Strategic Defense Options for Small Economies: How Can Bangladesh Effectively Defend Itself?

[Alter_Ego]

As a small nation with limited economic resources, Bangladesh faces unique challenges in securing its borders and maintaining sovereignty in the face of potential threats. I'm seeking insights into the most effective defense strategies that Bangladesh could employ to safeguard its interests. Specifically:

1. Defense Strategy: What are the most viable defense strategies for a country like Bangladesh, considering its geographical and economic constraints? How should it prioritize its defense spending?
2. Weapon Acquisition: Given the budget limitations, what types of weapons systems should Bangladesh consider? Are there specific, cost-effective technologies or platforms that would provide a significant defense capability?
3. Asymmetrical Warfare: Could asymmetrical warfare be a practical approach for Bangladesh? What forms might this take, and how could such strategies be implemented to deter or combat more powerful adversaries?

I'm interested in hearing from defense experts and enthusiasts on feasible, strategic recommendations that could enhance Bangladesh’s defense capabilities without overextending its resources.

Mandatory 1 year millitary service for all men aged between 18 and 40

Focus on mobility, in both weapon aquisition and command strategy. Create a system where smaller company level groups can continue the defence in absense leaders higher up. Iran and Hizollah uses this strategy with success.

Have a strong zealeous core of warriors, policemen and intelligence officers who can root out traitors, infiltration and sabotage.

Buy and make lots and lots of missiles, cruise, SAM, hypersonic, ballistic, AntiShip. Potent electronic warfare systems.

Oh and wage a potent propaganda war both internal and external.

 

[Afif]

I disagree totally.

It is impossible to cover every inch of potential landing ground, and even after detection, to mass defensive troops at the spot will be impossible.

1. At first this argument would depend on heliborne assault penetrating through Manpad/short range AD screens. Which btw, are not expensive at all, and can be procured in numbers to cover all areas. (A Manpad has an effective range of 5/6km) Very much easily hidden and dispersed and unlike MRSAM or LRSAM does not have a large static physical and electronic signature when operational.

BD army has variety of manpads in service today, they understood its significance enough to initiate a project for local production through ToT. So, I think we got that cover, maybe not today right now but in the near future.

Bottom line is, I do not believe in today's operational envoy heliborne assault force can penetrate through distributed manpad screen and survive enough in sufficient size and numbers to achieve any meaningful tactical gain. Ukraine war is a good example to examine failure and successes of attempted heliborne assaults in less adverse conditions.

The concept of universally available sensors is again a theoretical one, and has to be demonstrated as possible. These will not be acquired. Instead light tanks will be purchased, and self-propelled artillery, and all the bells and whistles.

2. Yes, our discussed sensor density is theoretical as of now. But given we are also making prediction on how limited budgets likely to be utilized, I would like to present indicators on why what you are saying is may not be the case.

First, let's discussed how localized sensor density across the breadth of battlefield is achieved. What we can tell from Ukraine lessons, 85% of its are very cheap and small UAVs (majority of which are commercial or at least assembled from off the shelf kits) while 15% are land based EW systems. (Passively listening into the EW spectrum m and often directing tactical UAVs where to look) The term 'transparent battlefield' maybe little bit misleading because it doesn't include the all of it. In fact, the further and further you go into enemy's depths (operational and strategic depths as coined by US Army) it is increasingly less and less transparent (unless you have air superiority. Which BD would never have). 'Transparent battlefield' is a more accurate description for the line of contact and adversary's tactical depth. This is what I meant by localized sensor density. That if achieved denies any tactical surprises whatsoever.

BD army has ran behind fairly expensive large drones for a while which could be aquired only in limited numbers. Just like you say. Finally they settled for TB-2. Which maybe cost effective for its class, still costs in millions and can never be procured in large numbers realistically. However, lately army is increasingly focusing on smaller and smaller UAVs and their potentials. It can be seen in its procurement patterns. (I can post tender documents, articles from army journal but that would unnecessarily lengthen this. So I hope you would take my word for it.) Like Bramore C4eye, RQ-21A (Already procured) And several other ongoing procurements. (In small numbers, nevertheless it points toward right direction)




But more importantly local development, which again like Manpads production initiative underscore its significance in the minds of BD military planners.



