Indian Air Force News and Discussions ll

Too much speculation happening here, based on your on everyones own prejudices.

FCAS has already edge of break off, due to work share challenges between dassault & Airbus with diffrences on naval version and nuclear delivery capable platform

GCAP has its own challenges with UK delaying funding, based on the news in telegraph, and japan irritaed with delay. Japan inviting india to join the program

There is SAAB which is desperately trying to woo germany with plan B just in case FCAS fails to take off.

India still has an oppuritunity to join 6th gen program as long as it does not take forever thinking due its red tape.

I would rather hope for India, japan, South korea, may be indonesia comming together for Asian 6th Fighter, just wishful thinking at this point
 
Delhi' walked away from a good joint 5Th Generation program with the Russians on the Su-57 project. This bad decision has cost them dearly. Lost time and energy indIans looking at being financially exploited by others jet makers to access their 6Th Generation plane. If Delhi had stuck around with the Russians a 6Th generation joint venture with Russians was guaranteed for them.
 
India's only direct access to the Arabian sea is the Chabahar Port which it abandoned after threat of US sanction (otherwise Indian coastline do not border the Arabian Sea). If China wanted to access Chabahar it needs to negotiate with Iran not India these days.
Indian coastline doesn't share border with Arabian sea? Which school you learnt your geography?
 
The Su-57/FGFA example actually contradicts your point.

India didn’t walk away because it was happy to just fund and buy. It walked away because it wasn’t getting sufficient workshare, design visibility and access to core technologies.
This was widely reported at the time.

The Indian Air Force raised concerns over lack of access to source codes, limited role in design, and dissatisfaction with the level of technology transfer being offered. There were also concerns around engine and stealth performance.

That’s not the behavior of a passive “cash-only” partner. It’s the opposite. India exited because it wasn’t getting enough participation.

So using FGFA as an example of India being a passive funding partner is quite a creative interpretation of how that program actually unfolded.
Given that you are a moderator—and out of respect for the forum's administrative team—I will answer this question with due seriousness.

In the realm of international military-technical cooperation, no matter how close the relationship between the collaborating parties may be, certain "underlying unspoken rules" invariably exist. These rules are never explicitly articulated, yet they are undeniably real and constitute boundaries that simply cannot be crossed. Specifically, fundamental core technologies are absolutely never included within the scope of international cooperation.

If one party publicly claims that a particular military-technical collaboration involves cooperation at the level of these "fundamental core technologies," then we can be reasonably certain that this constitutes a "commercial trap."

In the context of numerous international military-technical collaborations, India's public statements frequently include demands for access to precisely these "fundamental core technologies." This clearly runs counter to the aforementioned "underlying unspoken rules." Indeed, judging by the actual outcomes, in every single international military-technical collaboration India has undertaken since its founding, it has failed to acquire these "fundamental core technologies." ------ Decades have passed, yet to this day, India has still not acquired the "fundamental core technologies" associated with the Su-30MKI. India takes great pride in its BrahMos missile. Yet, despite India's continuous efforts to increase the share of indigenous content, it remains unable to achieve 100% self-reliance. There are certain "foundational core technologies" that Russia will absolutely not share with India.

In international military-technical cooperation, one may sell finished products, or engage in joint development (characterized by a division of labor and limited access). One may sell the *results* of a capability, but never the *means by which that capability is generated*.

A nation's own foundational scientific capabilities and its industrial starting point serve as the spark; its domestic industrial ecosystem—comprising infrastructure, capital, and human talent—serves as the fuel. International military-technical cooperation acts merely as a catalyst. What India lacks most critically is that initial spark. Without that spark, no amount of fuel or catalyst—however abundant—can ever ignite the blazing fire of true indigenous capability.

Current public reporting in India continues to reveal numerous instances of "boundary-crossing" behavior within the realm of international military-technical cooperation. While the actual contents of these cooperation agreements remain unclear to us, one thing is certain: what India ultimately receives differs vastly from what is claimed in the news.

