 

[ghazi52]

Major Babar Khan Niazi Shaheed, he embraced martyrdom during an IBO in Sambaza Sartoi, Zhob, Balochistan, may ALLAH Almighty bless his departed soul & grant him the highest place in Jannah Ameen ..

 

[ghazi52]

 

[Fatman17]

• cover story

A Giant Among Men​

Bravest of the brave Brig Muhammad Taj SJ & Bar
By
Ikram Sehgal

September 10, 2019

https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?te.../09/10/a-giant-among-men/&via=Defence+Journal
https://pinterest.com/pin/create/bu...GBmWYAAm-aV.jpg&description=A+Giant+Among+Men
https://api.whatsapp.com/send?text=...encejournal.com/2019/09/10/a-giant-among-men/

Brig Muhammad Taj SJ & Bar died peacefully in CMH, Rawalpindi on Sep 16, 2019 in the early hours of the morning. He was buried the same day in his native village Dewal Sharif, his Soyem is today. While I personally along with all the officers and men of 44 Punjab (now 4 Sindh) grieve for him, I must pen down some notes about this giant among men, bravest of the brave soldiers of the Pakistan army.
To quote from my forthcoming book being published by the oxford university Press (OUP), “Blood over Shades of green”, “Because of the impending war (Nov 1971), I requested a posting to an infantry unit, preferably 19 Punjab, my father’s Original unit. I got lucky, very, very lucky in getting 44 Punjab. This unit had a core of 19 Punjab is but when I heard the name of the co, Lt col (later Brig) Mohammad Taj, SJ (and later Bar), I had grave apprehension, there was a general perception that he did not like Bengalis, I was half Bengali. at 7pm on Nov 27, 1971, I got off the train at Rahimyar Khan railway Station and was received by Second lieutenant Hanif Butt, ‘Singhwala’ as I immediately called him because the lump on his forehead was very visible under his helmet; he had a wonderful smile that came through despite his huge moustache. The battalion was con centrated in Tarinda; I was asked to see the co immediately in his office dug out. Taj lived up to his reputation. as far as he was concerned I was a ‘Bengali’ and he would shoot me personally if I made a wrong move. He was going to give me D company, he called ‘Delta’ as ‘Deserter’ because it had 25 men ‘absent without leave’; his logic dictated I was just the right man to command it.
My Senior Jco, Subedar Mohammad Khan, well briefed by the Subedar Major (SM), acted defiant and dismissive, as Jcos (Junior commissioned officers) are apt to do in such circumstances. I told him that I did not need him and he should report to the co. Mohammad Khan hung around till the late evening, and when I had finished interviewing each and every soldier in my company, he came to me and said he had made a mistake and would never repeat it. He never did! In fact he refused to serve further after I was dismissed from service (no reasons given under Pakistan army act (PAA) 2 years later, giving up his chance to become the SM.
I was lucky to be in the company of wonderful rank and file in 44 Punjab, three of them stood out head and shoulders, capt (later Maj) Tariq Nasser, capt (later Maj Gen) fahim akhtar Khan and 2/Lt (later Maj) Hanif Butt. on Dec 3, 1971 war broke out, as part of 60 Brigade and 33 Division we were supposed to strike deep into the Indian desert, aiming for Jaisalmer. as it turned out this was a pipedream, we ended up being force-marched south by trucks and train without air cover till we reached Mirpurkhas. The Indians were threatening to take chor and umerkot, and thus enter the ‘green belt’. We moved forward by foot under incessant air attacks to reinforce 55 Brigade of 18 Div at umerkot and chor, we found the units of 55 Brigade in shambles. While on the move short of umerkot 44 Punjab brought down two Indian fighter jets, probably Su 7s, by concentrated machine gun fire, on Dec 12, 1971. My company got one!
By the time we reached the gun position of the Battery of 40 field regiment (being commanded by Maj (later Maj Gen) Hamid niaz, also an aviator) near chor, they were virtually firing over open sights without any infantry on the ridges in front of them. contrary to all teaching, we had our ‘orders (o) Group’ in the gun position and two companies formed up at midnight facing Sanohi ridge where the enemy was believed to be. Maj Hamid niaz gave us a mug of tea, cheerfully telling us that we might as well drink it as we were certainly going to be ‘Shaheed’ shortly. at about five thirty in the morning of Dec 13, 1971, while the guns were still booming, col Taj came up to Sanohi ridge and gave me ‘battlefield promotion’ to the rank of Major, taking the crowns off his own shoulders and putting them on mine. I can never forget the sun coming up on that day. To me this remains a most coveted moment. He immediately renamed Delta company as ‘Sehgal company’, (I am proud that this company still carries my name 48 years later) 4 Sindh has a Board with brass lettering, even though no one seems to know why this unique honour was bestowed.
Taj was wonderful to be with during war, sometimes insufferable during peace. after Dec 13, 1971 he looked after me like his own son. I can never repay the debt of gratitude I owe him and Maj Gen (later Gen) Iqbal Khan, who became my Goc (he was Director Military Intelligence) in late December 1971. Soon after the war a Desert Battle School was opened up in umerkot and Maj (later Brig) ‘lala’ farooq was made the commandant; I was made the chief Instructor (CI). This School has now a permanent place in chor, which has become a full fledged cantonment. I was being treated for heat exhaustion in the Main Dressing Station (MDS) at Dhoro naro in July 1972 when Taj reclaimed me (as usual without permission from the co of the MDS, who promptly charged me with desertion) for Internal Security (IS) duties in Hyderabad. We remained on IS duties during the language disturbances for months, my company looking after Jamshoro and Kotri on direct instructions from President Zulfikar ali Bhutto.
To quote Maj Gen (retd) fahim akhtar Khan, “Brig Taj, SJ & Bar died yesterday and was buried in his native village- upper Deval Sharif, Teh Murree with full military honour. It was a real big Jinaza, where people from far off places had come to bid farewell to the legendary soldier. Brig Taj, May Allah Pak Bless his soul, was our commanding officer (44 Punjab & later re-designated as 4 Sind regt) during 1971 War and also while the unit was employed on counter Insurgency ops in Baluchistan ( Marri-Bugti area) . Having personally served in the army for almost 38 hrs. & having had the opportunity to come across numerous cos while in service but frankly found none comparable to his abilities. Was head & shoulders above all those with whom I happen to interact during my service. Was the bravest & most possessive of his command. The subordinates under him would feel most secure & untouchable. He was the most honest, upright & fearless and would expect the same from his subordinates. any one who spoke truth would get away for any mistake/ fault committed intentionally unintentionally. The formation would always pick up our unit for the most difficult assignments primarily because the confidence he enjoyed with his superiors. It is very rare the one would come across an individual who would always excel in crisis situations. Brig Taj had proved that in 1965 War, east Pakistan operations, 1971 War, Baluchistan counter Insurgency operation & even while he was in command of Brigade. May Allah Bless his soul & grant him highest place in Junnah Aameen,” unquote. На реализацию бесплатной ставки у пользователя будет 4 календарных дня. Допустимый коэффициент от 1,3 до 2,0. мостбет Однако в целом использовать такое приложение намного удобнее.
In the words of Brig Taj himself in an interview with Defence Journal (DJ) in September 2002, to quote, “I belong to Dhund tribe, a dominant tribe of Murree Tehsil, which owes its origin to the dynasty of Hazrat abbass (RA), the uncle of prophet Muhammad (PBUH). It is because of this linkage that more people from this area use the word abbassi with their name. I completed my primary education in the village school and later joined the middle school, OSIA, in nearby village, which has the distinction of representing today the highest female literacy rate in the entire country. This distinction of OSIA has been certified by the education department. I passed my matriculation examination from Government High School, Murree in 1944. Those were very difficult days as far as travelling is concerned. Boys from Dewal daily walked more than 20 miles to and from the High School in Murree city.