These are very primary local examples and armed forces were experimenting with them. However, after successfully developing the BBT-2 trainer, they have officially sanctioned an ongoing turn-key project to develop a full fledge tactical UAV.

Auspicious move. Undertaking R&D project on UAV was a long cherished dream for BAF. After 10 years of work it has come to a shape. The said UAV is now equipped with sophisticated and complex electronics like GPS guided autopilot, live video transmission equipment, ground control station and various other features.

-From army journal

And then of course recently we have this news-

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"Sky Bees Limited to Establish Drone Manufacturing Industry in BEPZA EZ​

Bangladeshi company Sky Bees Limited is set to invest US$ 45.95 million to establish an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV, commonly known as drone) manufacturing factory in the BEPZA Economic Zone (BEPZA EZ)."

The signed an agreement for this. It's initially for commerical purposes. But these systems can easily be adopted for military use. (Just like in Ukraine)

BEPZA | Bangladesh Export Processing Zones Authority

www.bepza.gov.bd

---

As for land based EW systems, (the unseen aspect of the localized sensor dominance across the breadth of battlefield) army has procured these from Thales and looking to get more of various types from Türkiye.


TRC-274

Third, why cannot a bridgehead be established by light infantry and special forces? They will not be expected to do more than defend a perimeter.

Fourth, it is mind-boggling to think of every inch of every river bank being within striking range of armour, mechanised formations and artillery dug in into pre-determined positions.

Of course, every inch of river bank cannot be covered with armor and mechanized forces. Nor it needs to be.

1. First of all, even after theoretically stablishing a foothold/bridgehead, I can most of the time reposition my armor and mechanized units (to engage your light infantry and SOF, or gain the position of advantage) faster than you could bring your own sufficient heavy firepower to this side of the river.

2. secondly, just because every inch of the bank is not covered, doesn't mean you could land anywhere. Simply for the fact that after bringing your formations in the bridgehead, you have to follow through with subsequent maneuver into my territory to make tactical gains. And obviously all of the river bank are not good positions to start with. In fact some places would be bad choice and may put you in serious disadvantage after supposed successful landing. That already narrows down potential bridgehead sites.

However, most importantly, good old artillery when dispersed can actually pretty much cover all necessary spots on the river bank. And when coupled with localized sensor dominance it can enable a devastating reconnaissance-strike complex, break up enemy formations and attrit them down.

(See the new buzzword is 'maneuver fires instead of maneuvering forces' or 'concentrate fires instead of concentrating forces' to achieve the effects. I.e. due to absolute superiority of fires over 'protection' today, concentrating sufficient forces to tactically punch through is often porvibitively expensive. So you will try to mass effects from dispersed position instead of physically massing forces.

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/disaggregate-to-win-living-with-the-imbalance-between-fires-and-protection/)

In fact this is exactly what happened at battle of the Siverskyi Donets in may 2022.

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The Russians Lost An Entire Battalion Trying To Cross A River In Eastern Ukraine​

The better part of two or more Russian army battalions—potentially 100 vehicles and more than a thousand troops—in recent days tried to cross a pontoon bridge spanning the Siverskyi Donets River, running west to east between the separatist provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine.

Ukrainian artillery caught them at the river bank—and destroyed them.

(See the images below)

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The Ukrainian army’s 17th Tank Brigade spotted the bridge, using one of the many small drones that function as the army’s eyes over the battlefield.

But it was the brigade’s artillery battalion with its 2S1 122-millimeter howitzers that apparently got first crack at the Russian bridge and the vehicles and troops concentrated on and around it, out in the open.

The Russians Lost An Entire Battalion Trying To Cross A River In Eastern Ukraine

The better part of a Russian army battalion—50 or so vehicles and up to a thousand troops—in recent days tried to cross a pontoon bridge spanning the Siverskyi Donets River, running west to east between the separatist provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine.

www.forbes.com

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See, it wouldn't have mattered if the Russians somehow stablished a foothold, Ukrainian artillery coupled with their ISR UAVs would have done the
exact same thing. And that was largely achieved without engaging the Russians in direct combat with their own infantry and mechanized formations.

The bottom line is that Bangladesh will not be able to juggle a military budget that will allow the military, land, sea and air, to fight a conventional war.

