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Yes, jammers on the Indian side. No effect.Nice.
Did you consider the effects of ECM?
I agree, but from a different angle.The Ukraine war (and the Swift Retort episode) probably allowed our strategic planners to grasp that such strictly conventional systems (which are separate from the nuclear ones) gave them a lot of options for 'controlled escalation' (to 'punish' India) in the event of a low-intensity/localized conflict while remaining under the nuclear threshold.
Also, I would be very surprised if we had the industrial capability to be able to achieve the production scale that such large numbers would demand. It is still a ballistic missile with a lot of 'moving parts' so to speak and it is a fact that we are not self-reliant in sourcing all the mechanical/structural/propulsion inputs. This doesn't include the electronics, which might be the easier part.
The engineer in me would give anything to be able to see the actual electronic hardware that goes into these systems.
This would also explain the sudden appearance of the Taimoor ALCM at int'l defence fairs without any publicly revealed flight tests or any news about its integration with any of the PAF's platforms.
I would say that this shift towards strictly 'conventional' systems is part of broader strategic signaling, reflecting post-Swift Retort learning regarding the need for options for controlled escalation. It would be safe to assume that Swift Retort shook up some people in our higher echelons because of India's brinkmanship (preparing missiles for launch, etc) and our inability to respond with any 'strategic' system without initiating a nuclear conflict.
Perhaps I'm reading too much into this, but there also may be a realization that in a similar future conflict, there might be too much of a risk for aircraft to carry out Swift Retort-style precision strikes to 'punish' India.
tbh i think p282 will probably end up being yj21e which contradicts my other theory lol- why do thye make it so hard for us!
Thank you for full informations.I agree, but from a different angle.
Basically, our policymakers aren't concerned about initiating a nuclear conflict. Rather, they care about guaranteeing Pakistan's territorial integrity. If that is lost, then they'll go nuclear and, in turn, force the adversary into losing everything too.
Unfortunately, the Balakot episode showed that India didn't care about the nuclear threat. Rather, India will probe and instigate to see if our policymakers will "pull back" their red line. Yes, territorial integrity will trigger a nuclear response, but how much territory? Perhaps, at some point, India did wager that they could bite into Pakistan without triggering nuclear retaliation (i.e., Cold Start). But in turn, our policymakers decided that TNWs were a fair response to such situations.
Now, with Balakot, India isn't probing how much territory they can take, but how much insecurity they can create in Pakistan (via conventional means) without getting a nuclear response. This is a different problem to what the nuclear capability was designed for; now, we're not talking about the loss of territorial integrity, but national integrity. Citizens cannot feel safe closer to the border and, if left unchecked, India will expand its probing deeper into our territory (exerting a sense of de facto control over our affairs).
Thus, we're at a point now where 'conventional deterrence' is essential. Things like the long-range SAMs (across both the PAF and PA, possibly even the PN later) are there to help defend against a 'probe.' Likewise, the sudden and open emphasis on acquiring a stealth fighter (J-31), HALE UAVs, longer-ranged guided rockets, enlarging the surface fleet, adding AIP-equipped SWATS (thereby ballooning our SSP fleet to 12-16+ boats), etc, all point towards both neutralizing and following up on Indian probes with more Swift Retort-type operations.
The point being, if India decides to probe and, in turn, create insecurity for Pakistanis, then the Pak Army, Air Force, and Navy will carry out retaliatory measures which will cost India. This would start with neutralization of incoming threats (via SAMs, more tactical fighters like JF-17C/J-10CE, SWATS parked in our busy waters, frigates guarding SLOCs, etc), but then be followed up with very heavy conventional strikes. The heavy conventional strikes are meant to inflict a high cost, one that will be too high for India to continue probing. IMO, Swift Retort may have given India the idea that the Balakot-type ops - as undertaken at the time - was too expensive relative to the losses they had incurred due to Pakistan's response. And, in turn, they de-escalated.