Most of my close classmates and friends at school ultimately joined army and attained distinguished positions. They included Major General Muhammad riaz Khan, air commodore Khaqan abbassi, col. Saleh and col. Hafiz. (late) Khaqan abbassi entered politics in 1985, won the general elections and became Minister for Production in the cabinet of Muhammad Khan Junejo. He turned out to be a political leader of great qualities of both head and heart. He reached the highest point politically in this entire mountain range of Murree, Kotli Sattian and Kahuta and stood far ahead his more professional rivals. His political career was cut short in the ojhri camp blast on April 10, 1988 when a flying missile struck his moving car and killed him on the spot. apart from being an irreparable personal loss, the death of Khaqan Abbasi shocked the whole country and deprived the hill folk of an able leader.
Prived the hill folk of an able leader. I joined OTS in 1949 our Platoon commander was a British captain. I had gone from the army, faced no adjustment problem. I passed out as one of the top cadets.
I joined 7th Battalion of 1st Punjab regiment. Some of my elders from village had also served in this regiment. It was considered a very good battalion of the regiment and I wanted to be moulded into a better officer When I joined the unit lt. Iqbal, lt. Osman and lt. nadir were already there. lt. Sohrab and myself joined the unit from the OTS. unfortunately, lt. Iqbal was killed in an ambush while serving with Zhob Militia. Osman, nadir and Sohrab left the army as Majors.
On September 6 as Indo Pak war broke out, my unit was directed to reach the border of Khokhara Par in Tharparkar district. The entire population from Karachi to every nook and corner of Sindh was deeply motivated and united to defend the country against Indian onslaught. This gave a big boost to the morale of the army and they were ready to shed their last drop of blood for the safety and security of the country. I was given the assignment to recapture ranger post Shakarbu about sixteen miles from Khokhara Par, which had earlier been occupied by the Indian army. My force included a rifle company and a section of mortar guns. My company reached the outskirts of Shakarbu by first light on the attacking day and carried out the operation successfully. The Indian fled away, leaving some dead, and the post was recaptured. on reaching the post, I noticed some activity at Kharin Post on the Indian side of the border, I immediately planned an attack with mobile force consisting of about sixteen men with MGS and RRS. The post was captured without any opposition. Soon thereof, I sighted two enemy tanks advancing rapidly towards the post with two rifle companies. We immediately opened fire with machine guns. l naik Khushi Muhammad, commander RR, knocked out one tank and rendered the other disfunctional. The advancing Indian elements were engaged by me with mortar and machine gun fire, which forced it to withdraw leaving behind a number of dead bodies and the wreckage of two tanks. I and l naik Khushi Muhammad were awarded SJ and TJ respectively for this performance. It is seldom in military history that a force as small as sixteen men not only knocked out two tanks but also repulsed a counter attack supported by tanks and two Infantry companies.
On handing over Shakarbu Post to rangers, I joined the Battalion for Dali operation. My company was to lead the advance and establish a firm base on a high ground in the rear of the enemy. We established the firm base and a and c companies were launched to capture Dali. Two available air sorties performed dare devil-attacking feats; the base commander air CDR M. K. Abbassi was himself flying one of the aircraft. air action not only destroyed the enemy ammunition train but also enemy men and equipment were shelled resulting in heavy casualties. By dusk, attack began with thunderous ‘naras’. The result was a complete success. Dali was cleared next day again with the help of D company, which had earlier successfully repulsed an enemy counter attack from the direction of Jasso – JoPar. D company assaulted with RRS and MGS with one shout “Get out of the trenches otherwise you will be m butchered” the enemy men surrendered and seven officers, 12 Jco’s and a number of ors were taken prisoners. They belonged to 5 Maratha and 17 Madras. Here 18 Punjab captured three tanks also which were in subsequent operation used against Indian army. This action will go down as one of the finest operations ever fought by a Battalion. next to attract attention of 18 Punjab was Kalran-Ka-Talao. Here Indians had earlier occupied a number of rangers Post, 18 Punjab was to recapture Kalran Ka-Talao, hardly Battalion reached the concentration area, Indians attacked ranger Post, again D company from a flank moved forward and engaged the assaulting troops effectively, inflicting very heavy casualties. The attack was crushed and enemy escaped leaving behind their dead and wounded. 3 Garhwals, that led the advance were licking their wounds for the remaining period of war and never dared to challenge Pakistani troops again. These were the achievement in 1965 war of battalion that fought against two brigades of Indian army advancing along Gadra-chachro axis.
In my opinion this war was primarily fought by the officers of the ranks of lt. col. and below. They created history and proved to the world that how well-trained and motivated they were and how they repulsed aggression by an army three times bigger in equipment and human resources. I regret to say that generalship failed us in this war otherwise the history of Pakistan would have been much different. on December 4, when Indo-Pak war in east Pakistan spilled out we were deployed near rahimyar Khan as part of 2 corps. We heard the bad news of the debacle of 18 Division and I was ordered to go to Sadiqabad and get further orders from 18 Division rear Headquarters. I went there and found the Headquarters in utter confusion.