Disagreed.

@LeonBlack08 @AbuShalehRumi i added some meterials on indigenous UAV developments. It may interest you.

 

[nahtanbob]

Bangladesh coastline is narrow and vulnerable to naval blockade. Without import of raw materials and other goods I do not see how Bangladesh mounts an effective military defense in the intermediate term.

All the measures discussed here are vulnerable to massive artillery barrages. Rivers are obstacles both ways. It prevents invader from coming on. It also prevents defender from going out.

As far as bang for the buck in terms of defensive measures I have two words - drones and electronic warfare. In terms of getting started drones is low cost and low hanging fruit. Electronic warfare is very expensive and complicated for Bangladesh. No one is going to share anything of importance in electronic warfare,

 

[Joe Shearer]

At first this argument would depend on heliborne assault penetrating through Manpad/short range AD screens. Which btw, are not expensive at all, and can be procured in numbers to cover all areas. (A Manpad has an effective range of 5/6km) Very much easily hidden and dispersed and unlike MRSAM or LRSAM does not have a large static physical and electronic signature when operational.

BD army has variety of manpads in service today, they understood its significance enough to initiate a project for local production through ToT. So, I think we got that cover, maybe not today right now but in the near future.

Bottom line is, I do not believe in today's operational envoy heliborne assault force can penetrate through distributed manpad screen and survive enough in sufficient size and numbers to achieve any meaningful tactical gain. Ukraine war is a good example to examine failure and successes of attempted heliborne assaults in less adverse conditions.

I totally agree that MANPADS are cheap, reliable and effective devices to get short-range defence against slow-moving, low-flying aircraft (and drones). My point is elsewhere, and is best illustrated by a look at the map.

Are we proposing a MANPAD equipped soldier every 5 kms along every water obstacle? Seriously?

One might question not just the number of MANPADS, but the distribution of personnel in ribbons along rivers.

Yes, our discussed sensor density is theoretical as of now. But given we are also making prediction on how limited budgets likely to be utilized, I would like to present indicators on why what you are saying is may not be the case.

First, let's discussed how localized sensor density across the breadth of battlefield is achieved. What we can tell from Ukraine lessons, 85% of its are very cheap and small UAVs (majority of which are commercial or at least assembled from off the shelf kits) while 15% are land based EW systems. (Passively listening into the EW spectrum m and often directing tactical UAVs where to look) The term 'transparent battlefield' maybe little bit misleading because it doesn't include the all of it. In fact, the further and further you go into enemy's depths (operational and strategic depths as coined by US Army) it is increasingly less and less transparent (unless you have air superiority. Which BD would never have). 'Transparent battlefield' is a more accurate description for the line of contact and adversary's tactical depth. This is what I meant by localized sensor density. That if achieved denies any tactical surprises whatsoever.

This is the relevant part, and this is what should attract our attention first, leaving aside for now the tendency of the military everywhere to run after shiny new toys.

Let us grant for the sake of argument that a combination of land-based EW systems and cheap, tactical drones more or less of the off-the-shelf commercial variety are the front-ends intended to give a quick and dirty picture of a suspected battle-field.

Again, my question is one of coverage.

Suppose an attacker concentrates forces along the Basirhat-Bangaon line, and then penetrates through the Sundarbans. How will a defending commander move his resources around in time to counter a combined air-borne and sea-borne threat?

This is just a provocative example, and in reality, Bangladesh is far more likely to face serious threats along the Rakhine and Chin sectors into the CHT.

How will a defender manage enough forces to deploy (a few) land-based EW systems and slaved tactical drones to make the battlefield transparent?

First of all, even after theoretically stablishing a foothold/bridgehead, I can most of the time reposition my armor and mechanized units (to engage your light infantry and SOF, or gain the position of advantage) faster than you could bring your own sufficient heavy firepower to this side of the river.

That is assuming that multiple attacks by a more numerous attacker do not tie down the armour and mechanised units in wasting time and effort squeezing out bridgeheads established for the simple purpose of distracting the defender and tying down defensive resources, while the main attacks take place elsewhere.

