Pakistan-India Conflict 2025: News Updates and Discussion
- Thread starter Ali_Baba
- Start date
Oscar
Moderator
But you are aware of people are you not?
Think of this way - had it not been someone of the character and discipline of Gen Manekshaw and instead had been a counterpart to the drunkard womanizing military buffoon in Gen Niazi of Pakistan in 71 - India would be waging that war for a much much longer time bogged down in the jungles of BD. Had there been a competent , humble and focused leader instead of Niazi and his toadies in BD - it is possible they could have even held out against a well prepared Manekshaw.
Today, it seems India is juggling with the competence versus political sycophancy which is why regardless of Rafale's and training by this and that and exercises with published "spectacular" results - even hardliners like Swamy had to admit it did not go India's way in Sindoor.
NA71
Trusted Member
You have no idea of Military affairs but still posting constantly in Military forum.....
SoulSpokesman
Trusted Member
NA71
Trusted Member
Brother....keep posting ....no issue ......your Air chief also has no idea of modern Air Battles but still he is IAF chief......
gamaji
Registered Member
You can live in denial. No issues with that at all. But I think the American president will start counting the Indian planes destroyed on the ground.
gamaji
Registered Member
Lack of a video or two doesn't automatically imply it didn't happen.
Gregor Clegane
Registered Member
Regular publication of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs.
Publisher:
© Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, 2025.
EVEN WITH A BLOODIED NOSE, INDIA CONTROLS THE LEVEL OF ESCALATION.
In the first few hours, the Pakistani Air Force fought well and demonstrat-ed that, despite the disparity in the two sides’ total conventional forces, India enjoys no overwhelming superiority in smaller-scale, technology- heavy skirmishes short of a full-scale war. This outcome, including alleged images of downed Indian Rafale jets, made headlines around the world.
That said, over the next three days, Pakistan took more damage, especial-ly as a result of the underperformance of its Chinese-made air defense sys-tems, the strong performance of India’s Russian-made equivalents, and the ability of French, Israeli, and joint Indian–Russian equipment on the Indian side to conduct long-range, high-precision strikes deep in Pakistani territory while denying Pakistan such feats. All in all, despite taking some embarrassing losses on day one, India demonstrated its strategic advantage over Pakistan.
While Operation Sindoor was initially met with a Pakistani artillery shelling and small arms firing exchange along the Kashmiri Line of Control (LoC), Islamabad reserved the right to further respond “at a time, place, and manner of its choosing. ” Both sides claimed that the other had been conducting drone and missile strikes against its cities and air defense systems. Both India and Pakistan also claimed that their own air defense performed well in countering these attempts. May 10 also started with tit-for-tat missile strikes on both side’s air bases. Later that day, Pakistan launched its official response, Operation Bunyan-un- Marsoos (“Unbreakable Wall”), targeting Indian military bases, including in the state of Punjab in India’s internationally-recognized territory. Pakistan claimed that its operation severely damaged or destroyed over twenty Indian targets, including airfields, BrahMos storage facilities, and two S-400 air defense systems. India’s “retaliation to retaliation” saw the expansion of Operation Sindoor, thus far supposedly limited to terrorist targets, to include eleven PAF air bases selected based on their importance in terms of command and control, air defense, and drone warfare operations. The targets included the Nur Khan Air Force base near Rawalpindi, the headquarters of the Pakistani Armed Forces.
In contrast to Pakistan’s relative success in the May 8 dogfights, during the later-stage drone and missile exchanges, India’s air defense seems to have performed far better than that of Pakistan. Indian BrahMos missiles likely breached Pakistani air defenses around Lahore, Chaklala, and Sialkot and neutralized Pakistan’s Chinese-made HQ-9 and HQ-16 air defense systems. Analyses of satellite imagery by the New York Times and the Washington Post suggest that the damage inflicted by India was geographically widespread but relatively limited—probably intentionally so, since the hits appear fairly precise, targeted at specific command buildings at Nur Khan, hangars at Bholari, and airstrips at Rahim Yar Khan and Sargodha.
Pakistan’s accounts of significant damage to Indian Air Force bases cannot be corroborated, although one soldier’s family confirmed his death at Udhampur Air Force Base. India claims that its domestically-devel-oped Akashteer air defense control and reporting system adopted in 2024 played the most crucial role in detecting the incoming Pakistani projectiles.
All in all, despite downing at least one top-tier Indian jet fighter, it seems that Pakistan could not mount an effective retaliatory campaign targeting Indian and Indian-controlled Kashmiri territory. India, meanwhile, demonstrated that it is capable of striking valuable Pakistani military assets deep in Pakistani territory with relatively high precision.