Soon after I met lt. col. akram Syed who had returned from the front lines. He was cursing everybody around and what appeared from his utterances was that 18 Division operation was complete failure. This was a great setback to the Pakistan army and its subsequent operations were adversely affected. I was ordered to move to Hyderabad sector to reinforce 55 Brigade which was deployed at Chor and was facing problems. We moved by train to Hyderabad, Mirpurkhas. The enemy air was extremely active and all our movements were confined to night except for the move by road to Ghotki. next morning the battalion moved short of umarkot and stayed under cover during day time. I went forward and met lt. Gen. K. M. azhar, then Governor of NWFP, near chor. He briefed us on the situation. In the meantime HQ 60 Brigade and Goc 33 Division also moved to this area as the situation here was deteriorating. I took an instant decision and moved my battalion during daylight despite air superiority of the enemy. 44 Punjab moved forward despite continuous air attacks on the single road upto umarkot and then from umarkot towards chor. I left umarkot with my ‘r’ group to contact commander 55 Brigade to get further briefing. on my way I met Gen naseer who was going to the hospital. He told me that due to intensive enemy air action Gen. Azhar and his ADC, Major (now Brigadier) Shafqat Cheema and he himself were badly wounded and that I must reach the Brigade HQ immediately, on reaching HQ, I met Gen. Azhar and inquired about his condition. He
was really badly wounded but refused to be evacuated to hospital. He ordered me to deploy my battalion in defensive position along Sanohi ridge and hold it at all costs. In my battalion there were some officers from east Pakistan who could not be relied upon. Sanohi ridge was an important tactical feature and I wanted to deploy there the best of my men. captain Ikram Sehgal had joined us on 27 Nov 1971 a few days earlier. I happened to know this young officer from my Dacca days. He was a dedicated professional soldier and reliable. I decided to deploy his company at Sanohi ridge. later, we were also ordered to be ready to recapture 200r, a hill feature in the area. captain Sehgal and captain fahim (now Maj. General) were specially selected to command the assaulting companies. Capt. naseer ahmed Tariq and lt. Hanif Butt volunteered to go with the assaulting companies. They were daring officers of the battalion known for their grit and popularity. I have commanded two Brigades and five Battalions of the Pakistan army at various times, in peace and war but not seen the equal of such officers who literally laughed in the face of certain death. as they prepared for battle their high morale enthused the whole battalion with great elan and spirit. This assault, however, was not launched for certain logistical reasons. The enemy air actions continued and the battalion had the proud privilege of shooting down two SU7S. It was on Sanohi ridge in the desert that captain Sehgal was promoted to the rank of Major, under the peculiar circumstances prevailing at that time where no Major’s crescent and star was available, I took off my crescent and star and fixed them on the shoulder of Major Sehgal. I also re-named Delta company as “Sehgal company” after its company commander. (Thirty years later on installation of Maj Gen fahim as colonel of the Battalion recently in Okara cantonment in early April, I was pleasantly surprised to hear fullthroated slogans of “Sehgal company” Zindabad). The battalion continued to stay in the area and effectively checked further advance of enemy forces.
Second SJ was awarded to me in recognition of my performances in Dacca during military action and subsequent march to rajshahi, fighting a number of battles en route. This also included crossing of Brahmaputra under dire circumstances and capturing nagarbari. a number of battles were fought against Mukti Bahini and the defected ePr rangers. The crossing of Brahmaputra was so rapid and swift that even our adversary, one Indian General appreciated this operation in one of their books on east Pakistan War 44 Punjab performed well under most adverse air situations and moved swiftly to strengthen defences at chor. I was lucky to have a team of motivated, efficient and reliable officers. I have already named a few of them. I am in constant touch with them particularly Maj. (retd) Ikram Sehgal, Maj. Gen. fahim, captain (retd) Tariq and Brigadier Iftikhar Mehdi. These officers spent some of their younger days with me when I, too, was not that old. I always considered them as my family members and this relationship will, Inshallah, continue as long as I live”, unquote.

