SMASH SLBM Testing - Nov 2025

[Qadeer chaudary]

And Azerbaijan does?

No also no proof of iskander intercept as well
Even Ukraine provide some proof for patriot intercept
Yemen Iran missiles interception also have video proof

 

[Ak01]

No also no proof of iskander intercept as well
Even Ukraine provide some proof for patriot intercept
Yemen Iran missiles interception also have video proof

ok sir, aap sahi hain, nobody can be bothered to try and convert you lol, stay blind

 

[Qadeer chaudary]

The U.S ended anti-houthi action quite abruptly, the main reason was, it was only a matter of time before the houthis sunk a major U.S asset

As it was their were multiple close calls for the U.S navy and as you said they had to do difficult sharp turns/manoeuvring to avoid being hit and lost at least two fighter jets, with one just falling off the side

The Houthis major problem was the inability to sustain a attack with multiple assets at once

If we can create a 1000km shore based anti ship ballistic or hypersonic option and back it up with multiple drone and cruise missile options to target ships or carrier groups in a single attack, then it would be suicide for any navy to come within range of the Pakistani coast

India may still have the advantage with a larger navy, but they would struggle to enforce any blockade and the risk to their navy would be enormous and if they actually lost a ship, it would be humiliating

Risk is not blockade
India cannot do any blockade
Our oil comes from gulf and PAF in cannot are far powerful for IN to never think about blockade
Also other trade that passes to china via sea or ASEAN is all on Chinese shipping India will never touch it
Main problem is 10 may like attack on Karachi by Indian navy with 800 km range brahmos
So 1000 km smash will keep Indian navy out of reach of brahmos

Indian navy cannot army any fighter on carrier with any missile against Karachi

They will need to make bigger vls and then make new destroyer with that vls and make a new missiles to fit in that to get in reach of Karachi
Solving our problem for at least 12 years from surface sub surface fleet of Indian navy

 

[Qadeer chaudary]

The U.S ended anti-houthi action quite abruptly, the main reason was, it was only a matter of time before the houthis sunk a major U.S asset

As it was their were multiple close calls for the U.S navy and as you said they had to do difficult sharp turns/manoeuvring to avoid being hit and lost at least two fighter jets, with one just falling off the side

The Houthis major problem was the inability to sustain a attack with multiple assets at once

If we can create a 1000km shore based anti ship ballistic or hypersonic option and back it up with multiple drone and cruise missile options to target ships or carrier groups in a single attack, then it would be suicide for any navy to come within range of the Pakistani coast

India may still have the advantage with a larger navy, but they would struggle to enforce any blockade and the risk to their navy would be enormous and if they actually lost a ship, it would be humiliating

Houthis have 1000 km range cruise missile and ballistic missile in far greater number plus drones
They just didn't want to escalate so much and also best could get to 100 m of carrier with one shot missiles and no aerial drone or satellites guidance
That's what I am saying
If houthis can get to 100m with one shot and no guidance against USA navy jamming
Pakistan can guide missiles to Indian navy at long distance

 

[Qadeer chaudary]

@Qadeer chaudary janab...can you look at the following photo of Russian cruise missile launch where I marked the secondary gas pressure based stabilizer....normally all Russian cruise and ballistic missile systems use this secondary stabilizer on cold launch ( brahmos also uses it) ....

If you look at SMASH missile launch it is little skewed on flight trajectory....is it possible that we use similar stabilizers to obtain accurate flight course.
View attachment 162009

Taken from:

To view this content we will need your consent to set third party cookies.
For more detailed information, see our cookies page.

Accept third party cookies

Not on frontal part
Because these cruise missiles are aligning for low altitude flight
Smash will go to upper atmosphere directly
Also, small pitch thrusters are present on mid to last part of missiles to steer for correct alignment with target at last stage like someone shown thruster motor on Iranian Fatah missiles
But this small thruster is better advance and miniature tech
But does not give Moore speed or menu variability
Just correct missiles path for more prescice hit

 

[Qadeer chaudary]

Perhaps we do have a missile of that sorts derived from C-401. C-401 is the export variant of the infamous Chinese carrier killer DF-21D. It's a mean stick albeit a short one with sub 300 km range (thanks to MTCR) - besides, C-401 can be launched using the VLS system available on Tughril Class. So in theory it is possible that Pakistan might already have a variant of SMASH based on C-401, with MaRV and Hypersonic (Mach 5-6) in terminal phase, and extended range.

