Signalian
THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Aug 18, 2015
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Terrorists knew the weak spot. They knew the travel route and timings. They knew if there will be escort or not. They knew that Chinese travel in that vehicle. They knew driver was unarmed and Chinese didnt carry any weapons for self defense.Sir,
Before I start I think some perspective for some of the wayward members here is important on this subject. CPEC is a massive development and cooperation project between the Governments of Pakistan and China representing an investment of over $65 billion USD, present available data suggests in excess of 60,000 Chinese Nationals residing and working in Pakistan on various projects., this is a growth of 757% since 2015.
As per the report published by the in 2021 it is estimated that with growing cooperation between Pak/China in Biotech and under the Pak/China Health Corridor the number of Chinese Nationals living in Pakistan is estimated to grow to over five million by 2027****
Returning to your question and AFIK and remember;
Protective Intelligence Development:
Special Branch have a dedicated Chinese Security Cell established in 2010 which produce a daily security report which is shared with the Home Dept and CM office.
SB published a national security plan for residential security for Chinese Nationals - (Will not publish details here for obvious reasons but oversight of this lies with Home Dept in Punjab and Provincial Gov's accordingly.).
Physical Security:
National Level:
S.S.D have complete oversight = 9 battalions, six wings = 13,700 personnel dedicated to security of CPEC. Headed by a Major General of Pakistan Army reporting directly to GHQ. Over 5000 of these personnel will be dedictaed to counter-terrorism and crisis response capacity [LCB Baloch Regiment]
View attachment 29157
AGPL (APL/Askari) have national contract for PSC contract for all things CPEC [this is restricted to residential security teams and some limited CP details].
Provincial Level:
KPK:
In KPK SSU (CPEC) has control of escort duties for all CPEC personnel and projects. Some 400+ constables were merged into this unit in 2021.
Current Commandant - D.I.G. Muhammad Zafar Ali
Balochistan:
Six wings (5,700 personnel) of the Frontier Corps, 3,000 police constables and 1,000 Levies personnel would guard all the routes.
Punjab:
3,500 policemen, 900 Rangers, 4,100 private security guards and 740 Askari Guards would protect various projects linked to the economic corridor in Punjab.
In total some 32,000 security personnel including private guards from Askari and 500 security personnel from China have been assigned to CPEC security as of 2015*
The interior ministry of Pakistan revised the standard operating procedures (SOPs) regarding the protection of Chinese nationals, investors, and experts, especially those participating in the CPEC initiatives in Feb 2022 which included among other things the following caveat:
Chinese nationals utilize reinforced vehicles and notify the appropriate authorities and police stations prior to their visits.
**As per de-classified security threat assessments There are a number of internal and external factors posing threats to CPEC. These threats are diverse as, internally, TTP militancy in Khyber Pukhtunkhawa (KP) and the tribal areas is a threat whereas externally, hostile foreign agencies like the Indian Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) have plans to sabotage CPEC.
The enormity of the security threats can be judged from the fact that the highway project of the CPEC has faced more than a hundred security-related incidents since its launch in March 2014
Threat Analysis:
Internal threats:
Militancy is a tangible threat to the projects designed for the Corridor. Thus it will be a challenge for both countries to quash militant groups and their fighters along and across their borders. Militant groups have targeted Chinese citizens, workers and engineers in the past.
In Balochistan province, insurgent groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) etc. indulge in anti-state activities and pose a threat to mega development projects in Balochistan, including Gwadar Port. Although their activities have been considerably curtailed due to sustained operations by the security agencies, their capabilities to carry out terrorist attacks have not been crippled to the hilt.
The militant-criminal nexus in certain areas also poses a threat to Chinese engineers, workers and citizens in the form of kidnapping and robberies. In the past, there have been some incidents of kidnapping and killing of Chinese citizens working and living in Pakistan.
In Sindh, a small and insignificant group, Sindhudesh Liberation Army (SDLA) led by Shafi Burfat and affiliated with the Jeay Sindh Mahaz (JSM), levelled threats against Chinese companies. The SDLA has been involved in many bomb attacks on government installations, especially railway tracks and state-run banks, in the province; however, the recent crackdown and killings of JSM workers in different parts of the province have weakened the group
(News, 2015).
Analysis: There are chances that external forces can use these Balochi and Sindhi
groups to create problems for CPEC projects.
External theat actors:
Indian conspiracies to fail CPEC will place Gwadar on the matrix of intense geo-strategic competition (CPGS, 2014). It has been said that Gwadar will intertwine China and Pakistan in a strategically profitable position along the Arabian Sea, stoking up existing Indian concerns that stem from the favourable position China has attained with its ‘involvement in nearby ports such as Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Sittwe in Myanmar and Chittagong in Bangladesh’ (Chowdhury, 2013).