It seems that while not initially overwhelming, India very much did have an edge in the conflict.
Source: Magyar Külügyi Intézet https://share.google/polbVkN9ZFt24BaKV
Publisher:
© Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, 2025.
EVEN WITH A BLOODIED NOSE, INDIA CONTROLS THE LEVEL OF ESCALATION.
In the first few hours, the Pakistani Air Force fought well and demonstrat-ed that, despite the disparity in the two sides’ total conventional forces, India enjoys no overwhelming superiority in smaller-scale, technology- heavy skirmishes short of a full-scale war. This outcome, including alleged images of downed Indian Rafale jets, made headlines around the world.
That said, over the next three days, Pakistan took more damage, especial-ly as a result of the underperformance of its Chinese-made air defense sys-tems, the strong performance of India’s Russian-made equivalents, and the ability of French, Israeli, and joint Indian–Russian equipment on the Indian side to conduct long-range, high-precision strikes deep in Pakistani territory while denying Pakistan such feats. All in all, despite taking some embarrassing losses on day one, India demonstrated its strategic advantage over Pakistan.
While Operation Sindoor was initially met with a Pakistani artillery shelling and small arms firing exchange along the Kashmiri Line of Control (LoC), Islamabad reserved the right to further respond “at a time, place, and manner of its choosing. ” Both sides claimed that the other had been conducting drone and missile strikes against its cities and air defense systems. Both India and Pakistan also claimed that their own air defense performed well in countering these attempts. May 10 also started with tit-for-tat missile strikes on both side’s air bases. Later that day, Pakistan launched its official response, Operation Bunyan-un- Marsoos (“Unbreakable Wall”), targeting Indian military bases, including in the state of Punjab in India’s internationally-recognized territory. Pakistan claimed that its operation severely damaged or destroyed over twenty Indian targets, including airfields, BrahMos storage facilities, and two S-400 air defense systems. India’s “retaliation to retaliation” saw the expansion of Operation Sindoor, thus far supposedly limited to terrorist targets, to include eleven PAF air bases selected based on their importance in terms of command and control, air defense, and drone warfare operations. The targets included the Nur Khan Air Force base near Rawalpindi, the headquarters of the Pakistani Armed Forces.
In contrast to Pakistan’s relative success in the May 8 dogfights, during the later-stage drone and missile exchanges, India’s air defense seems to have performed far better than that of Pakistan. Indian BrahMos missiles likely breached Pakistani air defenses around Lahore, Chaklala, and Sialkot and neutralized Pakistan’s Chinese-made HQ-9 and HQ-16 air defense systems. Analyses of satellite imagery by the New York Times and the Washington Post suggest that the damage inflicted by India was geographically widespread but relatively limited—probably intentionally so, since the hits appear fairly precise, targeted at specific command buildings at Nur Khan, hangars at Bholari, and airstrips at Rahim Yar Khan and Sargodha.
Pakistan’s accounts of significant damage to Indian Air Force bases cannot be corroborated, although one soldier’s family confirmed his death at Udhampur Air Force Base. India claims that its domestically-devel-oped Akashteer air defense control and reporting system adopted in 2024 played the most crucial role in detecting the incoming Pakistani projectiles.
All in all, despite downing at least one top-tier Indian jet fighter, it seems that Pakistan could not mount an effective retaliatory campaign targeting Indian and Indian-controlled Kashmiri territory. India, meanwhile, demonstrated that it is capable of striking valuable Pakistani military assets deep in Pakistani territory with relatively high precision.
It seems that while not initially overwhelming, India very much did have an edge in the conflict.
Source: Magyar Külügyi Intézet https://share.google/polbVkN9ZFt24BaKV
gamaji
Registered Member
Bro, just ignore this Indian troll SoulSpokesman. He wants to move the discussion to Indian efforts to hide/remove the evidence vs. how Pakistanis can uncover that hidden evidence.
The videos that Indians keep insisting on are for a layman and not for governments/agencies. If the American president is indeed verifying the PAF's claims, that's what really matters. Americans (and Pak agencies) have much more effective and authentic means/resources for verification.
Last edited:
Gregor Clegane
Registered Member
PAKISTAN TURNED A MILITARY DISADVANTAGE INTO A REPUTATIONAL WIN.