This is not a good example, and taking lessons from the current Ukraine-Russia conflict might be more uptodate, but just for the sake of illustration, five different axes of attack were used in 1971; effectively, only one penetrated and came into alignment with the objective of Dhaka. How many piece-meal attacks can the Bangladesh Army fend off and not come to be scattered all along a widely separated set of minor locations?

secondly, just because every inch of the bank is not covered, doesn't mean you could land anywhere. Simply for the fact that after bringing your formations in the bridgehead, you have to follow through with subsequent maneuver into my territory to make tactical gains. And obviously all of the river bank are not good positions to start with. In fact some places would be bad choice and may put you in serious disadvantage after supposed successful landing. That already narrows down potential bridgehead sites.

However, most importantly, good old artillery when dispersed can actually pretty much cover all necessary spots on the river bank. And when coupled with localized sensor dominance it can enable a devastating reconnaissance-strike complex, break up enemy formations and attrit them down.

Again, while fifty years ago, commanders were compelled to define axes of advance, and align logistics to feed these lines, they were also not in a position to create sufficient air-borne/heli-borne minor tactical offensives to distract an enemy with limited resources.

The question is: can the defender both concentrate rapidly on a perceived threat, and deal with other threats separated from its places of action within relatively short periods of time?

That brings us to an examination of the Russian examples. In all the examples shown, the operation of ground forces and organic air resources of those ground forces (= attack helicopters, SU 34 ground attack aircraft) are not coordinated, at least from whatever observations are available. The second questionable aspect is the focus on tanks rather than on armoured cars mounting appropriate guns, maybe even 20 mm/40 mm automatic cannons as the spearhead.

Should we assume that the defender would be gifted the arteriosclerotic approach of the Russian military, with all its widely apparent inability to wage war? Or should we assume that an attacking force would deliberately lighten and make more flexible its personnel and resources, and arrange itself to offer multiple threats of which only a select few would be the main thrusts?

The Ukrainian army’s 17th Tank Brigade spotted the bridge, using one of the many small drones that function as the army’s eyes over the battlefield.

But it was the brigade’s artillery battalion with its 2S1 122-millimeter howitzers that apparently got first crack at the Russian bridge and the vehicles and troops concentrated on and around it, out in the open.

Agreed.

When it gets down to expanding a bridgehead by opening water-borne/river-borne routes of reinforcement, the defender has every opportunity to (a) shell the landing facilities to kingdom come; (b) focus armour to drive the shattered remnants back into the water.

My basic proposition is - will the real attack be detected in time, and will concentrations of defensive forces be possible to re-orient?

Disagreed.

This is a defender that has never fired a shot in anger. However, both affirmative and dismissive positions are untested. As of now.

I look forward to your responses, if you choose to respond. I also wonder why @shamir vanished. Having lit the match, he should have been available to have the soles of his feet toasted in that fire.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I will re-join the conversation in the evening, in case I am still in it and the conversation is continued.

 

[LeonBlack08]

I will re-join the conversation in the evening, in case I am still in it and the conversation is continued.

Loving this as a reader. Hope you guys continue the exchange.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Loving this as a reader. Hope you guys continue the exchange.

As one of the two moderators, you must encourage other youngsters to get involved. @shamir, for instance, has disappeared. Now, there is absolutely no doubt that @Afif can not only hold his own, but is, at the moment, clearly in a position of situational superiority, but it would help him to have other young Bangladeshis thinking in serious terms about defence.

 

[Afif]

I totally agree that MANPADS are cheap, reliable and effective devices to get short-range defence against slow-moving, low-flying aircraft (and drones). My point is elsewhere, and is best illustrated by a look at the map.

Are we proposing a MANPAD equipped soldier every 5 kms along every water obstacle? Seriously?
One might question not just the number of MANPADS, but the distribution of personnel in ribbons along rivers.

Well, kind of is, if you think about it. You can cover 100km Frontline with overlapps with 15-20 Manpads teams. (3x men per team equipped with several missiles)

This is the relevant part, and this is what should attract our attention first, leaving aside for now the tendency of the military everywhere to run after shiny new toys.

Let us grant for the sake of argument that a combination of land-based EW systems and cheap, tactical drones more or less of the off-the-shelf commercial variety are the front-ends intended to give a quick and dirty picture of a suspected battle-field.

Again, my question is one of coverage.

