Russia - Ukraine war part ll. News and Discussions

Ukraine is not winning but Russia is losing. Russia has lost even if it secures the land it acquired by conquest it will be a pyrrhic victory, likely leading to the same post war collapse we saw after the Soviet- Afghan war. Good thing the Russians have a high tolerance for pain, cause there will be pain.
You cite an alternative outcome for this war based on a historical moment.

Let me also cite another alternative based on historical data:

The collapse of the Ukrainian state.

And, contrary to the norm of Russian collapse as in 1917 and 1991, we have several historical examples of the opposite condition:

Starting with the Teutonic Knights in 1242, at the Battle of Lake Peipus, Alexander Nevsky exemplified tactical cunning. Against the heavy Germanic cavalry, the Novgorodians used the fragile ice of the lake as a trap: a feigned retreat led the knights into a suicidal chase, where the terrain betrayed their 300 kilograms of armor, sinking them into the icy waters. This ambush technique exploited logistical weaknesses, a harbinger of future victories.

Centuries later, in the Great Northern War, Peter the Great elevated this to a continental scale at the Battle of Poltava (1709). The Swedes, exhausted after endless marches, faced Russian fortifications and an artillery bombardment that exploited their poor communication, resulting in a rout that buried Stockholm's Baltic empire. Here, the strategy was attrition: deny supplies, force errors, and counterattack with renewed fury.

Napoleon, in 1812, stumbled upon the Russian masterpiece of evasion. With 600,000 men, the Corsican invaded Moscow, only to find a city in flames and supply lines stretched to collapse. The "scorched earth" – burning villages, poisoning wells – combined with the harsh winter, decimated the Grand Army, reducing it to 40,000 specters in retreat. It wasn't just "General Winter," as mythologized; it was Kutuzov applying Sun Tzu's dossier: "Defeat the enemy without fighting," yielding space to buy time.

Hitler, in 1941, with Operation Barbarossa, repeated the mistake on an industrial scale. Underestimating Soviet reserves (which mobilized 5 million men), the Nazis advanced 1,600 km, only to be swallowed up by vast distances, flawed logistics, and counter-offensives like Stalingrad. The rasputitsa (autumnal mud) and the -40°C cold sealed their fate, but the true crushing defeat came from popular resilience: partisans, relocated factories, and a fierce patriotism that turned the tide.

Teutonic Knights, Swedes, Napoleon, and Hitler: they all have in common that they were buried in history.

These victories reveal common techniques of "crushing defeat":

1) Strategic depth, using the size of Eurasia to dilute advances;

2) Asymmetrical attrition, via scorched earth and guerrilla warfare;

3) Environmental exploitation, where winters and terrain become allies;

4) Total or partial mobilization, transforming civilians into a vital force.

This is not isolated military genius, but a culture of hardening forged by centuries of nomadism and autocracy, where collective suffering forges unbreakable unity. Russia does not win battles; it survives wars, emerging stronger, like the Siberian bear that hibernates to devour in the spring.
 
