I have been wondering whether people define “effectiveness” too narrowly when they compare Iranian-style drone and ballistic attacks with more traditional precision airpower. Cheap drones have clearly reshaped modern warfare because even when they do limited damage individually, they can still force defenders to spend far more on interception and air defense than the attacker spent launching them
Ukraine seems to have reinforced this logic too. Long-range strike drones can be much cheaper than missiles with similar reach, and even systems with low hit rates can still be strategically useful if they exhaust defenses, disrupt daily life, and impose constant costs on the defender. That is what makes me think there is a difference between weapons that are mainly for saturation, fear, and economic pressure, and weapons that are precise enough to actually degrade warfighting capability.
So maybe the better comparison is not just “drones and ballistic missiles vs aircraft,” but three different models:
• Cheap mass drones / less accurate ballistic strikes for terror, harassment, and bad cost exchange.
• More precise ground-launched strike systems, like LORA, Rampage, or some Chinese systems, for hitting airbases, depots, radars, and command nodes.
• Traditional precision airpower for sustained, flexible destruction of high-value targets.
That also made me think of Germany’s V-1 and V-2 in World War II. They caused real fear and real damage, but are still often discussed more as terror and pressure weapons than as truly efficient tools for destroying the enemy’s warfighting system.
Another question is whether India now seems to be moving more deliberately toward this middle model, not just classic airpower and not just cheap saturation, but a heavier emphasis on stand-off precision systems that can degrade warfighting capability without having to fully dominate the air. Cheap drones and mass salvos can impose costs, but more precise strike systems appear better suited for hitting airbases, depots, radars, and command infrastructure in ways that matter operationally rather than just psychologically.
If that is where India is heading, is that the more dangerous problem for Pakistan over the long term, especially since Pakistan has not really shown its full hand through public procurement and likely does not have an economy that can compete across that entire spectrum anyway?