The DF-21D is TEL launched. So it is also possible that we may have derived something similar e.g. HGV derived from DF-21D integrated with our BMs. The mystery of those Lenticular Clouds still remain haha.

If we assume something like that is already available in the arsenal or is in testing phase - in either case I don't think Pakistan will disclose because of the ongoing threat environment.

Df21 D is not related to c400
C400 is based on Fatah type artillery rocket and its not compatible with vls
Vls is not for asroc rocket torpedo and SAM HQ 16 variants
Also df21d a version of df21 is very old missile it's 70s, 80s tech fielded in 90s and now retired

 

[Qadeer chaudary]

Perhaps we do have a missile of that sorts derived from C-401. C-401 is the export variant of the infamous Chinese carrier killer DF-21D. It's a mean stick albeit a short one with sub 300 km range (thanks to MTCR) - besides, C-401 can be launched using the VLS system available on Tughril Class. So in theory it is possible that Pakistan might already have a variant of SMASH based on C-401, with MaRV and Hypersonic (Mach 5-6) in terminal phase, and extended range.

The DF-21D is TEL launched. So it is also possible that we may have derived something similar e.g. HGV derived from DF-21D integrated with our BMs. The mystery of those Lenticular Clouds still remain haha.

If we assume something like that is already available in the arsenal or is in testing phase - in either case I don't think Pakistan will disclose because of the ongoing threat environment.

Df21 D is not related to c400
C400 is based on Fatah type artillery rocket and its not compatible with vls
Vls is not for asroc rocket torpedo and SAM HQ 16 variants
Also df21d a version of df21 is very old missile it's 70s, 80s tech fielded in 90s and now retired

Follow up, the length of the missile on the poster is 7500 mm, so we will probably see it shortened to 7000 meters to fit the UVLS. 16 of these missiles on a 2000-2500 ton corvette would allow the PN to field a few of these corvettes alongside an air defense destroyer to mix and match any configuration India tries to throw at Pakistan. With a corvette armada, Pakistan can afford to go with 64 cell 6000 ton air defense destroyers and not feel under equipped for a naval engagement, all due to cooperative engagement capability. Smaller ships, smaller signatures, and cheaper to mass produce.

Firstly Chinese uvls has ability to fit 8.5 metre long, 850 mm diameter missile versus 7.5 m long, 650 mm diameter smash
China fields their yj20 fork ship with 1500 km range
Yj 20 is a step beyond simple hyperosonic speed ballistic missiles
It is a biconical glide vehicle like ones Japan, usa is testing, Iran has fielded. This is a design below most advanced ballistic type hyperosonic that is HGV glide vehicle like DF 17 or df 27 that only china then Russia now north Korea made

Also, missiles is 3 ton with each vls needs to be 5 ton in weight
Whole module will weight 100 tons and very long wide and deep
Can't be fitted in any small 2-3k ton warship
Even for type 54B size ship of 6000 tons you will have to sacrifice a lot of Sam vls for it
Best was is to arm slanted launcher on type 54B
Or just buy type 52D destroyer for it

Small Corvette cannot fit vls if you ify you don't have much endurance and Sam defense left

 

[Qadeer chaudary]

Ive already provided the massive difficulty you seem to plainly forget in your first paragraph.

And then you insist on repeating it without providing any actual technical explanations on why a J-10 targeting a Rafale at 190km is different than targeting a ship at 1000km.

Please read about line of sight and earth's curvature before repeating the same answer.

Read AWACS that is even further back then j10c or at least 300 km from rafale guiding misiles while j10c was firing at Mach speed Rafael
And it is hard but not harder then this
J10 c firing at 500 km away from Indian navy and AWACS from 40k feet guiding misiles
There is no curvature impact at that range and height
AWACS will not be flying at sea level

Even houthis can land anti ship ballistic missile within 100 m of USA navy with all jamming

 

[Michael]

FYI for all - before everyone goes all into long range SMASH - this should be required reading.
Chinese AsBM
But since that expectation is unrealistic - The most pertinent parts for any extended range AsBM - land or sea launch is somewhat irrelevant - is


"China operates a wide spectrum of satellites, which can provide data useful for targeting within its maritime region.” Moreover,Dorsett stated, “China’s non–space-based ISR could provide the necessary information to support DF-21D employment. This includes aircraft, UAVs,fishing boats and over-the-horizon radar for ocean surveillance and targeting."