Gen Ziaul Haq followed double standards throughout his tenure. He said one thing and did quite the opposite to remain in power. The afghan war, however, provided him with opportunities to prolong his rule. Zia deliberately promoted relatively spineless people in order to strengthen his grip on the army. This is precisely what every military dictator would do to strengthen his position.
After retirement from the army and a short stint as DG, Murree Kahuta Development authority (MKDa), I opened a hotel to earn my bread and butter. once being one of them, prominent members of the hotel community, which constitutes the largest segment of local trade and business, often came to meet me and talked of various problems facing their profession. They persuaded me to accept the President ship of their union which I resisted with all the force at my command but finally I had this post virtually thrust on me. It was in this capacity that I came close to other trade, political, religious and social organization who vehemently opposed the arbitrary increase in toll tax in the summer of 1998.
Unfortunately, despite being a popular tourist centre, Murree has always been burdened with a nagging variety of road taxes including toll tax and parking fees. What is more, the officials increased the existing taxes and revived new ones simply with a wave of hand in total disregard of public opinions. In 1998, the toll tax at four posts, encircling the municipality and was increased from an average of Rs. 7 per vehicle to Rs. 50. This was an unprecedented measure anywhere in the country and caused immediate reactions among transporters, the touring public and other segments of local population. Though the local population is exempt from toll tax on private vehicles, it is not always easy to secure an exemptions permit.
We tried our best to sort out this issue amicably with the local administration but to no avail. The officials told us that the increase in toll tax was ordered by no less an authority than Mian Shabaz Sharif, the then chief Minister of Punjab, and he wanted full compliance with his order. We tried to meet the chief Minister during his frequent visits to Murree but nobody let us go near him.
This unreasonable stand was a perfect reason for trouble. The situation started warming and oneday complete wheel-jam hartal was observed from chattar to Kohala which continued for about two weeks. for two weeks, the roads remained deserted, the markets closed and the area under extreme turmoil. This was most difficult period for the common man who could not buy anything, including food item but that is precisely the hartals are aimed at. The event was widely publicized in the press and virtually shook the provincial government which finally conceded to sit with the leaders of the agitation on the negotiating table to settle the issue.
I had the privilege to lead this discussion. It was great experience and I learnt for the first time that a motivated and well-led civil population is no less than a trained army provided the cause is just and the target aimed at is correct,”unquote.
quote from DJ September 2002, “lt col Taj was co 44 Punjab (now 4 Sindh) during the 1971 war. Just consider only the events leading upto battle. as my company gave a canopy of machine gun fire over a train burning from end to end carrying Guides cav tanks at Daharki railway Station on 10 December 1971, he stood defiantly on the road only 200 yards away, arms akimbo flatly refusing to take cover till the Indian aircraft had been driven away and the cavalrymen ran to their tanks shackled on the MBFRs and started the engines, making a sharp right swivel to break the chains, letting the tanks fall sideways down the dusty embankment and putting out the fire. now that I call courage! “Don’t be late” Taj growled with pride at the bravery of Guides cavalry, “Tell ayub (the Guides CAV co) we have an appointment with the Indians you better not miss!” or pummelling Sep Yaqub (now a PIA Security Guard in Karachi) and giving him a bear embrace for shooting down an Su-7 which crashed and exploded only a few hundred yards away a mile or so short of umerkot.
Try and recapture the elan he would instil in the sub-units of 45 Punjab and 46 Baluch as they fanned out left and right of us, “Good hunting, tell the Indians Taj is here”. Quite dramatic, unabashed showmanship perhaps, but invaluable in raising the morale of troops on the receiving end of continuous Indian air attacks. and on Sanohi ridge, the guns of 26 field and 40 field on the reverse slope booming away, exhorting 44 Punjab to take 199r and 200r, two sandy dunes occupied by the Indians in the proximity of chor, “Is there a better day to be Shaheed than today, is there a better way to be Shaheed than with a bullet in your chest?” he would ask anyone who would listen.
And during the o (orders) Group with Maj Gen naseer, Goc 33 Div, sitting with his knee cap shot up and lt Gen. K.M. Azhar, Governor NWFP, also wounded looking on, “Hamid (we were assembled in the Gun Position of a Battery of 40 field) will give us something to eat, we won’t become Shaheed on an empty stomach!” Maj (later lt Gen) Hamid Niaz gave us a banquet of sukhi roti and dal, a very hot mug of gunner’s tea and sent us off with a tearful embrace into the darkness to what he thought was certain death.

