You can beat Ukraine that way on the long run but at what cost 1m casualties both sides. A high casualty strategy also has other risks for Russia. Periphery parts such as the caucasus region parts of Russia like Daghestan,Chechnya and others there can be revolts because of too high casualties.
SEAD-DEAD imporvements and smaller gains is better than gaining a larger area with too many casualties for Russia. Ukr airforce is also continiously improving. An immediate ceasefire to heal the wounds for Russia and imrpove its airforce sead-dead capability would be better with the condition that Ukraine wont be getting future f16s that would challange Ruaf. It can be connected to total number of Ru aircraft as it increases for example for every 20 new aircraft inducted to Ruaf 2 F16s can be taken by Ukraine from its western allies. That kind of proportion can protect the balance of ceasefire. There wont be nato membership as the lands are still contested with a conflict although will be stopped by ceasefire like NK and SK. Zelensky cannot give up the 4 regions as well as Crimea to get nato membership.
The ethnic minorities in Russia who are in the SMO are getting paid a lot of money to fight in Ukraine, and if any of them die, their families receive a large amount of money as payment for their services, and some of these families even hope that some of them die so that they can receive the bonus and payment. This was said by a Brazilian who went to Russia and saw the situation in the country up close. Most of the volunteers in the war are from these republics, while the Russian cosmopolitan sides have almost no volunteers, so Russia can still afford to hire volunteers for the SMO. Of course, this incurs large amounts of payments, since the ongoing war consumes money at unsustainable levels, so there is no way the Russians can keep this up forever, but it will all depend on which side can withstand the most casualties, and the Ukrainian side is the heaviest weight in this balance. Another thing that should be mentioned is that the Russians annexed part of the four oblasts, which means that more than 2 million Ukrainians are already part of Russia, so even if the Russians have 2 million or more casualties, they have not lost anything in terms of human resources, if you compare it with Ukraine, the number must be 20x worse if not more.
It is funny when people talk about large numbers of Russian casualties but exclude the Ukrainian side.
In a devastating war of such magnitude as the one that is unfolding before our eyes in real time, it is always worth talking and writing about the losses, even if the parties treat this data as state secrets.
It is especially important to deal with this data, because juggling with numbers has also become part of the information battlefield of this war. Most analysts do not address the issue in depth or simply do not want to see the horror that the Ukrainian battlefields reveal.
I am primarily qualified to deal with the losses of the Ukrainian side, because the Russians’ ability to tolerate losses and their human and material reserves are an order of magnitude greater than those of Ukraine.
The source of the basic information is the July 26, 2023 article by the Jamestown Foundation, which also maintains good relations with the Ukrainian political leadership and regularly dreams of the division of Russia (it also organizes international conferences). Citing several Ukrainian sources, the article claims that by the end of 2022 Ukraine had mobilized one million people, and by July 2023 a total of two million people.
There are sources with more partial data, for example, that by October 2022 the Ukrainian side had managed to mobilize 700,000 people, and there is also scattered information about the number of volunteers. Considering that in 2022 the Ukrainian side carried out a successful mobilization and in the autumn of that year conducted effective offensive operations in the Kherson and Kharkiv regions, and in the summer of 2023 organized and launched a large-scale offensive operation towards Crimea, the protection of information was not as strict as later, therefore we have significantly more information about mobilization and personnel data for 2022 and 2023.
For example, it is also known (it was made public by the deputy chairman of the Rada defense committee) what the Ukrainian Armed Forces had in February 2022, and there are also partial reports on average monthly mobilization.
Taking into account the above, we can state the following with a high degree of certainty:
The strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (contract soldiers, number of National Guard, border guards) in February-March 2022: 348,000 people; :arrow: Number of volunteers in 2022-2025: 165,000 – 185,000 people; (2022 data is 100,000 people, the number of candidates for volunteers decreased sharply after the fall of 2023);
Number of troops mobilized in 2022-2025: 2,440,000 – 2,660,000 people; (with the proviso that large-scale mobilization took place in the first year and a half of the war. The waste of personnel was caused by the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of 2023, as a result of which the then Chief of the General Staff announced his demand for the mobilization of 500,000 people to compensate for losses by the end of 2023);
Total number of people serving in the armed forces between 2022-2025: 2,953,000 – 3,193,000 people.