When “sending a message” and “setting a new normal” is a major goal on both sides, the question of who won the war of narratives becomes almost as important as who won the fighting. This is true both in the domestic arena as well as on the global stage. Domestically, the leadership of both countries seem to have successfully planted the notion that they won the recent escalation, although Indian Prime Minister Narendra Mo-di’s government faced greater skepticism than its Pakistani counterpart, especially in relation to the role the United States claimed to have played in securing the 10 May ceasefire. On the international stage, Pakistan is a clear winner in terms of how its relative position changed during and in the wake of the 2025 Indo–Pak conflict. This is a major development for a country that for decades has been associated with harboring terrorists, economic dysfunction, and regular military takeovers of government.
Indian analysts and media have slammed their Western counterparts (and the Qatar-based Al Jazeera) for pushing Pakistan- friendly narratives. These complaints have often been based on an exaggerated sense of insult to national pride. At the same time, it does seem like Pakistan enjoyed a greater deal of journalistic good faith than what the two countries’ trajectory in the past decades would have led one to predict. From the outset, the international media and commentators did not buy into India’s claim of Pakistan bearing obvious responsibility for the Pahalgam terrorist attack. Indian claims to that effect were present-ed just as such by outlets such as the BBC, DW , and Al Jazeera—one side’s charges against the other side. Language like India having “pointed the finger” hinted at a considerable degree of skepticism about the substance behind India’s claims.
Against this backdrop, reports leading up to and about Operation Sindoor were dominated by worries about military escalation, especially in the context of both parties’ nuclear arsenals, and not, as India would have preferred, by a sense of needing to stand up to Islamist terrorism.
India’s military response was seen as a highly likely but ultimately regretful step up toward escalation and not the firm but measured act of righteous fury India wanted it to be seen as. When the fighting began, international reports about the alleged downing of five or more Indian jets did dutifully describe these as mere Pakistani claims—but in the wider discourse about the conflict, they soon come to be seen as military achievements equaling India’s precision strikes on several military facilities across Pakistan’s territo-ry. The implicit equating of the two sides’ military achievements gave a rise to a sense of no winners. Overall, the parties were portrayed as equals in a potentially dangerous, spiraling conflict, with Pakistan successfully pitching a more responsible self-image—much to the astonishment of Indian com-mentators.
Despite this reception in the media, it was widely believed that the diplomatic environment would be highly favorable for a firm retalia-tion against Pakistan. The strategic partnership between India and the United States
has developed significantly since the mid-2010s. U.S. President Donald Trump’s first administration openly accused Pakistan of harboring terrorism, Trump and Modi have good personal nexus, and the American president’s superficially neutral-sounding remarks post Pahalgam were interpreted by some as effectively giving India a free hand in handling its impudent neighbor. Indeed, at the beginning of the conflict, the Unit-ed States took an indirect, hands-off approach. Then, as the fights escalated, U.S. diplomacy took on a more robust role in crisis management. It was President Trump who finally announced the “FULL AND IMMEDI-ATE CEASEFIRE” on May 10, and he floated the idea of U.S. mediation between India and Pakistan in Kashmir even after the ceasefire was reached.
These American claims are irreconcilable with the long-standing Indian policy of rejecting third-party mediation in its relationship with Pakistan, especially in the Kashmir conflict. One reason behind this poli-cy is that given the disparity between the two sides, any third-party media-tion would almost by default favor the weaker side: Pakistan. On a deeper level, India and Pakistan being considered each other’s moral equivalent is an affront to India’s self-image as Kashmir’s rightful owner and victim of Pakistani-incited terrorism. Consequently, the hyphenation of India and Pakistan into a singular “India-Pakistan problem” is particularly annoy-ing from India’s point of view and a major diplomatic win for Pakistan, which for long has advocated for greater international role in the Kashmir conflict. What is more, the United States keeps cozying up to Pakistan’s military leadership, likely motivated by a desire for basing rights for possible future military strikes on Iran.
Unfavorable international reactions did not stop with the Americans’ diplomatic activism. While New Delhi received condolenc-es after the Pahalgam attack, some Indian commentators noted that not one single major global player stood unequivocally by India’s “righteous self-defense” against Pakistan’s “support of terror. ”
Why did India, widely perceived to be a rising power and recently in the limelight for milestones like becoming the world’s most popu-lous country, a successful unmanned Lunar landing, and hosting the 2023 G20 summit, performed so poorly in the race for global sympathy? One explanation for why Pakistan managed to outmaneuver India in terms of perceptions is related to the Indian media’s conduct during Opera-tion Sindoor. As missiles fell, even the mainstream Indian media acted as a happy peddler of the Indian government’s messaging, spreading anti- Pakistan psyops in an uncritical manner. In the short term, this may have been seen as a boost for India’s side in the war of narratives. But it has already led to major credibility deficits. In the long term, it may make it more difficult for Indian media to globally broadcast a favorable but credi-ble and compelling narrative. By undermining its own media’s credibility in this way, India shot itself in the foot given that real news about missile exchanges was already quite favorable to the Indian side, and Pakistani claims to the contrary could have been fought in more credible ways.
