I don't think FAAZ is anywhere close to entering serial production yet. The Turkish Gökdoğan missile offers a useful benchmark for understanding the potential development timeline.
Turkey conducted tests of the Gökdoğan in 2018, with production reportedly commencing in 2022. This suggests a development cycle of roughly four to five years before the missile reached the production stage. However, it is important to account for the fact that Turkey's defence-industrial ecosystem is considerably more mature than Pakistan's, which has only recently begun to place greater emphasis on developing an indigenous defence production complex.
Even in Turkey's case, missile development and operationalisation were not instantaneous processes. The transition from initial design and testing to a production-ready system, followed by operational integration, took several years. This is an important consideration when assessing FAAZ's potential induction timeline.
Pakistan, meanwhile, has been working on the concept for FAAZ for quite some time. The experience gained through SD-10 production and integration has provided a useful technological foundation, while FAAZ itself appears to have been in development for more than five years. Nevertheless, having an established conceptual and technological base does not necessarily mean that the missile is ready for serial production or operational service.
If we were to apply a development timeline broadly comparable to Turkey's, I would consider 2030 a plausible, albeit speculative, timeframe for FAAZ's potential induction. This is not a confirmed timeline, of course, and progress could be accelerated depending on the maturity of the programme, testing outcomes and the availability of supporting infrastructure.
For Somalia, however, waiting until the end of the decade may not be a practical option. If Chinese BVR missile options are unavailable, Mogadishu could potentially turn to Turkish solutions to meet its immediate requirements. Pakistan's ability to integrate Turkish-origin equipment could also provide an alternative pathway, particularly if the objective is to establish an operational capability before FAAZ becomes available.
Ultimately, the distinction here is between a long-term indigenous capability and an immediate operational requirement. FAAZ may eventually offer Pakistan and its partners a viable option, but Somalia's near-term requirements could necessitate an interim solution.