lt col Taj was decorated with Sitara-e-Jurat for bravery in 1965 and then again in 1971. one cannot recapture in one article Taj’s actual war exploits, only how we were deeply motivated, (individually, as a unit and even as a formation) during desperate times by this man’s presence, how he lifted our spirits in an environment only someone who has been in a battle situation can empathize with.
This army and this country owes a debt of gratitude to the Tajs of Pakistan, a hundred, maybe a thousand Tajs were seen up and down the line thus exhorting their subunits, units and formations from Kashmir to Kutch in both the wars. They blunted the brunt of the enemy’s threat, asked for no quarter and gave none,” unquote.
How can those who have never smelt cordite under the stress of battle understand and appreciate heroes like Brig Taj?

https://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=https://defencejournal.com/2019/09/10/a-giant-among-men/
https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?te.../09/10/a-giant-among-men/&via=Defence+Journal
https://pinterest.com/pin/create/bu...GBmWYAAm-aV.jpg&description=A+Giant+Among+Men
https://api.whatsapp.com/send?text=...encejournal.com/2019/09/10/a-giant-among-men/
Previous articleRemember Our Warriors Brig Muhammad Taj, SJ & Bar
Ikram Sehgal
The writer is a defence and security analyst, he is Co-Chairman Pathfinder Group, Patron-in-Chief Karachi Council on Foreign Relations (KCFR) and the Vice Chairman Board of Management Quaid-e-Azam House Museum (Institute of Nation Building).