The planes wont work over donbas sector but in kherson and parts of crimea the iads is not as dense as the eastern contested regions. They dont need awacs flying in Ukraine airspace just like global hawk flying over black sea providing target data , an awacs securely flying in Romania can provide target aircraft data for Ukranian planes. Flying low negates iads unless it is very close range. Only when targeting Su35s the planes F16 or others by using data-link from Romanian awacs would need to get into high altitude launch the a2a missile and hold the lock on the target until missile seeker activates and then return again back to low altitude. It will be hard for iads to track low flying aircraft and only at altitude for a short period of time while they are launching a2a missiles they can be targeted by iads. But I agree it will take time to modify-upgrade planes to work with awacs flying in a neighboring country and it will only work in certain sectors like Kherson. Russian usage of awacs is also limited now compared to the beginning of the war this will not work when both sides are using awacs to track low-high flying targets.
Aim 120d is also 180km. It will require an upgrade though on F4Es. Radar upgrade is not necessary if Awacs data link is used by F4Es and missiles are guided by data-link. The equalizer here is awacs flying in Romania which cannot be shot down by Russia to not to get into conflict with nato. It will make F4s see Su35 first and shoot first.
Russia cannot fly awacs close to front lines for a long time after several of them were downed a year ago by Ukraine. Ukr airbases can be bombed by Russians and F4 planes will be downed for sure so the planes can be transferred by batches like 50 each until the planes are lost a new batch can be transferred to Ukraine from Poland or nearby countries.
They wont work on eastern regions yet but they can still provide some degree of air control over Kherson and Zaporizia regions with the awacs equalizer where Ukr counter attacks can happen successfully after air control over those areas. Most F4s are in high numbers and are in fliying condition in nato country inventories. They can be upgraded to bvr standards. Unlike Mig-21 the F4s were designed with a bvr consideration.
nwidkrL.jpeg
Let's be honest: This was the Russian ORBAT map before the invasion; it shows the distribution of air and air defense units and the maximum nominal ranges of surface-to-air missiles.

There is an intransigent obstruction to Ukraine's ability to breach Kherson:

It's not enough to contest the entire airspace; it's enough to open a breach in Russian air power at Kherson. What prevents this from happening is the uncertainty about whether losses will be replaced in time and the potential threat to the north of the country. However, if the RuAF manages to resume activity comparable to the first or second phase, the UAF may choose to expose itself to gain a temporary advantage in the south.

The Southern Military District is the weakest of the three main districts. It has no fully operational Su-35 units and uses Su-27SM3s and SMs as standard air superiority fighters. Most of the Southern Military District's Su-30SMs are based east of Donbas, leaving the Su-34 as the best air superiority aircraft.

Considering NATO's AEW presence, this is the only area where the remaining Ukrainian air force can contest air superiority – unsuccessfully in achieving it, but successfully in denying it to Russia – and counter air attacks. Such an operation would entail losses due to attrition.

It is worth remembering that the Ukrainians attempted to eliminate air denial capabilities in Kherson, attacking with GLMRS, ATACMS, air-to-ground cruise missiles, and HARM missiles. Although this resulted in some losses for the Russians, it didn't significantly change the Russians' ability to deny airspace.

Furthermore, we must discuss the reasons that might lead the Ukrainian military leadership to use its valuable resources in this completely inefficient attempt. Even if they were completely efficient in eliminating Russian IADS assets and VKS overflights in the southern region, this wouldn't change the landscape, where the attrition that truly matters is currently taking place.
 
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The Ukrainians continue to degrade Russian air defense capabilities
 
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Well placed Ukr artillery strikes
 
View attachment 164701
Let's be honest: This was the Russian ORBAT map before the invasion; it shows the distribution of air and air defense units and the maximum nominal ranges of surface-to-air missiles.

There is an intransigent obstruction to Ukraine's ability to breach Kherson:

It's not enough to contest the entire airspace; it's enough to open a breach in Russian air power at Kherson. What prevents this from happening is the uncertainty about whether losses will be replaced in time and the potential threat to the north of the country. However, if the RuAF manages to resume activity comparable to the first or second phase, the UAF may choose to expose itself to gain a temporary advantage in the south.

The Southern Military District is the weakest of the three main districts. It has no fully operational Su-35 units and uses Su-27SM3s and SMs as standard air superiority fighters. Most of the Southern Military District's Su-30SMs are based east of Donbas, leaving the Su-34 as the best air superiority aircraft.

Considering NATO's AEW presence, this is the only area where the remaining Ukrainian air force can contest air superiority – unsuccessfully in achieving it, but successfully in denying it to Russia – and counter air attacks. Such an operation would entail losses due to attrition.

