hydrabadi_arab
Trusted Member
- Thread starter
- #31
1. The Core Structural Problem
- Idle Capacity vs. Missing Capacity: Pakistan’s installed refining capacity is 20.5 MTPA (449,400 bpd), but actual throughput is only ~10 MTPA, resulting in a utilization rate of 48.8%.
- Furnace Oil (FO) Bottleneck: Because local power generation has shifted away from FO toward hydel, nuclear, Thar coal, and RLNG (FO share in power generation dropped from 9.1% in FY22 to 1.0% in FY26), refineries cannot offload FO. High FO yields (~21% of throughput) choke processing capacity and force refineries to export FO at steep discounts.
2. Policy Incentives & Financing Structure
The policy establishes a partially self-funding escrow mechanism:- Tariff Protection (Deemed Duty): 10% deemed duty on Motor Spirit (MS/Petrol) and High-Speed Diesel (HSD) for 7 years.
- Escrow Account Allocation: 10% of MS duty and 2.5% of HSD duty are routed into a joint escrow account.
- Withdrawal Caps: Refineries can withdraw up to 27.5% of total project costs for importing new machinery (or 24.5% for used machinery) upon meeting project milestones.
- Tax Relief: Imports of upgrade-related equipment are exempted from sales tax under the FY27 Finance Act.
- New Proposed Protection Clauses: Proposed 2026 amendments add stability/parity clauses (protecting against adverse tax/regulatory changes) and permit onshore foreign currency (FX) accounts.
3. Sector-Wide Output Transformation
Once fully upgraded, the sector's product slate will shift dramatically toward high-value Euro-V fuels:| Product | Pre-Upgrade Output | Target Post-Upgrade Output | % Change |
| Motor Spirit (MS / Petrol) | ~10,702 tons/day | ~21,251 tons/day | +99% |
| High-Speed Diesel (HSD) | ~21,237 tons/day | ~31,288 tons/day | +47% |
| Furnace Oil (FO) | ~15,417 tons/day | ~3,414 tons/day | -78% |
4. Refinery-by-Refinery Breakdown
| Refinery | Technology | CapEx (USD) | Completion | MS Output Shift (tons/day) | HSD Output Shift (tons/day) | FO Output Shift (tons/day) | Escrow Collection vs. Withdrawal Cap |
| PARCO | Mild Conversion | $1.40 Bn | 2029 | 3,678 $\rightarrow$ 5,493 (+49%) | 5,600 $\rightarrow$ 8,082 (+44%) | 3,290 $\rightarrow$ 212 (-94%) | Collects ~PKR 175Bn; Withdraws ~PKR 108Bn |
| ATRL | Hydroskimming | $0.60 Bn | 2029 | 1,923 $\rightarrow$ 2,379 (+24%) | 2,071 $\rightarrow$ 2,008 (-3%) | 1,024 $\rightarrow$ 908 (-11%) | Collects ~PKR 72Bn; Withdraws ~PKR 46.2Bn |
| PRL | Hydroskimming | $1.70 Bn | 2028 | 783 $\rightarrow$ 4,854 (+520%) | 1,793 $\rightarrow$ 6,111 (+241%) | 1,350 $\rightarrow$ 167 (-88%) | Collects ~PKR 50Bn; Withdraws ~PKR 131Bn |
| NRL | Lube + Hydroskimming | $1.00 Bn | 2029 | 818 $\rightarrow$ 2,025 (+148%) | 3,273 $\rightarrow$ 4,087 (+25%) | 2,253 $\rightarrow$ 1,127 (-50%) | Collects ~PKR 45Bn; Withdraws ~PKR 77Bn |
| Cnergyico (CPL) | Hydroskimming | $1.00 Bn | 2030 | 3,500 $\rightarrow$ 6,500 (+86%) | 8,500 $\rightarrow$ 11,000 (+29%) | 7,500 $\rightarrow$ 1,000 (-87%) | Collects ~PKR 44Bn; Withdraws ~PKR 77Bn |
5. Key Execution Bottlenecks & Risks
- Slow Execution Timeline: PRL is the only refinery that has signed the Upgrade Agreement so far. PARCO and Cnergyico (representing over 50% of national capacity) had not signed as of mid-2024 / late 2024. Refineries failing to sign by October 22, 2024, faced a penalty reduction in HSD deemed duty from 7.5% to 5%.
- Financing Limits of Local Banks: Domestic banking capacity is insufficient to absorb $6 billion in consortium loans. Refineries and the government are forced to look outward to entities like US EXIM Bank, DFC, and foreign Export Credit Agencies (ECAs).
- Tight Timeline vs. Moving Capex Targets: Final project costs only solidify after Front-End Engineering Design (FEED), but lenders are required to commit under a tight 6-month window to achieve financial close after signing.
- IMF Approval: Policy implementation faces potential delays pending formal clearance from the IMF.