On the diplomatic front, the lackluster reception of India’s military retaliation is in large part a consequence of India’s noncommit-tal multi-alignment policy. While some lament that the EU missed the opportunity to unequivocally side with India’s justified outrage, others remind that India equally tends to refuse unequivocally supporting its partners on issues similarly crucial to them. India’s refusal to call Russia out for its aggression in Ukraine and its cordial relationship with Iran are examples of policies irking its European and American partners and making them have second thoughts about automatically standing up for India in the face of Pakistan’s asymmetric tactics. This does not mean that India and the United States or the European Union are becoming less desirable partners in each other’s eyes. But these partnerships will remain fundamentally transactional and not based on “friendship” and “shared values, ” despite the rhetoric.
Some of these shortcomings of India’s public image are evident to New Delhi and Indian commentators. In May, India sent several parliamentary delegations to partner countries, engaging not only with.
When “sending a message” and “setting a new normal” is a major goal on both sides, the question of who won the war of narratives becomes almost as important as who won the fighting. This is true both in the domestic arena as well as on the global stage. Domestically, the leadership of both countries seem to have successfully planted the notion that they won the recent escalation, although Indian Prime Minister Narendra Mo-di’s government faced greater skepticism than its Pakistani counterpart, especially in relation to the role the United States claimed to have played in securing the 10 May ceasefire. On the international stage, Pakistan is a clear winner in terms of how its relative position changed during and in the wake of the 2025 Indo–Pak conflict. This is a major development for a country that for decades has been associated with harboring terrorists, economic dysfunction, and regular military takeovers of government.
Indian analysts and media have slammed their Western counterparts (and the Qatar-based Al Jazeera) for pushing Pakistan- friendly narratives. These complaints have often been based on an exaggerated sense of insult to national pride. At the same time, it does seem like Pakistan enjoyed a greater deal of journalistic good faith than what the two countries’ trajectory in the past decades would have led one to predict. From the outset, the international media and commentators did not buy into India’s claim of Pakistan bearing obvious responsibility for the Pahalgam terrorist attack. Indian claims to that effect were present-ed just as such by outlets such as the BBC, DW , and Al Jazeera—one side’s charges against the other side. Language like India having “pointed the finger” hinted at a considerable degree of skepticism about the substance behind India’s claims.
Against this backdrop, reports leading up to and about Operation Sindoor were dominated by worries about military escalation, especially in the context of both parties’ nuclear arsenals, and not, as India would have preferred, by a sense of needing to stand up to Islamist terrorism.
India’s military response was seen as a highly likely but ultimately regretful step up toward escalation and not the firm but measured act of righteous fury India wanted it to be seen as. When the fighting began, international reports about the alleged downing of five or more Indian jets did dutifully describe these as mere Pakistani claims—but in the wider discourse about the conflict, they soon come to be seen as military achievements equaling India’s precision strikes on several military facilities across Pakistan’s territo-ry. The implicit equating of the two sides’ military achievements gave a rise to a sense of no winners. Overall, the parties were portrayed as equals in a potentially dangerous, spiraling conflict, with Pakistan successfully pitching a more responsible self-image—much to the astonishment of Indian com-mentators.
Despite this reception in the media, it was widely believed that the diplomatic environment would be highly favorable for a firm retalia-tion against Pakistan. The strategic partnership between India and the United States
has developed significantly since the mid-2010s. U.S. President Donald Trump’s first administration openly accused Pakistan of harboring terrorism, Trump and Modi have good personal nexus, and the American president’s superficially neutral-sounding remarks post Pahalgam were interpreted by some as effectively giving India a free hand in handling its impudent neighbor. Indeed, at the beginning of the conflict, the Unit-ed States took an indirect, hands-off approach. Then, as the fights escalated, U.S. diplomacy took on a more robust role in crisis management. It was President Trump who finally announced the “FULL AND IMMEDI-ATE CEASEFIRE” on May 10, and he floated the idea of U.S. mediation between India and Pakistan in Kashmir even after the ceasefire was reached.
These American claims are irreconcilable with the long-standing Indian policy of rejecting third-party mediation in its relationship with Pakistan, especially in the Kashmir conflict. One reason behind this poli-cy is that given the disparity between the two sides, any third-party media-tion would almost by default favor the weaker side: Pakistan. On a deeper level, India and Pakistan being considered each other’s moral equivalent is an affront to India’s self-image as Kashmir’s rightful owner and victim of Pakistani-incited terrorism. Consequently, the hyphenation of India and Pakistan into a singular “India-Pakistan problem” is particularly annoy-ing from India’s point of view and a major diplomatic win for Pakistan, which for long has advocated for greater international role in the Kashmir conflict. What is more, the United States keeps cozying up to Pakistan’s military leadership, likely motivated by a desire for basing rights for possible future military strikes on Iran.