 

[Reichmarshal]

had the privilege of meeting brig. Taj in isd n murree a couple of times

 

[PakFactor]

General Abu Bakr Osman Mitha was not only one of the finest officers of Pakistan Army during his time but also can be considered one of the best men ever seen in the military history. Although his whole career was an example of excellence and hard work, but the brightest feather in his cap was the formation of SSG. The most elite unit of Pakistan Army. Here is our humble effort to depict that how hard he tried to raise the best unit. Based on his memoirs, we have written an article. Although Mitha was the person who never praised himself and preferred to remain in dark, but we have penned down the article in the first-person narration just to show how committed he was towards his cause.

Seeing the length of article, we have divided it into two parts.

I received the orders from GHQ that 17 Baluch is going to be converted into the SSG and I’ll be its first CO. This whole unit was to be made only out of volunteers. So, I kept only one company of 17 Baluch along with Major Sharif and Captain Riaz, with me to handle administrative duties and told Baluch Regimental Center to post out others to different units. Later I took Lieutenant Saleem Zia as well (He later commanded SSG too).

Lacking the expertise and relevant details for the operations, I had to visit America on 17 March 1956. Where I studied different kinds of curriculum to be inducted in the SSG. Initially I landed in New York, where I was taught the activities for “Stay Behind” in the enemy territory. Later I was taken to Fort Bragg (Fort Liberty now), where I studied the techniques of modern para warfare. After that I was taken to Jericho Vermont, where the Mountain Warfare School is located. Lastly, I attended Frogman School in Los Angeles. After couple of months on my return, I was able to draw up a course out line for the SSG.

After my return, I met with Ayub Khan and briefed him on what I had learned. On my return to Cherat, I received the first batch of the volunteers of the SSG, including officers and ORs. I personally selected the candidates for initial two companies, to indicate that what kind of men I want for the SSG. I never compromised over my criteria for the SSG. It was the reason that I always had shortage of men up to 15% of the requirement. I could accept the shortage but not any incompetent person. Under training recruits from the units, Frontier Corps, and other arms of the military as well, I asked for the men who were willing to go through intense hardship of training.

The first batch was selected, and the initial two months of rigorous training were started for the soldiers. They were asked to do what they couldn’t have ever imagined in their actual months. For example, an exercise was held to walk up to 40 miles in the mountainous terrain. After pushing beyond their limits when they made 40 miles, carrying their heavy burden; they were asked to go for another 10 miles and later 5 more. Only a few were able to do this initial phase. Those who were unable were sent to their parent units back immediately. It was just a tiny example of what they were told to do.

I encouraged them to improvise and act on their plans situation to situation, creating a real war like situation during the training. Although I preferred the lightest and most maneuverable weapons, but they had to carry it in a maximum quantity as much as they could. Only the backpack weighed up to 40 pounds. They were not given enough food supplies, instead they were ordered to take food from the environment. Such as, collecting dew drops for water, wring the moss, eating leaves and branches or even roots of different plants.

Instead of any decoration or garnishing of the unit lines and barracks, I had told on the very first day that I only need barracks and equipment to be cleaned and updated. I also strictly forbade the fatigue parties and labor work by the soldiers. I want them to be focused strictly on their work. I also forbade any soldier to take part in any sports out of the unit. However, sports inside the units must be participated. I also took part with my jawans. Unit mess was to remain open throughout the year. The timings and duration of the training was to remain the same, even in Ramzan. Instead of being called by the bugle, I told them to study the notice board where the daily schedule was pasted for everyone. I wanted them to treat them like adults, not like some school kids. Everyone was to reach the relevant point on time, otherwise he was to face the consequences. One more thing I added was that if anyone was not seen marching smartly while going in the unit premises, he will regret it.

If someone wanted to go on leave, all he should do is to enter the Kote-Guard and leave. However, he should be sure that he doesn’t have any duty assigned to him. If someone doesn’t come on the devised time after spending the weekend, he would be considered AWOL (Absent without Leave). I can proudly say that during my six years of command, there wasn’t any single case of AWOL. Instead, everyone thought it sacred to keep this in order. Captain Anwar (Later Major General) was returning to Cherat from Peshawar. But he missed the van and no cab driver agreed to travel here in such a dark. So he treadled from Peshawar to Cherat with his ordinary civillian shoes. He reached the parade 5 minutes earlier. But what condition was his feet suffering cant be described in words. A jawan named Noor Muhammd was returning to Cherat from his village. As the train reached Attock station, it passed without stopping as it was a nonstop train. Without caring for his life, he jumped from the train. He fell near the tracks and his head was chopped off under the train wheels. A common man must think it as an act of lunacy, but it was the discipline as I think it.