Pakistan’s intelligence agencies had collected authentic evidence and proof about the designs of RAW. The Indian agency has already initiated its efforts to try and scuttle the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and it has formed a special cell within RAW for this purpose.
The Indians are also making an effort to sabotage Gwadar and activate Chahbahar port in Iran. “Thriving on both sides of the divide, India has quietly worked on its Chabahar port Initiative to provide Europe and Central Asia an alternative, if and when Iran gets out of isolation. It can then skirt into Afghanistan as leverage against Pakistan and China”
The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which is also described as the Turkistan Islamic Party, is based in China’s Xinjiang province and largely comprises Uighur militants. ETIM militants are not only a threat to China’s stability but also to that of Pakistan. The ETIM had worked in close cooperation with different factions of the TTP and foreign militants, especially Al Qaeda in Pakistan’s tribal areas since 2009.
Uighur militancy has been on the rise during the past seven years. The Uighur militants’ links with the TTP in FATA pose a major threat to Chinese interests in Pakistan. An Uzbek speaking militant leader Mufti Abu Zar al-Burmi released a video message last year directing all Taliban groups to carry out attacks on Chinese embassies and companies and kidnap or kill Chinese nationals.
(Sirs you will recall the report and investigation into the presence of Uigur at raiwind Markaz)
Insecurity and instability in Afghanistan are a major source of concern not only for China but also other neighbouring countries including Pakistan, India and Iran.
In light of above mentioned threats and recommendations a four-pronged security strategy has been devised which aims at providing a comprehensive protective cover to CPEC.
The spirit of this strategy is not only to provide physical security to the manpower and assets but to protect the project from conspiracies, malicious propaganda and nefarious designs of local and foreign elements.
View attachment 29156
Physical Security:
Keeping in view the track record of attacks on Chinese projects and personnel, not only in Pakistan but all around the world, the physical security of Chinese personnel and assets in Pakistan ought to be the top priority of the Government of Pakistan.
Protective Intelligence:
Security of CPEC is not all about physical security and target hardening of manpower and assets. It needs to pre-empt and foil the sinister plans of sabotage and subversion. Only intelligence can ensure this protection.
Therefore Protective Intelligence would be a very important component of the security strategy of the CPEC. It will aim at tackling the plans and conspiracies at the source. For this purpose Federal and Provincial agencies will have to work in tandem.
Moreover the federal intelligence agencies of Pakistan like ISI and Intelligence Bureau (IB) must enhance their liaison with the intelligence community of China for this purpose.
NACTA can play vital role in bringing about coordination among the intelligence agencies and operate as the hub of receipt of intelligence from all agencies for onward transmission to LEAs for timely action.
Awareness through Media:
It is abundantly clear that estranged and hostile elements will try to create confusion and mistrust in the public about the Pak-China relations and CPEC through their agent provocateurs and facilitators.
For example initially some elements had raised objection about the change in the route of CPEC which aimed at creating mistrust in the minds of the people. Such unchecked persistent propaganda campaign can create doubts about the CPEC project and undermine its process. Media can play an effective role to ward off any such propaganda. It should work on the following lines:
a) Highlight the significance of CPEC for economic progress and stability of Pakistan.
b) Create awareness among the public of the nefarious designs of enemies to sabotage it.
c) Counter subversive activity.
Some recommendations:
i. A comprehensive review of the physical security of Chinese manpower and assets to protect them from terrorist attacks and kidnappings.
ii. There should be a greater focus on rigorous implementation of the National Action Plan to create a more secure and terror free environment in the country.
iii. National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) may be activated to monitor the security arrangements for the Chinese and to advise the provincial authorities for appropriate actions.
iv. CPEC Security Commission may be formed to give sustainability and agility to the security arrangements of Chinese in Pakistan.
v. Proper legislation should be done to empower PEMRA to bridle negative reporting about CPEC in the electronic media.
vi. Programs should be shown on the electronic media to promote CPEC
vii. Print media should establish development cells to regularly give news about development work of CPEC
viii. There is a need to enhance people to people interaction to create closer affinity and understanding of each other’s culture.
ix. Students must be encouraged to learn Chinese language.
x. Increase the number of universities and colleges signing MOUs for student exchanges and scholarships.
xi. Exchange of TV plays, movies, literature, cultural troupes can help bring the people closer.
xii. Intelligence coordination and sharing between provincial and federal agencies and also between Pakistani and Chinese intelligence agencies can help foil conspiracies of hostile agencies and elements against the CPEC.