Unfavorable international reactions did not stop with the Americans’ diplomatic activism. While New Delhi received condolenc-es after the Pahalgam attack, some Indian commentators noted that not one single major global player stood unequivocally by India’s “righteous self-defense” against Pakistan’s “support of terror. ”
Why did India, widely perceived to be a rising power and recently in the limelight for milestones like becoming the world’s most popu-lous country, a successful unmanned Lunar landing, and hosting the 2023 G20 summit, performed so poorly in the race for global sympathy? One explanation for why Pakistan managed to outmaneuver India in terms of perceptions is related to the Indian media’s conduct during Opera-tion Sindoor. As missiles fell, even the mainstream Indian media acted as a happy peddler of the Indian government’s messaging, spreading anti- Pakistan psyops in an uncritical manner. In the short term, this may have been seen as a boost for India’s side in the war of narratives. But it has already led to major credibility deficits. In the long term, it may make it more difficult for Indian media to globally broadcast a favorable but credi-ble and compelling narrative. By undermining its own media’s credibility in this way, India shot itself in the foot given that real news about missile exchanges was already quite favorable to the Indian side, and Pakistani claims to the contrary could have been fought in more credible ways.
On the diplomatic front, the lackluster reception of India’s military retaliation is in large part a consequence of India’s noncommit-tal multi-alignment policy. While some lament that the EU missed the opportunity to unequivocally side with India’s justified outrage, others remind that India equally tends to refuse unequivocally supporting its partners on issues similarly crucial to them. India’s refusal to call Russia out for its aggression in Ukraine and its cordial relationship with Iran are examples of policies irking its European and American partners and making them have second thoughts about automatically standing up for India in the face of Pakistan’s asymmetric tactics. This does not mean that India and the United States or the European Union are becoming less desirable partners in each other’s eyes. But these partnerships will remain fundamentally transactional and not based on “friendship” and “shared values, ” despite the rhetoric.
Some of these shortcomings of India’s public image are evident to New Delhi and Indian commentators. In May, India sent several parliamentary delegations to partner countries, engaging not only with.
Gregor Clegane
Registered Member
PAKISTAN TURNED A MILITARY DISADVANTAGE INTO A REPUTATIONAL WIN.
When “sending a message” and “setting a new normal” is a major goal on both sides, the question of who won the war of narratives becomes almost as important as who won the fighting. This is true both in the domestic arena as well as on the global stage. Domestically, the leadership of both countries seem to have successfully planted the notion that they won the recent escalation, although Indian Prime Minister Narendra Mo-di’s government faced greater skepticism than its Pakistani counterpart, especially in relation to the role the United States claimed to have played in securing the 10 May ceasefire. On the international stage, Pakistan is a clear winner in terms of how its relative position changed during and in the wake of the 2025 Indo–Pak conflict. This is a major development for a country that for decades has been associated with harboring terrorists, economic dysfunction, and regular military takeovers of government.Indian analysts and media have slammed their Western counterparts (and the Qatar-based Al Jazeera) for pushing Pakistan- friendly narratives. These complaints have often been based on an exaggerated sense of insult to national pride. At the same time, it does seem like Pakistan enjoyed a greater deal of journalistic good faith than what the two countries’ trajectory in the past decades would have led one to predict. From the outset, the international media and commentators did not buy into India’s claim of Pakistan bearing obvious responsibility for the Pahalgam terrorist attack. Indian claims to that effect were present-ed just as such by outlets such as the BBC, DW , and Al Jazeera—one side’s charges against the other side. Language like India having “pointed the finger” hinted at a considerable degree of skepticism about the substance behind India’s claims.
Against this backdrop, reports leading up to and about Operation Sindoor were dominated by worries about military escalation, especially in the context of both parties’ nuclear arsenals, and not, as India would have preferred, by a sense of needing to stand up to Islamist terrorism.
India’s military response was seen as a highly likely but ultimately regretful step up toward escalation and not the firm but measured act of righteous fury India wanted it to be seen as. When the fighting began, international reports about the alleged downing of five or more Indian jets did dutifully describe these as mere Pakistani claims—but in the wider discourse about the conflict, they soon come to be seen as military achievements equaling India’s precision strikes on several military facilities across Pakistan’s territo-ry. The implicit equating of the two sides’ military achievements gave a rise to a sense of no winners. Overall, the parties were portrayed as equals in a potentially dangerous, spiraling conflict, with Pakistan successfully pitching a more responsible self-image—much to the astonishment of Indian com-mentators.