Please consider China's fleet of these system versus Pakistan's.

Then
"Demonstrated Chinese ASBM capability to strike a moving maritime target would not only suggest the potency of a new, unique weapons system, but also serve as a leading indicator of emerging C4ISR-supported counter-intervention capabilities. "

You cannot truly be effective in AsBM without C4ISR - the initial success of PAF in May had this as the key lynchpin - NOT THE PL-15.

"Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets. For instance, a DF-21D ASBM might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed roughly at the position of aCSG based in part on satellite data. Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSG, e.g. by supplying position updates. 170 If engaged in air operations, the CSG would have a large electromagnetic signature. Initial detection systems include China’s existing land-based sky wave and surface wave OTH radars, which could detect aircraft Doppler.171 Such near-space vehicles as airships/aerostats are credited by Chinese analysts as offering large early warning surveillance areas, good concealment and survivability, good dwell time and persistent coverage; and low launch and operating costs; they might eventually play a similar role. Inputs from these systems, in turn,could be used to task imaging satellites to search small areas to confirm identification of the CSG"

"Imaging satellites, which must be based in low-earth orbit, remain in constant motion, and thus take snapshots of pre-designated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times. Shifting orbits could temporarily improve coverage slightly, but would consume precious fuel. Hence, a basic sense of coverage may be gained by examining satellites’ orbits, inclinations, and periods. By2009, China had approximately 22 imaging satellites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG"

What similar near continuous coverage can Pakistan claim for its EEZ or the Indian Ocean? India could with more investment make it because both money and ability to launch own ecosystem of satellites gives them an existing base, but Pakistan has no money nor the existing base.

What Pakistan has in options is hoping to get UAV's out HOURS IN ADVANCE to expected AOR of IN and hope they go undetected and robust against jamming - which can then be used for mid course correction or final targeting data.

LASTLY - before we all propose short paragraphs on "what ifs" and "YEH KYUN NAHIN KARTE!!!"

So folks talking to long range SmASH - Please try to answer the following in your post - as a sincere request. Or at least think of them.

P.s Happy to be corrected @JamD @Ak01 @Quwa @Michael @Deino

Overall kill chain​

1. How should Pakistani naval planners conceptualize the full ASBM kill chain against Indian carrier or major surface groups, beyond the basic steps of detection, tracking, defense penetration, hitting a moving target, and causing mission killing damage
2. What specific operational phases (such as peacetime shaping, crisis surveillance, targeting, strike authorization, and post strike assessment) should Pakistan define in its ASBM doctrine for the Indian Ocean theatre
3. How can Pakistan ensure that the kill chain remains resilient if individual nodes such as space assets, over the horizon radar, maritime patrol aircraft, data links, or command centers are degraded or destroyed

Targeting and seeker architecture​

1. What seeker and onboard sensor architecture would be most realistic for a Pakistani ASBM like SMASH or its successor to reliably engage high value Indian naval targets at range
2. What mix of sensors such as coastal or shipborne radars, airborne ISR (including Sea Sultan and UAVs), commercial or friendly satellites, electronic and communications intelligence, and potentially over the horizon radar could Pakistan integrate to generate and maintain targeting quality tracks for ASBM employment
3. In the likely absence of a dense, dedicated Pakistani space based ISR constellation, what alternative cueing concepts such as airborne ISR, surface pickets, UAV swarms, or passive RF sensing could keep the target’s potential movement during the missile’s flight within the seeker’s acquisition basket
4. To what extent could Pakistani planners consider non traditional or civilian maritime assets such as fishing fleets, commercial shipping, coastal observers, AIS data, and other open sources as contributors to the wider maritime picture used to cue ASBMs, and what are the operational and escalation risks
5. For a Pakistani ASBM seeker:
   • Would active radar, passive RF, imaging infrared, or a multi mode combination be most appropriate given India’s likely electronic warfare and decoy capabilities
   • How should the seeker be designed to perform target discrimination within a task group, for example identifying a carrier or major combatant versus escorts or merchant vessels
   • How challenging would robust discrimination be in the cluttered, high traffic Arabian Sea and broader Indian Ocean environment
6. Does accurate discrimination and engagement fundamentally rely on the large radar or infrared signature of a carrier sized target, or should Pakistan design its system and doctrine from the outset to also prosecute smaller but critical targets such as destroyers, large auxiliaries, and key logistics ships

