The backbone of the PLA's ground forces consists of its mechanized formations, particularly heavy CABs. However, due to geographical constraints, these heavy CABs can only be effectively deployed in areas such as the Depsang Plains, the North Sikkim Plateau, and the Chushul. Consequently, the PLA has had to form mountain formations that lack heavy weaponry and rely on 122mm howitzers for artillery support. The limited road networks to these conflict areas can be targeted and blocked at critical points like bridges, passes, and loose slopes using missile attacks and PGMs. This strategy can significantly hamper the PLA's mobility. In contrast, Indian forces can protect their assets through tunneling and localized deployment. Unlike the PLA, which has no localized combat units apart from border guard formations, India can maintain a persistent ground presence. Indian forces are capable of launching limited-scale counter-offensives, advancing up to 10 kilometers in depth to gain a strategic advantage. India's short lines of communication provide a significant logistical edge, while the headquarters of the PLA's WTC are located in Chengdu, along with central stores and reserve equipment. India can deploy scout units and the SFF behind enemy lines to disrupt logistics, thereby cutting off frontline PLA troops from their supplies. The PLA's critical supply route, the G219 highway, runs close to the Indian border at its nearest point, providing opportunities for India to interdict PLA convoys and supplies, effectively severing the connection between the Xinjiang Military Command and the Tibet Military District. Although India is well-prepared for a land battle, sustaining troops with ammunition and logistics is crucial to avoid a potential retreat.
Many claims that the PLAN can send a fleet to the Indian Ocean and attack India are often exaggerated. The PLAN has to maintain its Northern and Eastern Fleets to deter the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, the Korean Navy, and the US Navy's 7th Fleet in Okinawa. The Eastern Fleet also plays a crucial role in the potential invasion of Taiwan, leaving no room to spare ships for other operations. The PLAN's Southern Fleet, which has some expeditionary capability, is the same size as the Indian Navy and is primarily focused on enforcing China's claims in the South China Sea, facing opposition from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and possibly the US, Australia, and NATO forces entering through the Malacca and Sunda Straits. Given these commitments, only about 30% of the PLAN's Southern Fleet can be spared for expeditionary missions. This force might consist of approximately 1,000 marines, 2 LPDs, a few LSTs, possibly a carrier, and 4-5 destroyers and frigates. This is their peak capability, which is not sustainable over the long term. Their first obstacle would be the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, where India has robust naval anti-shipping units and an air force base at Car Nicobar capable of launching Sukhois. This defensive belt would inflict significant losses on the PLAN. Additionally, India has a SOSUS chain in the area to detect PLAN submarines and deploy P-8I aircraft for anti-submarine operations. The Indian Army has one amphibious brigade stationed in the Andamans. If necessary, the entire 54th Infantry Division can be deployed to defend the islands. This sizable force would be more than capable of countering not just 1,000 PLA marines but even an entire brigade.
