I think Mirage 2000 has been and gone now in terms of further upgrades. The French sold the upgrade from 2000 to 2000-5/9 as some super game changer but all it delivered was a slightly better radar and missiles. No long BVR, no AESA. Now it is being retired world wide India will have to develop its own upgrade for it, that is beyond them right now.
There are two ways to look at this issue. The first is from a sustainability and cost perspective. Since the Mirage platform has been operated by numerous countries over several decades, In near future there might be inventory of retired aircraft, spare parts, and technical expertise available. That makes it easier and often more affordable to keep older fleets operational. Pakistan's Mirage fleet is a good example of how a country can extend the service life of an aging aircraft through upgrades, cannibalized parts, and strong maintenance practices.
The second perspective is modernization. If the airframes still have sufficient structural life remaining and India is willing to invest the resources, there is no reason they cannot pursue their own upgrade program with French approval. Modern radars, electronic warfare suites, communications systems, and weapons integration can transform an older platform into a much more capable aircraft. The real question is whether such an investment aligns with India's long-term defense strategy over the next 20 to 25 years.
Looking back at the late 2000s, I personally believe India missed an opportunity to prioritize local production and technology transfer. If I had been a strategic planner during the 2007-2009 period, I would have strongly considered the Eurofighter Typhoon or the Saab Gripen, provided there was a meaningful domestic manufacturing arrangement. While the initial costs of setting up production lines, training the workforce, and developing industrial infrastructure would have been higher, the long-term benefits could have outweighed those expenses. Developing aerospace expertise at home provides strategic independence that cannot be measured solely in procurement costs.
Today, however, the options are more limited and far more complex. The F-35 is arguably the most advanced fighter available, but it comes with considerable restrictions regarding technology access, software control, and source code ownership. For a country that values strategic autonomy and operational independence, those limitations could become a significant concern despite the aircraft's impressive capabilities.
The Russian Su-35 and SU-57 remains an attractive option in terms of performance, range, payload, and compatibility with India's existing experience operating Russian origin equipment. It would likely be one of the safer and more familiar choices from an operational standpoint. However, long-term support, logistics, and geopolitical factors would inevitably play a role in any procurement decision.
The Rafale has already demonstrated its effectiveness and is widely regarded as one of the best multirole fighters in service today. It offers excellent combat capability, advanced avionics, and proven operational flexibility. Its main challenges are cost and production capacity. Expanding the fleet quickly can be difficult when acquisition budgets are under pressure and manufacturing rates are relatively slow.
Ultimately, the decision should not be based solely on which aircraft has the best specifications. India's real challenge is finding the right balance between combat capability, affordability, technology transfer, domestic industrial development, strategic autonomy, and long-term sustainability. The aircraft itself is only part of the equation; the ability to support, upgrade, and operate it effectively for decades is what truly determines its value.