Countermeasures and vulnerabilities​

1. What do Pakistani strategists assess as the main technical and operational failure modes that could render a SMASH type ASBM ineffective or unusable in a conflict with India, for example ISR disruption, jamming, decoys, interceptors, or cyber attacks on command and control
2. How should Pakistan evaluate and plan around Indian current and future counter space capabilities, including anti satellite testing and electronic attack on satellite links, that might threaten any reliance on foreign or domestic space based assets for ASBM targeting and navigation
3. If GPS, BeiDou, or other global navigation systems are degraded by India through jamming, spoofing, or regional denial measures, what backup or complementary navigation methods such as improved inertial navigation, terrain or sea state correlation techniques, celestial updates, or datalink corrections should a Pakistani ASBM incorporate
4. How effective might Indian ship and land based missile defense systems, for example Barak 8, Indian BMD layers, and cooperative engagement with airborne sensors, be against a Pakistani ASBM, and what saturation, timing, or trajectory tactics could Pakistan adopt to stress those defenses
5. What electronic warfare, cyber, and deception capabilities should Pakistan assume India will bring to bear against the ASBM kill chain, and how can Pakistani doctrine and technical design mitigate those threats

Evasion, maneuvering, and penetration aids​

1. What level of maneuverability, including pull up profiles, irregular or quasi ballistic trajectories, or depressed and lofted paths, is realistic and desirable for a Pakistani ASBM to complicate Indian early warning and engagement solutions
2. How should Pakistan prioritize and sequence the development of penetration aids such as decoys, chaff, inflatable or radar reflective submunitions, infrared flares, or signature shaping reentry vehicles for a SMASH class missile
3. What trade offs in range, payload, and guidance complexity is Pakistan willing to accept to gain higher terminal maneuvering performance and better survivability against Indian ballistic missile defense and ship based interceptors
4. How can Pakistan test and validate irregular or maneuvering trajectories, as well as penetration aid performance, within its own instrumented ranges and telemetry constraints without revealing too much about capabilities and profiles to external observers
5. What doctrine should Pakistan adopt for salvo size, launch timing, and mixed profile attacks, combining ballistic and cruise missiles and different trajectories and altitudes, to maximize the chance of ASBM penetration through India’s layered air and missile defenses

Integration into Pakistani strategy​

1. How does a SMASH type ASBM fit into Pakistan’s broader conventional deterrence and anti access or area denial posture against India, especially in the North Arabian Sea and approaches to key ports such as Karachi and Gwadar
2. What command and control arrangements, including the balance between centralized and delegated authority and between pre planned and dynamic target assignment, best reconcile escalation control with the need for rapid engagement of fleeting Indian naval targets
3. How should Pakistan coordinate ASBM employment with other assets such as submarines, anti ship cruise missiles, airpower, and coastal defenses to create layered, overlapping threats that complicate Indian naval operations and defenses

I have repeatedly appealed to my Pakistani friends on this forum to pay attention to these issues, but with little success. People here are usually more focused on superficial appearances than on the underlying infrastructure.

1. Systematization of weapons
2. Platformization of weapons
3. Networking of weapons

These capabilities allow weapons to achieve a "1+1>2" effect, multiplying the combat power of weapon systems. However, these capabilities are usually hidden in inconspicuous places.

 

[Qadeer chaudary]

Ive already provided the massive difficulty you seem to plainly forget in your first paragraph.

And then you insist on repeating it without providing any actual technical explanations on why a J-10 targeting a Rafale at 190km is different than targeting a ship at 1000km.

Please read about line of sight and earth's curvature before repeating the same answer.

J10 c was just launching platform
AWACS guided missile now and in 2019
Read again if you don't understand
AWACS going near destroyer but aft out of it's Sam range and guiding a missile that is launched far back from shore by navy or 100 km back by j10c

 

[Qadeer chaudary]

FYI for all - before everyone goes all into long range SMASH - this should be required reading.
Chinese AsBM
But since that expectation is unrealistic - The most pertinent parts for any extended range AsBM - land or sea launch is somewhat irrelevant - is


"China operates a wide spectrum of satellites, which can provide data useful for targeting within its maritime region.” Moreover,Dorsett stated, “China’s non–space-based ISR could provide the necessary information to support DF-21D employment. This includes aircraft, UAVs,fishing boats and over-the-horizon radar for ocean surveillance and targeting."

