I get where you’re coming from, especially on the gap between what’s often claimed and what actually gets agreed in these programs.
I also understand the bias you’re describing, it’s not unreasonable given the kind of claims that get made in media and on forums
On the substance, I broadly agree with you, foundational technologies are tightly held and not meaningfully transferred in these arrangements.
Where I’d request drawing a line is in carrying that broader context into an exchange with different individuals.
It’s probably cleaner if we treat each individual interaction on its own terms. One is only responsible for what they're saying here, just as you are for your position, and I think the discussion stays sharper if we keep it at that level rather than generalising from other voices
Alright. Let's get back to the main topic.
In the realm of fighter aircraft technology, there are certain technologies classified as fundamental core technologies. Examples include the source code for flight control systems, radar systems, and engines, as well as specific advanced materials. These technologies constitute absolute national core secrets, and there is absolutely no possibility of them ever being disclosed to external parties.
Even within the domestic sphere, the various collaborating entities involved would never disclose these technologies to one another.
For instance:
CAC—a subsidiary of AVIC—is responsible for the overall design and manufacturing of the J-20 fighter jet. However, AECC is responsible for supplying the aircraft's engines, while CETC is responsible for providing its AESA radar system. Although these parties collaborate very closely, AECC would never provide CAC with the underlying source code for the engines, nor would CETC ever provide CAC with the underlying source code for the AESA radar.
The same phenomenon exists within the U.S., European, and Russian defense industrial complexes alike.
In the context of international military cooperation, such a scenario is even more inconceivable. From the perspective of the technologically weaker party, it is understandable—albeit an unrealistic fantasy—to harbor a desire to acquire certain core technologies. When such requests are put forward, the technologically dominant party will either issue a direct refusal or set a "commercial trap." In this regard, India has already accumulated a wealth of "experience" and case studies. Yet, it appears that many observers continue to cling to this very illusion......
Not really
Russia Ukraine war proved that Indians were right all along.
Su-57 could not prove its worth in actual battlefield unlike its American counterpart that continues to dominate the skies of its adversaries.
This is a misconception.
In modern air combat concepts, systems warfare has an overwhelming advantage over platform warfare.
In the past concept of platform warfare, fighter jets were the absolute protagonists of war. The inherent performance capabilities of the individual aircraft directly determine the outcome of aerial combat.
However, in the concept of systems warfare, fighter jets are just one node in the entire system. This approach no longer places excessive emphasis on the standalone combat performance of the individual aircraft, but rather prioritizes the system's capacity for integration. Against this conceptual backdrop, a JF-17 fighter—operating from within a robust systemic architecture (and thus benefiting from powerful network support)—could conceivably defeat an F-35 fighter operating in a platform-centric environment (and thus lacking such systemic support). Does this, then, allow us to conclude that the JF-17 is a superior aircraft to the F-35?
Systemic warfare demands exceptionally robust capabilities in the electronics industry, information technology, and communications—precisely the areas where Russia is weakest. Ukraine, conversely, benefits from the formidable systemic support capabilities provided by the United States and Europe. These represent two distinct dimensions of warfare systems.