Judging by your response, it appears you still have not fully grasped the nature of this issue. Much of what you describe involves "underlying core technologies"—a category of technology that, by its very nature, is absolutely off-limits for collaborative development.
 
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India's only direct access to the Arabian sea is the Chabahar Port which it abandoned after threat of US sanction (otherwise Indian coastline do not border the Arabian Sea). If China wanted to access Chabahar it needs to negotiate with Iran not India these days.

Chabahar is not direct access for India.They literally have to sail there.
 
Given the nature of GCAP, the entire tooling and manufacturing ecosystem will be new with an emphasis on automated manufacturing, additive manufacturing techniques amongst, augmented reality manufacturing techniques amongst many new concepts. India has nothing as of now that is relevent to the Tempest programme. It is not just the platform that is being developed, it is also the manufacturing ecosytem, the support ecosystem that is also being developed.



India has produced a mockup, yes, but the problem that India faces is that of credibility as a development partner on its CV history. India has struggled to not only get the Tejas "right", but every single aviation project is has attempted in the last 40 years from primary trainers, to jet trainers, etc. Given the generational gap between India's 4th generation projects, and 6th generational platform that is GCAP, there is nothing that India brings that will add value or be at "peer level". If anything, India will be a drag on resources, and cross-training requirements.



The programme at the outset had exports orders built in, but the programme business case is built on the solid foundation of the core funding and procurement programmes of the founding partners. That makes the project more secure and stable on that basis. Export orders are a bonus, and not required for the programme to proceed.

Saudi Arabia can, and will order more of GCAP than India will, on a quicker schedule with fewer theatrics on contract talks, and financing and procurement timelines.



Given which way the QUAD is going, and India's ongoing Russia relationship, I will be interested to see how they view "India" strategically, but that is not relevant to the GCAP programme.



Given the deterioration of the military relationship between the USA and UK(/Europe) and the concerns of Japan with China, no one is going to risk this project now, esp. given that with a high certainty, India will purchase with the GCAP or FCAS "regardless" as India has no other real choices. Watch this space, maybe something will happen, but having watched this project since inception and where it fits in, I don't see anyone derailing this programme for anything as mundane as a little more money given the geostrategic issues the platform is meant to address.
You’ve raised fair points, especially on timelines, program maturity, and the risks around disruption. I don’t think we’re too far apart on the overall direction.

Where I think we differ is on the threshold for any participation versus full participation.

On the industrial side, I agree India isn’t operating at peer level with GCAP partners, and the manufacturing ecosystem being built is a step change. That makes a full development role unrealistic. But the bar for limited participation is different from the bar for core design ownership.

On credibility, the track record is mixed, and that’s a fair criticism. But even there, the question isn’t whether India leads or matches capability, it’s whether there are specific areas, subsystems, manufacturing, or downstream integration, where participation can be carved out without affecting the critical path.

On exports and funding, agreed that the program is not dependent on external buyers. But additional scale and funding can still be relevant at the margin, especially if structured in a way that doesn’t reopen core workshare.

On the Saudi comparison, I’d separate that slightly. Saudi’s proposition is primarily financial, whereas India at least brings some industrial and programmatic base. Not enough to change the core structure, but enough to make the discussion less binary than “partner or buyer.”

On the strategic side, I broadly agree that timelines and geopolitical urgency, particularly from Japan’s perspective, will dominate decision-making. That’s probably the strongest constraint against any late-stage integration.

So overall, I’d agree with your conclusion that a full development role is highly unlikely. The only distinction I’m making is narrower than that, that the outcome doesn’t have to be strictly limited to an off-the-shelf purchase. If anything moves, it would likely be in the form of limited, non-disruptive participation rather than a reopening of the core program.
 
Given that you are a moderator—and out of respect for the forum's administrative team—I will answer this question with due seriousness.

In the realm of international military-technical cooperation, no matter how close the relationship between the collaborating parties may be, certain "underlying unspoken rules" invariably exist. These rules are never explicitly articulated, yet they are undeniably real and constitute boundaries that simply cannot be crossed. Specifically, fundamental core technologies are absolutely never included within the scope of international cooperation.