It is worth remembering that the Ukrainians attempted to eliminate air denial capabilities in Kherson, attacking with GLMRS, ATACMS, air-to-ground cruise missiles, and HARM missiles. Although this resulted in some losses for the Russians, it didn't significantly change the Russians' ability to deny airspace.

Furthermore, we must discuss the reasons that might lead the Ukrainian military leadership to use its valuable resources in this completely inefficient attempt. Even if they were completely efficient in eliminating Russian IADS assets and VKS overflights in the southern region, this wouldn't change the landscape, where the attrition that truly matters is currently taking place.
If Ukraine controls an air corridor over Kherson with nato aew support they can easily make a bridge head and settle down on Kherson and then expand from there challanging the supply lines of Crimea later on. That would certainly shift Russian focus from Donbass.

Taking out the iads completely is not necessary for Kherson. It will be a costly amphibious Ukr assault without close air support but Russians wont be able to use glide bombs and cas either becauase of aew and a2a Ukr assets. There was a breach before to Krynky as well and it took some time for Russians to regain control even with glide bombs and cas.

A ceasefire condition like a limit of fighter jet, cruise missile etc. sales to Ukraine for a ceasefire is much more logical than proposing Ukranian surrender of remaining donbas territories and fighting a few more years and facing this kind of risk.

It is either limited demilitarisation of Ukraine with a ceasefire agreement or continue fighting for remaining 10% donbas without a ceasefire and take these kinds of risks. There are also new technologies like loyal wingman which within several years can be operational and can be tested in Ukraine.

But you are right if jets are given to Ukraine in 2029 then this kind of scenario wont happen and remaining %10 would be captured by Russia. But I wouldnt be so sure that jets wont arrive to Ukraine sooner since Eu is also a willing actor in the conflict not only Usa.
 
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Rare footage of the Russian 240mm Tyulpan self-propelled mortar in action in Donbas. The video shows a heavy Tyulpan self-propelled mortar shelling Ukrainian army positions in the Krasnoarmeysk sector; the exact location is not disclosed. The shelling was carried out using rocket-assisted munitions at a range of up to 15 km. The 2S4 Tyulpan mortar first entered service in 1972.

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Russian column in the northern part of Pokrovsk got destroyed.
 
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Another Russian shadow oil tanker hit by Ukr drone
 
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Russia can use a tactical nuke over Kiev and call it a day.

What's the West gonna do about it... Other than what they have already done to date....?
 
If Ukraine controls an air corridor over Kherson with nato aew support they can easily make a bridge head and settle down on Kherson and then expand from there challanging the supply lines of Crimea later on. That would certainly shift Russian focus from Donbass.

Taking out the iads completely is not necessary for Kherson. It will be a costly amphibious Ukr assault without close air support but Russians wont be able to use glide bombs and cas either becauase of aew and a2a Ukr assets. There was a breach before to Krynky as well and it took some time for Russians to regain control even with glide bombs and cas.

A ceasefire condition like a limit of fighter jet, cruise missile etc. sales to Ukraine for a ceasefire is much more logical than proposing Ukranian surrender of remaining donbas territories and fighting a few more years and facing this kind of risk.

It is either limited demilitarisation of Ukraine with a ceasefire agreement or continue fighting for remaining 10% donbas without a ceasefire and take these kinds of risks. There are also new technologies like loyal wingman which within several years can be operational and can be tested in Ukraine.

But you are right if jets are given to Ukraine in 2029 then this kind of scenario wont happen and remaining %10 would be captured by Russia. But I wouldnt be so sure that jets wont arrive to Ukraine sooner since Eu is also a willing actor in the conflict not only Usa.
Bridgehead with what strength?

The Russians would still use artillery, and the threat of drones would still exist, not only for reconnaissance but also for attack—a situation to which Ukraine, even with air superiority, would not be able to respond adequately.

You're just raising hypotheses, all without the slightest real basis in the situation of the Ukrainian army. They're just assumptions upon assumptions.
 
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