Despite this reception in the media, it was widely believed that the diplomatic environment would be highly favorable for a firm retalia-tion against Pakistan. The strategic partnership between India and the Unit-has developed significantly since the mid-2010s. U.S. President Donald Trump’s first administration openly accused Pakistan of harboring terrorism, Trump and Modi have good personal nexus, and the American president’s superficially neutral-sounding remarks post Pahalgam were interpreted by some as effectively giving India a free hand in handling its impudent neighbor. Indeed, at the beginning of the conflict, the Unit-ed States took an indirect, hands-off approach. Then, as the fights escalated, U.S. diplomacy took on a more robust role in crisis management. It was President Trump who finally announced the “FULL AND IMMEDI-ATE CEASEFIRE” on May 10, and he floated the idea of U.S. mediation between India and Pakistan in Kashmir even after the ceasefire was reached.
These American claims are irreconcilable with the long-standing Indian policy of rejecting third-party mediation in its relationship with Pakistan, especially in the Kashmir conflict. One reason behind this poli-cy is that given the disparity between the two sides, any third-party media-tion would almost by default favor the weaker side: Pakistan. On a deeper level, India and Pakistan being considered each other’s moral equivalent is an affront to India’s self-image as Kashmir’s rightful owner and victim of Pakistani-incited terrorism. Consequently, the hyphenation of India and Pakistan into a singular “India-Pakistan problem” is particularly annoy-ing from India’s point of view and a major diplomatic win for Pakistan, which for long has advocated for greater international role in the Kashmir conflict. What is more, the United States keeps cozying up to Pakistan’s military leadership, likely motivated by a desire for basing rights for possible future military strikes on Iran.
Unfavorable international reactions did not stop with the Americans’ diplomatic activism. While New Delhi received condolenc-es after the Pahalgam attack, some Indian commentators noted that not one single major global player stood unequivocally by India’s “righteous self-defense” against Pakistan’s “support of terror. ”Why did India, widely perceived to be a rising power and recently in the limelight for milestones like becoming the world’s most popu-lous country, a successful unmanned Lunar landing, and hosting the 2023 G20 summit, performed so poorly in the race for global sympathy? One explanation for why Pakistan managed to outmaneuver India in terms of perceptions is related to the Indian media’s conduct during Opera-tion Sindoor. As missiles fell, even the mainstream Indian media acted as a happy peddler of the Indian government’s messaging, spreading anti- Pakistan psyops in an uncritical manner. In the short term, this may have been seen as a boost for India’s side in the war of narratives. But it has already led to major credibility deficits. In the long term, it may make it more difficult for Indian media to globally broadcast a favorable but credi-ble and compelling narrative. By undermining its own media’s credibility in this way, India shot itself in the foot given that real news about missile exchanges was already quite favorable to the Indian side, and Pakistani claims to the contrary could have been fought in more credible ways.
On the diplomatic front, the lackluster reception of India’s military retaliation is in large part a consequence of India’s noncommit-tal multi-alignment policy. While some lament that the EU missed the opportunity to unequivocally side with India’s justified outrage, others remind that India equally tends to refuse unequivocally supporting its partners on issues similarly crucial to them. India’s refusal to call Russia out for its aggression in Ukraine and its cordial relationship with Iran are examples of policies irking its European and American partners and making them have second thoughts about automatically standing up for India in the face of Pakistan’s asymmetric tactics. This does not mean that India and the United States or the European Union are becoming less desirable partners in each other’s eyes. But these partnerships will remain fundamentally transactional and not based on “friendship” and “shared values, ” despite the rhetoric.
Some of these shortcomings of India’s public image are evident to New Delhi and Indian commentators. In May, India sent several parliamentary delegations to partner countries, engaging not only with
When “sending a message” and “setting a new normal” is a major goal on both sides, the question of who won the war of narratives becomes almost as important as who won the fighting. This is true both in the domestic arena as well as on the global stage. Domestically, the leadership of both countries seem to have successfully planted the notion that they won the recent escalation, although Indian Prime Minister Narendra Mo-di’s government faced greater skepticism than its Pakistani counterpart, especially in relation to the role the United States claimed to have played in securing the 10 May ceasefire. On the international stage, Pakistan is a clear winner in terms of how its relative position changed during and in the wake of the 2025 Indo–Pak conflict. This is a major development for a country that for decades has been associated with harboring terrorists, economic dysfunction, and regular military takeovers of government.Indian analysts and media have slammed their Western counterparts (and the Qatar-based Al Jazeera) for pushing Pakistan- friendly narratives. These complaints have often been based on an exaggerated sense of insult to national pride. At the same time, it does seem like Pakistan enjoyed a greater deal of journalistic good faith than what the two countries’ trajectory in the past decades would have led one to predict. From the outset, the international media and commentators did not buy into India’s claim of Pakistan bearing obvious responsibility for the Pahalgam terrorist attack. Indian claims to that effect were present-ed just as such by outlets such as the BBC, DW , and Al Jazeera—one side’s charges against the other side. Language like India having “pointed the finger” hinted at a considerable degree of skepticism about the substance behind India’s claims.
