Hmm.... No, I do not think they remain a potent force at this point. They're facing a lot of challenges preventing them from making a meaningful recovery. Read this excerpt, not to say it's true, some people argue the opposite that Iran gave Hezbollah freedom to operate and it was Hezbollah that outlined its strategy, but that's not the point. The point is being too risk adverse led to producing less effective strategies that the AoR is paying for to this day.... Hamas wanted Hezbollah to exercise option #2 around time (shortly after) Israel began a ground invasion of Gaza:
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Hezbollah’s Military Options
From a purely military perspective, if Hezbollah had the freedom to take action separate from the influence of Iran, and if it inherently believed in its mission to defeat Israel, it could have opted for far more effective strategies than the one it used on Oct. 8. It had at least three options.
The first option, which is the most escalatory, is to invade the Galilee with the best-trained Hezbollah fighters and sow even greater chaos and panic across Israel. Under that scenario, Hezbollah had a strategic opportunity to launch a Blitzkrieg-style offensive, which could have posed an acute security threat to Israel. This possibility had concerned Israeli defense planners since 2000, when Hassan Nasrallah first alluded to the prospect of a ground incursion by Hezbollah forces.
The second option, which is less escalatory than the first, is to launch a high volume of more lethal and precise missiles against urban and strategic targets inside Israel and, as a result, make it a lot more difficult for the Israeli military to effectively prosecute two fronts—one against Hezbollah, and one against Hamas.
The third option, which is the least escalatory, is to adopt a primarily defensive posture, remaining within Lebanese territory and refraining from opening an additional front against Israel. Hezbollah would only support Hamas politically.
However, in the end, Hezbollah opted for the least effective military strategy: a limited war of attrition it could not even sustain, one that would provoke the Israeli government just enough to badly hurt the group.
Hezbollah’s Oct. 8 response to Israel’s war against Hamas was consistent with Iranian wishes. Doing nothing was not an option for Iran because Hamas is a key player in the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.” But at the same time, Iran wanted to avoid escalation with Israel, which is why it arguably constrained Hezbollah’s military activity. The great irony is that by doing that and seeking to preserve Hezbollah’s alleged deterrent against Israel, Iran ended up significantly harming its Lebanese ally.
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Hezbollah is widely known as the world’s most powerful sub-state actor. Yet, it suffered a military defeat at the hands of Israel in the latest conflict.
gjia.georgetown.edu
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This is why I was calling for Hezbollah to participate in May 2021 skirmish alongside Hamas, because that long vacation from fighting Israel was not going to lead to good things for the group when it came to the struggle with Israel. Israel was not taking a vacation. It was heavily targeting Hezbollah's infrastructure and supply line in Syria and simulating attack plans on Lebanon, which it can afford to do, unlike Hezbollah and Hamas which have to put their systems and processes to test, in order to make any performance assessment.
didnt defeat any enemy after all those clashes and deaths and destruction + costs it received and paid.