Please consider China's fleet of these system versus Pakistan's.

Then
"Demonstrated Chinese ASBM capability to strike a moving maritime target would not only suggest the potency of a new, unique weapons system, but also serve as a leading indicator of emerging C4ISR-supported counter-intervention capabilities. "

You cannot truly be effective in AsBM without C4ISR - the initial success of PAF in May had this as the key lynchpin - NOT THE PL-15.

"Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets. For instance, a DF-21D ASBM might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed roughly at the position of aCSG based in part on satellite data. Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSG, e.g. by supplying position updates. 170 If engaged in air operations, the CSG would have a large electromagnetic signature. Initial detection systems include China’s existing land-based sky wave and surface wave OTH radars, which could detect aircraft Doppler.171 Such near-space vehicles as airships/aerostats are credited by Chinese analysts as offering large early warning surveillance areas, good concealment and survivability, good dwell time and persistent coverage; and low launch and operating costs; they might eventually play a similar role. Inputs from these systems, in turn,could be used to task imaging satellites to search small areas to confirm identification of the CSG"

"Imaging satellites, which must be based in low-earth orbit, remain in constant motion, and thus take snapshots of pre-designated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times. Shifting orbits could temporarily improve coverage slightly, but would consume precious fuel. Hence, a basic sense of coverage may be gained by examining satellites’ orbits, inclinations, and periods. By2009, China had approximately 22 imaging satellites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG"

What similar near continuous coverage can Pakistan claim for its EEZ or the Indian Ocean? India could with more investment make it because both money and ability to launch own ecosystem of satellites gives them an existing base, but Pakistan has no money nor the existing base.

What Pakistan has in options is hoping to get UAV's out HOURS IN ADVANCE to expected AOR of IN and hope they go undetected and robust against jamming - which can then be used for mid course correction or final targeting data.

LASTLY - before we all propose short paragraphs on "what ifs" and "YEH KYUN NAHIN KARTE!!!"

So folks talking to long range SmASH - Please try to answer the following in your post - as a sincere request. Or at least think of them.

P.s Happy to be corrected @JamD @Ak01 @Quwa @Michael @Deino

Overall kill chain​

1. How should Pakistani naval planners conceptualize the full ASBM kill chain against Indian carrier or major surface groups, beyond the basic steps of detection, tracking, defense penetration, hitting a moving target, and causing mission killing damage
2. What specific operational phases (such as peacetime shaping, crisis surveillance, targeting, strike authorization, and post strike assessment) should Pakistan define in its ASBM doctrine for the Indian Ocean theatre
3. How can Pakistan ensure that the kill chain remains resilient if individual nodes such as space assets, over the horizon radar, maritime patrol aircraft, data links, or command centers are degraded or destroyed

Targeting and seeker architecture​

1. What seeker and onboard sensor architecture would be most realistic for a Pakistani ASBM like SMASH or its successor to reliably engage high value Indian naval targets at range
2. What mix of sensors such as coastal or shipborne radars, airborne ISR (including Sea Sultan and UAVs), commercial or friendly satellites, electronic and communications intelligence, and potentially over the horizon radar could Pakistan integrate to generate and maintain targeting quality tracks for ASBM employment
3. In the likely absence of a dense, dedicated Pakistani space based ISR constellation, what alternative cueing concepts such as airborne ISR, surface pickets, UAV swarms, or passive RF sensing could keep the target’s potential movement during the missile’s flight within the seeker’s acquisition basket
4. To what extent could Pakistani planners consider non traditional or civilian maritime assets such as fishing fleets, commercial shipping, coastal observers, AIS data, and other open sources as contributors to the wider maritime picture used to cue ASBMs, and what are the operational and escalation risks
5. For a Pakistani ASBM seeker:
   • Would active radar, passive RF, imaging infrared, or a multi mode combination be most appropriate given India’s likely electronic warfare and decoy capabilities
   • How should the seeker be designed to perform target discrimination within a task group, for example identifying a carrier or major combatant versus escorts or merchant vessels
   • How challenging would robust discrimination be in the cluttered, high traffic Arabian Sea and broader Indian Ocean environment
6. Does accurate discrimination and engagement fundamentally rely on the large radar or infrared signature of a carrier sized target, or should Pakistan design its system and doctrine from the outset to also prosecute smaller but critical targets such as destroyers, large auxiliaries, and key logistics ships