Suppose an attacker concentrates forces along the Basirhat-Bangaon line, and then penetrates through the Sundarbans. How will a defending commander move his resources around in time to counter a combined air-borne and sea-borne threat?

Could we please leave sea-borne matters and naval topic out of it for now? I know in real life it is a combination of all domains, but here to limit the scope of argument I want to focus on army and its land based organic capabilities. But I will take on the main point of adversary presenting combined arms dilemmas at multiple places simultaneously.

This is just a provocative example, and in reality, Bangladesh is far more likely to face serious threats along the Rakhine and Chin sectors into the CHT.

How will a defender manage enough forces to deploy (a few) land-based EW systems and slaved tactical drones to make the battlefield transparent?

Short answer is yes. A bit longer answer, I have primary skeches in my mind of the formations and their necessary compositions. I.e. numbers of UAVs squadrons of various types organic to army echolens, numbers of EW units. But posting those would be time consuming.

Btw, a member above claimed EW capabilities is very expensive and complicated for Bangladesh. Well, not really. We are not seeking F35's EW capabilities or US Navy's growlers. We are seeking systems like TRC-274. Which only cost a $ million per unit. But comes With High performance ESM capacity to provide efficient detection of targets and direction finding in localized environment. These system has ranges of 30km or more in all directions. And BD army can realistically deploy them at brigade levels. Around 40 units for 40 brigades can provide 1800km tactical Frontline coverage with redundant overlaps. And given we are proposing passive uses, (mostly listening without emitting jamming signals) they are very much survivable concealed and camouflaged.

In fact, this is very similar what Ukrainians did before the expensive Western aids started to arrive. They utilized locally produced cheap EW/ESM solutions in numbers to form the backbone of their ISR along with drones. Which was evidently pretty successful.

That is assuming that multiple attacks by a more numerous attacker do not tie down the armour and mechanised units in wasting time and effort squeezing out bridgeheads established for the simple purpose of distracting the defender and tying down defensive resources, while the main attacks take place elsewhere.

This is not a good example, and taking lessons from the current Ukraine-Russia conflict might be more uptodate, but just for the sake of illustration, five different axes of attack were used in 1971; effectively, only one penetrated and came into alignment with the objective of Dhaka. How many piece-meal attacks can the Bangladesh Army fend off and not come to be scattered all along a widely separated set of minor locations?


Again, while fifty years ago, commanders were compelled to define axes of advance, and align logistics to feed these lines, they were also not in a position to create sufficient air-borne/heli-borne minor tactical offensives to distract an enemy with limited resources.

The question is: can the defender both concentrate rapidly on a perceived threat, and deal with other threats separated from its places of action within relatively short periods of time?

That brings us to an examination of the Russian examples. In all the examples shown, the operation of ground forces and organic air resources of those ground forces (= attack helicopters, SU 34 ground attack aircraft) are not coordinated, at least from whatever observations are available. The second questionable aspect is the focus on tanks rather than on armoured cars mounting appropriate guns, maybe even 20 mm/40 mm automatic cannons as the spearhead.

Should we assume that the defender would be gifted the arteriosclerotic approach of the Russian military, with all its widely apparent inability to wage war? Or should we assume that an attacking force would deliberately lighten and make more flexible its personnel and resources, and arrange itself to offer multiple threats of which only a select few would be the main thrusts?

Yes, so, i do not expect potential adversary to be incompetent like the Russians showed. I definitely am not counting on such gross incompetence. In fact, I expect them to be able to organize and coordinate combined arms approach. However, I am depending on my ability to actively force the domains apart and to actively prevent the adversary from converging effects from multiple domains simultaneously. I.e. for example, effectively placed manpads screen can prevent heliborne assault to converge with ground maneuvers. Defensive disrupting endeavor is almost always inherently simpler and eaiser to achieve than offensive organizing and synchronizing activities.

Agreed.

When it gets down to expanding a bridgehead by opening water-borne/river-borne routes of reinforcement, the defender has every opportunity to (a) shell the landing facilities to kingdom come; (b) focus armour to drive the shattered remnants back into the water.

My basic proposition is - will the real attack be detected in time, and will concentrations of defensive forces be possible to re-orient?