Against this backdrop, reports leading up to and about Operation Sindoor were dominated by worries about military escalation, especially in the context of both parties’ nuclear arsenals, and not, as India would have preferred, by a sense of needing to stand up to Islamist terrorism.
India’s military response was seen as a highly likely but ultimately regretful step up toward escalation and not the firm but measured act of righteous fury India wanted it to be seen as. When the fighting began, international reports about the alleged downing of five or more Indian jets did dutifully describe these as mere Pakistani claims—but in the wider discourse about the conflict, they soon come to be seen as military achievements equaling India’s precision strikes on several military facilities across Pakistan’s territo-ry. The implicit equating of the two sides’ military achievements gave a rise to a sense of no winners. Overall, the parties were portrayed as equals in a potentially dangerous, spiraling conflict, with Pakistan successfully pitching a more responsible self-image—much to the astonishment of Indian com-mentators.
Despite this reception in the media, it was widely believed that the diplomatic environment would be highly favorable for a firm retalia-tion against Pakistan. The strategic partnership between India and the Unit-has developed significantly since the mid-2010s. U.S. President Donald Trump’s first administration openly accused Pakistan of harboring terrorism, Trump and Modi have good personal nexus, and the American president’s superficially neutral-sounding remarks post Pahalgam were interpreted by some as effectively giving India a free hand in handling its impudent neighbor. Indeed, at the beginning of the conflict, the Unit-ed States took an indirect, hands-off approach. Then, as the fights escalated, U.S. diplomacy took on a more robust role in crisis management. It was President Trump who finally announced the “FULL AND IMMEDI-ATE CEASEFIRE” on May 10, and he floated the idea of U.S. mediation between India and Pakistan in Kashmir even after the ceasefire was reached.
These American claims are irreconcilable with the long-standing Indian policy of rejecting third-party mediation in its relationship with Pakistan, especially in the Kashmir conflict. One reason behind this poli-cy is that given the disparity between the two sides, any third-party media-tion would almost by default favor the weaker side: Pakistan. On a deeper level, India and Pakistan being considered each other’s moral equivalent is an affront to India’s self-image as Kashmir’s rightful owner and victim of Pakistani-incited terrorism. Consequently, the hyphenation of India and Pakistan into a singular “India-Pakistan problem” is particularly annoy-ing from India’s point of view and a major diplomatic win for Pakistan, which for long has advocated for greater international role in the Kashmir conflict. What is more, the United States keeps cozying up to Pakistan’s military leadership, likely motivated by a desire for basing rights for possible future military strikes on Iran.
Unfavorable international reactions did not stop with the Americans’ diplomatic activism. While New Delhi received condolenc-es after the Pahalgam attack, some Indian commentators noted that not one single major global player stood unequivocally by India’s “righteous self-defense” against Pakistan’s “support of terror. ”Why did India, widely perceived to be a rising power and recently in the limelight for milestones like becoming the world’s most popu-lous country, a successful unmanned Lunar landing, and hosting the 2023 G20 summit, performed so poorly in the race for global sympathy? One explanation for why Pakistan managed to outmaneuver India in terms of perceptions is related to the Indian media’s conduct during Opera-tion Sindoor. As missiles fell, even the mainstream Indian media acted as a happy peddler of the Indian government’s messaging, spreading anti- Pakistan psyops in an uncritical manner. In the short term, this may have been seen as a boost for India’s side in the war of narratives. But it has already led to major credibility deficits. In the long term, it may make it more difficult for Indian media to globally broadcast a favorable but credi-ble and compelling narrative. By undermining its own media’s credibility in this way, India shot itself in the foot given that real news about missile exchanges was already quite favorable to the Indian side, and Pakistani claims to the contrary could have been fought in more credible ways.