Countermeasures and vulnerabilities​

1. What do Pakistani strategists assess as the main technical and operational failure modes that could render a SMASH type ASBM ineffective or unusable in a conflict with India, for example ISR disruption, jamming, decoys, interceptors, or cyber attacks on command and control
2. How should Pakistan evaluate and plan around Indian current and future counter space capabilities, including anti satellite testing and electronic attack on satellite links, that might threaten any reliance on foreign or domestic space based assets for ASBM targeting and navigation
3. If GPS, BeiDou, or other global navigation systems are degraded by India through jamming, spoofing, or regional denial measures, what backup or complementary navigation methods such as improved inertial navigation, terrain or sea state correlation techniques, celestial updates, or datalink corrections should a Pakistani ASBM incorporate
4. How effective might Indian ship and land based missile defense systems, for example Barak 8, Indian BMD layers, and cooperative engagement with airborne sensors, be against a Pakistani ASBM, and what saturation, timing, or trajectory tactics could Pakistan adopt to stress those defenses
5. What electronic warfare, cyber, and deception capabilities should Pakistan assume India will bring to bear against the ASBM kill chain, and how can Pakistani doctrine and technical design mitigate those threats

Evasion, maneuvering, and penetration aids​

1. What level of maneuverability, including pull up profiles, irregular or quasi ballistic trajectories, or depressed and lofted paths, is realistic and desirable for a Pakistani ASBM to complicate Indian early warning and engagement solutions
2. How should Pakistan prioritize and sequence the development of penetration aids such as decoys, chaff, inflatable or radar reflective submunitions, infrared flares, or signature shaping reentry vehicles for a SMASH class missile
3. What trade offs in range, payload, and guidance complexity is Pakistan willing to accept to gain higher terminal maneuvering performance and better survivability against Indian ballistic missile defense and ship based interceptors
4. How can Pakistan test and validate irregular or maneuvering trajectories, as well as penetration aid performance, within its own instrumented ranges and telemetry constraints without revealing too much about capabilities and profiles to external observers
5. What doctrine should Pakistan adopt for salvo size, launch timing, and mixed profile attacks, combining ballistic and cruise missiles and different trajectories and altitudes, to maximize the chance of ASBM penetration through India’s layered air and missile defenses

Integration into Pakistani strategy​

1. How does a SMASH type ASBM fit into Pakistan’s broader conventional deterrence and anti access or area denial posture against India, especially in the North Arabian Sea and approaches to key ports such as Karachi and Gwadar
2. What command and control arrangements, including the balance between centralized and delegated authority and between pre planned and dynamic target assignment, best reconcile escalation control with the need for rapid engagement of fleeting Indian naval targets
3. How should Pakistan coordinate ASBM employment with other assets such as submarines, anti ship cruise missiles, airpower, and coastal defenses to create layered, overlapping threats that complicate Indian naval operations and defenses

Writing such long essay while forgetting realities
1. Houthis can target USA navy without any guidance with 100 m accuracy
Pakistan can achieve too
2. Indian forces, Chinese and international journalist as well as our contracts (Buido military level access, following 10 may contract to develop satellite constellation and manufacturing base) have shown Pakistan used Chinese satellite system for recon, guidance and tracking in may battles
Is there any reason Pakistan can't do same against Indian navy slow moving shops against MACH speed fighters?
3. Pakistan has Intel of when attack is happening just like against Indian may attack, we will have Intel Indian navy is tasked to attack Karachi
4. Now AWACS mpa are not 50 km per hour assets nor they need to do magic to appear near Indian navy
These assets are always in Pakistan EEZ flying 24/7 in some numbers
These can get in position from 700 km away from Indian navy ships to 300-400 km away and in Target position within 20 to 30 minutes and ready for guiding shore based ASBM
And Indian navy ships would have moved just 30 km maximum in that time
Also how do you think MPAs magically appear near Indian navy submarine when we intercepted them in last 7 years many times?
MPA are tracking snorkeling submarine from hundreds of Km while still in Indian eez and move on them when they near our EEZ
30 years old mpa can detect snorkeling submarine from that far
Surely sea sultan can detect very large non stealth destroyer form that distance.
4. Pakistan is also setting up its own satellite constellation for a very large amount and that only is spent on defense in Pakistan not some private internet firm would ever think of spending it
And 24 satellite constellation with .5 m imaging technology can cover anywhere on earth with 3/4 time per day refresh for any point
400 m can buy many more satellite and fixed on 3000 km region surrounding Pakistan these can easily give near hourly refresh of India navy bases and their assets can also be detected for 50 km accuracy that is very least effective scenario of satellite use still then mpa AWACS can reach tracking and targeting within that region

