IMO.
I do not believe that acquiring LIFT aircraft is a "priority" for the PAF, let alone a higher priority than fifth-generation fighter jets. ------ We need to distinguish between LIFT capability and the possession of LIFT aircraft; they are two completely different things.
The situation is as follows:
Whether it is the PAF or the Uzbekistan Air Force—which recently acquired the J-10CE fighter—pilots operating these aircraft complete their relevant familiarization and adaptation flights in China. This is part of the support services included in the procurement program. Furthermore, reports regarding the Bangladesh Air Force's prospective purchase of J-10CE fighters explicitly outline the cost plan for pilot training to be conducted in China.
4.5-generation or 5th-generation fighter jets have completely moved beyond traditional air combat paradigms. They rely more heavily on the support of an integrated air combat ecosystem than on one-on-one dogfighting between individual aircraft.
This implies that for many economically disadvantaged nations, establishing a simulation-based training environment for 4.5-generation or 5th-generation fighter pilots is virtually impossible. These countries face significant deficiencies in their actual aerial combat support infrastructure, making the allocation of funds for such simulation systems even less feasible. Furthermore, economic constraints limit the scale of their 4.5-generation or 5th-generation fighter fleets, resulting in a low demand for pilots; beyond the initial cohort, the number of new pilots added annually is in the single digits. Consequently, setting up such a training system for such a small number of pilots is clearly not a rational choice.
CATIC provides comprehensive pilot training services to customers for both the J-10CE and FC-31/J-35 fighter jets; in fact, virtually all fighter jet exporters offer such training. Even in the case of Pakistan, when PAC sells JF-17 series fighters to foreign customers, it includes pilot training services. Furthermore, PAC offers the JF-17B variant, enabling customers to conduct their own pilot training—much like the J-10S option available for China's J-10CE.
LIFT aircraft are unlikely to be a top priority for the PAF. While procurement remains a possibility, it is not a primary concern. Modern LIFT aircraft possess genuine combat capabilities rather than serving merely as trainers; should the PAF acquire them, the deciding factor would be their combat utility, not their training functions.
Moreover, LIFT aircraft are not a central consideration in the PAF's future acquisition of fifth-generation fighters. The PAF lacks the resources to sustain a standalone, comprehensive training system specifically for fifth-generation fighter pilots.
You are right to distinguish LIFT capability from ownership of a dedicated LIFT aircraft. But the rest of your argument is combining and equating, three separate things: lead-in fighter training, conversion onto a particular aircraft, and advanced operational training.
The fact that an exporter provides initial familiarization and conversion training does not establish that the customer depends on that exporter for its continuing training system. Nor does it answer whether the customer needs a better lead training stage. Those are
different requirements.
Little to none CATIC training services for JF-17 are in operation today.
It is completely in house at this point.
CATIC training services for the J-10 will be phased out barring the simulators that have been delivered.
Pakistan sourced its F-16 simulation infrastructure from L-3for networked F-16C Block 52 training implemented since 2013. Those devices supported new-pilot training, conversion and advanced tactical training.
The JF-17 simulator experience also contradicts the assumption that Pakistan simply relies on whatever training infrastructure CATIC supplies. The simulators delivered with the initial batch were found inadequate and inaccurate in representing the aircraft. When CATIC quoted a price for developing an accurate simulator, the PAF considered it prohibitively expensive which was effectively price gouging, and pursued its own development instead.
You can criticize the failure to negotiate that requirement earlier, but the resulting decision was to develop domestic capability, not accept permanent dependence. Pakistan has also developed full-fidelity Mirage III/V simulators and augmented-reality training systems for the F-16. Its approach has involved both indigenous development and mixed external sources.
More fundamentally, LIFT is not a capability exclusive to 4.5-generation fighters. Pakistan’s interest in modern lead-in trainers was already being discussed in 2015 in relation to preparing pilots for the F-16 and JF-17. It was not something that
suddenly became relevant with the J-10CE or prospective fifth-generation acquisitions.
This was based on 2 gaps documented in PAF interviews including those in Air Forces monthly and other places.
- A speed & performance gap: progressively bringing pilots from slower training aircraft into the speed brackets, handling demands and workload of high-performance fighters.
- A technology & training gap: preparing pilots for modern cockpit interfaces, sensors, weapons employment and tactical workflows before they reach frontline conversion units.
Neither gap is exclusive to 4.5-generation aircraft. Similarly, having a LIFT platform capable of preparing pilots for 4.5-generation fighters does not make its usefulness exclusive to those fighters.
So you are incorrect in:
-Establishing the absence of a LIFT requirement.
- Reducing Pakistan’s training demand to the intake for one small, newly acquired fighter fleet.
The PAF’s training system serves a mixed fleet, not merely the initial J-10 conversion cohort.
Your claim is resting on exporter-provided familiarization flights and nothing more.
You can argue that it is not the highest priority without claiming that its training function is incidental, that it depends on Chinese input, or that combat utility would necessarily be the deciding reason to acquire it.