On the diplomatic front, the lackluster reception of India’s military retaliation is in large part a consequence of India’s noncommit-tal multi-alignment policy. While some lament that the EU missed the opportunity to unequivocally side with India’s justified outrage, others remind that India equally tends to refuse unequivocally supporting its partners on issues similarly crucial to them. India’s refusal to call Russia out for its aggression in Ukraine and its cordial relationship with Iran are examples of policies irking its European and American partners and making them have second thoughts about automatically standing up for India in the face of Pakistan’s asymmetric tactics. This does not mean that India and the United States or the European Union are becoming less desirable partners in each other’s eyes. But these partnerships will remain fundamentally transactional and not based on “friendship” and “shared values, ” despite the rhetoric.
Some of these shortcomings of India’s public image are evident to New Delhi and Indian commentators. In May, India sent several parliamentary delegations to partner countries, engaging not only with
Gregor Clegane
Registered Member
SURPRISING LESSONS SHOULDN’T SKEW ASSESSMENTS Surprising outcomes often drive narratives in international media and expert commentary. The 2025 India–Pakistan conflict delivered some surprising results, most notable among them Pakistan’s success in defying India in the initial hours and then in presenting itself in a favorable light on the global stage.
Crucially, however, neither initial military success nor the post- conflict war of narratives should cloud the assessment of the real balance of capabilities demonstrated this May.
It remains clear that India has an upper hand in dictating the level of es-calation in the India–Pakistan conflict. Additionally, while international commentary mostly emphasized the escalatory nature of the developments, just as important is that the underlying trend of post-1999 India–Pakistan skirmishes—brief, demonstrative exchanges followed by de-escalation and a relatively robust and a lasting “proto-settlement”—held. Novel revelations uncovered during the conflict are important in order to get a better grasp of the region’s political and security dynamics. But not losing sight of what has remained unchanged is just as important. Despite the surprises of the 2025 Indo–Pak conflict, its course and outcome have demonstrated the enduring, if not always peaceful, stability of the India–Pakistan strategic calculus.
Crucially, however, neither initial military success nor the post- conflict war of narratives should cloud the assessment of the real balance of capabilities demonstrated this May.
It remains clear that India has an upper hand in dictating the level of es-calation in the India–Pakistan conflict. Additionally, while international commentary mostly emphasized the escalatory nature of the developments, just as important is that the underlying trend of post-1999 India–Pakistan skirmishes—brief, demonstrative exchanges followed by de-escalation and a relatively robust and a lasting “proto-settlement”—held. Novel revelations uncovered during the conflict are important in order to get a better grasp of the region’s political and security dynamics. But not losing sight of what has remained unchanged is just as important. Despite the surprises of the 2025 Indo–Pak conflict, its course and outcome have demonstrated the enduring, if not always peaceful, stability of the India–Pakistan strategic calculus.
gamaji
Registered Member
Clue: 8 planes were shot down essentially. No mention of all destroyed planes essentially.
Blain2
THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
A jumbalaya of technical jargon and nothing more.
"India demonstrated its strategic advantage over Pakistan." What advantage and how is it strategic?
That they launched imported BrahMos and Rampage missiles that hit a few buildings? If that is the strategic advantage then Pakistan has had that over India in every past war with multiple Indian bases, locations being hit at will by the PAF. How does a tactical strike become "strategic advantage"?
"May 8 dogfights"...what "dogfights"? At least they should get the taxonomy and terminology right. We aren't in the 60s fighting dogfights and on top of that, the bias is comical in stating "despite downing at least one top-tier Indian jet fighter".
There were 5+ downed aircraft locations highlighted by the Indian citizenry before the official muzzling.
This same attempt to whitewash the reverses of May 5/6 every few months has become a practice.
Lessons were learned on both sides, as such this so called "strategic advantage" will be demonstrated to full effect in the next episode along with satellite imagery by Pak.
"India demonstrated its strategic advantage over Pakistan." What advantage and how is it strategic?
That they launched imported BrahMos and Rampage missiles that hit a few buildings? If that is the strategic advantage then Pakistan has had that over India in every past war with multiple Indian bases, locations being hit at will by the PAF. How does a tactical strike become "strategic advantage"?
"May 8 dogfights"...what "dogfights"? At least they should get the taxonomy and terminology right. We aren't in the 60s fighting dogfights and on top of that, the bias is comical in stating "despite downing at least one top-tier Indian jet fighter".
There were 5+ downed aircraft locations highlighted by the Indian citizenry before the official muzzling.
This same attempt to whitewash the reverses of May 5/6 every few months has become a practice.
Lessons were learned on both sides, as such this so called "strategic advantage" will be demonstrated to full effect in the next episode along with satellite imagery by Pak.
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