Now, after the above numbers, the big question is: where are the soldiers, if we can estimate the current strength of the army at 800,000?
Because the math gives a somewhat confusing number: the difference is 2,153,000 to 2,393,000.
Considering that there is no demobilization in Ukraine during a state of war and martial law, I have only one logical explanation: the bulk of the difference of over 2 million is losses in killed and wounded. Of course, prisoners of war, missing persons and deserters should also be included in the large difference (in the case of the latter, you can read news reports about numbers in the hundreds of thousands).
Independent and even pro-Ukrainian analysts have already concluded that Ukraine, at the current pace of mobilization, cannot even replace its losses on the battlefield. Based on the open data sets available to us, we can also see that Ukraine has actually exhausted the age groups eligible for mobilization. This is one of the reasons why the medical exemptions of 900,000 people aged 25 to 60 had to be reviewed.
For the biased and inattentive: these 900,000 people are not part of the pool of people with medical disabilities, they were not reviewed. These 900,000 people are part of the pool of 3.4 million people who were available for mobilization by Ukraine at the beginning of 2024). As far as I know, the exemptions have been revoked for 250,000 people - approximately this is the amount of mobilization reserves that Kiev still has.
I would not go into the ratio of combat deaths to combat deaths among themselves now - I still believe the ratio is 1:1, maximum 1:1.5).
Let's see what the above numbers mean! There is historical experience on what the number of mobilizations and losses in relation to the total population in a society implies.
Germany mobilized 19.5% of its population in World War I and its losses in close combat (killed and wounded) were close to 10.5%. These rates contributed to the defeat and socio-economic collapse of Germany.
In World War II, Germany mobilized a quarter of its population, with losses in close combat (dead and wounded) of 12.6%. The high mobilization rate led to the complete exhaustion of the economy and society.
Russia mobilized 9% of its population in World War I, but could not logistically supply this huge army. Its casualty rate was 4.2%. Insufficient logistics, defeat and revolution (1917) showed the unsustainability of mobilization.
Japan mobilized 10.1% of its population in World War II, and its casualty rate was 3.7%. Military defeat reflected the unsustainability of mobilization and economic collapse.
What pattern do the above figures show?
For the losing countries (e.g. Germany, Japan, Russian Empire), mobilization rates generally ranged from 9% to 25% in the 20th century, depending on the extent of the war. High rates (e.g. Germany: 25.8%) often led to economic and social collapse.
Losses (dead and wounded) amounted to 3–12% of the total population in the losing countries.
What could all this mean for Ukraine?
First of all, we need to estimate the Ukrainian population. There are no official figures, so we can only estimate them, and besides, we cannot count the entire population of the territories within the internationally recognized borders. However, we know from official figures that after the outbreak of the war, the labor market decreased by 40%. Based on this, one of the estimates is 24.6 million people (this is an optimistic and maximum estimate).
I can also start from the number of live births, comparing the data with those of other European countries: thus, the 176,679 live births in 2024 can be compared with the data of a country with a population of about 20 million (for example, Romania). The average European birth rate is 9-12 newborns/1,000 people. Compared to Ukraine, this would already mean an extremely low population: 15-20 million people.
With 3 million soldiers and a population of 24.6 million, we have a mobilization rate of 12.2%. Considering 2 million casualties (dead, wounded, missing, deserters...), we get a loss of 8.13%.
You don't even need to dispute all this to know that Ukraine is in a much worse state than the Russians, just check the number of prisoners on each side.
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The VKS is also improving. The pace of learning is up to both sides in the conflict. It is not only Ukraine that has a learning curve, the Russians also have better aircraft and better assets to continually improve their air force, much more than the West is willing to offer Ukraine to win the war. Furthermore, between this year and next year is the period in which the Russians would produce the same or more aircraft than they lost, so they may reach the point where they will increase their combat strength in the VKS.
A ceasefire depends on both sides, the Russians are confident that they are the stronger side at the moment in this conflict and any full ceasefire will depend on guarantees on the root issues that the Russians talk so much about, so the war could continue until the Russians accept a bilateral or unilateral ceasefire.