SSG personnel were ordered to reach any part of the country on immediate notice, carrying their relevant gears. They were tasked to meet the task without any flaw. All they had were weapons and sometimes, not even that. They had to reach the target without any transport or aid, meet the objective and return without being spotted. If anyone was caught carrying any food supplies while going, money or even a pen knife while leaving for the target, he was immediately kicked out of the SSG and sent to his parent unit with a warning letter.

I had only kept a single company of 17 Baluch, naming them as “Training Company”. They were tasked to supervise the under-training men. I personally conducted “raids” on the hideouts of the commandos. In such a situation, they were ordered to leave the positions immediately, not only carrying their belongings, but also to remove any signs of their presence in the area. All I wanted was to keep them active all the time as being caught by me or any of the “training Company” personal meant was the return to the parent unit. For the initial two months, I also accompanied my men carrying full operational gears, carrying a forty pounds backpack, and performing the same duties with my men.

While going through all this, I was called by General Naseer (The Chief of Staff), who objected to my methods and accused me of spoiling army conducts. He also told me to finish all my practices or I shall face the consequence. I had no other choice but to talk to General Ayub Khan. I don’t know what he said to General Naseer, but I never faced any situation like that. Not only the trainees, but the company commander and the commanding officer (me) also had to attend the PT. It was not common sit ups and pushups but a hard core physical exercise, which everyone had to attend. For the whole day workout, it was just an appetizer. I also gave the demo to climb the 13 feet high wall without any support and descend without any support. Those (especially younger than me) who couldn’t do so, were given “special treatment” by the PT NCOs.

One day when I was descending a rope using only my hands, I heard some officers saying, “Sir may you slip from the rope”. For the next two days, I went to the boxing classes especially and had a match with those specific officers. I gave them a proper “reward” for their prayers. They asked me a time for couple of days to get trained in the boxing, which I gladly did. However, when I met them after a week, I beat them even worse than before. The poor chaps never hooted at me again.

I made the rotation practice of my men. I rotated them in such a manner that a person doing his duties in desert will be performing his tasks in snowcapped areas just after a couple of weeks and later in the coastal belts. The first company I sent to Baluchistan consisted of only ten soldiers. One day I received a call from the Commanding Officer of a scout platoon from Chaman.

When I reached there, I was told that only eight to ten of men are roaming in the area where even two hundred of scouts don’t dare to come without proper armament, as it was the stronghold of most fierce robbers and terrorists of the region. The nearest platoon what the CO was talking about was of Captain Syed. I called him on wireless and asked him to meet us (me and the CO). When Syed reached, I asked him the exact situation of the area. I told the CO not to worry about my men and ordered Syed to continue his operations.

Ironically, after a few weeks, Syed brought the most notorious robber of the area with robber’s hands tied on his back. Not only him but also three of his associates, known for robbery, killing and smuggling. I signaled to the CO that does he require the SSG escort for him if he wants to stay safe? I never received a reply from him.

