El Sidd
Elite Member
IK is has a very simple strategy and a simple message, that appeals to many in most of the country, especially Pashtun (and Baluch) majority areas; safety and dignity. This insistence has earned him fierce loyalty, which many can’t articulate in words (my analysis, not my personal affiliation speaking; although I acknowledge a useful figure when I see one).
IMHO, the solution to Afghanistan is economic interdependence. My examples are Japan after WW2 (interdependence on the US), Switzerland after the Napoleonic wars, and especially Saudi Arabia after the discovery of oil in 1938.
With the aim to renew CPEC, and the recently agreed upon Saudi-Pak defense agreement, the key now has to be FDI into KPK and Baluchistan into labor intensive mining. The investment in border areas will also allow the funding of better roads in the area, and allow state security forces/law enforcement better means of access to more remote parts of the border areas.
The prosperity will incentivize the Afghan to seek similar investment, by large potential investor like the Saudis, into Afghanistan. Saudis being able to spend their oil wealth in patronage politics helped secure the Saud family’s rule and the national unity. This could equally appeal to the Talibs and Afghan unity.
Where IK comes in: The Afghans also have many social issues, cross border marriages, even accepting the fact there is a border, and TTP militants (miscreant smugglers) operating against Pakistan. While IK may want to try a soft approach, Pakistanis know acknowledge this is a festering wound; and unresolved conflict that needs a political solution. With the advice and approval of Gen. Tariq Khan, who fought the TTP and is from the erstwhile FATA himself, IMHO, Pakistan could implement an agreement with the Afghans, overseen by IK as a one term President, (as we also need a reform to politics from figures to platforms), to exile all TTP and their families to Afghanistan, accept KPK is administered from Peshawar, a secure Trans-Afghan railway as well as other issues of interest to Pakistan, in exchange for recognition, and facilitating FDI into Afghanistan.
IK as President would allow him the dignity to return, as a national figure, but not jeopardize our reproachmont with Saudi Arabia. As President he would have to give his ascent, but another PTI leader could be the PM and work with a team of experts on a carefully crafted and balanced foreign policy. IK would be most useful in domestic politics, reproachment with the Afghans, and rebuilding trust in the state, so that even modest increases in social spending (from the mining profit) will go a long way, practically and in the perception of the public.
We can’t afford to waste a leader like IK. We have to value people who hold credibility within their ethnic background, but fiercely uphold Pakistani law, try to challenging the system within the rules, and can be the change agent that can shift the culture.
So in summary, where trade does not go, an army follows. We need to create a symbiotic relationship with Afghanistan, as well as Pashtun culture in general to Pakistan the state, in an understanding that can endure. We need to leverage our political figures as well as our diplomatic relations to secure this border and turn from a border that needs defending to a new place that will be a catalyst for our economic growth and gestation importance, especially in a way that heals internal divisions and restores the trust in democracy, rule of law, civilian supremacy, and checks on the power of the military, as well as civilians (IK will also have to drop his anti-corruption rallies and focus on governance or allowing his government to focus on governance, which would also allow the other parties time to reset with a new generation of leadership and new ideas).
As for the need the use force. IK is right and wrong; we need force, but it needs the legitimacy of provincial legal norms. We need to fold the FC into a revamped KPK police force, and give them the means to deal with armed force up to and including the TTP, but in a way that will limit the risk of civilians being killed; heavier use of FPV drones to scout ahead; and using troops in MRAPs and attack helicopters to sweep for militants, employing deadly force when absolutely certain the threat cannot be dealt another way, and civilians won’t be harmed. Capturing known militants, not causing death, will also limit the tendency for a cycle of vengeance, per the culture, and being by put on trial in an open KPK court will prevent a repeat of some of the mistakes that antagonized the public across the border (the tactics of the zero units).
With the return of IK, and renewed public trust in the rule of law, the KPK police could kill or capture militants, and those caught alive could be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, to be made an example of, while not facing the anger of the public, as everything was done in an acceptable manner. We have to acknowledge IK’s usefulness (and the limitations of the his usefulness) and craft a strategy accordingly. It’s not about liking the man or not. It’s about what serves the interests of the nation (people) and the state.
This is some messianic perception of an opportunistic egocentric grave worshipper.