CPEC is considered a game changer in Pakistan. It has huge potential to transform the regional dynamics of trade, development and politics very quickly and is expected to boost the economy and usher in prosperity in Pakistan.
Besides, it has initiated a new era of reinvigorated Pak-China friendship. Nevertheless, a host of security issues are facing it. China and Pakistan are well aware of the security threats and are employing all resources to counter the same. These security threats can be addressed by deliberate, planned and sustained efforts.
References:
Chowdhury, D. R. ‘Pakistan Happy to Aid in China’s Quest for Land Route to the West;
India, Not So Much’. South China Morning Post. November 19, 2014. http://www.
scmp.com/business/commodities/article/1359761/pakistan-happy-aid-chinas-
quest-land-route-west-india-not-so
Ebrahim, Zofeen T. ‘China’s New Silk Road: What’s in it for Pakistan?’ Dawn. April 20,
2015. http://www.dawn.com/news/1177116
‘Four Bodies of Abducted Workers of CPEC Project Found in Turbat’. News. August
24, 2015. http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-39252-Four-bodies-of-
abducted-workers-of-CPEC-project-found-in-Turbat
Gishkori, Zahid. ‘Army Assigned Security of Chinese Engineers’. Tribune. April 22, 2015.
Army assigned security of Chinese engineers | The Express Tribune
12,000-strong division will comprise 9 army battalions, 6 wings of civil armed forcestribune.com.pk
Haider, Mateen. ‘Army’s Special Security Division to Protect Chinese Workers in
Pakistan’. Dawn. April 21, 2015. http://www.dawn.com/news/1177322.
‘President’s Remarks in China’. Dawn. September 4, 2015. http://www.dawn.com/
news/1204765
Rahman, F. ‘Targeted Attacks on Chinese: Myths and Reality’. Pakistan Council on
China. July 21 2007. http://pcc.org.pk/downloads/targeted-attacks-on-chinese.pdf
Rahman, Zia Ur. ‘Militants May Target Chinese Interests in Pakistan’. Friday Times.
May 23, 2014. http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/militants-may-target-chineseinterests-in-pakistan/
RAW at Frontline to Sabotage Economic Corridor, China Warns Pakistan’. Express
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sabotage-economic-corridor-china-warns-pakistan/
Rehman, Z. ‘Taliban, Separatists May Attack Chinese
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321579-Taliban-separatists-may-attack-Chinese-interests-in-Sindh
Sharaf, S. S. ‘Challenges to CPEC’. Nation. May 23, 2015. http://nation.com.pk/
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Sharif, Army Chief Discuss Security of CPEC Projects’. Dawn. September 5, 2015.
Sharif, army chief discuss security of CPEC projects
ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Friday consulted Army Chief Gen Raheel Sharif on the security of...www.dawn.com
Sial, Safdar.‘The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: An Assessment of Potential Threats
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‘Taliban Group Threatens to Attack Chinese Interests.’ Nation. November 17, 2014.
chinese-interests
Tadesse, T & Heavens, A. ‘Rebels kill 74 in Ethiopian Oil
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ethiopia-china-idUKL246401020070424
Zaafir, Muhammad Saleh. ‘Special Cell Set Up in RAW to Foil Economic Corridor’.
News. May 11, 2015. http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-37418-Special-
cell-set-up-in-RAW-to-foil-Economic-Corrido
Zafar, Muhammad. ‘Rockets Fired at Gwadar Airport’. Tribune. September 3, 2015.
Rockets fired at Gwadar Airport | The Express Tribune
Police and security forces have started a search operation in the area
China-Pakistan corridor faces multiple security risks | Emerald Insight
China-Pakistan corridor faces multiple security riskswww.emerald.com
Pak China Institue: Monologues - 2018-2022-2023
Riaz Ahmad, Hong Mi & Lloyd W. Fernald (2020) Revisiting the potential security threats linked with the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Journal of the International Council for Small Business, 1:1, 64-80, DOI: 10.1080/26437015.2020.1724735
You mentioned SB. I am aware that they patrol routes in plain clothes. SSD didnt provide substantial provide escort to vehicle transit. There was no security guard inside vehicle with chinese.
Its come down to this - one mistake cost lives. Even if other 99% Chinese are secured, its only one lapse and there's the bang.
but I think with increased investment in Economic Zone from Chinese enterprises we may see some action from China perhaps as a show of force in the region? Is China concerned about potentially stirring up emotions to our east? Who knows.
