I perfectly understand the strict limitations that India faces in the unforgiving Himalayas, not only does high altitude degrade motor performance, but it also puts much higher mechanical strain by demanding higher engine temp and RPM, thus requiring more frequent maintenance and parts replacement. Thus, building a light tank that sacrifices certain capabilities for higher availability is a completely legitimate design decision.
Yet at the end of the day, so long as Zorawar is considered a tank both by designation and by its place in the Indian army unit template, it will need to do the job of a tank as an armoured spearhead, first in line against enemy direct-fire opposition, and that is something that Zorawar, with its STANAG 4569 IV protection on the hull and V on the turret protecting against at most 14.5 HMG and 25mm APDS respectively, doesn't seem to be able to do.
It's quite curious to see how both India and China reacted to the tank encounter, India producing the lightweight Zorawar, and China employing a hybrid powerplant to enable ~40ton platforms.