I think it's high time to accept it isn't a restraint problem, it's a capacity problem with a sprinkling of funding.
No restraint is stopping you from keeping 12 of your towns secure. No restraint has ever stopped you from doing whatever else you want in the country. It's among the basic responsibilities of the government/state, to keep the people secure. You don't play kiddie gloves and restraint when every other month, half a dozen (if we are lucky) cities get practically ransacked and looted. Phir aap kay pas Goebbel tactics reh jatay hain to defend yourself.
Don't take it the wrong way. As I said, our response and capabilities in alot of areas have improved (20 years back we wouldn't have been able to do much about this sort of an attack), but this country really has to ditch the politics aside and get serious about the Baloch and TTP issue.
You correctly point out capacity and funding as constraints. But these are not natural disasters, they are choices. Pakistan maintains one of the world's largest armies, with significant conventional deployments on eastern borders. The capacity issue is not absolute. It's about reallocation of existing capacity and the political will to make strategic decisions.
The capacity argument ignores historical precedent. Pakistan has executed large scale military operations (Zarb e Azb, Radd ul Fasaad) in FATA with measurable success. The capacity was mustered then because the threat was deemed existential and the political military consensus was there. Making it a capacity issue now suggests the state no longer views the Balochistan/BLA with the same existential urgency.
And as an engineer I believe the border sealing is not just a military task, It's a technological and administrative one aswell. The Afghan border is porous, but so are many borders globally. Surveillance, drones, sensors and layered fencing can be effective if implemented. The real capacity gap here may be in engineering corps and border security technology funding, both choices in budget allocation. If this were the highest national priority, funding would be diverted from lower priority sectors.
Respectfully, I think the restraint vs capacity dichotomy is false. They are linked. Strategic restraint is driven by fear of international backlash, or domestic political friction in Balochistan. If the state were unrestrained in its strategic resolve, it would:
Temporarily reorient a significant portion of the military's focus from the eastern border, accepting the calculated risk. Launch a multi year, province wide clear hold build transfer operation, where clear is the short military phase, and hold build is the long term, costly civil administrative and development phase.
Development is not a substitute for security. They Are sequential. My original point stated 'operation then development.' You cannot bring sustainable development while terrorists systematically destroy infrastructure and intimidate populations. The state must first establish a monopoly on violence, a basic contract of governance you mentioned. The current approach of simultaneous low evel security and patchy development fails at both. A brief, intense, and decisive military surge to dismantle terrorist nodes, followed by a development influx, breaks the cycle. The 'carrot' only works if the 'stick' has first removed those who punish people for taking the carrot.
In short, capacity is a function of will. The state has not treated this threat with the same all of government, resource mobilizing response it has for other perceived existential threats. But the extremely painful casualities toll should make us realise it is time to choose.