In both examples, the same logic applies to international relations. Real restraint is not weakness; it is calculation. Those who accuse one side, in this case Pakistan, of showing restraint as if it were mere timidity often miss how deterrence works. Sometimes purposeful non-escalation is a signal of both capability and control.
@hnn
I'm not sure about the context of the conversation, so I'm only going to contextualize your post that already has valueable practical insights for anyone who's familiar with the concept of deterrence.
So, in context of Pakistan and India:
Firstly, "deterrence by punishment" isn't practically and strategically feasible here because that form of deterrence requires firepower and attrition asymmetry, economic endurance, and escalation dominance i.e. one of the states involved in the conflict has a much weaker military and economy compared to the other (in simpler terms) e.g. US v. Afghanistan.
Secondly, amongst peer (or near-peer) military firepowers, deterrence by punishment becomes a "strategic miscalculation" as it removes ambiguity of intent, demands a response from the other side (for their domestic credibility), and compresses the escalation ladder rather abruptly.
So in Pakistan v. India context, "deterrence by punishment" is akin to an "open invitation" for an all-out war. Why? Let's step away from theory, and look into evidential history. Did the 1948 "deter" Pakistan from 1965? Or better, did the 1971 "deter" Pakistan from 1999? If "deterrence by punishment" didn't alter or shape the future behavior of a militarily weaker (in the past) Pakistan compared to India, what rational explanation is there to be found to assume that it'll shape the future behavior of India?
What Pakistan did back in 2019, and then in 2025 (albeit better) is:
- Deterrence by denial: denied India control over scale, opportunity for any tactical exploitation, and raised the cost to goal ratio (goals were denied too but a separate discussion).
- Latent deterrence: signalled to India the will and readiness to incur cost on any Indian aggression, and defense of Pakistan's sovereignty, with capability (CMs and Nukes) held in reserve still.
- Escalation control: this is the key deterrence signalled to India. By not replying to them in kind and yet denying them operational freedom, Pakistan implicitly communicated "you don't have control over this conflict, we don't have to use higher tiered weapons system (but we can) depending on your next move."
Why it is the key? Because Pakistan maintained the strategic ambiguity by
not forcing them in a binary of either escalate (and risk severe punishment) or fold (and risk domestic humiliation). The ball was in India's court, and they had the options to:
- Escalate without justification (invite severe punishment from Pakistan, severe scrutiny from international actors, and erode domestic credibility by getting bogged in a protracted war)
- Continue their tactics and keep on bleeding (military attrition)
- Realize that Pakistan can't be pushed over, and de-escalate while domestic face-saving is still in play
That escalation control and latent (punishment) deterrence is what forms the core of Minimal Credible Deterrence (MCD) i.e. nuclear arsenal. Nuclear exchange hasn't occurred post Hiroshima and Nagasaki because the single case real life example of certainty of "catastrophic punishment", combined with restraint and escalation control, remains in play globally.
So while "deterrence by punishment" appears emotionally satisfying, it is exercising "escalation and operational control" that wins military conflicts.
Pakistan doesn't have to (and didn't) dare India to "take a deep breath and step back" but rather make (and made) "taking a deep breath and stepping back" the most rationally viable move for survival. Incurring a severe punishment invites taking a step forward than back b/w peer military powers.
I have mentioned this before - India's post May behavior - feeding political rhetoric to their population in the aftermath of Dehli incident, their large-scale military exercises to explore and patch capability and doctrinal gaps, and now the expensive purchase order for Rafales - all this points to Pakistan having and showing credible deterrence back in May without causing "massive observable damage" -
and to quote Sun Tzu here:
"The highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities"
PS: I'm going to go back and finish up the promised gamified geo-political framework. Hopefully, I will share that by the end of this week.
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