About concentrating forces, again, primarily I want to focus on the new theme of concentrating effects
instead of physical concentration and movement of forces. Which can be enabled by reconnaissance-strike complex from dispersed position over tens of kilometers. That is of course not to dismiss the physical concentration and maneuver of defensive formations as secondary matter.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Could we please leave sea-borne matters and naval topic out of it for now? I know in real life it is a combination of all domains, but here to limit the scope of argument I want to focus on army and its land based organic capabilities. But I will take on the main point of adversary presenting combined arms dilemmas at multiple places simultaneously.

A quick interruption of my cooking chores to post a quick response - this is not at all intended as a naval thrust. On the contrary, this was put forward as an entirely amphibious light infantry effort.

My logic is consistent, and what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If it is best for Bangladesh to re-orient her defences to light infantry and very flexible deployment strategy, with speed being of the essence, certainly India in a defensive role would in those geographies be best suited to do exactly the same, with one important difference.

While it might suit Bangladesh best to rely on 'technicals' and not stress the Bangladesh road system with armoured traffic in times of war, India would have the financial edge, and might add to that considerable home-grown helicopter resources. So a typical Indian brigade battle-group structured and trained to defend against Bangladesh would contain mobile infantry - again, dependent on 'technicals' - mobile artillery of guns of light enough calibre to be vehicle mounted, and support echelons of lightly armoured trucks and armoured cars; as well as an air cavalry component combining the regular cavalry element, and eliminating tanks, and subsuming the mixed transport helicopter/attack helicopter combination that would give Indian forces the speed with which to react.

What Bangladesh faces on the eastern side, from the Burmese/Myanmarese provinces of Rakhine and Chin, is completely different. Since we are not to go into naval matters at all, it is best to mention that Bangladesh already has an indigenous trawler building industry, that produces trawlers at less than US$ 85,000 each. The additional cost for arming these entirely home-grown patrol vessels would amount to the cost of 0.50 calibre heavy machine guns, vessel-mounted MANPADs (no longer, of course, MANPADs; perhaps VESPADS?) and Zodiac boats on board for inspection teams to board intercepted boats and ships.

A problem more aligned with the terrestrial direction that @Afif seems to have preferred is the need to invest in Jungle warfare, and to create an eco-system that effectively transmutes regular troops into consistently effective jungle warfare specialists. A collaboration with Vairengte is desirable but probably will never happen. Just to remind, jungle warfare requires far more training than the regular routines and schedules.

Back to Chow Mein and Gaji Namul.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Well, kind of is, if you think about it. You can cover 100km Frontline with overlapps with 15-20 Manpads teams. (3x men per team equipped with several missiles)

Goes to show how technology has drastically reduced the cost of defence. At this moment, the projectile is definitely ahead of the shield, to take a quick glance at the classic military races of the past.
This has obvious implications both for defence and for attack.

 

[Joe Shearer]

About concentrating forces, again, primarily I want to focus on the new theme of concentrating effects
instead of physical concentration and movement of forces. Which can be enabled by reconnaissance-strike complex from dispersed position over tens of kilometers. That is of course not to dismiss the physical concentration and maneuver of defensive formations as secondary matter.

If I have understood, this concept implies that my forces may be scattered over a large physical expanse, but the firepower that they can mobilise can be focussed on critical spots, or critical areas, effectively, due to the long ranges of modern military projectiles.

This is not as fool-proof as it may sound on paper.

If I have 20 teams of 3 persons covering a 100 kms front at distances of 5 kms each, and if the weapons that they support are ranged at a maximum of 5 kms each, then each team has only one target per 5 kms, IF THE TEAMS ARE DISTRIBUTED IN A STRAIGHT LINE.

But the teams can congregate quickly, and pool their firepower. How about that? Again, that depends on the speed of congregation. Foot soldiers will cover a maximum of 5.5 kms per hour at a walk, or, running at Usain Bolt's speed over 100 m., around 36 kms per hour. That would in realistic terms be closer to 15 to 20 kms per hour at top speed, for a soldier loaded with gear and in the kinds of uniforms that decision-makers sitting in air-conditioned offices and pleasantly out of shape themselves, bestow on soldiers.

