1. Can't do a wargame without data. How much will India improve? How much will our defenses improve? Please give some datums.
2. We can afford multiple hits on our bases and still keep the operations up. It is the optics and roasting regarding how PAF failed to defend its bases that is more troublesome. There are contingencies practiced on every base annually where you have to show that you can operate without runway or POL or other such hits.
3. Again, good of India that they went for cease fire after hitting the bases but not destroying any aircraft to equalize the score of 7th.
4. "Really tested the limit of our ADS" again, a generic statement. Did we intercept the drones with EW? Are we not filling up the gaps identified with better kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities? Has India started producing 10,000 drones annually as envisaged by some?
5. " Airpower is offensive in nature" doesn't mean the punch you are referring too. Let me recommend you 2 books that will clarify this statement about the employment of Airpower. The War in the Air, 1914-1994 by Alan Stepheminns and Airpower in 3 Wars by USAF Gen. Momyer.
6. I would love to do an Oxford style academic debate based on many other such books. But this forum has its limitations and I can only conclude by saying that expensive cruise missiles in Indo-Pak scenario can only achieve so much. You need the concentration of force that is not possible with 4 millions dollar Brahmos or small LMs. You will have to use bombs in numbers. The stand-off range of glide bombs is much lesser than missiles. Except great powers, no country can afford to rely solely on hitting the adversary by keeping its aircraft 200 km away throughout the conflict.
1. I referred to factor in assumed modernization of BOTH sides for scenario building and war gaming instead of focusing on one side only. Now, if you want to quantify this to polish the research there are many data sets available to help like SIPRI database. It can help us quantify the modernization of Both air forces in terms of exact numbers and we can build scenarios based on these new (futurisitc) inventories of main combat systems (fighters, SAMS, space base sensors etc.)
2. Multiple hits is a generic term here. How much qualify as "multiple"? 10,20,50?? Whatever the number is, it is certainly not indefinite. And in order to render airbase unoperational one doesn't need to completely destroy each HAS, bunker, tower in it. Constant hitting Runways and taxiway joints will be actual challeng. Optics is part of informaiton operations no one can take it out of the conflict. Only way of winning it is to put enemy airbases more under operatioanl stress by disabling their runways, communication nodes, IADS assets like SAMs. Optics will favor which party hits opponent more time. (Satellite imagery will emerge eventually).
3. That's the whole point, after hitting our bases they didn't need to shotdown 7 of our fighters. They were able to go off ramp declaring "all objectives complete" when both sides accepted ceasefire. Lolz, funny thing.. India offered this off ramp to Pakistan right after losing 8 of their fighters when no Pakistani base was hit. But obviously, Pakistan was in no position to accept it at that time without giving a response.
4. Again, the same argument. We are building defenses, YES we are but they are building offenses as well.
5. Both topics i.e. "Air power is offensive" and "PAF needs punch" are related not the same. I don't know what gave you an impression that I am saying they are the same. One is artchitecture and other is application. Books you referred are two basic academic text to understand how airpower application can be/must be employed in OFFENSIVE manner to achieve strategic results. No ways books contraditcs what I have been saying. For example, core argument in both books is that offense will always prevails no matter how resilient air defense is. In fact, Momyer in his work warned against relying on technological superiority, networking, and resilience of air defense systems and he went on to concluding that
“If you are not using airpower aggressively to destroy the enemy system, you are misusing it.”
Now what I am saying (lack of punch) is not having aqequade offensive strength and relying on air defense both in the air and from ground and then going for counter-offensive. This thinking demands building both offensive and defensive capabilities at SCALE. It demands an infrastructure that can first absorb opening salvo from enemy and then launching counter offensive larger than what enemy would mount on you. It is obvious that even in presence of such infrastruture party without initiative will be playing a catching game on escalation ladder. BTW, both books you refer don't take into account prevailing asymmetric situation between IAF/PAF. The authors have written from USAF prespective where it always enjoys numerical and technological superiority. My argument is simple. PAF will be better not adopting this expensive defensive architecture and have some capabilities in the sleeve that will enable it to take the war to enemy right from the onset of a future conflict. Pakistan can achieve this with vertical force integration by combining firepower from army, navy and PAF.
6. How about we both give each other a topic of academic research and exchange our papers. This will also help in your IR degree and then we can send both papers for peer review. Oxford style debate is obviously not possible here due to techincial limitations of forum. Through this research we can explain our argument about developing offensive capabilities in Indo-Pakistan air balance of power in context of ongoing conflicts (Ukraine, Iran etc.) Offer is here, Any taker?
Apologies for long post.
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