If one party publicly claims that a particular military-technical collaboration involves cooperation at the level of these "fundamental core technologies," then we can be reasonably certain that this constitutes a "commercial trap."

In the context of numerous international military-technical collaborations, India's public statements frequently include demands for access to precisely these "fundamental core technologies." This clearly runs counter to the aforementioned "underlying unspoken rules." Indeed, judging by the actual outcomes, in every single international military-technical collaboration India has undertaken since its founding, it has failed to acquire these "fundamental core technologies." ------ Decades have passed, yet to this day, India has still not acquired the "fundamental core technologies" associated with the Su-30MKI. India takes great pride in its BrahMos missile. Yet, despite India's continuous efforts to increase the share of indigenous content, it remains unable to achieve 100% self-reliance. There are certain "foundational core technologies" that Russia will absolutely not share with India.

In international military-technical cooperation, one may sell finished products, or engage in joint development (characterized by a division of labor and limited access). One may sell the *results* of a capability, but never the *means by which that capability is generated*.

A nation's own foundational scientific capabilities and its industrial starting point serve as the spark; its domestic industrial ecosystem—comprising infrastructure, capital, and human talent—serves as the fuel. International military-technical cooperation acts merely as a catalyst. What India lacks most critically is that initial spark. Without that spark, no amount of fuel or catalyst—however abundant—can ever ignite the blazing fire of true indigenous capability.

Current public reporting in India continues to reveal numerous instances of "boundary-crossing" behavior within the realm of international military-technical cooperation. While the actual contents of these cooperation agreements remain unclear to us, one thing is certain: what India ultimately receives differs vastly from what is claimed in the news.

Judging by your response, it appears you still have not fully grasped the nature of this issue. Much of what you describe involves "underlying core technologies"—a category of technology that, by its very nature, is absolutely off-limits for collaborative development.
While I do appreciate your seriousness, there's No need for you to frame your answer basis my title, id rather we continue discussing this on its merits

I think you’re treating a consistent constraint as a fixed rule, but I agree with you on where that constraint actually sits.

Foundational design authority and core enabling technologies are tightly held. That layer is not meaningfully opened up in these programs, and FGFA is a good example of where that boundary held.

Where I’d differ is in what follows from that.
Participation in these programs isn’t defined only at that layer. Workshare, manufacturing, systems integration, and long-term industrial participation all sit outside core design authority, and those are negotiated and do vary across partners.

That’s where FGFA is still relevant. India wasn’t looking to be a passive buyer, it was pushing for a role beyond funding alone and exited when that didn’t align. That’s a disagreement over scope of participation, not an attempt to cross a hard boundary.
And that distinction matters for the current discussion. If core technology access is off the table, the question isn’t whether India enters at that level, it’s whether it brings enough value to justify participation in the layers that are actually negotiable.

From India’s perspective, that can still be worthwhile. Building mature core capabilities isn’t isolated from the broader ecosystem. Experience in advanced manufacturing, systems integration, supply chains and program execution at scale all feed into developing those capabilities over time.

So I’d agree the core of the program won’t be reopened. But that doesn’t reduce the outcome to only a buyer role, because meaningful participation exists outside that core layer and can still contribute to long-term capability building.
 
While I do appreciate your seriousness, there's No need for you to frame your answer basis my title, id rather we continue discussing this on its merits

I think you’re treating a consistent constraint as a fixed rule, but I agree with you on where that constraint actually sits.

Foundational design authority and core enabling technologies are tightly held. That layer is not meaningfully opened up in these programs, and FGFA is a good example of where that boundary held.

Where I’d differ is in what follows from that.
Participation in these programs isn’t defined only at that layer. Workshare, manufacturing, systems integration, and long-term industrial participation all sit outside core design authority, and those are negotiated and do vary across partners.

That’s where FGFA is still relevant. India wasn’t looking to be a passive buyer, it was pushing for a role beyond funding alone and exited when that didn’t align. That’s a disagreement over scope of participation, not an attempt to cross a hard boundary.
And that distinction matters for the current discussion. If core technology access is off the table, the question isn’t whether India enters at that level, it’s whether it brings enough value to justify participation in the layers that are actually negotiable.