So at top speed, teams can congregate around a given team of 3 at the rate of (4+4 =) 8 teams an hour. That is, the team furthest from the core team that is to be reinforced will be the team 20 kms away. In between are the 5 kms, 10 kms and 15 kms teams, so, a total of 4 teams on one side. Another 4 teams will converge from the other side. We have a theoretical possibility, somewhat unrealistic, but logical by arithmetic reckoning, of concentrating 9 foot-soldier teams per hour. For an ongoing battle that might be in development over several hours, perhaps 8 to 10 hours, the numbers will increase.

Remember that we are talking about the range of the weapons carried by these 3 person teams being 5 kms on an average; certainly longer-range MANPADs can be found and sourced, but for the argument, we may assume 5 kms to be a realistic range for realistic weapons.

Again, assuming that all defence is on foot, without vehicular assistance, we have the power to concentrate 9 teams on a particular point in an hour, a fairly robust counter-attacking kernel. 9 MANPADs firing at a bridgehead of entrenched light infantry/special forces will make a frightening noise, but will it mean much more?

Let us assume what has been proposed instead, a defensive force mounted on technicals, ordinary SUVs/trucks with weapon mounting on them. Immediately the force concentration levels become better, and assuming an average of 20 kms per hour over indifferent roads, or no roads and rough terrain instead, the figures are the same. However, that is unlikely to happen, as, taking roads only slightly further back, technicals may reach velocities of 40 kms per hour (average). That will give the defence to concentrate 8+8 teams on the core team, so, 8+8+1=17 teams, or 51 foot-soldiers on technicals.

Note that there is no surplus personnel strength to supplement the 3-person MANPAD team. The team members may at most be in possession of their regular battle rifles, more likely, their machine pistols or similar.

That is NOT enough to react to a feint, that even places personnel into a point of concern behind entrenchments, possibly with gunship support as well. As soon as these 17 teams assemble, in dribs and drabs, and leave a gap of 40 kms on either side of the point of danger, a total gap of 80 kms., the defence team is vulnerable to a swift withdrawal and a determined probe just outside either of the outer limits of the vacated zone.

This is not a defensible response, and perhaps it is better to remain with our conventional armour, self-propelled artillery and concentrations of SAM batteries located at strategic points.

Surely, a similar exercise will demonstrate that a linear deployment, even of mechanical forces, can never, ever, succeed against a well-mounted and swift moving attacking force.

 

[Afif]

I feel like I have been stabbed in the stomach. Not well at all. Never experienced such pain. Please allow me to reply later.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I feel like I have been stabbed in the stomach. Not well at all. Never experienced such pain. Please allow me to reply later.

Please take care. This can wait. What happened? Write when you can.

 

[Afif]

If I have understood, this concept implies that my forces may be scattered over a large physical expanse, but the firepower that they can mobilise can be focussed on critical spots, or critical areas, effectively, due to the long ranges of modern military projectiles.

This is not as fool-proof as it may sound on paper.

If I have 20 teams of 3 persons covering a 100 kms front at distances of 5 kms each, and if the weapons that they support are ranged at a maximum of 5 kms each, then each team has only one target per 5 kms, IF THE TEAMS ARE DISTRIBUTED IN A STRAIGHT LINE.

But the teams can congregate quickly, and pool their firepower. How about that? Again, that depends on the speed of congregation. Foot soldiers will cover a maximum of 5.5 kms per hour at a walk, or, running at Usain Bolt's speed over 100 m., around 36 kms per hour. That would in realistic terms be closer to 15 to 20 kms per hour at top speed, for a soldier loaded with gear and in the kinds of uniforms that decision-makers sitting in air-conditioned offices and pleasantly out of shape themselves, bestow on soldiers.

So at top speed, teams can congregate around a given team of 3 at the rate of (4+4 =) 8 teams an hour. That is, the team furthest from the core team that is to be reinforced will be the team 20 kms away. In between are the 5 kms, 10 kms and 15 kms teams, so, a total of 4 teams on one side. Another 4 teams will converge from the other side. We have a theoretical possibility, somewhat unrealistic, but logical by arithmetic reckoning, of concentrating 9 foot-soldier teams per hour. For an ongoing battle that might be in development over several hours, perhaps 8 to 10 hours, the numbers will increase.