China’s Piesat Soars Over 15% on USD406.4 Million Pakistan Satellite Deal

www.yicaiglobal.com

 

[FuturePAF]

Df21 D is not related to c400
C400 is based on Fatah type artillery rocket and its not compatible with vls
Vls is not for asroc rocket torpedo and SAM HQ 16 variants
Also df21d a version of df21 is very old missile it's 70s, 80s tech fielded in 90s and now retired

Firstly Chinese uvls has ability to fit 8.5 metre long, 850 mm diameter missile versus 7.5 m long, 650 mm diameter smash
China fields their yj20 fork ship with 1500 km range
Yj 20 is a step beyond simple hyperosonic speed ballistic missiles
It is a biconical glide vehicle like ones Japan, usa is testing, Iran has fielded. This is a design below most advanced ballistic type hyperosonic that is HGV glide vehicle like DF 17 or df 27 that only china then Russia now north Korea made

Also, missiles is 3 ton with each vls needs to be 5 ton in weight
Whole module will weight 100 tons and very long wide and deep
Can't be fitted in any small 2-3k ton warship
Even for type 54B size ship of 6000 tons you will have to sacrifice a lot of Sam vls for it
Best was is to arm slanted launcher on type 54B
Or just buy type 52D destroyer for it

Small Corvette cannot fit vls if you ify you don't have much endurance and Sam defense left

The UVLS comes in different lengths, the length on the corvette could be 7 meters, as has been estimated by others.

 

[falcon34]

Do you have proof that S400 was NOT hit?

I know for a fact it was hit because when Modi visited the air base, they never showed the 96L6E "Cheese Board" radar, which Pakistan air force specifically named as the target that was hit -- so the Indians never showed it, not even once. Instead, Modi got the tour of the 55K6E mobile command and control (C2) vehicle, and they put the launcher vehicle behind him as a propaganda prop to fool the Indian public.

Even worse is they don't talk about bhuj we didn't even seen any propaganda video of any launchers and command vehicles.
My theory is after bholari pak hit bhuj pretty hard. @Panzerkiel also mentioned some lucrative targets were hit in retaliation to bholari.

 

[Michael]

The UVLS comes in different lengths, the length on the corvette could be 7 meters, as has been estimated by others.

We refer to it as "HT-1 VLS," and do not use the term "UVLS."

"HT" is the Pinyin abbreviation of the Chinese word "海通(Pinyin: Hai-tong)". The full English translation of "HT-1 VLS" is "Type 1 Naval General-Purpose Vertical Launching System".

The HT-1 VLS has several variants with different depths to accommodate missiles for various purposes. The maximum depth is 9 meters.

Currently, a new generation of larger VLS (Vertical Launching Systems) is undergoing testing in China.

Post in thread 'Chinese Naval Platform & PLAN discussions'

Nov 21, 2025

Reports indicate that China has developed a new generation of large vertical launching systems (VLS).

Maximum missile weight that can be launched: 17.78 tons
Maximum missile length that can be launched: 8.7 meters
Maximum missile diameter that can be launched: 0.84 meters
Internal diameter of the VLS: 1.02 meters

It is primarily used for launching large hypersonic missiles.




It is reported that the VLS has completed relevant tests on a test ship.

• Michael

• 

 

[falcon34]

The missile was fired from the Pakistan Navy’s most advanced Type 054A/P frigate, PNS TIPPU SULTAN (F-280), and successfully validated a full spectrum of mission parameters including cold-launch ejection from a universal vertical launch system (UVLS), accurate mid-course guidance updates, autonomous terminal-phase manoeuvring, and a steep-angle hypersonic re-entry exceeding Mach 8 before achieving a direct kinetic kill on its intended target.

(VIDEO) Pakistan Navy Unveils Historic Ship-Launched Hypersonic SMASH Ballistic Missile, Redefining Indian Ocean Naval Power - Defence Security Asia https://share.google/ycLbYuccoX86Rmqew

Whattt??

Steeper angle I agree hypersonic nah.