Since this is Turkish Foreign Policy and Geopolitics (although could also be in the Turkey-Israel thread)
@Eşbah @hyperman if you guys haven't merged the threads,you can move it of course if it doesn't fit here
I'll google translate because I can't find it on kathimerini's english site. Some very interesting developments. The article is written by Alexis Papahelas
Η στρατηγική σχέση της Ελλάδας με το Ισραήλ κλείνει φέτος 16 χρόνια ζωής. Φτάνει τώρα σε ένα σημείο ενηλικίωσης που θα απαιτήσει δύσκολες αποφάσεις από την κυβέρνηση αλλά και όλη την ελληνική πολιτική ηγεσία. Η σχέση αυτή στηρίχθηκε άλλωστε από όλες τις ελληνικές κυβερνήσεις και εξασφάλισε μια...
www.kathimerini.gr
What has changed today?
Israel now considers Turkey a key strategic adversary in the region. It is not just Netanyahu’s personal choice, but the entire national security establishment’s. This was not the case fifteen or even ten years ago. Israel’s deep state maintained backroom channels of communication and tried to salvage what it could from the relationship with Ankara. There was suspicion, but also very specific “red lines” that Israel did not cross. This has changed.
Greek officials who talk to their counterparts in Jerusalem now get the impression that the rift is deep and that Turkey is treated much like Iran, with the difference that Turkey has become a powerful player in the world of armaments and intelligence. This assessment, combined with the prediction that “the headscarf will forever dominate politics in Turkey,” has changed how Israelis see it.
The rivalry is so deep that it creates embarrassment for Greek officials who are trying to maintain “calm waters” in the Aegean. The equation will not be easy, however, from now on. Greece will be called upon to make important decisions, because from the moment Israel decided to “play ball,” it will expect the same from Athens. It expects, for example, that the government will not be afraid of the political cost every time it has to bring to Parliament an agreement to purchase or co-produce military equipment. Or that it will send Greek soldiers as part of the peacekeeping mission in Gaza. The hidden and overt dilemmas will be many in a period of intense and toxic political confrontation in Greece and with elections on the horizon.
The Israelis are, as always, impatient and pushy when setting goals. They are tired of the blah blah of the endless trilateral and quadrilateral meetings and it is as if they are telling us “grow up and play ball properly in order to survive in our neighborhood”. On the other hand, Athens must weigh the pros and cons, from the risk of a terrorist attack or a dead Greek soldier to the risk of a rupture with Ankara due to a car bomb. What is happening in Gaza and the resulting moral dilemmas, as well as the attitude of our European partners, make our decisions very difficult.
What is very interesting in this scenario is the attitude of Donald Trump, who seems to have inexhaustible admiration for Erdogan and Turkey. The American president does not share Netanyahu's rivalry at all and continues to "empty" him every time the discussion focuses on Ankara.
Israeli officials, however, use this fact as an argument to convince their Greek counterparts that at the end of the day "you are and we are alone in a very dangerous neighborhood." And they propose the classic Israeli recipe, to become a country that will be feared and counted on in the region and which, instead of asking for support from the US, will have the leverage to secure it with its own means.
Have you signed any agreements to get into nuclear war if someone attacks them?