Remember that we are talking about the range of the weapons carried by these 3 person teams being 5 kms on an average; certainly longer-range MANPADs can be found and sourced, but for the argument, we may assume 5 kms to be a realistic range for realistic weapons.

Again, assuming that all defence is on foot, without vehicular assistance, we have the power to concentrate 9 teams on a particular point in an hour, a fairly robust counter-attacking kernel. 9 MANPADs firing at a bridgehead of entrenched light infantry/special forces will make a frightening noise, but will it mean much more?

Let us assume what has been proposed instead, a defensive force mounted on technicals, ordinary SUVs/trucks with weapon mounting on them. Immediately the force concentration levels become better, and assuming an average of 20 kms per hour over indifferent roads, or no roads and rough terrain instead, the figures are the same. However, that is unlikely to happen, as, taking roads only slightly further back, technicals may reach velocities of 40 kms per hour (average). That will give the defence to concentrate 8+8 teams on the core team, so, 8+8+1=17 teams, or 51 foot-soldiers on technicals.

Note that there is no surplus personnel strength to supplement the 3-person MANPAD team. The team members may at most be in possession of their regular battle rifles, more likely, their machine pistols or similar.

That is NOT enough to react to a feint, that even places personnel into a point of concern behind entrenchments, possibly with gunship support as well. As soon as these 17 teams assemble, in dribs and drabs, and leave a gap of 40 kms on either side of the point of danger, a total gap of 80 kms., the defence team is vulnerable to a swift withdrawal and a determined probe just outside either of the outer limits of the vacated zone.

This is not a defensible response, and perhaps it is better to remain with our conventional armour, self-propelled artillery and concentrations of SAM batteries located at strategic points.

Surely, a similar exercise will demonstrate that a linear deployment, even of mechanical forces, can never, ever, succeed against a well-mounted and swift moving attacking force.

Well good sir, I was talking about offensive indirect fires/artillery here. (Considering BD army has around 35x Regiments of tube artillery.) Not AD/Manpads operation. 20x teams (3x person each) with several missiles each covering 100km is just an example, not a valid concept of operation.

And i agree mobile manpads teams are realistically better suited as you pointed out.



Or even less sophisticated shoulder mounted ones on Technicals and SUVs.

+ Manpads team will be layered with other types air defenses and early warning systems, giving them time to react.

 

[Afif]

These are my three main points.

1. Short answer is yes. A bit longer answer, I have primary skeches in my mind of the formations and their necessary compositions. I.e. numbers of UAVs squadrons of various types organic to army echolens, numbers of EW units. But posting those would be time consuming.

Btw, a member above claimed EW capabilities is very expensive and complicated for Bangladesh. Well, not really. We are not seeking F35's EW capabilities or US Navy's growlers. We are seeking systems like TRC-274. Which only cost a $ million per unit. But comes With High performance ESM capacity to provide efficient detection of targets and direction finding in localized environment. These system has ranges of 30km or more in all directions. And BD army can realistically deploy them at brigade levels. Around 40 units for 40 brigades can provide 1800km tactical Frontline coverage with redundant overlaps. And given we are proposing passive uses, (mostly listening without emitting jamming signals) they are very much survivable concealed and camouflaged.

In fact, this is very similar what Ukrainians did before the expensive Western aids started to arrive. They utilized locally produced cheap EW/ESM solutions in numbers to form the backbone of their ISR along with drones. Which was evidently pretty successful.

2. Yes, so, i do not expect potential adversary to be incompetent like the Russians showed. I definitely am not counting on such gross incompetence. In fact, I expect them to be able to organize and coordinate combined arms approach. However, I am depending on my ability to actively force the domains apart and to actively prevent the adversary from converging effects from multiple domains simultaneously. I.e. for example, effectively placed manpads screen can prevent heliborne assault to converge with ground maneuvers. Defensive disrupting endeavor is almost always inherently simpler and eaiser to achieve than offensive organizing and synchronizing activities.

3. About concentrating forces, again, primarily I want to focus on the new theme of concentrating effects instead of physical concentration and movement of forces. Which can be enabled by reconnaissance-strike complex from dispersed position over tens of kilometers. That is of course not to dismiss the physical concentration and maneuver of defensive formations as secondary matter.