It is also pertinent to mention about Naik Miran, who was operational in this area. He was roaming the area in civilian attire. Scouts saw him suspiciously and arrested him. They arrested him and started interrogating, including third degree as well. He kept silent until forty-eight hours. After forty-eight hours he told that he belongs to SSG. When we were asked, we confirmed that he is one of us. On inquiring by the scouts, he told that it is the training of SSG that ID remains undisclosed until it passes forty eight hours. Naik Miran was taken by us. He was given an option to get one rank demotion or to be kicked out of the SSG. He didn’t want to get our of SSG so he accepted demotion. He was demoted because of the reason why he was caught.
However, it would be futile to say that never happened any problem. Once I saw an officer marching. His backpack looked overstuffed, even heavier than 40 pounds, but its condition looked as if it had not been opened for days. I called him and asked him to open it. He opened it and I was furious to see that it was only filled with cardboard pieces. Before lunch, he had to leave Cherat.
Every year in the month of February, an exercise was conducted in Mansehra. Its purpose was to test the “Stay Behind” capabilities of SSG. An infantry battalion played the role of the enemy and SSG had to penetrate their lines. It longed for four weeks. In the month of February, it was the season of intense rain and cold. They were not issued any ration, tent or supplies, or even the medical aid. Every soldier had to carry his burden and arrange food supplies for him. Even if someone was injured or sick, he had to approach exercise headquarters on his own, without anyone’s help. I feel proud to say that my men never let me down. I always kept my head high because of them.
As long as I had been the commander of SSG, I always objected to have any specific shoulder sign, Barret or insignia for the SSG. Instead of being symbolic, I wanted them to act practically. My friend Colonel (Later Major General Janjua) once asked me to stay in Cherat for a couple of days. He wanted to verify whether the SSG are special indeed or its just a propaganda among the lines. On a fateful day I received him in Cherat and dropped him in the mess, as he wanted to see himself in a casual mood what SSG really is. I arranged his stay for a week in Cherat. But surprisingly the next day, he asked me to leave Cherat. I asked him why so soon? Wont he verify my claim about SSG? But he replied that he has seen my men here. The way they talk and reply any question and scan a person while saluting, it’s enough to tell that they are not a common breed now.
My doors were open to anyone. Any moment of grief, joy, trouble or advise; was common between me and my men. I proudly say that in my absence, any of my officers or jawans never hesitated to knock my door and asked my wife anything in their household matters. As per the routine in army unites, I had also issued orders that only ten percent of the men can go on leave for Eid celebrations. However, my home was opened for every jawan or officer at that moment. A feast was arranged for them at my home. Considering me more than their elder brother, they helped my wife in kitchen, arranging the feast or even cleaning the utensils after lunch. But this was hell of a job to do. Just imagine what a group of strong and sturdy men will do to the lunch, when they have some score to settle with their CO?
On receiving the first batch of officers, I arranged an ice cream party for them. I was the only person having a refrigerator at home so I could keep the ice cream. But after that day on every week end, my home was the picnic point for those who wanted to enjoy ice cream. Even after the refrigerator was arranged in the mess, ice cream party still continued to grace my home.
I had heard much about Americans regarding their skills. But they surprised me even more. I was shocked to see how much they under estimated us. I had told them already about our basic course outlines, but it was of no use. On the very first day when I visited the class, I saw them teaching the officers about the basics of small arms and ballistics. I attended that class for four hours myself, just to see what they were teaching. I called the chief instructor to my office and stopped this futile activity because our “Small Arms Course” has told us much about it already. The same happened when the class of demolition course started. I told them we know about it already.

Once a survival instructor was sent to us, considering that he can teach us something. After a week, we received a gigantic and sturdy American officer. He kept teaching my men for two weeks. After that he came to my office and told me that he is just wasting his time. I asked why he is saying that. Then he told me that my men already know what he is here to teach, even they know better than him in several matters. For example, he said that my men already know that how to make loaf out of wild berry seeds or the medical characteristics of many herbs. He even came to know about some other practices as well which were not in his knowledge already.

When general Musa became the C-in-C, he planned a visit to Cherat. During his visit, he reached a hideout where the survival course was under practice. There was a strange odor in the air when Musa arrived at hide out. He saw that a couple of men were cooking frogs in a tin to eat. In a surprised manner Musa asked the NCO,”Do you really intend to eat it or just trying to impress me?”
“Sir will you try some if I eat one?”, NCO asked.
“For sure”, Musa answered.

The next moment Musa saw NCO chewing the two frogs and very next moment, Musa picked up two frogs and swallowed it without chewing. “How was the taste sir?” I couldn’t resist asking.

For a few days, Musa stayed in Peshawar and off and on, he visited Cherat, seeing the most unique military exercises to the extent of my knowledge he saw. About a week prior to Musa’s visit, my company commanders came to me and asked whether they should prepare for guard of honor and demos for the exercises. I replied to them, why do they need a week for practice, what’s the purpose of such rigorous training? Do they have enough spare time? All I allowed them was to have only one day to practice before the visit. I not even asked them that are they even practicing it or not, I knew my men. On the day of the visit, the demo and guard of honor given by the SSG not only spell bounded me, but what to say of Musa. I could read it on his face that he is not dealing here with ordinary men.

The time of six years just passed in a few moments. The day I remember when I was going to complete my three years in the SSG, on the instructions of General Ayub Khan I was given an extension of three more years because I was not satisfied with the standards of SSG. From the company of Unit 17 Baluch, I had now raised a full-fledged unit of Special Services Group. They could now operate on land, air, sea and under sea. I could not see anything further to be added in the curriculum. Till 1962, I had put my best for the SSG. Now I was feeling bored and monotonous. Although GHQ looks in a mood to extend my tenure for a further three years, it was enough. So, on a fateful day, I left the SSG with a heavy heart and lots of love.


View attachment 30869



View attachment 30870

His nephew and I in the U.S. are good friends; he owns and operates a chain of franchise businesses in the state of Florida. He comes from the wealthy side of the family; in Bombay, they operated an import/export business before shifting to Pakistan during the partition. His nephew mentioned that Abu Bakr was a wild child.

His nephew once told me that Abu Bakr, the father of SSG, was thrown to the wolves.

 

[ghazi52]