From India’s perspective, that can still be worthwhile. Building mature core capabilities isn’t isolated from the broader ecosystem. Experience in advanced manufacturing, systems integration, supply chains and program execution at scale all feed into developing those capabilities over time.

So I’d agree the core of the program won’t be reopened. But that doesn’t reduce the outcome to only a buyer role, because meaningful participation exists outside that core layer and can still contribute to long-term capability building.
I admit that there is a certain "bias" in my remarks. However, this bias stems from the persistent claims made by the Indian media, as well as the extreme viewpoints expressed by many Indian members on this forum.

We must recognize that in the realm of international military cooperation, access to certain foundational technologies is simply never granted. Take, for instance, the demand you mentioned regarding India's access to the source code for the FGFA; or consider the discussions among many Indian members on this forum concerning the transfer of core materials technology involved in India's joint engine development project with Safran. There are numerous examples of such issues, and I will not list them all here.

If any instance of international military cooperation were to appear to involve the joint development or transfer of such foundational technologies, we could be almost certain that it is, in fact, a "commercial trap." Indeed, to date, there has not been a single documented case globally of international military cooperation involving the transfer of foundational technologies.

Take the United States as an example. Many people assume that Israel enjoys the highest level of access and privilege in its military cooperation with the U.S. In reality, however, it is the United Kingdom that holds that distinction. Yet, even in the context of military-technical cooperation between the UK and the U.S., these very "barriers" to foundational technology access remain firmly in place.

Judging by the coverage in many Indian news outlets—as well as the views expressed by numerous Indian members on this forum—these foundational technologies would seem to be easily obtainable...... I must be honest: this phenomenon exists in Pakistan as well, but it is not as severe as it is in India.

I am not a nationalist. Although my knowledge is admittedly limited, I strive to maintain an objective and rational attitude in my interactions with others. However, the presence of so many irrational Indian members on this forum has, regrettably, led me to develop certain "biases." I hope you can understand.
 
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I admit that there is a certain "bias" in my remarks. However, this bias stems from the persistent claims made by the Indian media, as well as the extreme viewpoints expressed by many Indian members on this forum.

We must recognize that in the realm of international military cooperation, access to certain foundational technologies is simply never granted. Take, for instance, the demand you mentioned regarding India's access to the source code for the FGFA; or consider the discussions among many Indian members on this forum concerning the transfer of core materials technology involved in India's joint engine development project with Safran. There are numerous examples of such issues, and I will not list them all here.

If any instance of international military cooperation were to appear to involve the joint development or transfer of such foundational technologies, we could be almost certain that it is, in fact, a "commercial trap." Indeed, to date, there has not been a single documented case globally of international military cooperation involving the transfer of foundational technologies.

Take the United States as an example. Many people assume that Israel enjoys the highest level of access and privilege in its military cooperation with the U.S. In reality, however, it is the United Kingdom that holds that distinction. Yet, even in the context of military-technical cooperation between the UK and the U.S., these very "barriers" to foundational technology access remain firmly in place.

Judging by the coverage in many Indian news outlets—as well as the views expressed by numerous Indian members on this forum—these foundational technologies would seem to be easily obtainable...... I must be honest: this phenomenon exists in Pakistan as well, but it is not as severe as it is in India.

I am not a nationalist. Although my knowledge is admittedly limited, I strive to maintain an objective and rational attitude in my interactions with others. However, the presence of so many irrational Indian members on this forum has, regrettably, led me to develop certain "biases." I hope you can understand.
I get where you’re coming from, especially on the gap between what’s often claimed and what actually gets agreed in these programs.

I also understand the bias you’re describing, it’s not unreasonable given the kind of claims that get made in media and on forums

On the substance, I broadly agree with you, foundational technologies are tightly held and not meaningfully transferred in these arrangements.

Where I’d request drawing a line is in carrying that broader context into an exchange with different individuals.