So, overall, the conventional deterrence focus is now there to, basically, deter Indian probing in the future. IMO, for our policymakers, if India escalates into brinkmanship is irrelevant, or - devil's advocate here - a good thing. Why? Because Indian brinkmanship now interferes with American geo-political goals in Asia (containing China) and, in turn, invite American pressure on India (esp. if India started the 'panga' so to speak).
Well, this Fatah-2 episode confirms one important thing...what our military designates something before it's inducted doesn't mean anything. So, for all we know, the "P282" could be a supersonic-cruising AShM (like HD-1 or CM-302), while the ASBM is something else.
In both last conflicts, though small in nature like a skirmish, it was the use of stand off weapons which brought results with help from drones and aircrafts as well as jamming side of the things.I agree, but from a different angle.
Basically, our policymakers aren't concerned about initiating a nuclear conflict. Rather, they care about guaranteeing Pakistan's territorial integrity. If that is lost, then they'll go nuclear and, in turn, force the adversary into losing everything too.
Unfortunately, the Balakot episode showed that India didn't care about the nuclear threat. Rather, India will probe and instigate to see if our policymakers will "pull back" their red line. Yes, territorial integrity will trigger a nuclear response, but how much territory? Perhaps, at some point, India did wager that they could bite into Pakistan without triggering nuclear retaliation (i.e., Cold Start). But in turn, our policymakers decided that TNWs were a fair response to such situations.
Now, with Balakot, India isn't probing how much territory they can take, but how much insecurity they can create in Pakistan (via conventional means) without getting a nuclear response. This is a different problem to what the nuclear capability was designed for; now, we're not talking about the loss of territorial integrity, but national integrity. Citizens cannot feel safe closer to the border and, if left unchecked, India will expand its probing deeper into our territory (exerting a sense of de facto control over our affairs).
Thus, we're at a point now where 'conventional deterrence' is essential. Things like the long-range SAMs (across both the PAF and PA, possibly even the PN later) are there to help defend against a 'probe.' Likewise, the sudden and open emphasis on acquiring a stealth fighter (J-31), HALE UAVs, longer-ranged guided rockets, enlarging the surface fleet, adding AIP-equipped SWATS (thereby ballooning our SSP fleet to 12-16+ boats), etc, all point towards both neutralizing and following up on Indian probes with more Swift Retort-type operations.
The point being, if India decides to probe and, in turn, create insecurity for Pakistanis, then the Pak Army, Air Force, and Navy will carry out retaliatory measures which will cost India. This would start with neutralization of incoming threats (via SAMs, more tactical fighters like JF-17C/J-10CE, SWATS parked in our busy waters, frigates guarding SLOCs, etc), but then be followed up with very heavy conventional strikes. The heavy conventional strikes are meant to inflict a high cost, one that will be too high for India to continue probing. IMO, Swift Retort may have given India the idea that the Balakot-type ops - as undertaken at the time - was too expensive relative to the losses they had incurred due to Pakistan's response. And, in turn, they de-escalated.
So, overall, the conventional deterrence focus is now there to, basically, deter Indian probing in the future. IMO, for our policymakers, if India escalates into brinkmanship is irrelevant, or - devil's advocate here - a good thing. Why? Because Indian brinkmanship now interferes with American geo-political goals in Asia (containing China) and, in turn, invite American pressure on India (esp. if India started the 'panga' so to speak).
Well, this Fatah-2 episode confirms one important thing...what our military designates something before it's inducted doesn't mean anything. So, for all we know, the "P282" could be a supersonic-cruising AShM (like HD-1 or CM-302), while the ASBM is something else.
There is no active collaboration with China to make FATAH-II. Never was. It is an old Pakistani project which was brought back to life. FATAH-I seems to share similarity with A-100s etc so it might be a reverse-engineered rocket. China, unfortunately, does not give free lunch like most Pakistanis and even foreigners believe.Fateh 2 seems very large and heavy . Going by visuals, and the amount of dust it kicked up.
Even bigger than Nasr .
It's a collaboration between GIDS of Pakistan and some Chinese company.
May be a variant of WS-2D or WS-3.
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