This is the argument has been had for ages. Please see my
earlier post in the F-16 thread on the subject for information. I would kindly request to please dispute it technically and with figures if you wish to do so. I cannot reply to "I don't like the US relationship" or plain emotional discourse.
Here is a summary:
Pakistan has operated the F-16 for more than 40 years. That alone should give pause to anyone casually suggesting a wholesale replacement. Four decades is not just fleet age. It is accumulated investment, sunk cost, institutional muscle memory, and a fully amortized ecosystem that most air forces would hesitate to walk away from.
Pakistan already has hardened shelters, maintenance depots, simulators, ground equipment, software systems, and trained personnel built specifically around the F-16. That investment is already paid for. A new platform does not fit neatly into that structure. It requires new tooling, new diagnostic equipment, new simulators, new software licenses, and often new base modifications. None of this is optional. All of it costs money.
There is also the cost of lost efficiency. Pakistan’s engineers, technicians, and pilots understand the F-16 deeply. They know how it behaves at the edge of the envelope. They know which components fail first in local conditions. They know how to stretch availability during surge operations. That kind of expertise does not show up in procurement spreadsheets, but it has real financial value. Losing it means higher error rates, lower availability, and more expensive maintenance during the early years of a new platform.
If the F-16 were only a bomb truck, then yes, systems like Akinci or the S2 paired with Al-Rasoob make financial sense. Unmanned platforms are cheaper per flight hour, don’t risk pilots, and are well suited for permissive strike roles. For stand-off weapons delivery against fixed targets, they are efficient and increasingly capable.
But the F-16 has never been just a bomb truck in PAF service. Its value sits in air defense, strike escort, counter-air, and high-end deterrence roles. That is where drones, even advanced ones, still fall short. Akinci carrying munitions does not replace a manned fighter with radar, electronic warfare, data fusion, and the ability to dynamically react in contested airspace.
On cost, this is where the argument usually flips. Buying new F-16s is expensive and politically constrained. That is a given. But upgrading existing airframes is a very different financial profile. A deep upgrade package is a fraction of the cost of introducing a new manned fighter type. More importantly, Pakistan already paid for the infrastructure, training, spares, and doctrine around the F-16. Walking away from that ecosystem to replace it with either a new fighter or drones does not save as much money as it appears once sustainment and readiness are factored in.
Drones and fighters are not interchangeable line items. They solve different problems. Akinci can supplement the force. It can take on strike and ISR roles and free up F-16 hours. That actually strengthens the case for keeping the F-16 fleet, because it reduces wear while preserving high-end capability.
On the C7 point, that is not new information. Pakistan was never going to receive the latest F-16 variants. But that does not make the current fleet obsolete. Modern radars, avionics refreshes, electronic warfare upgrades, and weapons integration can keep existing jets credible for another decade or more.
So the real question is not “do we need new F-16s?” It is “do we need to throw away 40 years of sunk cost and institutional experience?” Drones should complement the F-16, not be used as an argument to retire it. The cheapest and most stable option remains upgrading what Pakistan already understands, operates, and can sustain.