It’s probably cleaner if we treat each individual interaction on its own terms. One is only responsible for what they're saying here, just as you are for your position, and I think the discussion stays sharper if we keep it at that level rather than generalising from other voices
 
Delhi' walked away from a good joint 5Th Generation program with the Russians on the Su-57 project. This bad decision has cost them dearly. Lost time and energy indIans looking at being financially exploited by others jet makers to access their 6Th Generation plane. If Delhi had stuck around with the Russians a 6Th generation joint venture with Russians was guaranteed for them.
Not really
Russia Ukraine war proved that Indians were right all along.
Su-57 could not prove its worth in actual battlefield unlike its American counterpart that continues to dominate the skies of its adversaries.
 
I get where you’re coming from, especially on the gap between what’s often claimed and what actually gets agreed in these programs.

I also understand the bias you’re describing, it’s not unreasonable given the kind of claims that get made in media and on forums

On the substance, I broadly agree with you, foundational technologies are tightly held and not meaningfully transferred in these arrangements.

Where I’d request drawing a line is in carrying that broader context into an exchange with different individuals.

It’s probably cleaner if we treat each individual interaction on its own terms. One is only responsible for what they're saying here, just as you are for your position, and I think the discussion stays sharper if we keep it at that level rather than generalising from other voices
Alright. Let's get back to the main topic.

In the realm of fighter aircraft technology, there are certain technologies classified as fundamental core technologies. Examples include the source code for flight control systems, radar systems, and engines, as well as specific advanced materials. These technologies constitute absolute national core secrets, and there is absolutely no possibility of them ever being disclosed to external parties.

Even within the domestic sphere, the various collaborating entities involved would never disclose these technologies to one another.

For instance:
CAC—a subsidiary of AVIC—is responsible for the overall design and manufacturing of the J-20 fighter jet. However, AECC is responsible for supplying the aircraft's engines, while CETC is responsible for providing its AESA radar system. Although these parties collaborate very closely, AECC would never provide CAC with the underlying source code for the engines, nor would CETC ever provide CAC with the underlying source code for the AESA radar.
The same phenomenon exists within the U.S., European, and Russian defense industrial complexes alike.

In the context of international military cooperation, such a scenario is even more inconceivable. From the perspective of the technologically weaker party, it is understandable—albeit an unrealistic fantasy—to harbor a desire to acquire certain core technologies. When such requests are put forward, the technologically dominant party will either issue a direct refusal or set a "commercial trap." In this regard, India has already accumulated a wealth of "experience" and case studies. Yet, it appears that many observers continue to cling to this very illusion......
Not really
Russia Ukraine war proved that Indians were right all along.
Su-57 could not prove its worth in actual battlefield unlike its American counterpart that continues to dominate the skies of its adversaries.
This is a misconception.

In modern air combat concepts, systems warfare has an overwhelming advantage over platform warfare.

In the past concept of platform warfare, fighter jets were the absolute protagonists of war. The inherent performance capabilities of the individual aircraft directly determine the outcome of aerial combat.

However, in the concept of systems warfare, fighter jets are just one node in the entire system. This approach no longer places excessive emphasis on the standalone combat performance of the individual aircraft, but rather prioritizes the system's capacity for integration. Against this conceptual backdrop, a JF-17 fighter—operating from within a robust systemic architecture (and thus benefiting from powerful network support)—could conceivably defeat an F-35 fighter operating in a platform-centric environment (and thus lacking such systemic support). Does this, then, allow us to conclude that the JF-17 is a superior aircraft to the F-35?

Systemic warfare demands exceptionally robust capabilities in the electronics industry, information technology, and communications—precisely the areas where Russia is weakest. Ukraine, conversely, benefits from the formidable systemic support capabilities provided by the United States and Europe. These represent two distinct dimensions of warfare systems.
 
Systemic warfare demands exceptionally robust capabilities in the electronics industry, information technology, and communications—precisely the areas where Russia is weakest.
More or less I said the said the same thing in my previous post.

I said Su-57 is weak, you said no,its actually Russia that's weak when more or less we are making the same point.
 

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